

National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies

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Country: Croatia

FRANET contractor: Centre for Peace Studies, Human Rights
House Zagreb

Author(s) name(s): Klara Horvat, Luka Kos

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1. Summary

FRANET contractors are requested to highlight in 1 page **maximum** the key developments in the area of surveillance by intelligence services in their Member State. This introductory summary should enable the reader to have a snapshot of the evolution during the reporting period (mid-2016 until third quarter of 2022). It should mention:

*the most significant legislative reform/s that took place or are taking place and highlight the key aspect/s of the reform, focusing on oversight and remedies.
relevant oversight bodies' (expert bodies (including non-judicial bodies, where relevant), data protection authorities, parliamentary commissions) reports/statements about the national legal framework in the area of surveillance by intelligence services.*

List of the different relevant reports produced in the context of FRA's surveillance project to be taken into account

FRA 2017 Report:

[Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU - Volume II: field perspectives and legal update](#)

FRANET data collection for the FRA 2017 Report:

[Country studies for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies - Legal update](#)

[Country studies for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies - Monthly data collection on the current reform of intelligence legislation \(BE, FI, FR, DE, NL and SE\)](#)

FRA 2015 Report:

[Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU – mapping Member States' legal framework](#)

FRANET data collection for the FRA 2015 Report:

[Country studies for the project on National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies](#)

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*the most significant legislative reform/s that took place or are taking place and highlight the key aspect/s of the reform, focusing on oversight and remedies.
relevant oversight bodies' (expert bodies (including non-judicial bodies, where relevant), data protection authorities, parliamentary commissions) reports/statements about the national legal framework in the area of surveillance by intelligence services.*

In Croatia, in the period from mid-2016 until first quarter of 2022 there were no major legislative reforms related to the intelligence services or surveillance measures in Croatia. However, in this period Croatia adopted two legal acts relevant for the work of the security and intelligence agencies: Law on Electronic Communications¹ in 2022 and Homeland Security System Act² in 2017; and two legal acts

¹ Croatia, Electronic Communications Act ([Zakon o elektroničkim komunikacijama](#)), 12 July 2022.

² Croatia, Homeland Security System Act ([Zakon o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti](#)), 16 November 2017.

regulating the competences of the Personal Data Protection Agency: Implementation of the General Regulation on Data Protection Act³ in 2018 and, also in 2018, the Act on the Protection of Natural Persons in Connection with the Processing and Exchange of Personal Data for the Purposes of Prevention, Research, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offenses or Execution of Criminal Sanctions.⁴

At the beginning of the Covid-19 epidemic in 2020, the Government of Croatia proposed an amendment to the Law on Electronic Communications, which provided for the possibility of monitoring the location of every mobile phone in Croatia, which would take the purpose of this measure beyond public health and potentially jeopardize the right to privacy. After a series of harsh public reactions, the Government dropped these changes. The new Law on Electronic Communications was adopted in July 2022. In Article 43, the Law on Electronic Communications expanded the list of already existing exceptions to the principle of secrecy of electronic communications. Namely, the new law no longer prohibits listening, eavesdropping, storing and any form of interception or monitoring of electronic communications and associated traffic data in cases where this is necessary for the maintenance or re-establishment of the security of electronic communication networks and services, or for the detection of technical malfunctions and/or or errors, security risks or attacks on electronic communication networks and services.

The Homeland security system was established by the Homeland Security System Act from 2017 with the aim, as prescribed by the Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Act, „*to systematically manage security risks of importance to national security and to act in crises.*” In accordance with its Article 3, homeland security system is defined as a system consisting of the resources of internal affairs, defence, security and intelligence system, civil protection, fire brigade, foreign affairs service and other bodies that organize and coordinate the activities and tasks of identification, assessment, reduction and/or removal of security risks of importance for the national security of the Republic of Croatia, whereas „risk“ is defined as a „*possibility or potential of negative consequences for national security, and is determined based on an assessment of the probability of the occurrence of a harmful event and possible harmful consequences.*“ As per Article 5 of the Act, homeland security system primarily acts as a system which enables easier exchange of the information between the involved participants, more efficient coordination in matters concerning the aim of the law and systematic approach towards detecting security risks and threats.

