Article 41 - Right to good administration
Key facts of the case:
AB holds belgian authorisations for the placing on the market of eight plant protection products containing glyphosate, an active substance approved by the European Commission at EU level until 15 december 2023. In light of the principle of mutual recognition enshrined in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, the Minister for Agriculture, Viticulture and Consumer Protection (“Minister”) granted AB authorisations for the placing on the Luxembourgish market of the same products in December 2018. The authorisations were initially valid until 15 December 2023. In a letter from October 2019, AB was informed by the Minister of its intention to revoke such authorisations, given the coalition agreement to end the use of glyphosate from 1 January 2021, notwithstanding its approval at EU level. The letter also indicated that the revokation was part of the government's commitment to considerably reduce the use of plant protection products in Luxembourg. AB submitted its observations to the Minister in writting in November 2019. These were followed by eight separate decisions from January 2020 revoking the above mentioned authorisations with effect from 1 February 2020. AB brought an action for annulment before the Administrative Tribunal (tribunal administratif) in January 2020. By judgment of July 2022, the Administrative Tribunal declared the appeal well-founded and annulled the contested decisions. It considered that the decisions, on the one hand, had been taken in breach of the adversarial principle provided for in national administrative law and, on the other, disregarded the principle of mutual recognition enshrined in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. The Minister lodged the current appeal against the decision of the Administrative Tribunal in August 2022.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The key legal questions raised by the Court were: i) the field of application of the Charter, notably with regard to the implementation of EU law by Member States ii) the content of the right to good administration, notably its requirements in the framework of administrative procedures aimed at nullifying for the future a decision that has created or recognised rights for a person.
Outcome of the case:
The Administrative Court started by clarifying that, insofar as the eight decisions were based on Article 44 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, the Minister had implemented EU law and Article 41 of the Charter was therefore applicable to them. As a consequence, and in line with relevant caselaw of the Constitutional Court, a coherent application of all principles, both European and national, coming under the general principle of good administration was required. The Administrative Court went on to address the content of such principles, stating that the values which underpin them are those of adversarial proceedings, respect for the rights of the defence and the widest possible participation of the persons concerned in the decision-making process. In the case under review, involving a public administration which intended to nullify for the future a decision that created or recognised rights in respect of a person, these values and principles require that the administration in question sets out clearly the facts and points of law that lead it to take action. Furthermore, any written observations or oral elements put forward by the person concerned in the framework of the administrative procedure should be included in the reasoning underlying the revokation decision. The Administrative Court concluded that, in light of the fact that, among others, the State party had not provided any legal reasoning either at the beginning of the administrative procedure nor, subsequently, in the ministerial decisions, particularly in regard to the the relevant legal provisions, the Administrative Tribunal was fully entitled to annul the contested decisions. As such, the Administrative Court confirmed the judgement of the Administrative Tribunal As a consequence, the placing on the market and use of the plant protection products in question containing glyphosate was again authorised by the Government from the date of delivery of the judgment.
