

National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies

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Country: Sweden

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Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

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1. Summary

FRANET contractors are requested to highlight in 1 page **maximum** the key developments in the area of surveillance by intelligence services in their Member State. This introductory summary should enable the reader to have a snapshot of the evolution during the reporting period (mid-2016 until third quarter of 2022). It should mention:

*the most significant legislative reform/s that took place or are taking place and highlight the key aspect/s of the reform, focusing on oversight and remedies.
relevant oversight bodies' (expert bodies (including non-judicial bodies, where relevant), data protection authorities, parliamentary commissions) reports/statements about the national legal framework in the area of surveillance by intelligence services.*

List of the different relevant reports produced in the context of FRA's surveillance project to be taken into account

FRA 2017 Report:

[Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU - Volume II: field perspectives and legal update](#)

FRANET data collection for the FRA 2017 Report:

[Country studies for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies - Legal update](#)

[Country studies for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies - Monthly data collection on the current reform of intelligence legislation \(BE, FI, FR, DE, NL and SE\)](#)

FRA 2015 Report:

[Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU – mapping Member States' legal framework](#)

FRANET data collection for the FRA 2015 Report:

[Country studies for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies](#)

The two most significant legislative reforms in the field of signals intelligence are (A) the overhaul of key legislation relevant to the Swedish signals intelligence regime following the 2021 government bill “Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment” (*Behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarmakten och Försvarets radioanstalt*), and (B) the ongoing reform of the Swedish signals intelligence regime following the judgement of the ECtHR in *Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden*. Reports by relevant oversight bodies will be discussed in relation to (A).

A. The 2021 Government Bill

In September 2021, the Swedish government submitted the bill “Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment” to the parliament.¹ The bill proposed the replacement of the acts on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces (*Försvarmakten*) and National Defence Radio Establishment (*Försvarets radioanstalt*) respectively (as well as subsequent amendments of relevant laws) as well as amendments to the Signals Intelligence

¹ Sweden, Ministry of Defence (*Försvarsdepartementet*) (2021), Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment ([Behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarmakten och Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), government bill, 13 September 2021.

Act (*Lag [2008:717] om signalspaning i försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet*)² relating to the international cooperation of the National Defence Radio Establishment. The bill was accepted by the parliament and the new laws and amendments entered into force on 1st of January 2022.

The bill was based on two government appointed inquiries: “Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment” (*Behandlingen av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten och Försvarets radioanstalt*)³ and “The international cooperation of the National Defence Radio Establishment – a review of the legal framework” (*Försvarets radioanstalts internationella samarbete – en översyn av regelverket*).⁴ The purpose of these inquiries was to analyse whether the (previous) legal framework was appropriate and effective in relation to the operations of the Swedish Armed Forces (*Försvarsmakten*) and the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Försvarets radioanstalt*) as well as appropriate and sufficient in relation to personal integrity. The most important issues in relation to oversight and remedies were as follows:

- The introduction of a legal requirement for the Swedish Armed Forces⁵ and the National Defence Radio Establishment⁶ to make certain information available to the public, including how personal data is processed by these agencies, how to contact the relevant data protection officer, and on the right of individuals to request correction, destruction, or limitations on the processing of personal data.
- The addition of measures available to the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (*Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten*). One preventative, namely to issue a warning in order to emphasise the seriousness of a situation,⁷ and one corrective, namely to issue an injunction to take measures for the processing of personal data to be lawful.⁸ It was not deemed necessary to exemplify what measures the Authority could order. Rather, it was agreed that, depending on the situation, either the Authority or the relevant agency, namely the Swedish Armed Forces or the National Defence Radio Establishment, would be in the better position to decide on the most appropriate measure to be taken.⁹ These measures are initiated by the Authority in the course of an inquiry, rather than following a remedial action by an individual (although the inquiry may be initiated following a tip by a member of the public).
- The decision to keep the existing framework on the right of individuals to request correction, destruction, or limitations on the processing of personal data. Despite the framework having

² Sweden, Signals Intelligence Act (*Lag [2008:717] om signalspaning i försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet*), 10 July 2008.

