

Database 2012-2019 on anti-Muslim Hatred

Cases and rulings

This database section allows to search here for international, European and national case law and rulings as well as decisions by courts, and decisions, reports, findings by human rights or equality bodies and organisations, relating to hate crime and incitement to hate speech, hate crime and discrimination against Muslims.

Filter the database by

COUNTRY(-IES) :

Belgium

YEAR(S) :

2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018

BIAS MOTIVATION AS DEFINED BY COURT/BODY :


Ethnic origin, Race, Religion, Nationality, Gender, Migrant status

COURT/BODY TYPE :

UN Human Rights Committee, UN CERD Committee, European Court, National Higher Court, National court, Equality Body, Ombudsman, High regulatory authority

CRIME TYPE :

Homicide, Physical violence, Arson, Vandalism, Property offence, Threat of violence, Incitement to violence or hatred, Hate speech, Discrimination, Harassment

MS	YEAR	REFERENCE DETAILS TITLE	REFERENCE DETAILS URL	HATE BIAS	COURT / BODY	KEY FACTS	MAIN REASONING / ARGUMENTATION	KEY ISSUES (CONCEPTS, INTERPRETATIONS) CLARIFIED BY THE CASE	RESULTS (SANCTIONS, OUTCOME) AND KEY CONSEQUENCES OR IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE	KEY QUOTATION IN ORIGINAL LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH WITH REFERENCE DETAILS
	2018	Belgium / Court of First Instance of	https://www.unia.be/files/Dokumenten/Recht	Religion, Ethnic	French-speaking Court of	A female pharmacist is	The defendant does not understand the complaint. He merely	The defendant argued that it could not be proven that he said the	The defendant is found guilty. In determining the	De plus, la responsable de la pharmacie, B. C. ,

Brussels /
Judgment
number
2018/6234 -
Roll number
18F033246 -
System
number
16R83630

[tspraak/Tribunal correctionnel Bruxelles 20 novembre 2018.pdf](#)

origin

First Instance of Brussels, 61st penal chambre (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, 61e chambre correctionnelle)

asked in a very aggressive tone by a client to give more information about a prescription he had received ten days earlier from one of her colleagues. During her reply, the pharmacist is interpreted by the client who says he does not want to talk to her but to someone else, because “with the thing

wanted his treatment and addressed the pharmacist in a nice way. The defendant told the police and repeated at the court hearing that he did nothing wrong. The only thing he is sorry for is that he may have spoken too loudly because he was feeling unwell. At the time, he was in distress and feeling very bad due to the chemotherapy he was receiving, yet the complainant did not act as required by a representative of the medical profession. He has no problem with her wearing a veil, so there can be no racism or hatred. The Court does not follow this reasoning. It would be surprising that the pharmacist would be unable to perceive that a customer is suffering and go through the trouble to go to the police 5 days later. The pharmacist’s manager intervened because of the noise and tone and the offensive and discriminating remarks made by the defendant.

things he is accused of saying by the complainant, because the pharmacist's manager did not repeat the words when she was heard in the case. The Court determined that this is not necessary, because the manager interrupted her own work to intervene, because she heard the man raise his voice and tone. It is not surprising that the manager does not remember the exact statements made by the defendant, because the facts took place in August 2016 and the manager was heard in the case only in December 2016. While not remembering the exact wording, the manager did remember that the defendant's remarks were offensive and discriminating. The Court also argued that not feeling well, does not justify the statements made to the pharmacist.

punishment to impose, the Court took into account the defendant’s unacceptable behaviour, his total absence of regrets and his attitude during the court procedures, which demonstrate that he still minimizes the facts and pities on his personal case, as well as his lack of a criminal record. The Court hoped that the punishment will be of such a nature to make the defendant truly aware of the fact that his remarks about the victim are not tolerable in society. The Court condemned the defendant to a fine of 900 euro (to be replaced by a subsidiary imprisonment of 15 days if not paid). Additionally, he has to pay 200 euro to the Special Fund to help victims of intentional acts of violence and occasional rescuers, a compensation of 53.58 euro, 20.00 euro to the Budget Fund for second-line


