

Majorities' attitudes towards minorities in (former) Candidate Countries of the European Union:

Results from the Eurobarometer in Candidate Countries 2003

Report 3 for the
European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia
Ref. No. 2003/04/01

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3.0 Executive summary

As to our *first general question*, i.e. on the prevalence and more specific country differences regarding exclusionist stances, we first found that:

- The level of support for some dimensions of ethnic exclusionism in (former) candidate countries (cf. Appendix 1) is quite similar to the level in member states: this holds true for resistance to multicultural society, opposition to civil rights for legal migrants and repatriation policies for these migrants.
- We found that views regarding the limits to multicultural society and the insistence on conformity of migrants to law are less widely shared by the people living in candidate countries than in member states.

Regarding differences between candidate countries, we found that:

- Many of these exclusionist stances were strongly favoured by the people living in the Baltic States, more in particular in Estonia and Latvia, but also those living in Cyprus and Malta. Countries like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria tend to be consistently low on exclusionist stances.

Regarding our *second general question*, i.e. on the differences between social categories on the different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we would like to emphasise that we found quite consistent patterns in the candidate countries that also showed some similarities to the consistent patterns found in member states. In general, differences in candidate countries are more modest than in member states.

- We found quite a consistent relationship between educational attainment and different exclusionist stances. The general finding is that the higher someone's education is, the less these people supports exclusionist stances.

There is, however, one exception to this rule, just as in the member states, regarding the insistence on conformity of migrants to law: this view is rather strongly present among the highly educated. The differences between occupational categories were also quite consistent.

- Unskilled manual workers turned out to support exclusionist stances more strongly. Regarding some dimensions, unskilled manual workers turned out to

be joined by skilled manual workers, self-employed people or by people performing routine non-manual work.

However, regarding the insistence on conformity of migrants to law the higher professionals showed somewhat more support, equal to that of manual workers, which was also the case in member states.

- We consistently found that people in the lowest income category showed the highest levels of support for exclusionism which also holds for people living in rural areas.
- Regarding differences between age categories, we found generally that the older people are, the more they adhere to exclusionist stances.
- Lastly, we also looked at differences between denominations. All exclusionist stances, except for support for repatriation policies, were strongly favoured by people who do not belong to any denomination and by people who never attend religious services.
- Differences between men and women were never significant. For that reason we present no visual results on these non-differences.

Let us turn to our *third general question*, i.e. on the spurious relationships of individual characteristics with different stances of ethnic exclusionism. Remarkably, we found that educational attainment turned out to be spuriously related to some stances of ethnic exclusionism, implying that there are no significant differences between educational categories in these candidate countries when we controlled for other individual characteristics. There is one exception, regarding the support for repatriation policies, where we found a pattern similar to the pattern in member states:

- The higher the level of education, the less support for repatriation policies.

There is, however, another rather remarkable exception: the higher someone's education, the stronger they insist on conformity of migrants to law.

- The effects of income also turned out to be spurious regarding some stances of ethnic exclusionism.
- Some differences between occupational categories remained significant. Particularly, people performing manual labour supported some exclusionist stances, sometimes joined by people performing routine non-manual work.

Most of the other individual characteristics turned out to be spuriously related to ethnic exclusionism, which consistently holds true for gender and religiosity.

- However, just as in member states, we found that people living in the countryside support some exclusionist stances more often.

The answer to our *fourth general question*, i.e. on the national characteristics affecting the prevalence of exclusionist stances, is related to the presence of migrants.

- The more migrants live in the country, the more widespread all distinguished exclusionist stances are, which turns out to be a very consistent finding.
- Net migration that had taken place in preceding years turned out to affect support for repatriation policies.
- The influx of asylum seekers appeared to increase insistence on conformity to law.
- The effects of the unemployment level were inconsistent.
- Remarkably, the effects of the GDP were rarely found to be in the direction we had expected them to be, with one exception: the higher the level of GDP, the lower the support for insistence on this type of conformity.

Overall, considering the effects of national characteristics in member states and candidate countries, we found the effect of migrant stock to be quite consistent across all five dimensions measured through the Eurobarometer survey: it appears that the more migrants live in the country, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism.

3 Majorities' attitudes towards minorities in Candidate Countries of the European Union

Just as in Report 2 on member states, we have distinguished the same five dimensions of majorities' attitudes that have been shown to be cross-nationally comparable (see for technical details: Appendix 3). These five dimensions include eleven items that we have used to calculate scores for citizens living in EU candidate countries on these five dimensions for comparative purposes. Next to the grand means, we present percentages of citizens who favour a particular stance. Appendix 6 provides more elaborate information on the calculation procedures. A comparison of these mean scores in candidate countries tells us that there are quite a few differences between these dimensions.

Five 'dimensions' of ethnic exclusionism

Overview 1: grand mean scores on dimensions of majority population's attitudes

	<i>candidate countries</i>		<i>member states</i>	
	<i>mean</i>	<i>% support</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>% support</i>
Resistance to multicultural society	0.41	28	0.37	25
Limits to multicultural society	0.56	42	0.70	60
Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants	0.40	38	0.41	39
Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants	0.34	19	0.35	22
Insistence on conformity to law	0.57	45	0.78	67

We find that support for some dimensions of ethnic exclusionism is at a quite similar level as the level we ascertained in member states. This is particularly true of opposition to civil rights for legal migrants (grand mean=.40 in candidate countries versus .41 in member states) and being in favour of repatriation policies for legal migrants (grand mean=.34 in candidate countries versus .35 in member states) and somewhat less so for resistance to multicultural society (grand mean=.41 in candidate countries versus .37 in member states). These findings imply that similar proportions, i.e. substantial minorities of the people living in candidate countries and member states share these views. Big differences between member states and candidate countries can be found regarding the view that limits to multicultural society have been reached (grand mean=.56 in candidate countries versus .70 in member states) and regarding the insistence on conformity of migrants to law (grand mean=.57 in candidate countries versus .78 in member states). These findings imply that larger proportions, i.e. vast majorities of people living in member states hold the latter views whereas of the people living in candidate countries only a slight majority supports these views.

3.1 Comparisons between Candidate Countries: descriptive analyses

Let us now take a look at the differences between candidate countries. This relates to our *first general question* introduced in Report 1.


1. To what extent does the general public in different countries vary in its support for different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

We have performed analyses of variance to calculate these differences between the means of the countries, that in general reach significance levels. We have depicted these differences in graphs for visual purposes. Appendix 6 contains the numeric information. Candidate countries and former candidate countries (cf. Appendix 1) have been ordered geographically, from north to south.

3.1.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us first have a look at the differences between the candidate countries on resistance to multicultural society that is the view that denies the strength of cultural or religious variations for society.

Figure 1: mean scores on resistance to multicultural society




Resistance to multicultural society appears to be widespread in Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Lithuania and much less so in Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Turkey where the scores are well below the grand mean for these countries.

3.1.2 Limits to multicultural society

Now, let us turn to the view that multicultural society has (reached) its limits.

Figure 2: mean scores on limits to multicultural society




This attitude is strongly supported in Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus, but much less so by the people of Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

3.1.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

Which countries harbour widespread opposition to granting civil rights to legal migrants? Figure 3 tells us the story.

Figure 3: mean scores on opposition to civil rights




Again, we find that exclusionist stances are strongly favoured by people living in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus but also to some extent in Slovakia and Slovenia. Much less support for this view is present in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Turkey. The Czech Republic is included although this particular measurement turned out to be incomparable for this state (see Appendix 3).

3.1.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

More severe policy measures refer to the repatriation of legal migrants. Let us consider the differences between countries.

Figure 4: mean scores on repatriation policies for legal migrants




Support for these rather harsh policy measures is widely present in Malta, Cyprus, Latvia and Turkey, whereas the people living in Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria tend to disassociate themselves from these policies.

3.1.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

What about the view that migrants should give up their own religious and cultural practices for the sake of conforming to the law and conventions of society?

Figure 5: mean scores on the conformity of migrants to law



This view is strongly present in Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, but also in Romania and Turkey. In Poland, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus only a minority take this view.

3.2 Comparisons between social categories: descriptive analyses

We will proceed with analyses on the differences between social categories regarding the majority's attitudes to migrants. We follow these procedures to answer our *second general question*:


- 4) *Which social characteristics among the general public support different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?*

Again, we have performed analyses of variance to calculate the differences between these categories.

3.2.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us first consider the resistance to multicultural society that was generally shared by a minority of the people living in candidate countries.

Figure 6: resistance to multicultural society by education.



Here we found minor differences between educational categories. People who finished their educational career before or at the age of 21 tend to subscribe to this view whereas people who have prolonged their education after this age show somewhat less support for

this view which in turn supports our *hypothesis 1a*¹. There is, however, an exception to this pattern: the category of people who finished their education at an early age, before or at age 14, show the least resistance to multicultural society.


¹ Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic 'outgroups', more particularly among: a) people with a low level of education.

Figure 7: resistance to multicultural society by occupation




This view is somewhat more strongly present among the people who perform unskilled manual work, and this is also true, though somewhat less, for (the supervisors of) skilled manual workers, self-employed people and routine non-manual workers. The latter finding on the routine non-manuals is dissimilar to the finding in member states. People who depend on social security and professionals share this view somewhat less.

Figure 8: resistance to multicultural society by income



Again, we only found minor differences, but people in the lowest category support this view the strongest.

Figure 9: resistance to multicultural society by age



Only minor (non-significant) differences show up between the age categories.

Figure 10: resistance to multicultural society by urbanisation




Figure 10 shows that resistance to multicultural society is somewhat more widespread among people who live in rural areas which refutes our hypothesis 1e².

² Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic 'outgroups', more particularly among: e) people living in urban areas.

Figure 11: resistance to multicultural society by denomination





Figure 11 shows that people who do not belong to any denomination show the most resistance to multicultural society whereas non-Christians show the least support. Figure 12 shows that those who never attend church support this view somewhat more strongly.


Figure 12: resistance to multicultural society by religious attendance



3.2.2 Limits to multicultural society

Let us turn to the view that the limits of multicultural society have been reached, i.e. a view that is less widely shared by the people living in candidate countries than by people living in member states.


Figure 13: limits to multicultural society by education



In Figure 12 we recognise a pattern that we have already encountered on a few occasions. The pattern is consistent with our *hypothesis 1a*³ that the people who have finished their education at a rather young age, i.e. before the age of 18, tend to support exclusionist stances more strongly than people who have prolonged their education. The people currently still studying show the least support for this view.


³ Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic 'outgroups', more particularly among: a) people with a low level of education.

Figure 14: limits to multicultural society by occupation




With regard to occupation, we find that people who perform unskilled manual work support this view somewhat more strongly than average which also holds true for retired people and routine non-manuals.

Figure 15: limits to multicultural society by income




Again, we find merely minor as yet significant differences between income categories. People in the lowest category show more support for this view than other income categories.

Figure 16: limits to multicultural society by age




We find that age categories differ significantly regarding limits to multicultural society. People in their forties and over are more strongly in favour of this view than the younger age categories.

Figure 17: limits to multicultural society by urbanisation




Again, we find only minor differences regarding urbanisation. People living in rural areas hold this view on limits somewhat more strongly than other categories.