In 2018 Croatia adopted two new laws which regulate the main scope of the competences of the Personal Data Protection Agency. Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Implementation of the General Regulation on Data Protection Act prescribes that the law does not apply to the processing of personal data carried out by competent authorities for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offenses or executing criminal sanctions, including protection against threats to public security and their prevention, as well as to the area of national security and defence, while article 3 paragraph 2 of the Act on the Protection of Natural Persons in Connection with the Processing and Exchange of Personal Data for the Purposes of Prevention, Research, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offenses or Execution of Criminal Sanctions prescribes that the provisions of that act do not apply to the processing and exchange of personal data during activities carried out in the field of national security by bodies of the security-intelligence system.

With regards to public policies in Croatia, in the period from mid-2016 until first quarter of 2022 the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia⁵ was adopted in 2017 which, apart from the

³ Croatia, General Regulation on Data Protection Act ([Zakon o provedbi Opće uredbe o zaštiti podataka](#)), 25 May 2018.

⁴ Croatia, Act on the Protection of Natural Persons in Connection with the Processing and Exchange of Personal Data for the Purposes of Prevention, Research, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offenses or Execution of Criminal Sanctions ([Zakon o zaštiti fizičkih osoba u vezi s obradom i razmjenom osobnih podataka u svrhe sprječavanja, istraživanja, otkrivanja ili progona kaznenih djela ili izvršavanja kaznenih sankcija](#)), 4 August 2018.

⁵ Croatia, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia ([Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske](#)), July 2017.

adoption of the Homeland Security System Act, does not anticipate any major legislative reform in matters involving surveillance agencies. However, within the strategy it is determined that “*The Republic of Croatia will improve the normative and implementation conditions for permanent parliamentary, expert and civil supervision of the legality of the work of the security-intelligence system, as well as civil supervision over the application of individual police powers.*” According to the 2019 Report on the implementation of the Strategy⁶, no significant developments related to the aforementioned improvements were recorded. The 2019 report is the latest implementation report published and publicly available.

In the reporting period, the Civilian Oversight Council of Security Intelligence Agencies was established at the end of 2018 after several years of delay. Summaries of reports on its work without classified data are publicly available on the website of the Croatian Parliament. There was a seven-year-long gap between the work reports of the Civilian Oversight Council of Security Intelligence Agencies published on the Croatian Parliament website. According to them, the Council had been active between 2007-2011 and continued its activity from 2018 until today.⁷

Any individual who believes that the state bodies have, through their illegal or irregular work, jeopardized or violated their constitutional or statutory rights and freedoms may lodge a complaint with the Ombudswoman of the Republic of Croatia. For several years in a row, the Ombudswoman has been receiving citizens' complaints⁸ concerning the alleged arbitrary treatment by the Ministry of the Interior that manifested in issuing negative decisions on citizenship and residence approval based on the existence of security obstacles as determined by the Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA), and despite the fulfilment of other preconditions. It was emphasized by the Ombudsperson and several administrative courts that the access to classified data should also be granted to certified persons of the Ministry of Interior. The existing practice was assessed as legally deficient, considering that the legality of the Ministry of Interior's decision was judicially assessed even though the Ministry of the Interior's officials were not at all familiar with the facts and reasons for the existence of the security barrier as determined by the SOA.

CSOs in Croatia have been reporting about the case of the Ministry of the Interior withdrawing the decision on refugee status to Iraqi citizen O.E.M. who was granted international protection in 2018. The decision to revoke the refugee status to O.E.M. was partially based on the opinion of the Security and Intelligence Agency (Sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija, SOA) that O.E.M. is a threat to the national security and public order of the Republic of Croatia which was supported by the set of classified information collected by the agency marked with a level of secrecy. Although the Administrative court in Zagreb and High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia had the access to the information allegedly justifying the opinion of the Security-Intelligence Agency, O.E.M. and his lawyer were not able to access the set of information and challenge such opinion. Therefore, O.E.M. was not able to access information based on which his international protection was revoked nor to challenge those reasons, effectively defend himself from the accusations of the Security-Intelligence Agency or bring possible evidence that would possibly prove their claims as incorrect. O.E.M. believes the reason for this was his refusal to act as an informant for the Security and Intelligence Agency as well as his

⁶ Croatia, The Government of the Republic of Croatia (*Vlada Republike Hrvatske*), Report on Implementation of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (*Izješće o provedbi Strategije nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske*), January 2019.

⁷ Croatia, Croatian Parliament (*Hrvatski sabor*), Overview of reports of the Civilian Oversight Council of Security Intelligence Agencies ([Pregled izvješća Vijeća za građanski nadzor sigurnosno-obavještajnih agencija](#)).

