CJEU Case C-610/23 / Judgment

FO v Ypourgos Metanastefsis kai Asylou
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Decision
Decision date
03/07/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2025:514
  • CJEU Case C-610/23 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case: 

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Asylum policy – International protection – Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Directive 2013/32/EU – Article 46 – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 47 – Right to an effective remedy – Requirement of full and ex nunc examination of the appeal – Obligation to appear in person before the authority examining the appeal – Presumption that an appeal has been improperly brought – Dismissal of the appeal as manifestly unfounded without examination of the merits – Principle of proportionality

    Outcome of the case: 

    On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

    Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, in the event of failure by an applicant for international protection to comply with a procedural obligation to appear in person before the court or tribunal having jurisdiction to rule on his or her appeal against a decision rejecting his or her application, the sole objective of which is to verify the applicant’s presence on the national territory and not to be heard, establishes a presumption that the appeal has been improperly brought and provides for it to be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    45. By its two questions, which should be examined together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, in the event of failure by an applicant for international protection to comply with a procedural obligation to appear in person before the court or tribunal having jurisdiction to rule on his or her appeal against a decision rejecting his or her application, establishes a presumption that that appeal has been improperly brought and provides for it to be dismissed as manifestly unfounded without any examination as to its merits.

    51. Although, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States and subject to the observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing remedies for ensuring that individual rights derived from the EU legal order are safeguarded (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 April 2025, Barouk, C‑283/24, EU:C:2025:236, paragraph 37), Member States nevertheless have the responsibility to ensure observance in every case of the right to effective judicial protection of those rights as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraph 142 and the case-law cited).

    52. Consequently, the characteristics of the remedy provided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 must be determined in a manner that is consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal for everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are infringed. It follows that each Member State bound by that directive must order its national law in such a way that applicants for international protection are able to exercise their right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter and specifically provided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Admissibility of a subsequent application), C‑216/22, EU:C:2024:122, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

    55. Article 52(1) of the Charter provides that limitations may be placed on the exercise of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter on condition that those limitations are provided for by law; they respect the essence of those rights and freedoms; and, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (judgment of 6 October 2020, État luxembourgeois (Right to bring an action against a request for information in tax matters), C‑245/19 and C‑246/19, EU:C:2020:795, paragraph 51).

    68. In those circumstances, as stated in essence by the Advocate General in points 77 to 89 of her Opinion, in circumstances where applicants for international protection must travel to the capital of the country to appear in person and not to be heard, bearing costs of transport, accommodation and lodging which may be substantial, a presumption that an appeal has been improperly brought and must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded, without providing for other means by which such an applicant can prove his or her presence on the national territory and without providing him or her with the material means enabling him or her to comply with the obligation to appear in person at the hearing, is such as to make the exercise of the right to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 excessively difficult and thus undermine the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.

    69. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, in the event of failure by an applicant for international protection to comply with a procedural obligation to appear in person before the court or tribunal having jurisdiction to rule on his or her appeal against a decision rejecting his or her application, the sole objective of which is to verify the applicant’s presence on the national territory and not to be heard, establishes a presumption that the appeal has been improperly brought and provides for it to be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)