Figure 18: limits to multicultural society by denomination



People who do not belong to any denomination share this view somewhat more strongly than Christians and people belonging to non-Christian denominations, i.e. this is a similar pattern to the one we presented regarding resistance to multicultural society. Figure 19 shows that this view is somewhat more strongly prevalent among those who never attend religious services.


Figure 19: limits to multicultural society by religious attendance



3.2.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants


Now we turn to the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants, i.e. an attitude that we ascertained to be supported by just as many people living in candidate countries as in member states.

Figure 20: opposition to civil rights by education



A pattern similar to the pattern on other exclusionist stances emerges. People who have finished their education before the age of 18 are opposed to civil rights for legal migrants more strongly than people who have prolonged their education.


Figure 21: opposition to civil rights by occupation



Again, we find that people performing unskilled manual work stand out: they rather strongly oppose, in accordance to our *hypothesis 1b*⁴, the granting of civil rights to legal migrants.


Figure 22: opposition to civil rights by income

⁴ Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic 'outgroups', more particularly among: b) manual workers.




Minor differences between income categories show up: again people in the lowest category show the most support for this kind of exclusionist stance.

Figure 23: opposition to civil rights by age




People in their fifties and over are opposed to civil rights for legal migrants more strongly than people below the age of 40, whereas people in their forties hold this view averagely.


Figure 24: opposition to civil rights by urbanisation



Regarding urbanisation we found minor differences: people living in rural areas oppose civil rights for legal migrants more strongly.

Figure 25: opposition to civil rights by denomination


When we look at differences between denominations, we ascertain a similar pattern to the ones we have described above: people who do not belong to a denomination are opposed to civil rights for legal migrants more strongly than Christians and non-Christians. Figure 26 shows that this view is somewhat more strongly supported by those who never attend church.

Figure 26: opposition to civil rights by religious attendance

3.2.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

Let us now turn to the attitude on repatriation policies, i.e. the view that legal migrants should (all) be sent back to their country of origin or should be sent back in case of unemployment, a view that was shared by similar proportions of the population both in candidate countries and member states.

Figure 27: favour repatriation policies by education




Again, we find a pattern highly similar to the ones we found on other exclusionist stances: the fewer years people have been in education, the more strongly they favour repatriation policies.

Figure 28: favour repatriation policies by occupation




Again, the people performing unskilled manual labour support this view more strongly, joined by the people working in their household and somewhat less so by retired people.

Figure 29: favour repatriation policies by income




This time, we find that not only the lowest income category, but also the next to the lowest category favour this type of exclusionism more than the higher income categories.

Figure 30: favour repatriation policies by age




People in their fifties and older favour such harsh policies more than the people under the age of 40. This is a similar pattern to the ones we ascertained previously.


Figure 31: favour repatriation policies by urbanisation



Again, we find that the people living in rural areas favour this kind of exclusionist policy somewhat more strongly than other categories do.

Figure 32: favour repatriation policies by denomination


We find a pattern somewhat dissimilar to the patterns we presented above. People belonging to non-Christian denominations favour repatriation policies more strongly than Christians and people who do not belong to any denomination. Figure 33 shows a dissimilar pattern: those who attend frequently support these policies more strongly.

Figure 33: favour repatriation policies by religious attendance

3.2.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law


Finally, we turn to the insistence on conformity of migrants to law, i.e. the view that it is in the interest of minorities to give up religious and cultural practices which may be in conflict with the national law, in order to become fully accepted by the majority. Previously, we ascertained that this view is much less widely dispersed in the candidate countries than it is in member states.

Figure 34: insistence on conformity of migrants to law by education




We find that the people who have prolonged their education over the age of 22 insist most strongly on conformity of migrants to law whereas all other categories hold this view averagely. We reported a similar finding for people living in member states.

Figure 35: insistence on conformity of migrants to law by occupation




We find that higher professionals join skilled and unskilled manual workers as well as retired people in their relatively strong insistence on migrants' conformity to law. We ascertained a similar pattern in member states.

Figure 36 insistence on conformity of migrants to law by income




Differences between income categories turn out to be non-significant. As yet, there is a slight tendency for the highest income category to join the lowest as far as conformity of migrants to law is concerned.

Figure 37: insistence on conformity of migrants to law by age




Insistence on conformity of migrants to law is somewhat more strongly present among people in their sixties and seventies, and somewhat less so among teenagers.


Figure 38: insistence on conformity of migrants to law by urbanisation



The relationship between urbanisation and the insistence on conformity of migrants to law turns out to be non-significant: the differences between the categories are rather minor.

Figure 39: insistence on conformity of migrants to law by denomination

Similar proportions of people among people who do not belong to a denomination as well as among people who belong to non-Christian denominations insist on conformity of migrants to law, whereas this proportion is somewhat smaller among Christian people. Figure 40 shows that those people who never attend church support this view somewhat more strongly.

Figure 40: insistence on conformity of migrants to law by religious attendance

3.3 Comparisons between Candidate Countries and social categories: multivariate multilevel analyses

After these descriptions of differences between social categories in answer to our second general question, we set out, just as in Report 2, to answer our *third general question*:

- 4) Which social characteristics are spuriously related to (different dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism?

Answers to this question establish which of the social characteristics have spurious relationships with ethnic exclusionism when we controlled for each of the other social characteristics. Answers to this type of question are useful to disentangle the direct effects of strongly associated characteristics such as education, occupation and income. Simultaneously, we take the national context in which all of these people live into account, thereby answering our *fourth and final general question*:

- 4) To what extent do particular national characteristics affect (dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism?

For this purpose we have, once again, executed multivariate multilevel analyses on each of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

3.3.1 Resistance to multicultural society

This view turned out to be supported by a minority of the people living in candidate countries. A comparison between Model 1 and Model 0 in Table 1a tells us that differences between countries are strongly significant and the comparison between Model 2 and 1 reveals that there are also differences between social categories. Adding country characteristics to the equations improves the model's fit significantly, and this may be deduced from a comparison between Model 3 and Model 2.

Table 1a. Different multi-level models of resistance to multicultural society in 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (individual-level variation)	10638.6		
1 + random variation at country level	9937.9	700.7*	1

2	+individual characteristics	9609.7	328.1*	18
3	+country characteristics	9596.7	13.0*	5

Table 1b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to multicultural society in 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=9541)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.42 (0.03)	0.44 (0.06)	0.42 (0.04)
Individual characteristics			
Education		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Routine non-manuals		0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Self-employed people		0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)
Skilled manuals		0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		<i>0.08 (0.04)</i>	<i>0.08 (0.04)</i>
Housewives		0.09 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)
Students		0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Unemployed people		0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Retired people		0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Income		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.04 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)
Large sized town		-0.07 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.02)
Religion: (non-member = ref.)		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Church attendance: (never = ref.)			
Attend frequently		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Attend rarely		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			0.51⁻² (0.24⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			0.64 ⁻² (0.64 ⁻²)
Migrant stock: 2000			1.01⁻² (0.18⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			-0.15 ⁻² (0.52 ⁻²)
<i>Asylum applications: 2001-2</i>			0.02 (0.04)
Variance components			
Individual	0.16	0.16	0.16
(Percentage explained)		(0.74)	(0.74)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.00
(Percentage explained)		(6.70)	(71.69)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

Remarkably, we notice that the effect of education does not reach significance, after we controlled for other individual characteristics. This finding is at odds with the general findings in member states and with much previous research on the relationship between educational attainment and ethnic exclusionism. We do find, however, some significant differences between occupational categories. Self-employed people and housewives stand out in their support for this view, followed by people performing unskilled manual labour. Comparing these findings with the ones in the member states, we have to emphasise that differences between occupational categories appear to be somewhat smaller than in member states. The effect of income is negative and non-significant. Resistance to multicultural society is strongly prevalent in the countryside as indicated by the finding that people living in middle sized or large towns differ negatively from people living in villages. The effects of age, gender and religious characteristics are absent.

Regarding the effects of country characteristics, we find positive effects of the unemployment rate and migrant stock: the higher the level of unemployment and the more migrants live in the country, the more widespread the resistance to multicultural society. Other country characteristics do not reach significance.

3.3.2 Limits to multicultural society

The view that there are limits to multicultural society turned out to be supported by a smaller proportion of the people living in candidate countries than in member states. Table 2a makes us expect significant differences between countries, social categories and moreover to ascertain differences due to particular country characteristics.

Table 2a. Different multi-level models of limits to multicultural society in 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	10771.4		
1 + random variation at country level	9883.8	887.6*	1
2 +individual characteristics	9443.0	440.8*	18
3 +country characteristics	9427.1	15.9*	5

In Table 2b, we see that the effect of educational attainment is again rather weak, yet significantly negative. None of the occupational categories stand out in this respect, except for the routine non-manuals who support this view slightly more which is rather remarkable. We find a positive effect for age: the older people are, the stronger they

support the view on limits to multicultural society. We find that people living in large towns turn out to support this view significantly less strongly than people living in rural villages. We also find that people who attend church frequently support this view rather strongly in comparison to those who never attend. Effects of income, gender and denomination do not reach significance.

Regarding country characteristics, it appears that the more migrants there are in the country, the more widespread this view, which is in accordance with our *hypothesis 3a*⁵. However, we find a negative effect for unemployment which refutes our *hypothesis 3d*⁶ as does the slightly positive effect of the GDP (*hypothesis 4b*⁷). Effects of other country characteristics do not reach significance.

⁵ Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) a relatively high proportion of resident migrants.

⁶ Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic 'outgroups', more particularly among: d) a high proportion of unemployment.

⁷ Hypothesis 4: ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition.

Table 2b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on limits to multicultural society in 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=9541)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.57 (0.04)	0.55 (0.04)	0.54 (0.03)
Individual characteristics			
Education		<i>-0.23⁻² (0.13⁻²)</i>	<i>-0.24⁻² (0.13⁻²)</i>
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Routine non-manuals		<i>0.04 (0.02)</i>	<i>0.04 (0.02)</i>
Self-employed people		0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Skilled manuals		0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Housewives		0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Students		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed people		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Retired people		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Income		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age		0.21⁻² (0.05⁻²)	0.21⁻² (0.05⁻²)
Gender: (male = ref.)		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Large sized town		-0.05 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)
Religion: (non-member = ref.)		0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Church attendance: (never = ref.)			
Attend frequently		0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Attendance rarely		<i>0.02 (0.01)</i>	<i>0.02 (0.01)</i>
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			-1.06⁻² (0.45⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			<i>2.36⁻² (1.22⁻²)</i>
Migrant stock: 2000			0.49⁻² (0.21⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			<i>-0.98⁻² (0.61⁻²)</i>
Asylum applications: 2001-2			<i>-0.80⁻¹ (0.51⁻¹)</i>
Variance components			
Individual	0.16	0.16	0.16
(Percentage explained)		(1.76)	(1.76)
Country	0.02	0.02	0.00
(Percentage explained)		(0.98)	(73.60)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.01$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.3.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

Let us turn to the view that equal civil rights should be denied to legal migrants living in the country¹. This view was supported by a minority of the people living in candidate countries. Table 3a makes us expect variation at the individual and contextual levels. The difference between Model 3 and 2, however, reveals us that adding country characteristics to the equation does not significantly improve the overall fit of the model.