si elle ne répète pas les propos tenus par le prévenu, indique néanmoins qu'elle a abandonné la tâche qu'elle effectuait pour aller voir ce qu'il se passait car elle avait entendu la voix d'un homme et que le ton montait. Elle signale que les propos étaient injurieux et discriminants. D ne fait aucun doute que s'il ne s'était rien passé, elle aurait poursuivi ce qu'elle faisait et il serait très surprenant qu'elle aurait embayé dans le sens de la plaignante. Elle aurait tout simplement déclaré qu'elle n'avait pas été témoin des faits dénoncés par la plaignante. Tel n'est pas le cas en l'espèce, bien au contraire. Il faut aussi remarquer qu'elle a été

you wear on your head, you are not a scientist". The pharmacist wears a veil at work and has never had any problem with other customers or her colleagues.


legal aid, and 30.87 euro for the expense of public action.

entendue en décembre 2016 alors que les faits se sont déroulés en août 2016 de sorte qu'il ne peut lui être reproché de ne pas se souvenir mot à mot des termes utilisés par le prévenu.

Moreover, the head of pharmacy, BC, if she does not repeat the words of the accused, nevertheless indicates that she abandoned the task she was performing to see what was happening because she had heard the voice of a man and that the tone rose. She points out that the remarks were offensive and discriminating. There is no doubt that if nothing had happened, she would have continued what she was doing and it would be very surprising

										that she would have gotten in the way of the complainant. She would have simply stated that she had not witnessed the facts complained of by the complainant. This is not the case here, quite the contrary. It should also be noted that she was heard in December 2016 when the facts took place in August 2016 so that it can not be blamed for not remembering verbatim the terms used by the defendant.
	2018	Belgium / Court of First Instance of Ghent / Roll number 18G011567 - System number 18RG9098	https://www.unia.be/files/Dokumenten/Rechtspraak/Tribunal_premiere_instance_Gand_16_octobre_2018.pdf	Ethnic origin, Race, Nationality, Religion	Court of first instance East-Flanders, department Ghent criminal matters (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaander	The facts of the case concern a wide range of inappropriate and racist remarks made on social media following the	The Court finds the defendants' arguments completely implausible, considering the inconsistencies in the defendant's declarations and the complete lack of evidence of hacking. The Court argues that there can be no doubt about the defendant's "special will to incite hatred or violence",	The Court gave special consideration to the defendant's use of Facebook, the most well known and used online social network site, to spread racist messages. Not only is doing so from behind a computer considered cowardly and very reprehensible behaviour, the defendant denied his online statements when confronted with them in	The Court found the defendant guilty and imposed sanctions with a preventive and repressive objective. The defendant was ordered to pay the symbolic amount of 1 euro of compensation to the plaintiffs and to UNIA as well as their litigation costs (180 euro each).	De beklagde heeft duidelijk een gebrek aan respect voor anderen waarbij hij vulgair en racistisch taalgebruik niet schuwt. Het gedrag van beklagde is totaal onverantwoord en draagt bij tot een polarisering