³ Sweden, Ministry of Defence (*Försvarsdepartementet*) (2018), Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Behandlingen av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten och Försvarets radioanstalt*), inquiry, 9 August 2018.

⁴ Sweden, Ministry of Defence (*Försvarsdepartementet*) (2020), The international cooperation of the National Defence Radio Establishment – a review of the legal framework (*Försvarets radioanstalts internationella samarbete – en översyn av regelverket*), inquiry, 26 November 2020.

⁵ Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces (*Lag [2021:1171] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten*), 2 December 2021, chapter 5 section 1.

⁶ Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Lag [2021:1172] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt*), 2 December 2021, chapter 5 section 1.

⁷ Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces (*Lag [2021:1171] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten*), 2 December 2021, chapter 6 section 3; Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Lag [2021:1172] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt*), 2 December 2021, chapter 6 section 4.

⁸ Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces (*Lag [2021:1171] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten*), 2 December 2021, chapter 6 section 4; Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Lag [2021:1172] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt*), 2 December 2021, chapter 6 section 5.

⁹ Sweden, Ministry of Defence (*Försvarsdepartementet*) (2021), Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Behandlingen av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten och Försvarets radioanstalt*), government bill, 13 September 2021, page 148.

been deemed “ineffective in practice” by the ECtHR Third Chamber (albeit in a judgment which was later referred to the Grand Chamber),¹⁰ the government bill did not discuss potential issues with the current framework in relation to the criticism brought by the ECtHR. However, following the Grand Chamber judgement, the government initiated a review of the framework (see below).

Consultation responses on the bill were submitted by several actors including governmental agencies, oversight bodies and civil society organisations. Among the oversight bodies, only the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection made comments in relation to oversight and remedies. The Authority found that the bill lacked sufficient analysis of the actual need for a broader mandate of the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment to process personal data, as well as of the risks for personal integrity. The Authority was also of the opinion that its own powers should be strengthened by means of a power to issue penalty fees (in addition to the right of an individual to claim damages) as well as to prohibit certain processing of personal data.¹¹ Finally, the Authority suggested amendments relating to the international cooperation of the National Defence Radio Establishment positive in terms of strengthening personal integrity.¹²

Responding to the consultation response from the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection, the government argued that the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment was of such importance for the defence of Sweden and the security of the nation, that it would not be reasonable to grant the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection the power to prohibit certain processing of personal data.¹³

B. Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden

In May 2021, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 ECHR relating to the Swedish bulk interception regime.¹⁴ The case was brought by Swedish public interest law firm *Centrum för rättvisa*, which alleged that its privacy-sensitive communications with individuals, organisations and companies in Sweden and abroad had been or would be intercepted and examined by way of signals intelligence.¹⁵ As for the violation, the ECtHR found three defects relating to requirements on the quality of the law: (1) the absence of a clear rule on the destruction of intercepted material which does not contain personal data; (2) the absence of a requirement in the Signals Intelligence Act or other relevant legislation that, when making a decision to transmit intelligence material to foreign partners, consideration be given to privacy interests; and (3) the absence of an effective *ex post facto* review.¹⁶ The second issue was partly remedied through the Act on the processing of personal data by the Swedish National Defence Establishment that entered into force on 1st of January 2022 and which contains specific criteria that

¹⁰ European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), [Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden](#), no. 35252/08, 19 June 2018, section 175.

¹¹ Sweden, Swedish Data Protection Agency (*Dataskyddsmyndigheten*) (2018), [DI-2018-17150](#), 14 December 2018.

¹² Sweden, Swedish Agency for Privacy Protection (*Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten*) (2021), [DI-2020-12263](#), 15 March 2021.

¹³ Sweden, Ministry of Defence (*Försvarsdepartementet*) (2021) Processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces and National Defence Radio Establishment ([Behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten och Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), government bill, 13 September 2021.

¹⁴ European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), [Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden](#) [GC], no. 35252/08, 25 May 2021.

¹⁵ European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), [Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden](#) [GC], no. 35252/08, 25 May 2021, sections 10–12.