⁸ Croatia, Ombudsperson's Office (*Ured pučke pravobraniteljice*), Ombudsperson's Annual Reports for 2017, 2018 and 2019 (*Izješća pučke pravobraniteljice*).

partner’s activist engagement.^{9 10} In addition to the above, both O.E.M. and his partner experienced multiple instances of targeted actions by the state authorities which caused an unwanted and unfavourable life change, as well as development of health problems. Due to the above-mentioned in 2022 they have submitted complaint to the Constitutional Court of Republic of Croatia for violation of articles 2, 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and article 1 of the Protocol No. 12.¹¹

2. Annexes- Table and Figures

2.1. Overview of security and intelligence services in the EU-27

FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of the table below (see Annex pp. 93 - 95 of the FRA 2015 report) and correct or add in track changes any missing information concerning security and intelligence services in their Member State (incl. translation and abbreviation in the original language). Please provide the full reference in a footnote to the relevant national law substantiating all the corrections and/or additions made in the table.

	Civil (internal)	Civil (external)	Civil (internal and external)	Military
HR ¹²			Security and Intelligence Agency/Sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija (SOA)	Military Security and Intelligence Agency/Vojna sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija (VSOA)

2.2. EU Member States’ legal framework on surveillance reformed since 2017

In order to update the map below (Figure 1 (p. 20) of the FRA 2017 report), FRANET contractors are requested to state:

- Whether their legal framework on surveillance has been reformed or is in the process of being reformed since **mid-2017** – see the Index of the FRA 2017 report, pp. 148 - 151. Please do not to describe this new legislation but only provide a full reference.*

In Croatia, legal framework on surveillance has not been substantially reformed and is not in the process of being reformed since mid-2017 with the exception of adopting a new Homeland Security

⁹ Frontline Defenders, Article: Pressure on family member of migrant rights defender Tajana Tadić, 21 July 2021.

¹⁰ PortalNovosti.com, Article: They asked me to be an informant (*Tražili su da budem doušnik*), November 2021.

¹¹ PortalNovosti.com, Article: Omer versus the state (Omer protiv države), October 2022.

¹² Official translation as per information available at: [Security and Intelligence Agency, about us](#) and article “[President Milanović Launches Procedure for the Dismissal of the Director of the Military Security and Intelligence Agency \(VSOA\)](#)”.

SOA officials also act in foreign countries in accordance with the following provisions of the Act on the Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia (*Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske*), Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) Nos. 79/06 and 105/06: “officials of security-intelligence agencies may be sent to work abroad within the framework of cooperation with a foreign security service or other relevant service or on the basis of international of the contract” (article 97); and

“SOA takes care of the counter-intelligence security of the citizens and institutions of the Republic of Croatia abroad and to this end cooperates with the appropriate organizational unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for security affairs.” (article 48 paragraph 3). Hence, we propose to move the SOA in fourth column “Civil (internal and external).”

System Act¹³ in 2017 and Electronic Communications Act¹⁴ in 2022.

The whole list of the legal framework on surveillance is as follows:

Croatia, Homeland Security System Act ([*Zakon o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti*](#)), 16 November 2017. [Click here to enter text.](#)

Croatia, Electronic Communications Act ([*Zakon o elektroničkim komunikacijama*](#)), 12 July 2022. [Click here to enter text.](#)

Croatia, Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia Act ([*Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske*](#)), 16 July 2006.

Bylaws adopted on the basis of the Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia Act:

Decision on the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security-Intelligence Agencies ([*Odluka o Vijeću za građanski nadzor sigurnosno-obavještajnih agencija*](#)), 27 April 2007.

Decree on obligations in the field of national security of the Republic of Croatia for legal and natural persons in telecommunications ([*Uredba o obvezama iz područja nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske za pravne i fizičke osobe u telekomunikacijama*](#)), 4 June 2008 and Decree on amendments to the Decree in the field of national security of the Republic of Croatia for legal and natural persons in telecommunications ([*Uredba o dopunama Uredbe o obvezama iz područja nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske za pravne i fizičke osobe u telekomunikacijama*](#)), 29 June 2013.

Decree on the establishment of disciplinary courts of the Security-Intelligence Agency ([*Uredba o ustrojavanju disciplinskih sudova Sigurnosno-obavještajne agencije*](#)), 10 November 2006.