					en,afdeling Gent strafzaken)	attacks in Istanbul (Turkey) on 1 January 2017. K.A. from Houthalen-Helchteren was killed in those attacks.	considering that he not only liked posts on other people's Facebook page, but also spreaded racist and hateful messages through his own Facebook profile.	the real world. According to the Court, this demonstrated the defendant's true attitude and raises questions regarding his insight in his errors and the associated possibility of recidivism.	Furthermore, the defendant received 6 months in prison and a 4.000 euro fine (or 1 month and 15 days in prison). He was also ordered to pay 200 euro to the Fund to help victims of intentional acts of violence and occasional rescuers, 20 euro to the Budget fund for legal second-line assistance, 53,58 euro for the management costs in criminal cases, and litigation costs (28,46 euro) of the office of public prosecutor.	in de huidige samenleving. De samenleving wordt reeds geconfronteerd met onverdraagzaamheid en extremisme dat aanzet tot haat en het gebruik van geweld. (...) Het is zeer verontrustend om te lezen hoeveel mensen, al dan niet anoniem, net als beklagde haatdragende en racistische boodschappen verspreiden via sociale media. The defendant clearly has a lack of respect for others and does not avoiding vulgar and racist language. The behaviour of the defendant is totally irresponsible and contributes to polarization in today's society. Society is already confronted with intolerance and extremism that incites hatred
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										and the use of violence. (...) It is very disturbing to read how many people, whether or not anonymously, like defendant spread hate and racist messages through social media
	2017	Belgium / Court of Cassation / S.12.0062.N	http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob?idpdf=N-20171009-1%20%28NL%29%20and%20http%3A%2F%2Fjure.juridat.just.fgov.be/pdfapp/download_blob%3Fidpdf%3Df-20171009-1%20%28FR%29	Religion	Court of Cassation of Belgium (Hof van Cassatie van België)	A muslim receptionist was dismissed by the defendant as she refused to conform to the unwritten rule in force in the company, which imposed a prohibition on carrying outward signs of a political, philosophical or religious belief. The	The Court of Cassation states that an employer is liable under civil law as soon as anti-discrimination law is violated. The Labour Court did not have to check whether the employer made a mistake or was negligent, but it had to test the employer's neutrality policy against the possibilities of justification under anti-discrimination law. Measures that discriminate indirectly can only be justified if three conditions are met: they must pursue a legitimate aim, the measures must be necessary and appropriate to reach that goal, and they must be proportionate to the pursued goal.	The Court confirmed that the dismissal based on neutrality policy does not constitute direct discrimination. This is in line with the judgment of 14 March 2017 of the Court of Justice, in response to a question from the Court of Cassation in this case. There, the Court of Justice ruled that the prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf, which results from an internal rule of a private company providing for a prohibition on the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign at work, does not constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief within the meaning of Council Directive 2000/78 / EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment	The Court of Cassation set aside the judgment of the Labour Court of Antwerp of 23 December 2011, with the exception that the dismissal based on neutrality policy does not constitute direct discrimination. The case is referred to the Labour Court of Ghent.	Bij gebrek aan een beoordeling in concreto van de vraag of er binnen de onderneming van verweerster daadwerkelijk behoefte bestond om ter vrijwaring van een vreedzame arbeidsomgeving maatregelen te nemen, enerzijds, en van de vraag of het hiertoe opgelegde verbod op het dragen van uiterlijke tekenen van religieuze overtuigingen op de werkvloer proportioneel is met het nagestreefde doel, anderzijds, kon het


Labour Court of Antwerp had ruled that a security firm did not commit abuse of law by dismissing a receptionist who wanted to combine a modest headscarf with her uniform.

and occupation.

bestreden arrest bijgevolg niet wettig besluiten dat indien er sprake zou zijn van indirecte discriminatie, deze objectief en redelijk gerechtvaardigd is waardoor het hierop gesteunde ontslag van eerste eiseres niet onrechtmatig is en geen misbruik van ontslagrecht inhoudt.


In the absence of a specific assessment of whether there was a real need within the defendant's company to take measures to safeguard a peaceful working environment, and whether the prohibition imposed for that purpose on wearing external signs of religious beliefs in the workplace are proportional to the objective pursued, on the other hand, the


										judgment under appeal could not lawfully decide that if there were indirect discrimination, it would be objective and reasonably justified, so that the dismissal of the first plaintiff based on it would not be unlawful and would not abuse of dismissal law.
	2017	Belgium / ECtHR / Application no. 34367/14 / Belkacem v. Belgium	http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175941	Religion	European Court of Human Rights, ECHR	The case concerned the conviction of Mr Belkacem, the leader and spokesperson of the organisation "Sharia4 Belgium", which was dissolved in 2012, for incitement to discrimination,	The Court was in no doubt as to the markedly hateful nature of Mr Belkacem's views, and agreed with the domestic courts' finding that the applicant, through his recordings, had sought to stir up hatred, discrimination and violence towards all non-Muslims. In the Court's view, such a general and vehement attack was incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination underlying the Convention.	With particular reference to Mr Belkacem's remarks concerning Sharia, the Court reiterated that it had ruled that the fact of defending Sharia while calling for violence to establish it could be regarded as "hate speech". The Court considered that Mr Belkacem had attempted to deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real purpose by using his right to freedom of expression for ends which were manifestly contrary to the spirit of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court held that, in accordance with Article 17 of the	The Court therefore rejected the application, finding that it was incompatible with the provisions of the Convention and that Mr Belkacem had attempted to deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real purpose by using his right to freedom of expression for ends which were manifestly contrary to the spirit of the Convention.	The Court noted at the outset that, while its case-law enshrined the overriding and essential nature of freedom of expression in a democratic society, it also laid down its limits by excluding certain statements from the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. In the Court's view, such a general and vehement attack was incompatible with the values of tolerance, social