¹⁶ European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), [Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden](#) [GC], no. 35252/08, 25 May 2021, sections 369–372.

need to be fulfilled before the National Defence Radio Establishment may decide to transfer personal data to another country or to an international organisation.¹⁷ In July 2022, the government decided on instructions for an inquiry to make an overview of the Signals Intelligence Act. Inter alia the inquiry shall (1) assess measures needed for the National Defence Radio Establishment to, regardless of security situation, effectively fulfil its mission relating to signals intelligence in defence intelligence operations; (2) analyse additional measures required to correct the defects found by the ECtHR in *Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden*; (3) assess whether additional government agencies should be granted the right to direct (*inrikta*) signals intelligence in defence intelligence operations; and (4) suggest necessary legal proposals.¹⁸ The second issue is to be reported on the 1st of April 2023 and the rest on the 1st of April 2024.

2. Annexes- Table and Figures

2.1 Overview of security and intelligence services in the EU-27

FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of the table below (see Annex pp. 93 – 95 of the FRA 2015 report) and correct or add in track changes any missing information concerning security and intelligence services in their Member State (incl. translation and abbreviation in the original language). Please provide the full reference in a footnote to the relevant national law substantiating all the corrections and/or additions made in the table.

	Civil (internal)	Civil (external)	Civil (internal and external)	Military
SE	Security Service / Säkerhetspolisen(SÄPO)		National Defence Radio Establishment ¹⁹ / Försvarets radioanstalt ²⁰ (FRA)	Military Intelligence and Security Service ²¹ / Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten ²² (MUST)

Correct (changed names).

2.2 EU Member States' legal framework on surveillance reformed since 2017

In order to update the map below (Figure 1 (p. 20) of the FRA 2017 report), FRANET contractors are requested to state:

2. *Whether their legal framework on surveillance has been reformed or is in the process of being reformed since **mid-2017** – see the Index of the FRA 2017 report, pp. 148 - 151. Please do not to describe this new legislation but only provide a full reference.*

¹⁷ Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment ([Lag \[2021:1172\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 2 section 20.

¹⁸ Sweden, Ministry of Defence (Försvarsdepartementet) (2022), Review of the Signals Intelligence Act ([Översyn av lagen om signalspaning i försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet](#)), 14 July 2022.

¹⁹ Sweden, National Defence Radio Establishment (Försvarets radioanstalt), [English summary](#).

²⁰ Sweden, Ordinance (2007:937) with instructions for the National Defence Radio Establishment ([Förordning \[2007:937\] med instruktion för Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), 15 November 2007.

²¹ Sweden, Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarmakten), [The Intelligence and Security Service – detects threats to national security](#).

²² Sweden, Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarmakten), The Military Intelligence and Security Services ([Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten](#)); Sweden, Ordinance (2007:1266) with instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces ([Förordning \[2007:1266\] med instruktion för Försvarmakten](#)), 6 December 2007.

3. *whether the reform was initiated in the context of the PEGASUS revelations.*

Correct.

1. Completed reforms:


- Sweden, Act (2007:979) on measures to prevent certain particularly serious crimes ([*Lag \[2007:979\] om åtgärder för att förhindra vissa särskilt allvarliga brott*](#)), 22 November 2007.
- Sweden, Act (2012:278) on the collection of data on electric communication in the intelligence operations of law enforcement agencies ([*Lag \[2012:278\] om inhämtning av uppgifter om elektronisk kommunikation i de brottsbekämpande myndigheternas underrättelseverksamhet*](#)), 16 May 2012.
- Sweden, Act (2019:547) on the prohibition of the use of certain information to investigate criminal offences ([*Lag \[2019:547\] om förbud mot användning av vissa uppgifter för att utreda brott*](#)), 27 June 2019.
- Sweden, Act (2019:1182) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service ([*Lag \[2019:1182\] om Säkerhetspolisens behandling av personuppgifter*](#)), 28 November 2019.
- Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces ([*Lag \[2021:1171\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten*](#)), 2 December 2021.
- Sweden, Ordinance (2021:1207) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces ([*Förordning \[2021:1207\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten*](#)), 9 December 2021.
- Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment ([*Lag \[2021:1172\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt*](#)), 2 December 2021.
- Sweden, Ordinance (2021:1208) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment ([*Förordning \[2021:1208\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt*](#)), 9 December 2021.
- Sweden, Act (2022:700) on special control of certain foreigners ([*Lag \[2022:700\] om särskild kontroll av vissa utlänningar*](#)), 2 June 2022.
- Sweden, Act on electronic communications ([*Lag \[2022:482\] om elektronisk kommunikation*](#)), 19 May 2022.