Table 3a. Different multi-level models of opposition to civil rights in 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	8475.9		
1 + random variation at country level	6933.6	1542.3*	1
2 +individual characteristics	6632.0	301.6*	18
3 +country characteristics	6623.2	8.8	5

Again we find no significant effect for educational attainment which seems to be a consistent finding in candidate countries as opposed to member states. Between occupational categories, however, we do ascertain significant differences. People performing unskilled manual work turn out to support this view rather strongly, followed by people performing skilled manual labour, people performing routine non-manual labour and the unemployed. The effect of income is negative implying that the higher someone's income, the less they oppose civil rights. None of the other individual characteristics reaches significance.

Regarding country characteristics, we once again ascertain a positive statistical effect of the migrants living in the country which suggests that: the more migrants, the more widespread the opposition to the granting of civil rights to them. None of the other country characteristics reach significance.

Table 3b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on opposition to civil rights in 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=9541)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.42 (0.04)	0.44 (0.05)	0.42 (0.03)
Individual characteristics			
Education		-0.31 ⁻² (0.20 ⁻²)	-0.32 ⁻² (0.20 ⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Routine non-manuals		0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Self-employed people		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Skilled manuals		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Housewives		<i>0.04 (0.02)</i>	<i>0.04 (0.02)</i>
Students		-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Unemployed people		<i>0.02 (0.01)</i>	0.02 (0.01)
Retired people		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Income		-0.46⁻² (0.10⁻²)	-0.45⁻² (0.11⁻²)
Age		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Large sized town		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Religion (non-member = ref.)		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Church attendance (never = ref.)			
Attend frequently		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Attend rarely		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			-0.00 (0.01)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			0.00 (0.02)
Migrant stock: 2000			0.13⁻¹ (0.04⁻¹)
Net migration: 1995-2000			0.01 (0.01)
<i>Asylum applications: 2001-2</i>			0.05 (0.10)
Variance components			
Individual	0.12	0.12	0.12
(Percentage explained)		(1.35)	(1.35)
Country	0.02	0.02	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(7.54)	(57.89)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.3.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

Harsh policies to send back legal migrants were supported by a rather small minority of the people living in candidate countries. Table 4a shows that differences between countries and social categories reach significance. Moreover, Model 3 reveals that inclusion of these particular country characteristics only marginally adds to the explanation of support for this type of policy.

Table 4a. Different multi-level models of in favour of repatriation policies in 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	9088.4		
1 + random variation at country level	8518.1	570.4*	1
2 +individual characteristics	8052.3	465.7*	18
3 +country characteristics	8046.7	5.5	5

As opposed to the previous stances of ethnic exclusionism, here we find a clear negative effect for education: just as in member states, it turns out that the higher someone's education is, the less they support repatriation policies. There are also significant differences between occupational categories. People performing (unskilled and skilled) manual work appear to support this view rather strongly and the same is true to a lesser extent for people performing routine non-manual work, but also for the unemployed and retired people. Income again has a negative effect: the higher someone's income, the less they support these policies. The effect of age is slightly positive: the older someone is, the more they support repatriation policies.

With regard to the effects of country characteristics, we find that the more migrants have come to the country between 1995 and 2000 (i.e. net migration), the more widespread support for repatriation policies is. The effect of migrant stock present in 2000 also reaches significance: the more migrants there are in the country, the more widespread support for this policy.

Table 4b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of repatriation policies in 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=9541)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.35 (0.03)	0.32 (0.03)	0.31 (0.03)
Individual characteristics			
Education		-0.50⁻² (0.20⁻²)	-0.50⁻² (0.20⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Routine non-manuals		0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)
Self-employed people		0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Skilled manuals		0.07 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		0.10 (0.04)	0.10 (0.04)
Housewives		<i>0.05 (0.03)</i>	<i>0.05 (0.03)</i>
Students		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Unemployed people		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Retired people		0.05 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)
Income		-0.89⁻² (0.22⁻²)	-0.88⁻² (0.22⁻²)
Age		0.10⁻² (0.04⁻²)	0.10⁻² (0.04⁻²)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Large sized town		<i>-0.03 (0.02)</i>	<i>-0.03 (0.02)</i>
Religion (non-member = ref.)		0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Church attendance: (never = ref.)			
Attend frequently		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Attend rarely		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			-0.01 (0.01)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			-0.00 (0.02)
Migrant stock: 2000			0.57⁻² (0.23⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			0.16⁻¹ (0.06⁻¹)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			0.00 (0.06)
Variance components			
Individual	0.14	0.14	0.14
(Percentage explained)		(2.28)	(2.28)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(10.53)	(42.10)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.3.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

Finally, we turn to insistence on conformity of migrants to law, a view far less widespread in candidate countries than in member states. Table 5a shows that there are significant differences between countries and social categories. Moreover, some country differences may to some extent be due to particular country characteristics, in spite of the fact that adding country characteristics does not significantly improve the model fit.

Table 5a. Different multi-level models of insistence on conformity of migrants to law in 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	11471.4		
1 + random variation at country level	10931.8	539.6*	1
2 +individual characteristics	10584.0	347.8*	18
3 +country characteristics	10573.9	10.6	5

Remarkably, we find a positive effect for education, indicating that higher educated people support this view somewhat more than people with lower levels of education. Between occupational categories we find only minor differences: most categories support this view similarly except for the unemployed who disassociate themselves from this view. Age turns out to have a positive effect: the older people are, the more they support conformity of migrants to law. Other individual characteristics do not reach significance.

When we turn to the effects of country characteristics, it turns out that 4 out of 5 characteristics have significant effects. The higher the unemployment level in the country or the higher the GDP, the less people support this view. The former finding is at odds with our *hypothesis 3a*⁸, whereas the latter corroborates our *hypothesis 4b*⁹. Additionally, the findings appear to support the result showing that the more migrants live in the country and

⁸ Hypothesis 3: ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: d) a high proportion of unemployment.

⁹ Hypothesis 4: ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition.

the more asylum applications the country has received, the more support for the insistence on conformity to law there is. These findings corroborate our hypotheses *3a and 3c*.¹⁰

¹⁰ Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) a relatively high proportion of resident migrants, and c) A relatively high number of asylum seekers.

Table 5b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on insistence on conformity of migrants to law in 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=9541)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.56 (0.03)	0.61 (0.03)	0.59 (0.03)
Individual characteristics			
Education		0.31⁻² (0.16⁻²)	0.31⁻² (0.16⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Routine non-manuals		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Self-employed people		-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Skilled manuals		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Housewives		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Students		-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Unemployed people		-0.06 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
Retired people		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age		0.11⁻² (0.05⁻²)	0.11⁻² (0.05⁻²)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Large sized town		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Religion (non-member = ref.)		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Church attendance: (never = ref.)			
Attend frequently		-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Attend rarely		-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			-0.68⁻² (0.23⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			-3.39⁻² (0.80⁻²)
Migrant stock: 2000			0.65⁻² (0.24⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			-1.04 ⁻² (0.71 ⁻²)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			0.13 (0.04)
Variance components			
Individual	0.18	0.17	0.17
(Percentage explained)		(0.40)	(0.40)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(8.50)	(62.58)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

In general we have to emphasise that the effects of the individual characteristics are very modest, even more modest than in member states, which amounts to quite low percentages of explained variance at the individual level varying in between .4 and 2.8. The percentages of explained variance at the country level are somewhat less modest, however, less than half of the country characteristics reach significance. The only consistent finding is that the higher the number of migrants living in the country, the more widespread all aspects of ethnic exclusionism. We will evaluate these findings from the perspective of the hypotheses postulated in Report 1.

3.3.6 Evaluation of hypotheses

We proposed first testing hypotheses on the individual conditions¹¹. It turned out that there were no significant differences between educational categories for some instances of ethnic exclusionism. This general finding is at odds with a vast amount of empirical evidence predominantly collected in so-called Western Countries, but has been found previously in other countries who share a relatively short history of democracy (Hello et al., 2002; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). Apparently, in the latter countries, education does not have the strong and presumably lasting influence that it has in countries with a relatively long history of democracy. We also found the positive effect of education on the insistence on migrants' conformity to law: the higher someone's education, the more they insist on conformity of migrants to law. These findings refute *Hypothesis 1a, regarding the level of education*, for the candidate countries. Regarding occupational categories, we find much less significant differences in the candidate countries in comparison to member states. Yet, we found that people performing manual labour support some stances related to ethnic exclusionism, which partially supports *Hypothesis 1b*. Manual workers are sometimes joined by people performing routine non-manual work which was not taken into account in our hypotheses. In candidate countries we rarely found support for *Hypothesis 1c*: only on support for repatriation policies and opposition to civil rights, the unemployed appeared to stand out. *Hypothesis 1d*, regarding the level of income, turned out to be supported in some instances, i.e. for opposition to civil rights and support for repatriation policies: the higher

¹¹ According to hypothesis 1 *Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic outgroups, more particularly among 3a) people with a low level of education; 3b) Manual workers; 3c) unemployed people; 3d) people with a low income; 3e) People living in urban areas.*

people's income, the less support for these dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. *Hypothesis 1e* regarding the effects of living close to ethnic outgroups was, just as in member states, refuted more often. Instead, people living in small villages showed rather strong support for some dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. We have to summarise that the evidence corroborating hypotheses on individual conditions derived from Ethnic Competition Theory is less consistent in candidate countries than in member states. However, we have to emphasise that in general we found less differences between social categories in these candidate countries. The differences we found are clearly related to an individual's position in the labour market or to resources earned on the labour market.

Regarding the effects of contextual conditions, we found that demographic conditions were significantly and consistently positively related to all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism: it appears that the higher the migrant stock, the stronger the level of ethnic exclusionism in a country. The other two demographic characteristics only had a significant effect on one aspect of ethnic exclusionism. We found that the stronger the net migration that had taken place (between 1995 and 2000), the stronger the support for repatriation policies. Furthermore, the higher the number of recent asylum applications, the stronger the insistence on conformity to law. In summary, with regard to demographic conditions, it turned out that not all the effects were significant, but the significant effects were all in line with the hypothesis from Ethnic Competition Theory: the higher the number of migrants living in the country or the higher the level of migration or the number of asylum applications, the higher the level of ethnic exclusionism among the majority population. Hence, *Hypothesis 3a* was not refuted, but *Hypothesis 3b and 3c* were only partially supported.¹²

The effects of economic country conditions were less consistent. We found that the higher the level of unemployment was, the more resistance to multicultural society prevails in a country. However, contrary to our expectations, in countries with a high level of unemployment, support for the view that the limits of multicultural society had been reached as well as for the insistence on conformity turned out to be less widespread. Regarding the other two dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, the effect of unemployment

¹² Hypothesis 3 stated that: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) a relatively high proportion of resident migrants; b) a relatively high level of immigrants; c) A relatively high number of asylum seekers; d) A high proportion of unemployment

level did not reach significance. Hence, overall *Hypothesis 3d* had to be refuted. Likewise, *Hypothesis 4b*¹³ was refuted in these candidate countries. The effect of the GDP per capita was either not significant, or – with regard to the limits to multicultural society – even positively related to ethnic exclusionism. Only one finding was in line with our hypothesis: the higher the GDP per capita, the less widespread the insistence on conformity was. In general we have to say that we found less corroborations for Ethnic Competition Theory in these candidate countries. Yet, a crucial hypothesis derived from propositions in this theory, on resident migrants, is not refuted.