					hatred and violence on account of remarks he made in YouTube videos concerning non-Muslim groups and Sharia.		Convention, Mr Belkacem could not claim the protection of Article 10.		peace and non-discrimination underlying the Convention. With particular reference to Mr Belkacem's remarks concerning Sharia, the Court reiterated that it had ruled that the fact of defending Sharia while calling for violence to establish it could be regarded as "hate speech".	
	2017	Belgium / ECtHR / Application no. 37798/13 / Judgement / Belcace mi and Oussar v. Belgium	http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng/?i=001-175141	Religion	European Court of Human Rights, ECHR	The case concerned the ban on the wearing in public of clothing that partly or totally covers the face. Ms Belcace mi and Ms Oussar present themselves as	The Court found in particular that the restriction sought to guarantee the conditions of "living together" and the "protection of the rights and freedoms of others" and that it was "necessary in a democratic society".	The Court found that the concern to ensure respect for the minimum guarantees of life in society could be regarded as an element of the "protection of the rights and freedoms of others" and that the ban was justifiable in principle, solely to the extent that it sought to guarantee the conditions of "living together". It was a matter of protecting a condition of interaction between individuals which, for the State, was essential to ensure the functioning of a democratic society. The question whether the full-face veil was to	The European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been: no violation of Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken together with Articles 8 and 9.	Secondly, the Court found that the drafting history of the Belgian Law used three aims to justify the ban in Belgium: public safety, gender equality, and a certain conception of "living together" in society. It noted that, as it had found in S.A.S. v. France2, the concern to ensure respect for the minimum guarantees of life in society could be regarded as an


					<p>Muslims who have decided on their own initiative to wear the niqab on account of their religious convictions.</p> <p>On 26 July 2011, Ms Belcemi and Ms Oussar brought actions for the suspension and annulment of the law before the Constitutional Court. Their cases were dismissed by that court.</p>		<p>be accepted in the Belgian public sphere was thus a choice of society.</p>		<p>element of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and that the ban was justifiable in principle solely to the extent that it sought to guarantee the conditions of “living together”.</p>	
	2017	Belgium /	http://hudoc.ec	Religio	Europea	The case	The Court found in	The Court found in	The European Court	The Court noted.