Ongoing reforms:

- Sweden, Ministry of Defence (*Försvarsdepartementet*) (2022), Review of the Signals Intelligence Act ([*Översyn av lagen om signalspaning i försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet*](#)), inquiry, 14 July 2022.
- Sweden, Ministry of Justice (*Justitiedepartementet*) (2022), Evaluation of secret data interception ([*Utvärdering av hemlig dataavläsning*](#)), inquiry, 22 June 2022.
- Sweden, Ministry of Justice (*Justitiedepartementet*) (2021), Data retention in law enforcement – additional measures for a modern and appropriate regulation ([*Data-lagring vid brottsbekämpning – ytterligare åtgärder för en modern och ändamålsenlig reglering*](#)), inquiry, 5 August 2021.
- Sweden, Ministry of Justice (*Justitiedepartementet*) (2022), Increased opportunities to use secret coercive measures ([*Utökade möjligheter att använda hemliga tvångsmedel*](#)), inquiry, 2 November 2021, reports delivered on 29 April 2022 (first, partial) and 12 October 2022 (final).

2. None of the ongoing or completed reforms have been initiated in the context of the PEGASUS revelations.


Figure 1: EU Member States' legal frameworks on surveillance reformed since October 2015



2.3 Intelligence services' accountability scheme

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm whether the diagram below (Figure 5 (p. 65) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Figure 5: Intelligence services' accountability scheme




Correct.

2.4. Parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in EU Member States

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm that the map below (Figure 6 (p. 66) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Figure 6: Parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in EU Member States



Correct.

2.5. Expert bodies (excluding DPAs) overseeing intelligence services in the EU

FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of the table below (Table 2 (p. 68) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Table 2: Expert bodies (excluding DPAs) overseeing intelligence services in the EU

EU Member State	Expert Bodies
SE	<p>Swedish Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate (<i>Statens inspektion för försvarsunderrättelseverksamheten</i>)</p> <p>Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (<i>Säkerhets- och integritetsskyddsnämnden</i>)</p> <p>Foreign Intelligence Court²³ (<i>Försvarsunderrättelsedomstolen</i>)</p>


Correct (changed names).

²³ Sweden, Government Offices of Sweden (*Regeringskansliet*), [The Foreign Intelligence Court](#).

2.6. DPAs' powers over national intelligence services, by member states

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm that the map below (Figure 7 (p. 81) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Figure 7: DPAs' powers over national intelligence services, by member states




Correct.

2.7. DPAs' and expert bodies' powers over intelligence techniques, by EU Member State

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of the figure below (Figure 8 (p. 82) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Figure 8: DPAs' and expert bodies' powers over intelligence techniques, by EU Member State



Correct.

2.8. Binding authorisation/approval of targeted surveillance measures in the EU

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of table below (Table 4 (p. 95) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Table 4: Binding authorisation/approval of targeted surveillance measures in the EU-27

	Judicial	Executive	Expert bodies	Services
SE	✓			

Correct.

2.9. Approval/authorisation of general surveillance of communication

All FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of the table below (Table 5 (p. 97) of the FRA 2017 report), and to update/include information as it applies to their Member State (if not previously referred to). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework, in particular where - since 2017 - your Member State regulates these type of surveillance methods (for a definition of general surveillance, see FRA 2017 Report, p. 19).

Table 5: Approval/authorisation of general surveillance of communication in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden

	Judicial	Parliamentary	Executive	Expert
SE				✓

Correct.