¹³ Hypothesis 4: ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition.

3.4 Multivariate multilevel analyses on Member States and Candidate Countries

In Report 1, we addressed the crucial question for cross-national research which is: to what extent are measurements conceptually valid and reliable, and moreover equivalent across nations and time? To answer this question, we set out to implement multi-sample procedures using structural equation models aimed at equivalent measurements over time and across nations. The major methodological advantages of these procedures have already been shown in previous reports, but we can take these advantages even further by performing analyses on different aspects of ethnic exclusionism taking member states *as well as* candidate countries into account simultaneously. As far as we know, this procedure using multivariate multi-level analyses has not been executed in so many different countries (28) in previous research on different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

Logically, the results of these analyses have to be highly consistent with the results reported in Reports 2 and 3, in the respective Chapters 3, which goes without saying for the differences between social categories that we have ascertained - when we controlled for other individual characteristics - to be quite similar across both data sets for member states and candidate countries. So, we will only draw attention to particular deviations from previous findings regarding effects of individual characteristics. The statement that the results of analyses are, logically, highly consistent with previous reports does not necessarily hold true for the effects of the contextual characteristics because the distributions and possibly the effects of these contextual characteristics vary more widely by taking into account so many different countries in so very different social circumstances.

3.4.1 Resistance to multicultural society

Let us start with the contextual effects on resistance to multicultural society that appear in Table 6a, comparing Model 3 to Model 2, to be marginally relevant to the explanation of this dimension of exclusionism. The results on the individual characteristics are highly consistent with previous findings. Worth mentioning is the effect of educational attainment that proves to be significantly negative, most probably due to the effect education has in member states.

Table 6a. Different multi-level models of resistance to multicultural society in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (individual-level variation)	27205.0		
1 + random variation at country level	25467.0	1738*	1
2 +individual characteristics	24967.9	499.1*	15
3 +country characteristics	24957.7	10.2	5

Regarding contextual effects, we find that the number of migrants in the country appears to increase resistance to multicultural society which is also rather consistent with the effects that we ascertained in previous reports. The other country characteristics do not reach significance.

Table 6b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to multicultural society in 15 EU member states and 13 EU candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=24946)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.39 (0.02)	0.38 (0.03)	0.36 (0.02)
Individual characteristics			
Education		-0.70⁻² (0.13⁻²)	-0.70⁻² (0.13⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Routine non-manuals		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Self-employed people		0.06 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)
Skilled manuals		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		0.07 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Housewives		0.07 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Students		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Unemployed people		0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Retired people		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Income		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age		0.55⁻² (0.26⁻²)	0.57⁻² (0.26⁻²)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Large sized town		-0.06 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			0.39 ⁻² (0.41 ⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			-0.52 ⁻² (0.39 ⁻²)
Migrant stock: 2000			0.66⁻² (0.19⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			-0.28 ⁻² (1.11 ⁻²)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			1.16 ⁻² (1.43 ⁻²)
Variance components			
Individual	0.16	0.16	0.16
(Percentage explained)		(1.71)	(1.71)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(0.00)	(30.93)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.4.2 Limits to multicultural society

The findings on the view that limits to multicultural society have been reached are quite similar to the findings on resistance to multicultural society. This also holds true for the negative effect of educational attainment.

Table 7a. Different multi-level models of limits to multicultural society in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	26743.5		
1 + random variation at country level	23209.1	3544.4*	1
2 +individual characteristics	22408.7	800.4*	15
3 +country characteristics	22398.5	10.2	5

With respect to country characteristics, we find a comparable effect for migrant stock on the view that the limits of multicultural society have been reached, which effect is similar to the effect we ascertained regarding resistance to multicultural society. Other country characteristics do not reach significance.

Table 7b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on limits to multicultural society in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=24946)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.64 (0.03)	0.61 (0.03)	0.61 (0.03)
Individual characteristics			
Education		-0.69⁻² (0.11⁻²)	-0.70⁻² (0.11⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Routine non-manuals		0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Self-employed people		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Skilled manuals		0.06 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)
Unskilled manuals		0.07 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Housewives		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Students		0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed people		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Retired people		0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Income		<i>-0.01⁻² (0.56⁻²)</i>	<i>-0.01⁻² (0.56⁻²)</i>
Age		0.20⁻² (0.03⁻²)	0.21⁻² (0.03⁻²)
Gender: (male = ref.)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Large sized town		-0.04 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			<i>-0.01 (0.01⁻²)</i>
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			<i>0.15⁻² (0.54⁻²)</i>
Migrant stock: 2000			<i>0.49⁻² (0.27⁻²)</i>
Net migration: 1995-2000			<i>-0.12⁻² (1.14⁻²)</i>
Asylum applications: 2001-2			<i>0.70⁻² (2.63⁻²)</i>
Variance components			
Individual	0.15	0.14	0.14
(Percentage explained)		(2.23)	(2.23)
Country	0.02	0.02	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(4.75)	(34.65)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.01$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.4.3 Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants

When it comes to the opposition to civil rights, we find quite similar patterns both at the individual level and at the contextual level. Again, the proportion of migrants present in the country tends to increase the opposition to civil rights for these legal migrants, whereas other effects do not reach significance to contribute to the explanation of this type of opposition.

Table 8a. Different multi-level models of opposition to civil rights in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	21936.8		
1 + random variation at country level	19836.6	2100.2*	1
2 +individual characteristics	19383.0	453.6*	15
3 +country characteristics	19372.8	10.2	5

Table 8b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on opposition to civil rights in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=24946)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.41 (0.02)	0.40 (0.03)	0.39 (0.02)
Individual characteristics			
Education		-0.68⁻² (0.12⁻²)	-0.68⁻² (0.12⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Routine non-manuals		0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Self-employed people		<i>0.03 (0.02)</i>	<i>0.03 (0.02)</i>
Skilled manuals		0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)
Unskilled manuals		0.07 (0.01)	0.07 (0.01)
Housewives		0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Students		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Unemployed people		0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Retired people		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Income		-0.01 (0.64⁻²)	-0.01 (0.64⁻²)
Age		0.06⁻² (0.02⁻²)	0.06⁻² (0.02⁻²)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		-0.01 (0.05⁻²)	-0.01 (0.05⁻²)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		<i>-0.02 (0.01)</i>	<i>-0.02 (0.01)</i>
Large sized town		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			-0.48 ⁻² (0.61 ⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			-0.14 ⁻² (0.44 ⁻²)
Migrant stock: 2000			0.67⁻² (0.30⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			-0.01 (0.01)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			0.02 (0.02)
Variance components			
Individual	0.13	0.13	0.13
(Percentage explained)		(1.55)	(1.55)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(0.00)	(31.65)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.4.4 Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants

Again, we find quite consistent effects of individual characteristics. The effect of educational attainment turns out to be negative. Many occupational categories favour repatriation policies more than do the higher professionals, except for lower professionals and students. The effect of income is negative and the effect of age is positive. The gender difference slightly reaches significance. In large towns support for this policy prevails less than in rural areas

Table 9a. Different multi-level models of in favour of repatriation policies in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	24545.6		
1 + random variation at country level	22862.5	1683.1*	1
2 +individual characteristics	22114.1	748.4*	15
3 +country characteristics	22109.8	4.3	5

In terms of contextual characteristics, we now find that next to the proportion of migrants in the country, the effect of net migration also reaches significance. Other country characteristics do not reach significance.

Table 9b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of repatriation policies in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=24946)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.35 (0.02)	0.33 (0.02)	0.32 (0.02)
Individual characteristics			
Education		<i>-0.98⁻² (0.12⁻²)</i>	<i>-0.98⁻² (0.12⁻²)</i>
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Routine non-manuals		0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Self-employed people		0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Skilled manuals		0.07 (0.01)	0.07 (0.01)
Unskilled manuals		0.07 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Housewives		0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)
Students		0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Unemployed people		0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Retired people		0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Income		<i>-2.55⁻² (0.77⁻²)</i>	<i>-2.55⁻² (0.77⁻²)</i>
Age		<i>0.07⁻² (0.02⁻²)</i>	<i>0.07⁻² (0.02⁻²)</i>
Gender: male (female = ref.)		<i>1.20⁻² (0.64⁻²)</i>	<i>1.20⁻² (0.64⁻²)</i>
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Large sized town		-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			-0.29 ⁻² (0.48 ⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			-0.59 ⁻² (0.37 ⁻²)
Migrant stock: 2000			0.35⁻² (0.16⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			0.14⁻¹ (0.06⁻¹)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			0.18 ⁻² (1.97 ⁻²)
Variance components			
Individual	0.15	0.14	0.14
(Percentage explained)		(2.66)	(2.66)
Country	0.01	0.01	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(21.25)	(32.67)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

3.4.5 Insistence on conformity of migrants to law

Finally, we turn to the findings on an aspect of exclusionism that we have previously ascertained to contain deviations from rather general patterns of relationships.

Table 10a. Different multi-level models of insistence on conformity to law in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries (*=significant improvement of model fit)

<i>Models</i>	<i>-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δ-2*loglikelihood</i>	<i>Δdf</i>
0 Intercept (Individual-level variation)	24840.3		
1 + random variation at country level	21087.0	3753.3*	1
2 +individual characteristics	20957.3	129.7*	15
3 +country characteristics	20939.4	17.9*	5

Here, we find that the effect of educational attainment is slightly positive, yet non-significant, underlining previous findings that highly educated people take a similar stand with regard to this dimension of ethnic exclusionism just as lower educated people do. This finding is a deviation from the general pattern that has been ascertained so often and that we have also found across these data sets. A second deviation from general patterns concerns the differences between occupational categories. In most instances of exclusionism, we found that people performing manual work support these views, often joined by self-employed people and people outside of the labour market, sometimes joined by people performing routine non-manual work. Regarding insistence on conformity, we find that the pattern is the other way around: most if not all occupational categories insist just as much or even less on conformity to law than higher professionals. In spite of the fact that many differences between occupational categories do not reach significance, this finding is worth mentioning. Comparable to previous findings is the effect of age: older people insist more strongly on this type of conformity.

Also regarding contextual characteristics, we find patterns of relationships that deviate from general patterns. We find that the effect of the GDP is significantly positive and we find the effect regarding the influx of migrants to be negative, implying that the fewer migrants have come to the country in preceding years, the more widespread the view is that these migrants should conform to laws and conventions of the country.