		<p>ECtHR / Application no. 4619/12 / Dakir v. Belgium</p>	<p>hr.coe.int/eng/?i=001-175139</p>	<p>n</p>	<p>n Court of Human Rights, ECHR</p>	<p>concerned a by-law adopted in June 2008 by three Belgian municipalities (Pepinster, Dison and Verviers)</p> <p>) concerning a ban on the wearing in public places of clothing that conceals the face.</p>	<p>particular that the ban imposed by the joint by-law of the municipalities in the Vesdre police area could be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It therefore held that the contested restriction could be regarded as “necessary” “in a democratic society”, and that the question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places in Belgium constituted a choice of society.</p>	<p>particular that the ban imposed by the joint by-law of municipalities in the Vesdre police area could be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It therefore held that the contested restriction could be regarded as “necessary” “in a democratic society”, and that – similarly to the situation which had previously arisen in France (S.A.S. v. France²) – the question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places in Belgium constituted a choice of society.</p>	<p>of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:</p> <p>no violation of Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights,</p> <p>no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), taken together with Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention,</p> <p>and a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right of access to a court).</p> <p>The Court held that Belgium was to pay Ms Dakir 800 euros (EUR) in respect of costs and expenses.</p>	<p>firstly, that the contested ban had a legal basis – the joint by-law of the municipalities included in the Vesdre police area – and thus met the criteria set out in its case-law concerning Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. Secondly, as in the case of S.A.S. v. France², the Court considered that the aim of ensuring the observance of the minimum requirements of life in society could be considered as part of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and that the contested ban could be regarded as justified in its principle solely in so far as it sought to guarantee the conditions of “living together”.</p>
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	2017	Belgium / CJEU - C-157/15 / Judgment / Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV	http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-157/15	Religion	European Court of Justice	The case concerns G4S' dismissal of S.A. because of her refusal to remove her Islamic headscarf. S.A., a Muslim, was employed by G4S at a time when the company had an unwritten rule that prohibited employees from wearing visible signs of their political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace.	The Court of Justice found that G4S's internal rule refers to the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs and therefore covers any manifestation of such beliefs without distinction. The rule thus treats all employees of the undertaking in the same way, notably by requiring them, generally and without any differentiation, to dress neutrally. It is not evident from the material in the file that that internal rule was applied differently to Ms Achbita as compared to other G4S employees. Accordingly, such an internal rule does not introduce a difference of treatment that is directly based on religion or belief, for the purposes of the directive.	The concept of a blanket ban on religious clothing does not constitute direct discrimination, however, it could constitute indirect discrimination if it puts members of a certain religion at a particular disadvantage unless it is justified by a legitimate aim that is appropriate and necessary.	The Court therefore found that there was no direct discrimination, whilst emphasising that the national court hearing the case has sole jurisdiction to determine whether, and to what extent, the internal rules meet the criteria of the directive.	Article 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation must be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf, which arises from an internal rule of a private undertaking prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign in the workplace, does not constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief within the meaning of that directive.
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						Several years later G4S approved the rule. After this, Ms Achbita was dismissed because she refused to comply with the rule not to wear the Islamic headscarf at work.				
	2016	Belgium / Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels	http://unia.be/files/Documenten/Rechtspraak/2016_05_31_Corr._Bruxelles.pdf	Nationality	Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels (Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles)	In 2016, the Tribunal of Brussels convicted a person for incitement to hatred and violence based on the	The Tribunal said that asking why a person is still in Belgium, is merely an insult; it does not constitute incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination. Considering that nationality is a protected ground and that asking why a person has not yet been put down, is likely to incite others to be violent towards	Incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence requires that the author encourages, exhorts or instigates others to adopt a different behaviour towards the victim and with the intention to incite to discrimination, hatred or violence. Without such intention, it would fall under freedom of expression. By posting a message on Facebook asking how has	The accused is given a suspended six month prison sentence.	"The content of the comment itself is sufficient to consider that it is inciting others to become violent towards the plaintiff and that this was the intention of the accused." 'Le contenu même du commentaire suffit à

					<p>victim's nationality. The accused had posted public messages on Facebook containing racist insults towards the Turkish victim and her son and calling for her murder. The Tribunal considered that mere insults do not constitute incitement to hatred; however, in this case, the call for murder demonstrated there</p>	<p>that person, the accused was found to have had the intention to incite readers to violence and hatred towards the plaintiff and her son.</p>	<p>someone not yet been killed, the author shows that he considers that the person should already have been killed, showing his intention of wanting others to kill the person. There is an incitement to violence and the intention is clearly demonstrated.</p>	<p>considérer qu'il était de nature à entraîner autrui à se montrer violent à l'égard de la plaignante et que telle était bien la volonté du prévenu.'</p>
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						was an intent to incite violence .				
	2016	Belgium / Tribunal of First Instance of Gent	http://unia.be/files/Documenten/Rechtspraak/2016_04_19_Corr._Gand.pdf	Race	Tribunal of First Instance of Gent (Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te Gent),	In 2016, the Tribunal of Gent convicted a person for incitement to hatred. After fighting with a Somali man, the accused shouted various racist insults such as "dirty black" and "go back to your country" while the Somali man was describing his account of the	The Tribunal found a violation of the law of 30 July 1981 on racism and xenophobia and held that the conditions of incitement to hatred or violence in Article 444 of the Criminal Code were met in this case when the accused shouted at the victim in public - in the presence of a police officer and bystanders - with the intention to harm the victim. Also, the accused did not dispute the facts and the incitement to hatred against the victim based on the latter's origin or skin colour was clearly established in the police findings.	/	The accused was condemned to four months of prison plus an additional fine and contributions to the Fund for assistance to the Victims of intentional acts of violence.	"Article 444 of the Criminal Code set the conditions for incitement to hatred or violence against a person, in this case H.K, based on one of protected criteria here being the race, the colour of the skin and the origin, and even beyond the domain of Article 5 (Article 20-2), in this case in public, in the presence of the verbalising police officer and various passers-by, shouting 'dirty black - return to your country - it's those blacks again', with the clear intention to set the passers-by against the victim." 'In een van de in art 444 van het strafwetboek