Insofar as the eight decisions at issue are based in particular on Article 44 of Regulation 1107/2009, European Union law has been implemented and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, hereinafter "the Charter", has also been properly invoked in relation to them. The same is true of the arguments put forward by the parties in the debates before the Court. The Court must point out from the outset that following the Constitutional Court's judgment of 19 March 2021 (no. 146 of the register - 2nd judgment) and the common ground laid down therein between the fundamental principle of the rule of law and the constitutional principles derived therefrom, on the one hand, the corresponding principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and, in the case in point of the implementation of European Union law, those of the Charter, it is important that the court hearing the case apply the values underlying these principles, as well as the principles themselves, in a coherent manner. In this respect, account must be taken not only of the European Union principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, but also of the corresponding general principle of good administration that underpins all rules on administrative procedure which were introduced by the Act of 1 December 1978 regulating the administrative procedure, hereinafter "the Act of 1 December 1978", and the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 8 June 1979, and are precisely outlined in a non-exhaustive manner by paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the said Act of 1 December 1978, which introduces these outlining elements by the term "in particular". In its analysis, the Court will therefore be required to go beyond the criteria adopted by the tribunal in its judgment under appeal, and to base its analysis on all the principles, both European and national, overall relating to the general principle of good administration, which finds its practical reflection in Article 41 of the Charter and, more specifically, in Article 9 of the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 8 June 1979. The values underpinning these principles are those of adversarial proceedings and, further on, respect for the rights of the defence, combined with the widest possible participation of the persons concerned in the decision-making process, which are implemented in a particularly eloquent manner by paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Act of 1 December 1978 and generally underpin the common ground as referred to in the aforementioned Constitutional Court’s judgement of 19 March 2021. In application of these values and principles, Article 9 of the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 8 June 1979, which is in phase with both Article 41 of the Charter and the general principle of good administration, requires the administration that intends to nullify for the future a decision that has created or recognised rights in respect of a citizen, such as the case in point, to set out clearly the factual and legal elements that lead it to take action.
En ce que les huit décisions querellées sont notamment basées sur l’article 44 du règlement 1107/2009, il y a mise en œuvre du droit de l’Union Européenne et l’article 41 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne, ci-après « la Charte », a également été invoqué à bon escient par rapport à celles-ci. Il se trouve de même dans les débats devant la Cour à partir des argumentaires afférents proposés par les parties. La Cour se doit de relever d’emblée qu’à la suite de l’arrêt de la Cour Constitutionnelle du 19 mars 2021 (n° 146 du registre – 2 ième arrêt) et du socle commun y consacré entre le principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit et les principes constitutionnels en dégagés, d’un côté, les principes correspondants de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et, tel le cas d’espèce de mise en œuvre du droit de l’Union Européenne, de ceux de la Charte, il importe que le juge saisi opère une application cohérente des valeurs sous-tendant ces principes de même que des principes eux-mêmes. Sous cet aspect, il y a lieu de tenir compte non seulement du principe de l’Union Européenne de la bonne administration inscrit à l’article 41 de la Charte, mais encore du principe général correspondant de la bonne administration qui sous-tend toute la réglementation en matière de procédure administrative non-contentieuse telle qu’introduite à travers la loi du 1er décembre 1978 réglant la procédure administrative non contentieuse, ci-après « la loi du 1er décembre 1978 » et le règlement grand-ducal du 8 juin 1979, en étant précisément balisé de manière non-exhaustive par les alinéas 2 et 3 de l’article 1er de ladite loi du 1er décembre 1978 qui prend soin d’introduire ces éléments de balisage par le terme « notamment ». La Cour sera dès lors amenée, dans son analyse, au-delà des critères retenus par le tribunal dans son jugement dont appel, à porter son analyse à partir de l’ensemble des principes, tant européens que nationaux, relevant de manière globale du principe général de bonne administration trouvant son reflet pratique dans l’article 41 de la Charte et, de manière plus ponctuelle, dans l’article 9 du règlement grand-ducal du 8 juin 1979. Les valeurs sous-tendant ces principes sont celles du contradictoire et, plus loin, du respect des droits de la défense, combinées à une participation aussi large que possible de l’administré à la prise de la décision, mises en application de manière particulièrement éloquente par l’alinéa 2 de l’article 1er de la loi du 1er décembre 1978 et sous-tendant globalement le socle commun tel que visé par l’arrêt de la Cour Constitutionnelle du 19 mars 2021 précité. En application de ces valeurs et principes, l’article 9 du règlement grand-ducal du 8 juin 1979, en phase à la fois par rapport à l’article 41 de la Charte et au principe général d’une bonne administration, impose à l’administration qui entend mettre à néant pour l’avenir une décision ayant créé ou reconnu des droits dans le chef d’un administré, tel le cas d’espèce, d’exposer avec clarté les éléments de fait et de droit qui l’amènent à agir.