Table 10b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on insistence on conformity to law in 15 EU member states and 13 candidate countries; standard errors in brackets (N=24946)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Intercept	0.67 (0.03)	0.69 (0.03)	0.71 (0.02)
Individual characteristics			
Education		0.06 ⁻² (0.11 ⁻²)	0.06 ⁻² (0.11 ⁻²)
Occupation: (higher professionals = ref.)			
Lower professionals		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Routine non-manuals		-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)
Self-employed people		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Skilled manuals		0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Unskilled manuals		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Housewives		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Students		-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
Unemployed people		-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Retired people		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income		-0.01 (0.71 ⁻²)	-0.01 (0.71 ⁻²)
Age		0.11⁻² (0.03⁻²)	0.11⁻² (0.03⁻²)
Gender: male (female = ref.)		0.41 ⁻² (0.55 ⁻²)	0.41 ⁻² (0.55 ⁻²)
Urbanisation: (rural area or village = ref.)			
Small or middle sized town		-0.10 ⁻² (1.00 ⁻²)	-0.10 ⁻² (1.00 ⁻²)
Large sized town		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Country characteristics			
Unemployment: 2002			0.05 ⁻² (0.65 ⁻²)
Gross domestic product per capita: 2002			1.70⁻² (0.56⁻²)
Migrant stock: 2000			-0.14 ⁻² (0.30 ⁻²)
Net migration: 1995-2000			-3.04⁻² (1.05⁻²)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			-0.47 ⁻² (2.37 ⁻²)
Variance components			
Individual	0.14	0.14	0.14
(Percentage explained)		(0.43)	(0.43)
Country	0.02	0.02	0.01
(Percentage explained)		(0.96)	(42.42)

Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, Italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

Considering all results, we would like to emphasise some consistency in the general results pertaining to the effects of the number of migrants in the country. The findings appear to show that the higher the number of migrants, the more people living in a country support different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Regarding the influx of asylum seekers into the country we find similar effects in most instances of exclusionism that, however, do not reach significance. The effect of net migration into the country affects support for repatriation policies. The effect of the national unemployment rate and the effect of the GDP are rather inconsistent and more often non-significant which implies that we should not attach too much value to these findings. The exception to this general finding is that the higher the GDP of the country is, the more the people insist on migrants' conformity to law.

Note

¹ In spite of the fact that the measurement model for the Czech Republic did not actually fit satisfactorily (cf. appendix 3), we still included this country in the multilevel analysis in order not to lose this information.

Appendix 1. List of countries and abbreviations

In the report's figures ISO 3166-1-Alpha-2 codes are used to present the various European countries (International Organization for Standardization, 2004). These codes are listed below in geographical order from North to South and from West to East. To these standard codes we added Northern Ireland (NIE), Germany West (DEW) and Germany East (DEE).

<i>Country</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Status</i>
Finland	FI	
Sweden	SE	
Denmark	DK	
Great Britain	GB	
Northern Ireland	NIE	
Ireland	IE	
Netherlands	NL	
Belgium	BE	
Luxembourg	LU	Old EU Member States
Germany (West)	DEW	
Germany (East)	DEE	
Austria	AT	
France	FR	
Spain	ES	
Portugal	PT	
Italy	IT	
Greece	GR	
Estonia	EE	
Latvia	LV	
Lithuania	LT	
Poland	PL	
Czech Republic	CZ	New EU Member States
Slovakia	SK	former Candidate Countries
Hungary	HU	
Slovenia	SI	
Malta	MT	
Cyprus	CY	
Romania	RO	
Bulgaria	BG	EU Candidate Countries
Turkey	TR	

Appendix 2. Data collection

The candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003.2 was collected in May 2003, carried out by the Gallup Organization Hungary, on request of the European Commission, Directorate – General Press and Communication and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC).

The candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003.2 covers citizens of each of the 13 countries that are applying for European Union membership. Of them, 10 become member in 2004. Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are by then still candidate countries. Each target sample was 1000 interviews, except for Cyprus and Malta, for which the target was 500 interviews. Regarding the sampling method the Gallup Organization Hungary (2004) provides the following information:

‘candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003.2 covers citizens of each of the countries that are applying for European Union membership aged 15 and over. In Estonia the survey covered permanent residents aged 15 and over. In Cyprus, the sample covered the territory of the Republic of Cyprus only. The basic sample design applied is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points is drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

For doing so, points are drawn systematically from each of the ‘administrative regional units’, after stratification by individual unit and type of area. Hence, they represent the whole territory of member states according to EUROSTAT NUTS 2 (or equivalent) and according to the distribution of resident population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling points, a starting address was drawn at random. Further addresses were selected as every Nth address by standard random route procedures, from the initial address. In each household, the respondent was drawn at random. All interviews are face-to-face in the respondent's home and in the appropriate national language. In countries with significant minorities the respondents has a chance to respond in their mother tongue (in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Russian and in Romania in Hungarian’.

The provided fieldwork control report shows that the response rate varies from 41.4% in Estonia to 64.4% in Latvia (see Table A3.2.1).

Table A3.2.1 Number of completed interviews and response rate by country

	<i>Total number of completed interviews</i>	<i>Response rate</i>	<i>EU population aged 15+ (x 1000)</i>	<i>% of respondents with country's nationality</i>
Estonia	1006	41.4%	1,360	65.4%
Latvia	1002	64.4%	2,345	58.7%
Lithuania	1022	41.6%	3,475	86.2%
Poland	1000	45.7%	38,632	99.5%
Czech Republic	1000	56.9%	10,226	97.4%
Slovakia	1035	52.2%	5,331	88.4%
Hungary	1015	48.3%	10,195	98.4%
Romania	1018	53.5%	22,435	93.5%
Bulgaria	1000	62.0%	7,891	90.8%
Slovenia	1000	42.6%	1,980	95.0%
Malta	500	47.7%	386	99.2%
Cyprus	500	59.2%	689	99.8%
Turkey	1000	46.9%	67,803	100.0%

2.1 Weighting

For the candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003.2 weights are constructed by the Gallup Organization, based on a comparison of the sample with population statistics from national statistics. For each sample, a weighting procedure was carried out, using marginal and intercellular weighting, to adjust to distributions of gender, age, NUTS 2 region, household size and educational level. We constructed a weight to adjust to standard sample size of 1000 interviews (500 for Cyprus and Malta). Therefore, we constructed such a weight ourselves, using the variable weight1 (weight result from target). In multilevel analyses, the individual level weight (w1) and country weight (to adjust all countries to the same sample size) are separated from each other into two different weights, though having the equal impact.

2.2 Selection of majority population

In the original candidate countries Eurobarometer samples no selection of respondents based on their nationality was made. As the reports are intended to describe the majorities' attitudes of each country, we decided to select only those respondents with the nationality of the respective country. Particularly in the Baltic states, a large proportion of Russians were in the sample (which is representative for the Baltic population). Other large minorities in the data set consisted of Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, Turks in Bulgaria and Polish in Lithuania.

2.3 Missing value treatment

We selected respondents based on their valid scores on the dependent variables. We first tested whether the items referring to ethnic exclusionism can be regarded as valid, reliable and cross-national comparable measurements. In these analyses, as described in appendix 3, we only included respondents that answered all 11 items. Respondents with missing answers on one or more of the 11 items were excluded from these analyses.

Having assessed that these 11 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we treated respondents with missing answers as follows. In order to avoid severe reductions in the numbers of respondents, we performed a well-considered procedure previously used and published in scientific journals. From the 11 items on exclusionist stances, we took the criterion that at least 4 out of the 11 items should have been answered. This leads to a selection of approximately 91% of the respondents. Missing values of respondents, providing that they had answered 4 items or more, were replaced by missing value substitution based on regression estimation. As the items correlated positively with each other (as expected), we regressed an item on all ten other items referring to exclusionist stances. In this manner, a missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by an estimate based on the answers that this respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Finally, substituted values were rounded into the valid values of the original item.

Table A3.2.2 Percentages of respondents with missing values on the measurement of the dependent variables, percentages of respondents with 7 missing values or less (which were substituted) and percentage of respondents with no missing value.

	<i>% respondents with 8 or more missing values (dropped from analyses)</i>	<i>% of respondents with 1 to 7 missing values</i>	<i>% respondents with no missing values</i>
Estonia	5.1	48.1	46.8
Latvia	4.1	53.7	42.2
Lithuania	10.8	57.2	31.9
Poland	11.1	51.0	38.0
Czech Republic	6.7	51.1	42.2
Slovakia	6.3	56.3	37.4
Hungary	5.9	40.9	53.2
Romania	12.3	45.9	41.8
Bulgaria	17.0	54.8	28.2
Slovenia	8.9	39.6	51.5
Malta	5.0	54.6	40.3
Cyprus	3.2	49.5	47.3
Turkey	15.6	34.8	49.6

Appendix 3. Measurements of ethnic exclusionism

The Eurobarometer surveys provide measurements of most of the phenomena described in Report I. The Eurobarometer in the candidate countries contained the same questions as the Standard Eurobarometer of the EU member states.¹ We analysed the same set of items as in our analyses of the EU member states. In Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 we presented which particular dimensions of ethnic exclusionism are theoretically expected to be measured by the items. This conceptualisation of items and dimensions builds on the conceptual analysis provided in Report 1.

Figure 3.3.1 Theoretical measurement model

'resistance to multicultural society', 'insistence on conformity of migrants to law and conventions' and 'limits to multicultural society'





Figure 3.3.2 Theoretical measurement model

'opposition to civil rights for legal migrants' and 'favour repatriation policies for legal migrants'



In this section, we test whether the items presented in figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 can indeed be applied as valid and reliable measurements across countries. We test this by means of structural equation modelling (Jöreskog, 1977; Jöreskog, 1993), applying the LISREL computer programme, as developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, 1993b). The measurement sub model of a full structural equation model describes the causal links between the unobserved theoretical concepts or latent variables and the observed or manifest variables. Whether, and to what extent, the applied indicators indeed refer to the same theoretical concept (or dimension thereof) can be examined by means of the measurement model.

An important question in international comparative survey research is the degree of comparability of the measurement instrument: Is it possible to construct an international comparable measurement of exclusionist attitudes? If it can be demonstrated that theoretical concepts are measured in a quite comparable or equivalent manner in different countries, then we have a basis for valid cross-national comparisons. By means of multi-sample analysis, that is, the simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from several populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a), it is possible to empirically test the equivalence of the measurement instrument in the different countries, and to assess whether, and to what extent, the measurement instruments operate in a similar fashion in these different national settings.

The causal relationships between latent and manifest variables are modelled in measurement equations, generally denoted as (cf. Bollen, 1989):

$$x_q = \lambda_{q1}\xi_1 + \lambda_{q2}\xi_2 + \dots + \delta_q \text{ (with } q = 1, 2, \dots, \text{ the number of manifest variables } x).$$

The entire set of measurement equations for all manifest variables written in matrix notation is:

$$x = \Lambda_x \xi + \delta$$

Consequently, the covariance matrix of observed variables (Σ) is defined as:

$$\Sigma = \Lambda_x \Phi \Lambda_x' + \Theta_\delta$$

The terms in the measurement model are defined as follows:

Variables:	x	is a $q \times 1$ vector of observed indicators of ξ
	ξ	is a $n \times 1$ vector of latent variables (common factors)
	δ	is a $q \times 1$ vector of measurement errors (unique factors) of x
Coefficients:	Λ_x	is a $q \times n$ matrix of coefficients (factor loadings) of the regression of x on ξ
Covariance matrices:	Φ	is a $n \times n$ covariance matrix of ξ
	Θ_δ	is a $q \times q$ covariance matrix of δ

The parameters in Λ_x (lambda x), $\Phi(\phi)$, and Θ_δ (theta-delta) can either be fixed, constrained, or freed. That is, parameters can either be given specified values (i.e. fixed), or parameters can be constrained to be equal to one or more other unknown parameters. Free parameters are neither fixed nor constrained. The scale indeterminacy of the latent variables is eliminated by giving the latent variable the scale of one of the observed variables (i.e. fixing a factor loading to one).