2.10. Non-judicial bodies with remedial powers

FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of table below (Table 6 (p. 112) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Table 6: Non-judicial bodies with remedial powers in the context of surveillance, by EU Member State


	Executive (ministry)	Expert body(ies)	DP A	Parliamentary committee(s)	Ombuds institution
SE		✓	✓		

Correct.

2.11. Implementing effective remedies

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm that the diagram below (Figure 9 (p. 114) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Figure 9: Implementing effective remedies: challenges and solutions



Correct.

2.12. Non-judicial bodies' remedial powers

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of table below (Table 7 (pp. 115 - 116) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Table 7: Non-judicial bodies' remedial powers in case of surveillance, by EU Member State

	Bodies with remedial competence	Decisions are binding	May fully access collected data	Control is communicated to complainant	Decision may be reviewed
SE	Swedish Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate (SIUN)				
	Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (SIN)				
	Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection ²⁴				

Note:

- = Expert body
- = Ombuds institution
- = Data protection authority
- = Parliamentary Committee
- = Executive

Source: FRA, 2017

Incorrect.

The Commission on Security and Integrity Protection is obliged, at the request of an individual, to control whether he or she has been subjected to surveillance and notify the individual whether such control has been conducted (albeit not the result of it).²⁵ The box "Control is communicated to the complainant" should therefore be ticked.

The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (*Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten*) is the oversight body under the acts on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service (*Säkerhetspolisen*), the Swedish Armed Forces (*Försvarsmakten*), and the National Defence Radio Establishment (*Försvarets radioanstalt*).²⁶ As such, the Authority is granted access to all personal data processed by these authorities, including safety and protective measures.²⁷ The box "May fully access collected data"

²⁴ Sweden, Government Offices of Sweden (*Regeringskansliet*), [Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection](#).

²⁵ Sweden, Act (2007:980) on oversight over certain law enforcement operations (*Lag [2007:980] om tillsyn över viss brottsbekämpande verksamhet*), 22 November 2007, section 3.

²⁶ Sweden, Ordinance (2007:975) with instructions for the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (*Förordning [2007:975] med instruktion för Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten*), 22 November 2007, section 2a.

²⁷ Sweden, Act (2019:1182) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service (*Lag [2019:1182] om Säkerhetspolisens behandling av personuppgifter*), 28 November 2019, chapter 7, section 3; Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the

should therefore be ticked. The Authority may order the Swedish Security Service to stop processing or destroy personal data,²⁸ but may not order the Swedish Armed Forces or the National Defence Radio Establishment to neither stop processing nor destroy personal data.²⁹ Decisions by the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection may be reviewed by a court, although in the case of the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment limited to the decision to order the relevant authority to comply with the law.³⁰ The box “Decision may be reviewed” should therefore be ticked.

2.13. DPAs’ remedial competences

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of the figure below (Figure 10 (p. 117) of the FRA 2017 report) with respect to the situation in your Member State. In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.


processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces ([Lag \[2021:1171\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 6, section 2; Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment ([Lag \[2021:1172\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 6, section 3.

²⁸ Sweden, Act (2019:1182) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service ([Lag \[2019:1182\] om Säkerhetspolisens behandling av personuppgifter](#)), 28 November 2019, chapter 6, section 8 and chapter 7, sections 4–5.

²⁹ Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces ([Lag \[2021:1171\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 6, sections 3–4; Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment ([Lag \[2021:1172\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 6, sections 4–5.

³⁰ Sweden, Act (2019:1182) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Security Service ([Lag \[2019:1182\] om Säkerhetspolisens behandling av personuppgifter](#)), 28 November 2019, chapter 8, section 3; Sweden, Act (2021:1171) on the processing of personal data by the Swedish Armed Forces ([Lag \[2021:1171\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarsmakten](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 7, section 3; Sweden, Act (2021:1172) on the processing of personal data by the National Defence Radio Establishment ([Lag \[2021:1172\] om behandling av personuppgifter vid Försvarets radioanstalt](#)), 2 December 2021, chapter 7, section 3.

Figure 10: DPAs' remedial competences over intelligence services



Correct.