Decree on the establishment of disciplinary courts in the Office of the National Security Council ([*Uredba o ustrojavanju disciplinskih sudova u Uredu Vijeća za nacionalnu sigurnost*](#)), 10 November 2006.

Decree on the establishment of disciplinary courts in the Military Security and Intelligence Agency ([*Uredba o ustrojavanju stegovno-disciplinskih sudova u Vojnoj sigurnosno-obavještajnoj agenciji*](#)), 10 November 2006.

Decree on the determination of protected persons, facilities and spaces and the implementation of the protection and securing ([*Uredba o određivanju štice i objekata i prostora te provođenje njihove zaštite i osiguranja*](#) Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) Nos. 46/13, 103/14, 151/14, 10/16, 99/16 and 131/20), 11 April 2013.

2. *whether the reform was initiated in the context of the PEGASUS revelations.*

In Croatia, reform was not initiated in the context of the PEGASUS revelations.

¹³ Croatia, Homeland Security System Act ([*Zakon o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti*](#)), 16 November 2017.

¹⁴ Croatia, Law on Electronic Communications ([*Zakon o elektroničkim komunikacijama*](#)), 12 July 2022.

Figure 1: EU Member States' legal frameworks on surveillance reformed since October 2015




2.3 Intelligence services' accountability scheme

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm whether the diagram below (Figure 5 (p. 65) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

No amendments needed.

Figure 5: Intelligence services' accountability scheme




2.4 Parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in EU Member States

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm that the map below (Figure 6 (p. 66) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

In Croatia, parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in Croatia is carried out by the Croatian Parliament directly and through the committee of the Croatian Parliament responsible for national security and through the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies.¹⁵ Considering that only the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies is specifically specialized for the parliamentary oversight of intelligence services the map below illustrates the situation in Croatia in an accurate manner.

¹⁵ Croatia, Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia Act ([Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske](#)), Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) Nos. 79/06 and 105/06, 30 June 2006, Article 104, paragraph 1.

Figure 6: Parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in EU Member States



2.5 Expert bodies (excluding DPAs) overseeing intelligence services in the EU

FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of the table below (Table 2 (p. 68) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

The Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia Act defines UVNS as a “central state body” and therefore it indeed is not independent from the state.

Although UVNS functions as an expert office that conducts internal oversight of the security agencies, the same logic for the omission of the UVNS from the table due to lack of “independence” can be applied here.

We deleted the indication of the UVNS.

Table 2: Expert bodies (excluding DPAs) overseeing intelligence services in the EU

EU Member State	Expert Body
HR	Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Services <i>(Vijeće za građanski nadzor sigurnosno-obavještajnih agencija)</i> Central state body: Office of the National Security Council <i>(Ured Vijeća za nacionalnu sigurnost)</i> <i>(UVNS)</i> ¹⁶

2.6 DPAs' powers over national intelligence services, by member states

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm that the map below (Figure 7 (p. 81) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

In Croatia, DPAs' powers are mainly regulated by the Implementation of the General Regulation on Data Protection Act (*Zakon o provedbi Opće uredbe o zaštiti podataka*) Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) No. 42/18 and by the Act on the Protection of Natural Persons in Connection with the Processing and Exchange of Personal Data for the Purposes of Prevention, Research, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offenses or Execution of Criminal Sanctions (*Zakon o zaštiti fizičkih osoba u vezi s obradom i razmjenom osobnih podataka u svrhe sprječavanja, istraživanja, otkrivanja ili progona kaznenih djela ili izvršavanja kaznenih sankcija*), Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) No. 68/18.

Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Implementation of the General Regulation on Data Protection Act prescribes that the law does not apply to the processing of personal data carried out by competent authorities for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offenses or executing criminal sanctions, including protection against threats to public security and their prevention, as well as to the area of national security and defence.


Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Act on the Protection of Natural Persons in Connection with the Processing and Exchange of Personal Data for the Purposes of Prevention, Research, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offenses or Execution of Criminal Sanctions prescribes that the provisions of that act do not apply to the processing and exchange of personal data during activities carried out in the field of national security by bodies of the security-intelligence system.

In consideration of the above, the Personal Data Protection Agency in Croatia has no powers over national intelligence services which is also corroborated by the opinion of the Personal Data Protection Agency.¹⁷ Therefore "Figure 7: DPAs' powers over national intelligence services, by member states" should be amended in such a way that Croatia is visually presented as falling under the "no powers" category.