To take into account the dichotomous scale scores of the measurement items, we analysed the matrix of polychoric correlations with the Generally Weighted Least Squares method with a Correct Weight matrix (Jöreskog, 1990). In this approach, for each variable x , it is assumed that there is an underlying continuous variable x^* that is standard normally distributed. The polychoric correlations are the theoretical correlations of the underlying x^* -variables (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993b).

The fit of the measurement model is assessed by means of the Chi-square statistic. This statistic can be used for a goodness-of-fit test of the model against the alternative model that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained. However, such a test is only justified if all the model assumptions are satisfied, if the sample size is sufficiently large, and if the model holds exactly in the population. Consequently, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice it is more useful to regard the Chi-square statistic as a *measure* of fit rather than as a formal *test statistic*. In this view, the Chi-square statistic is a measure of the overall ‘badness-of-fit’ of the model to the data; the larger the Chi-square value, the worse the fit of the model.

Based on the aforementioned notions, we therefore preferred not to search for a measurement model with a ‘perfect’ fit (i.e. a non-significant Chi-square value), but instead to start with a model without correlated error terms, and to examine whether such a model has an acceptable model fit, as indicated by several fit indexes. In addition to the Chi-square statistic, we assessed the fit of the measurement model applying other goodness-of-fit measures such as GFI and RMSEA.²

As stated in the previous section, we started the search for an internationally comparable measurement instrument of ethnic exclusionism with an original pool of items. These items, which were included in the questionnaire in all countries, are listed in Appendix B. Each item is assumed to indicate one and only one theoretical variable. To select the best cross-nationally equivalent indicators for ethnic exclusionism we applied the following procedures and criteria. Step-by-step, we excluded indicators that were less suitable, as judged by the goodness-of-fit of the LISREL model and a detailed examination of the parameter estimates. That is, we subsequently removed items that were hardly affected by the latent variable, as shown by a low explained item-variance ($R^2 < .20$ on average in the samples), indicating that this item cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator for the

proposed (dimension of the) theoretical concept. However, before excluding such an item from further analyses, we checked whether the specific item should not in fact have been regarded as an indicator of a *different* (dimension of a) theoretical concept than the one we initially presumed. If this was the case, this is indicated by a considerable high modification index for a zero-element of the matrix of factor loadings, indicating that freeing and estimating this factor loading (i.e. allowing a relationship between the item and a different concept than the one originally proposed) will improve the fit of the model considerably. The modification indices for factor loading parameters were also examined in order to check whether items – on average in the different samples – referred to more than one latent variable, indicating that the specific item cannot be applied to discriminate between the different theoretical concepts (or dimensions thereof). In this manner, we selected a set of indicators that – on average in all the samples – can be regarded as valid, reliable, and one-dimensional indicators.

Firstly, we assumed that the form of the measurement model is the same in the different countries.³ That is, the parameter matrices (Λ_x , Φ , and Θ_δ) of the measurement models in the different countries have the same dimensions (in other words, each model has the same numbers of observed and latent variables) and the same pattern of fixed and freed elements. Consequently, in this model, an observed variable is regarded as an indicator of the *same* theoretical construct in the different countries. Each observed variable is strictly one-dimensional, referring to only one theoretical variable. Furthermore, following the theoretical expectations, the theoretical variables are allowed to covariate: the model therefore gives an oblique solution. In addition, the measurement errors of the observed variables are assumed not to be correlated with each other. With respect to comparability across different countries, the model only assumes comparability in model form, and not in parameter values: all non-fixed parameters are allowed to vary across countries. If we found problems for countries with respect to relatively bad fit, we decided to add country specific error variance correlations or double loadings. For the double loadings we used the criterion that it should be at least .20 smaller than the loadings of the other indicators on the same phenomenon .

The second model assumes not only an invariant model form, but also invariant relationships between indicators and theoretical variables, in other words, invariant factor loadings across countries. In this model, there are no cross-national differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which indicators refer to a theoretical variable.⁴ If this model is acceptable, it seems more likely that the same latent variables are tapped in the different countries (Williams & Thomson, 1986).

We have to remark that the item-categories which are dichotomous (having only two categories: agree or not agree) creates some limits to statistical research. Though

asymmetric measures are used which account thereof, minimal variation in answering patterns puts limits on distinguishing clearly between items and consequently, between theoretical phenomena. It was this lack of variation, which we believe is due to bad fit of LISREL analyses when testing models on all items (of the two different sets) simultaneously. Similarly to previous reports on measurement instruments based upon these sets of indicators (SORA 2000), we decided to test on distinction of factors within subsets of indicators. Hence, we tested the theoretically expected models as provided in figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

3.1 Invariance in measurement models in the candidate countries: comparing candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003 with Standard Eurobarometer 2003

The question formulations of the Eurobarometer for the candidate countries and the standard Eurobarometer for the EU member states are identical. We tested whether these items can be regarded as measurement instruments that are cross-national comparable, not only across candidate countries, but also in comparison with the EU member states. To answer the question whether measurement instruments are equivalent across candidate countries *and* EU member states in 2003, we applied multi-sample analyses upon all 30 samples of the Standard Eurobarometer 59.2 (17 samples in 15 countries, including separate samples of Northern Ireland and Eastern Germany) and the 2003 *candidate countries Eurobarometer* data (13 national samples).

3.2 Invariance in measurement models regarding measurements of ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and ‘limits to multicultural society’

To test cross-national equivalence of the measurement model, we first assessed whether the form of the measurement model is equivalent across all countries. According to a multi-sample analysis of all candidate countries and member states simultaneously, this test provided satisfactory results as presented in table A.3.3.1 (RMSEA = .046).⁵ Hence, according to this measurement model, each item can be regarded as an indicator of the same theoretical construct in every country. This measurement model is equivalent to the model for EU member states only, as presented in Report 2.

Overall fit statistics for a model with invariant factor loadings turned out to exceed the RMSEA criterion of .05 (RMSEA = .053). As already found in the separate analysis of the Eurobarometer 59.2, the model had a relatively bad fit in the samples of Northern Ireland and Austria. Similarly, statistics pointed to relatively large deviations for Malta and Romania. As we tried to solve this misfit with as least adjustments as possible, we followed the statistics of the modification indices to free the factor loadings in these four countries for v_1 on ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and for v_6 on ‘resistance to multicultural society’. As these cross-loadings were in each of the four countries at least .20 smaller than the smallest other loading on the concept, we accepted the relatively small cross-loadings for these countries. With these minor adjustments, the fit of the measurement model is now satisfactory, as shown in table A.3.3.1.

The unstandardised factor loadings of this measurement model are presented below in Model 1. These factor loadings are invariant across all countries. Next to these invariant factor loadings, there are 8 minor cross-loadings in 4 countries. Item v_1 also loads on ‘insistence on conformity’ in Austria, Northern Ireland, Malta, and Romania: the unstandardised factor loadings are respectively 0.34, 0.43, 0.49, and 0.53. Item v_6 also loads on ‘resistance to multicultural society’ in the same countries with unstandardised factor loadings of respectively -0.25, -0.61, -0.07, and -0.12. These 8 cross-loadings are relatively small, especially when compared with the size (and the t-values) of the invariant factor loadings as displayed in Model 1. Hence, despite these few cross-loadings, we can conclude that *‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’, and ‘limits to multicultural society’ can be equivalently measured in all candidate countries and member states by the same indicators.*


Table A3.3.1 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards minorities across candidate countries and EU member states: ‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’

	<i>RMSEA</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>Problem identification</i>	<i>Problem solved by:</i>
Multi-sample model: form equivalence	.046	443.99	216		
Multi-sample model: invariant factor loading	.053	736.00	303	Relatively bad fit for Austria, Northern-Ireland, Malta and Romania	For AT, NIE, MT and RO: cross-loading of V1 on ‘insistence on conformity’ and cross- loading of v6 on ‘resistance to multicultural society’
Multi-sample model: Invariant factor loading	.050	662.99	295		

Note: multi-sample analyses of 30 samples; Source: EB59.2 and CCEB03

Model 1 Unstandardised measurement model

‘resistance to multicultural society’, ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law and conventions’ and ‘limits to multicultural society’



3.3 Invariance in measurement models regarding measurements of ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

Applying multi-sample analyses upon the 30 samples of Standard Eurobarometer 59.2 data and the candidate countries Eurobarometer data, we were able to answer the question whether the measurement model of the indicators of set 2 are invariant between the EU member states and the candidate countries too. Multi-sample analyses for all EU member states and all the candidate countries simultaneously showed that a measurement model with equivalent model form across all countries had a satisfactory model fit (RMSEA = .044), as presented in table A.3.3.2. In this model, specific covariances between error terms were allowed in Spain, Greece, Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania. This measurement model is again equivalent to the model for EU member states only, as presented in Report 2.

Overall fit statistics for a model with invariant factor loadings turned out to exceed the RMSEA criterion of .05 (RMSEA = .053). This turned out to be partly due to a misspecification for Czech Republic. Here, indicator v18 did not direct to either dimension. This implies that for the Czech Republic it is not possible to equivalently measure ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’. Where it concerns this set of items for the Czech Republic, we can only compare the measurement of ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ with all other countries.

As already found in a separate analyses of the member states only, Spain fitted the solution relatively bad. Allowing a small cross-loading for item v17 on ‘civil rights’ in Spain solved the problem. Since this cross-loading was more than .20 smaller than the smallest other loading on the concept, we accepted this cross-loading in Spain. With this minor adjustment, the fit of the measurement model (excluding Czech Republic) is now satisfactory, as shown in table A.3.3.2 (RMSEA = .048).

In the figure below, the unstandardised factor loadings of this measurement model are presented. These factor loadings are invariant across all countries, with the exception of Czech Republic. Only in Spain, item v17 has a cross-loading of -0.52 on ‘civil rights’. This cross-loading is relatively small compared to the size (and t-values) of the other loadings, as displayed in Model 2. Hence, despite this cross-loading in Spain, we can conclude that overall, *‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ can be equivalently measured in all candidate countries and member states by the same indicators*. Only in Czech Republic we found a substantial lack of cross-national equivalence regarding ‘opposition to civil rights’. Hence for Czech Republic, one can only directly compare the measurement of ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ with all other countries.