					event to a policeman. The tribunal considered that the accused clearly had the intent to incite bystanders to violence and hatred towards the victim.				bedoelde omstandigheden te hebben aangezet tot haat of geweld jegens een persoon, namelijk jegens H. K., wegens een van de beschermde criteria zijnde een zogenaamd ras, huidskleur en afkomst, en dit zelfs buiten de in artikel 5 bedoelde domeinen (artikel 20-2"), Namelijk door in het openbaar, in aanwezigheid van de verbalisanten en verschillende omstaanders 'vuile zwarte - ga terug naar uw land - 't is weer diene zwarten' te roepen, duidelijk met de bedoeling om de omstaanders op te juttten tegen het slachtoffer.'	
	2015	Belgium / Tribunal of First Instance of Brugge / BG43.L5.5987-12 -DJ	http://unia.be/files/Z_ARCHIEF/2015_02_25_corr_brugge.pdf	Ethnic origin, Race	Tribunal of First Instance of Brugge (Rechtbank van	In 2015, the Tribunal of Bruges convicted	The three men were accused of incitement to hatred based on the victim's nationality, race, skin colour, descent or national or	/	For the crime of bodily harm causing incapacity, the first two men were sentenced to six and eight months of	"On the basis of the data in the criminal record and the hearing of the case by the tribunal, it cannot

					<p>Eerste Aanleg te Brugge)</p> <p>d a person for incitement to hatred based on the victim's ethnic origin. The victim, a migrant, was assaulted by two men and racially insulted by a third person. On the basis of the police report of the incident, the Tribunal considered that the accused intended to incite hatred.</p>	<p>ethnic origin. The Tribunal acquitted the first two men due to lack of evidence. On the other hand, the witness' statement and the police's statement were considered sufficient to establish hatred by the third man towards the victim.</p>		<p>prison respectively, and to pay fines. For the crime of damaging property and for the crime of incitement to hatred on basis of a person's nationality, so-called race, skin colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, the third man was sentenced to sixty hours of community work plus fines.</p>	<p>be established with sufficient certainty that one of the driving forces of the hits and wounds caused by the first and second defendants was the hate, contempt or hostility against G. Nassine based on his skin color or his origin. [...] Based on the data of the investigation and the hearing, the indictment C of the third defendant is substantiated. The tribunal refers to the statements of the third defendant at the time of his interception as noted by the police officer."</p> <p>'Op grond van de gegevens van het strafdossier en de behandeling van de zaak ter zitting van deze rechtbank kan niet met voldoende zekerheid worden vastgesteld dat</p>
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										een van de drijfveren van de door de eerste en de tweede beklagde toegebrachte slagen en verwondingen bestond in de haat tegen, het misprijzen van of de vijandigheid tegen G. Nassine wegens zijn huidskleur of zijn afkomst. [...] Door de gegevens van het opsporingsonderzoek en door het onderzoek ter terechtzitting is de tenlastelegging C in hoofde van de derde beklagde bewezen. De rechtbank verwijst terzake naar de uitlatingen van de derde beklagde op het ogenblik van zijn interceptie en zoals genoteerd door de verbalisanten.'
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<https://fra.europa.eu/en/databases/anti-muslim-hatred/home>

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