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Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 — Determination of the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national — Procedures and periods laid down for making a take back request — Unlawful return of a third-country national to a Member State that has transferred him — Article 24 — Take back procedure — Article 27 — Remedy — Scope of judicial review — Circumstances after the transfe
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby rules:
4) Recitals 4, 5 and 19 of the Dublin III Regulation are worded as follows:
‘(4) The Tampere conclusions [of the European Council at its special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999] also stated that the [Common European Asylum System] should include, in the short-term, a clear and workable method for determining the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum application.
(5) Such a method should be based on objective, fair criteria both for the Member States and for the persons concerned. It should, in particular, make it possible to determine rapidly the Member State responsible, so as to guarantee effective access to the procedures for granting international protection and not to compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications for international protection.
(19) In order to guarantee effective protection of the rights of the persons concerned, legal safeguards and the right to an effective remedy in respect of decisions regarding transfers to the Member State responsible should be established, in accordance, in particular, with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In order to ensure that international law is respected, an effective remedy against such decisions should cover both the examination of the application of this Regulation and of the legal and factual situation in the Member State to which the applicant is transferred.’
5) Article 3(1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation provides:
‘1. Member States shall examine any application for international protection by a third-country national or a stateless person who applies on the territory of any one of them, including at the border or in the transit zones. The application shall be examined by a single Member State, which shall be the one which the criteria set out in Chapter III indicate is responsible.
2. Where no Member State responsible can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this Regulation, the first Member State in which the application for international protection was lodged shall be responsible for examining it.
Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible.
31) Furthermore, it follows from the Court’s case-law concerning Article 29 of the Dublin III Regulation that, in view of (i) the objective mentioned in recital 19 of the regulation of guaranteeing, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, effective protection of the persons concerned and (ii) the objective set out in recital 5 of the regulation of determining rapidly the Member State responsible for processing an application for international protection, an applicant must have an effective and rapid remedy available to him which enables him to rely on circumstances subsequent to the adoption of the decision to transfer him, when the correct application of the Dublin III Regulation depends upon those circumstances being taken into account (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Shiri, C‑201/16, EU:C:2017:805, paragraph 44).
40) In the light of the foregoing, the answer to question 1(a) is that Article 27(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in the light of recital 19 of the regulation and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that the factual situation that is relevant for the review by a court or tribunal of a transfer decision is that obtaining at the time of the last hearing before the court or tribunal determining the matter or, where there is no hearing, at the time when that court or tribunal gives a decision on the matter.
92) Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
1. Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, read in the light of recital 19 of the regulation and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that the factual situation that is relevant for the review by a court or tribunal of a transfer decision is that obtaining at the time of the last hearing before the court or tribunal determining the matter or, where there is no hearing, at the time when that court or tribunal gives a decision on the matter.