Table A3.3.2 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants across candidate countries and EU member states: ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’

	<i>RMSEA</i>	χ^2	<i>Df</i>	<i>Problem identification:</i>	<i>Solve problem by:</i>
multi-sample - form equivalence	.051	328.92	133	Relatively bad fit for Spain, Greece, Latvia, Bulgaria and Lithuania	Covariance between some error terms in these countries
multi-sample - invariant factor loading	.044	238.91	115		
multi-sample - invariant factor loading	.053	500.53	193	Particular bad fit for Czech Republic: v18 does not load on ‘civil rights’, neither on ‘repatriation policies’	Leaving Czech Republic out of the model
multi-sample - invariant factor loading	.052	475.89	189	Relatively bad fit for Spain	Cross-loading of v17 on ‘civil rights’ in Spain
multi-sample - invariant factor loading	.048	436.07	188		

Note: multi-sample analyses of 30 samples; Source: EB59.2 and CCEB03

Model 2 Unstandardised measurement model

'opposition to civil rights for legal migrants' and 'favour repatriation policies for legal migrants'

**3.4 Sum indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism**

The previous analyses were conducted among respondents without missing answers. Having assessed that these 11 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we can now use this result to estimate missing answers of respondents. A missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by a regression estimate based on the answers that this respondent had provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. However, this procedure was only followed if a respondent answered at least four of the eleven items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Respondents with less valid answers were excluded from all analyses.

After substitution of missing values, we computed summated indices for each dimension of ethnic exclusionism. The indices are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Throughout this report, these indices are applied to measure exclusionist stances. The mean score on these indices across all countries and per country are displayed in Appendix 6. Table A.3.3.3. displays the overall relationships between the indices of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

Table A3.3.3 Relationships between dimensions of ethnic exclusionism

	Resistance to multicultural society	Limits to multicultural society	Insistence on conformity	Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants	Repatriation policies for legal migrants
Resistance to multicultural society	1.00				
Limits to multicultural society	.21	1.00			
Insistence on conformity of migrants to law	.10	.26	1.00		
Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants	.27	.16	-.01	1.00	
Repatriation policies for legal migrants	.12	.22	.02	.39	1.00

Note: Total sample of all candidate countries. Each national sample (except Malta and Cyprus) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size: standard sample size is 800, with Malta and Cyprus a standard sample size of 400.

The strongest relationship exists between ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’. The stronger people oppose to granting civil rights for legal migrants, the stronger they are in favour of sending back legal migrants to their country of origin. ‘Insistence on conformity’ has remarkable low correlations with most other dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. About half of the population in the candidate countries strongly insists that minorities conform to law and conventions, but this does not necessary imply that they share other exclusionist stances, in particular opposing civil rights or favour repatriation policies for legal migrants. A rather similar finding regarding ‘insistence on conformity’ was found in the analyses of the member states.

The relationships between dimensions of exclusionist stances in the candidate countries are overall somewhat lower compared to the relationships in the member states. It appears that attitudes toward ethnic minorities and migrants in the candidate countries are somewhat less crystallised than in the member states.

Appendix 4. Measurements of independent variables at the individual level

In this study we focus on the attitudes of the ethnic majority population in various countries toward migrants and ethnic minorities. In order to select respondents from the majority populations, we restricted our analyses to citizens with the nationality of the country of residence.

To measure the first of our independent variables, *educational attainment*, we used information on the age at which respondents had stopped their full-time education. In the descriptive analyses, we distinguished five ordinal categories, ranging from the lowest category 'education stopped at age 6 to age 14' to the highest category 'education stopped at age 22 or later' and an additional category consisting of respondents who were still studying at the time of survey. In the explanatory analyses, we regarded educational attainment as an interval variable. In order to assign a numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time of survey, we took their age. Furthermore, to prevent extreme high scores on the educational attainment variable, we regarded the age of 30 as an upper-limit.

A measure of *social class* was constructed, using the available information in these secondary data, to resemble the cross-national comparable categorisation of Erickson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983). We distinguished a number of categories, based on their actual social position in the labour force: the higher professionals (including professionals, business proprietors and top management); the lower professionals (middle management); routine non-manuals workers (people with an employed position at a desk, in service jobs or travelling); self-employed people (farmers, fishermen and shop owners); supervisors and skilled manual workers; and a category of other (unskilled) manual workers and servants. To these classes we added as distinct categories the people who were momentarily not active in the labour force: people working in their own household; students; unemployed people; and lastly, retired people and disabled people.

In the candidate countries Eurobarometer dataset that we received from the EUMC, no country-specific income questions were available. Instead, only a harmonised income variable was available that measures the gross monthly household income in ten deciles. This harmonised income variable is comparable across countries. Missing data for household income were – for each country separately – imputed by a estimated value based on other information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing income values by means of a regression analysis of household income on seven variables that are related to household income.⁶

Urbanisation was measured by means of three categories ranging from ‘a rural area or village’ or ‘a small or middle sized town’ to ‘a large town’, as judged by the respondent. With regard to *religious denomination*, we distinguished between non-religious people, religious people belonging to Christian denominations and religious people belonging to non-Christian denominations. To a large extent, the latter category consisted of Islamic Turks. In addition, *church attendance* was also taken into account, ranging from never attending church, rarely attending church (a few times a year or less) to frequent church attendance (once a week or more).

Political self-placement was measured by asking respondents to place their own political viewpoints on a ten point scale, ranging from left (score 1) to right (score 10). Finally, we include *gender* and *age* as variables in the analysis.

Appendix 5. Measurements of independent variables at the contextual level

Individuals, as social beings, are affected by their surrounding social contexts. In this report, comparably to report 2 and report 4 of majorities' attitudes towards minorities, we focus on the impact of the national context on individual attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. In order to explain cross-national differences in ethnic exclusionism, we searched for appropriate operationalisations and measurements of national contextual characteristics. However, one should be cautious when comparing national statistics. The comparability of national statistics can be problematic, due to cross-national differences in applied definitions, modes of registration and classification. Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in the reliability of national statistics between countries. In order to minimise these problems of comparability, contextual data are primarily derived from internationally recognised organisations, such as Eurostat, the United Nations Population Division and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The statistical departments of these international organisations have put a lot of effort in the standardisation of definitions and data collection methods in order to improve consistency and comparability of indicators across countries.

The national statistical data for the countries included in the candidate countries Eurobarometer 2003 are displayed in table A3.5.1. The national statistics we used in the integral analyses of both the Standard Eurobarometer and the candidate countries Eurobarometer are displayed in table A3.5.2. Figures on the *unemployment rate* in 2002 were taken from Eurostat (2003a) and they refer to the number of unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. The estimates of the number of unemployed are based on the results of the European Union Labour Force Survey. Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 years not living in collective households who were without work within the two weeks following the reference week and have actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks or who found a job to start within a period of at most three months. We applied the unemployment rate in 2002, since this is the latest available annual figure on the unemployment rate.

In the Standard Eurobarometer sampling design (used in the integral analyses of EU member states and candidate countries), separate samples were drawn for West and East Germany and within the United Kingdom separate samples were drawn for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We analysed the German data separately for (former) West and East Germany, due to the large differences in political and economic developments that took place after the Second World War, as well as the vast differences in economic and

demographic circumstances that still exist between East and West Germany today. Similarly, data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland are analysed separately. Hence, East and West Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland are all regarded as separate 'national' contexts. However, some contextual variables, such as the number of asylum applications, are by definition only defined for Germany or the United Kingdom as a whole.

We applied unemployment data from the German national statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to derive the unemployment rate in (former) West and East Germany. The unemployment rate for Germany as a whole, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in West Germany and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). Likewise, the unemployment rate for the United Kingdom, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2002).

Figures on Gross Domestic Product were taken from Eurostat (2003b). GDP is measured per head in thousands of PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) at current prices, indexed at 100 for the 15 EU members, in the year 2002. At the time when we started the analyses, only these indexed figures were available for 2002. Next, these relative figures were multiplied with the actual GDP per head in thousands for the EU (Eurostat 2003c) to derive the actual GDP for each country. For Malta, Eurostat did not report GDP figures after 1999. To estimate Malta's GDP in 2002, we used GDP growth rates between 2000 and 2002 from the National Statistics Office Malta (2003). With regard to table A3.5.2, the German figure was adjusted for East Germany and West Germany by the GDP ratio for the regions as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). Similarly, the GDP for the United Kingdom was adjusted for the GDP ratio in Great Britain and Northern Ireland as reported by the Office for National Statistics (2003a), based on figures of 1999.

Since Eurostat-figures regarding the percentage of non-nationals were only available for a selection of Central and Eastern European Countries, we had to find another indicator for the candidate countries. As an alternative indicator, we applied the size of the *migrant stock* as a percentage of the total population, as registered by the United Nations Population Division (2002). The latest available figures refer to mid-year 2000. The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) defines the migrant stock as the number of people who are born outside the country. For a subset of countries that did not have data on place of birth but had data on citizenship, the estimated number of non-citizens is given. In both cases, the migrant stock also includes refugees, some of whom may not be foreign-born. For Slovakia and Bulgaria, the migrant stock was estimated by the UNPD applying a statistical model based on census data classified by place of birth or citizenship.

To take into account the effect of immigration on ethnic exclusionism, we took the average annual number of migrants and related it to the total population. For the EU candidate countries only the net migration was available for all countries. From the United Nations Population Division (2002), we derived the *average annual net migration in the period 1995 to 2000, per 1,000 capita*. The average annual net migration is the net average annual number of migrants during the period, that is, the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and non-citizens.

In the integral analyses of the Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, we included for the European member states identical measurements as for the candidate countries. This implies that we used in these integral analyses the measurements of migrant stock (UNPD 2002) and net migration instead of the more refined measurement of non-western non nationals and average annual immigration of non-EU nationals (see report 2 on Majorities' attitudes towards minorities in European Union member states).

Finally, we took the *average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 1,000 capita* as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum applications are quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers, such as the number of admitted refugees. It is much more complicated to produce comparable figures regarding the number of admitted refugees, due to cross-national differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g. provisional versus durable permits), as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general. The number of asylum applications in each country is registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2002, 2003). To take into account strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average number of asylum applications in the two years preceding the time of survey, that is in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of asylum applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total population as derived from Eurostat (2003d).

Table A3.5.1 Contextual characteristics of EU candidate countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Unemployment rate in 2002^a</i>	<i>GDP per capita^b</i>	<i>Migrant stock in percentage of population in 2000^c</i>	<i>Average annual net migration in 1995-2000, per 1,000 capita^d</i>	<i>Average annual number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002, per 1,000 capita^e</i>
Estonia	9.1	10.03	26.2	-8.0	0.01
Latvia	12.8	8.45	25.3	-2.0	0.01
Lithuania	13.1	9.38	9.2	0.0	0.07
Poland	19.9	9.46	5.4	-0.5	0.12
Czech Republic	7.3	14.38	2.3 ^g	1.0	1.41
Slovakia	18.6	11.35	0.6 ^h	0.3	1.65
Hungary	5.6	13.58	3.0	-0.7	0.80
Slovenia	6.0	17.71	2.6 ^g	0.5	2.22
Malta	7.4	11.93 ^f	2.2 ^g	1.4	0.60
Cyprus	3.8	17.38	6.3	3.9	2.05
Romania	7.0	5.88	0.4	-0.5	0.08
Bulgaria	18.1	5.93	1.3 ^h	-4.9	0.33
Turkey	10.4	5.50	2.3	-0.8	0.07

^a Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. Source: Eurostat (2003a).