¹⁶ Croatia, Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia Act ([Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske](#)), Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) Nos. 79/06 and 105/06, 30 June 2006, Articles 7 and 106.

¹⁷ Croatia, Personal Data Protection Agency ([Agencija za zaštitu osobnih podataka](#)), Insight into the files of school employees by employees of the Security and Intelligence Agency ([Uvid u dosje zaposlenika škole od strane zaposlenika Sigurnosno-obavještajne agencije](#)).

Figure 7: DPAs' powers over national intelligence services, by member states



In Figure 7, HR should be placed under the “no powers” category.


2.7 DPAs' and expert bodies' powers over intelligence techniques, by EU Member State

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of the figure below (Figure 8 (p. 82) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

In Croatia, the Personal Data Protection Agency has no powers over national intelligence services (including intelligence techniques).

In accordance with article 3 of the Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia Act (*Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu Republike Hrvatske*), Official Gazette (*Narodne novine*) Nos. 79/06 and 105/06, National Security Council can determine measures to be taken by the President and the Government of the Republic in connection with the results of monitoring the work of security-intelligence agencies and other bodies of the security-intelligence system. Therefore, “HR” should be placed in the third bubble with an existing specialised expert body.

Figure 8: DPAs' and expert bodies' powers over intelligence techniques, by EU Member State



In Figure 8, HR should be moved from the first to the third bubble.

2.8 Binding authorisation/approval of targeted surveillance measures in the EU

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of table below (Table 4 (p. 95) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

There were no changes in the reporting period.

Table 4: Binding authorisation/approval of targeted surveillance measures in the EU-27

	Judicial	Executive	Expert bodies	Services
HR	✓			

2.9 Approval/authorisation of general surveillance of communication

All FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of the table below (Table 5 (p. 97) of the FRA 2017 report), and to update/include information as it applies to their Member State (if not previously referred to). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework, in particular where - since 2017 - your Member State regulates these type of surveillance methods (for a definition of general surveillance, see FRA 2017 Report, p. 19).

No changes in the reporting period.

Table 5: Approval/authorisation of general surveillance of communication in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden

	Judicial	Parliamentary	Executive	Expert
DE		✓		✓
FR			✓	
NL	✓		✓	✓
SE				✓

This type of intelligence techniques are not regulated by law in Croatia.

2.10 Non-judicial bodies with remedial powers

FRANET contractors are requested to check the accuracy of table below (Table 6 (p. 112) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

As explained in the section 2.6 the Croatian Personal Data Protection Agency has no powers over national intelligence services (including intelligence techniques). Therefore, we suggest to the removal of the indication that the Croatian DPA has remedial powers in the context of surveillance

Table 6: Non-judicial bodies with remedial powers in the context of surveillance, by EU Member State


	Executive (ministry)	Expert body(ies)	DPA	Parliamentary committee(s)	Ombuds institution
HR		✓	✗	✓	✓

2.11 Implementing effective remedies

FRANET contractors are requested to confirm that the diagram below (Figure 9 (p. 114) of the FRA 2017 report) illustrates the situation in your Member State in an accurate manner. If it is not the case, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

We have nothing to add/comment with respect to the diagram.

Figure 9: Implementing effective remedies: challenges and solutions



2.12 Non-judicial bodies' remedial powers

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of table below (Table 7 (pp. 115 - 116) of the FRA 2017 report). In case of inaccuracy, please suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Table 7: Non-judicial bodies' remedial powers in case of surveillance, by EU Member State

	Bodies with remedial competence	Decisions are binding	May fully access collected data	Control is communicated to complainant	Decision may be reviewed
H R	Council for Civic Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies		X	X	
	Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia		X	X	
	Personal Data Protection Agency				
	Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security Parliamentary Committees		X	X	

Note:

	= Expert body
	= Ombuds institution
	= Data protection authority
	= Parliamentary Committee
	= Executive

Source: FRA, 2017

2.13 DPAs' remedial competences

FRANET contractors are required to check the accuracy of the figure below (Figure 10 (p. 117) of the FRA 2017 report) with respect to the situation in your Member State. In case of inaccuracy, please

suggest any amendment(s) as appropriate and substantiate it/them with specific reference to the legal framework.

Based on the explanation provided in 2.6, we suggest removing HR from this figure.

Figure 10: DPAs' remedial competences over intelligence services