^b GDP per capita in purchasing power standards. Source: Eurostat (2003b).

^c The mid-year estimate of the number of people who are born outside the country. For countries that did not have data on place of birth but had data on citizenship, the estimated number of non-citizens is displayed. In both cases, migrant stock also includes refugees. Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

^d Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

^e Source for asylum application figures: UNHCR (2002, 2003). Total population on January, 1, 2001 and 2002 derived from Eurostat (2003c).

^f Eurostat did not report figures for Malta after 1999. From the National Statistics Office Malta GDP growth rates were taken and multiplied with the Eurostat 1999 figure.

^g Estimated mid-year number of non-citizens of the country with the addition of refugees.

^h Imputed mid-year number of migrants with the addition of refugees.

Table A3.5.2 Contextual characteristics of EU member states and candidate countries, for integral analyses on Standard Eurobarometer and candidate countries Eurobarometer

<i>Country</i>	<i>Unemployment rate in 2002^a</i>	<i>GDP per capita in 2002^b</i>	<i>Migrant stock in percentage of population in 2000^c</i>	<i>Average annual net migration in 1995-2000, per 1,000 capita^d</i>	<i>Average annual number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002, per 1,000 capita^e</i>
Finland	9.1	24.79	2.6	0.8	0.49
Sweden	4.9	24.50	11.2	1.0	3.18
Denmark	4.5	27.48	5.7	2.7	1.73
Great Britain	5.1 ^f	24.77 ^h	6.8 ^k	1.6	1.89
Northern Ireland	7.4 ^f	19.20 ^h	0.7 ^k	1.6	1.89
Ireland	4.4	30.12	8.1	4.9	3.53
Netherlands	2.7	27.05	9.9	2.1	1.60
Belgium	7.3	25.97	8.6	1.3	2.28
Luxembourg	2.8	45.46	37.2	9.4	1.95
Germany West	6.5 ^g	26.50 ⁱ	10.4 ^l	2.8	1.09
Germany East	15.2 ^g	16.45 ⁱ	4.4 ^l	1.1	1.09
Austria	4.3	26.90	9.4	0.6	4.27
France	8.8	24.65	10.6	0.7	1.11
Spain	11.3	20.23	3.2	0.9	0.20
Portugal	5.1	16.49	2.3	1.3	0.02
Italy	9.0	24.55	2.8	2.0	0.15
Greece	10.0	15.82	5.0	3.3	0.53
Estonia	9.1	10.03	26.2	-8.0	0.01
Latvia	12.8	8.45	25.3	-2.0	0.01
Lithuania	13.1	9.38	9.2	0.0	0.07
Poland	19.9	9.46	5.4	-0.5	0.12
Czech Republic	7.3	14.38	2.3 ^m	1.0	1.41
Slovakia	18.6	11.35	0.6 ⁿ	0.3	1.65
Hungary	5.6	13.58	3.0	-0.7	0.80
Slovenia	6.0	17.71	2.6 ^m	0.5	2.22
Malta	7.4	11.93 ^j	2.2 ^m	1.4	0.60
Cyprus	3.8	17.38	6.3	3.9	2.05
Romania	7.0	5.88	0.4	-0.5	0.08
Bulgaria	18.1	5.93	1.3 ^m	-4.9	0.33
Turkey	10.4	5.50	2.3	-0.8	0.07

^a Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. Source: Eurostat (2003a).

^b GDP per capita in purchasing power standards. Source: Eurostat (2003b).

^c The mid-year estimate of the number of people who are born outside the country. For countries that did not have data on place of birth but had data on citizenship, the estimated number of non-citizens is displayed. In both cases, migrant stock also includes refugees. Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

^d Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

^e Source for asylum application figures: UNHCR (2002, 2003). Total population on January, 1, 2001 and 2002 derived from Eurostat (2003c).

^f Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2002).

^g Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a).

^h Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2003a).

ⁱ Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b).

^j Eurostat did not report figures for Malta after 1999. From the National Statistics Office Malta GDP growth rates were taken and multiplied with the Eurostat 1999 figure.

^k Data spring 1998. Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Office for National Statistics (2003).

^l Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003c).

^m Estimated mid-year number of non-citizens of the country with the addition of refugees.

ⁿ Imputed mid-year number of migrants with the addition of refugees.

Appendix 6: Grand means, means per country and percentages of support for exclusionist stances

Table A3.6.1 Mean score and percentage support on 'resistance to multicultural society' and 'limits to multicultural society' per country.

Country	<i>resistance to multicultural society</i>		<i>limits to multicultural society</i>		N
	Mean ^a	% support ^b	Mean ^a	% support ^b	
Estonia	0.627	50.8	0.767	64.3	618
Latvia	0.569	43.9	0.677	58.2	568
Lithuania	0.439	32.6	0.467	31.1	785
Poland	0.374	20.1	0.467	30.1	885
Czech Republic	0.549	39.3	0.711	56.4	909
Slovakia	0.401	28.5	0.335	17.1	856
Hungary	0.314	17.9	0.627	48.5	940
Slovenia	0.275	15.3	0.566	42.8	865
Malta	0.383	21.8	0.722	58.9	471
Cyprus	0.497	36.2	0.656	52.3	483
Romania	0.256	10.3	0.397	22.6	837
Bulgaria	0.383	24.9	0.464	34.4	767
Turkey	0.311	21.3	0.534	39.0	844
Candidate countries ^c	0.412	27.8	0.559	41.7	9828
Candidate countries ^d	0.347	21.5	0.512	36.0	9828

^a Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

^b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

^c To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Malta and Cyprus) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 800, whereas Malta and Cyprus were given a standard sample size of 400.

^d To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Table A3.6.2 Mean score and percentage support on ‘opposition to civil rights for legal migrants’ and ‘favour repatriation policies for legal migrants’ per country

<i>Country</i>	<i>opposition to civil rights for legal migrants</i>		<i>favour repatriation policies for legal migrants</i>		<i>N</i>
	<i>Mean^a</i>	<i>% support^b</i>	<i>Mean^c</i>	<i>% support^b</i>	
Estonia	0.570	56.6	0.340	17.3	618
Latvia	0.659	68.5	0.449	30.3	568
Lithuania	0.353	35.0	0.346	18.0	785
Poland	0.188	14.3	0.233	9.3	885
Czech Republic	0.259	21.0	0.272	14.7	909
Slovakia	0.420	37.9	0.256	13.1	856
Hungary	0.521	50.2	0.321	20.7	940
Slovenia	0.448	44.0	0.371	22.0	865
Malta	0.620	66.1	0.579	39.7	471
Cyprus	0.484	50.2	0.461	25.1	483
Romania	0.193	14.6	0.193	7.8	837
Bulgaria	0.294	26.0	0.270	11.0	767
Turkey	0.352	30.4	0.462	29.8	844
<i>Candidate countries^d</i>	<i>0.401</i>	<i>38.1</i>	<i>0.336</i>	<i>18.9</i>	<i>9828</i>
<i>Candidate countries^e</i>	<i>0.304</i>	<i>26.2</i>	<i>0.335</i>	<i>19.0</i>	<i>9828</i>

^a Based on a four-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

^b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

^c Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

^d To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Malta and Cyprus) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 800, whereas Malta and Cyprus were given a standard sample size of 400.

^e To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Table A3.6.3 Mean score and percentage support on ‘insistence on conformity of migrants to law’ per country

<i>Country</i>	<i>insistence on conformity of migrants to law</i>		
	<i>Mean</i> ^a	<i>% support</i> ^b	<i>N</i>
Estonia	0.706	58.6	618
Latvia	0.688	59.1	568
Lithuania	0.544	40.1	785
Poland	0.433	30.4	885
Czech Republic	0.685	58.0	909
Slovakia	0.552	42.3	856
Hungary	0.474	34.2	940
Slovenia	0.548	40.4	865
Malta	0.346	28.1	471
Cyprus	0.345	29.2	483
Romania	0.616	48.3	837
Bulgaria	0.554	44.5	767
Turkey	0.646	52.5	844
<i>Candidate countries</i> ^c	<i>0.566</i>	<i>44.8</i>	<i>9828</i>
<i>Candidate countries</i> ^d	<i>0.572</i>	<i>44.8</i>	<i>9828</i>

^a Based on a three-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

^b To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

^c To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Malta and Cyprus) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 800, whereas Malta and Cyprus were given a standard sample size of 400.

^d To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Notes appendices

¹ The items v13 to v18 in the standard Eurobarometer refer to ‘legally established immigrants from outside the European Union’, whereas in the Eurobarometer of the candidate countries it (logically) reads ‘legally established immigrants’.

² We applied the goodness-of-fit measure GFI of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a). GFI is a normed statistics ranging from zero to one. As a rule-of-thumb, a minimum value for GFI of 0.90 has been proposed. Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) proposed a fit measure that takes account of the error of approximation in the population. They suggested using Steiger’s Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as a measure of the discrepancy (due to error of approximation) per degree of freedom. RMSEA will be zero only if the model fits exactly. It will decrease if parameters are added to the model that substantially reduce the discrepancy due to approximation. If, however, the additional parameters reduce the discrepancy only slightly, the RMSEA can increase. Based on practical experience, Browne and Cudeck suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas values of 0.08 and lower indicate a reasonable error of approximation.

³ As Bollen (1989, p. 356) pointed out, the comparability (or invariance) in models represents a continuum. He distinguished between two dimensions of comparability: model form and similarity in parameter values. Models for different samples have the same form if each model has the same parameter matrices with the same dimensions and the same location of fixed, free, and constrained parameters. The invariance in model form is a matter of degree. On the one hand, the invariance in model form can be rather low if models have very different numbers of latent variables or if observed variables load on different latent variables in different models. On the other hand, the invariance in model form is rather high if the model forms are identical except for the pattern of correlated measurement errors. Models can also differ with regard to the parameter values, from the one extreme where no parameters are equal across the populations under study, to the other extreme where all are invariant.

⁴ Since only ratios of factor loadings are identified – and not factor loadings themselves – the model assumes invariance of factor loading ratios across countries. Invariance of all factor loadings across countries is not a testable assumption. However, if the assumption of invariant factor loading ratios is justified, then it is probably safe to assume invariance of the factor loadings themselves (Bielby, 1986).

⁵ Country specific Heywood cases are controlled for by setting negative error variances to a value of .05. A Heywood case is a situation in which the analysis results in a negative variance estimate for the measurement error of a particular item (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001). This anomaly can be solved by setting the specific error variance to a fixed value, for instance zero. Since fixation of error variances to zero would imply absence of measurement error, we prefer to set negative error variances to a value of .05.

⁶ The following information was applied to estimate missing income values: ‘years of fulltime education’; ‘age’ (divided into six categories); ‘social class of the respondent’; whether the respondent is the ‘main income earner’ or not; ‘household size’ (six categories, ranging from ‘one-person households’ to ‘six or more person households’); ‘house ownership’, and finally, the

'household purchase power' as indicated by a list of 13 possessed consumer goods, recoded into four ordinal quarters. Likewise as in the Standard Eurobarometer data, a random normal deviate was added to the estimated income values and the range of the imputed income values was set equal to the original range of the income variable.