

Framet national contribution to the Fundamental Rights Report 2025

Part 1: Political participation and equality in elections

Part 2: Protecting women victims of violence

Slovakia

Disclaimer

This document was commissioned under contract as background material for a comparative analysis by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) for the project 'FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2025'. The information and views contained in the document do not necessarily reflect the views or the official position of FRA. The document is made publicly available for transparency and information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion.

Frnet national contribution to the Fundamental Rights Report 2025

Political participation and equality in elections

Slovakia

Contractor: Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture

Author(s): Elena Gallo Kriglerová, Alena Holka Chudžíková, Jana
Kadlečíková, Michaela Píšová

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1. Inclusiveness of the 2024 elections

In Slovakia, two elections took place in 2024 - presidential elections in March and April 2024 and EP elections in June 2024.

In Slovakia there were no developments with regard to the ambition to ensure that the electorate participating in elections and the people being elected reflect the overall composition of society at large. In 2024, no specific legislation or measures were adopted to strengthen equality, inclusiveness and non-discrimination in the exercise of the active or passive right to vote.¹

In its final report on the observation of the presidential elections in Slovakia, ODIHR underlines its reservations about the fact that persons cannot run for the post of president who lost legal capacity through a court decision, serving a prison sentence, and those with an unexpunged conviction for an intentional crime, regardless of its gravity, are ineligible to stand. ODIHR has previously recommended that these restrictions should be removed, as they are contrary to international commitments and standards.²

Gender equality

In the Presidential elections, eleven candidates submitted candidacy applications and were registered, all of them men.³ As observed by ODIHR, women were prominently present among participants of rallies, as speakers at events, and in campaign visuals.⁴

¹ Information provided by the Ombudsperson via email on 22 November 2024, by the Slovak National Human Rights Centre via email on 22 November 2024 and by the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic via email on 22 November 2024.

² Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024, p. 5.

³ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024, p. 6.

⁴ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024, p. 7.

In the EP elections overall 308 candidates ran for a seat in the European Parliament out of which 30,8% were women.⁵ Up to 46,67% of the elected MEPs are women (7 out of 15 MEPs).⁶

ODIHR reiterates their recommendation to enhance women's participation in public life. According to their report, authorities should address gender stereotypes through comprehensive legal, institutional, and educational measures. Political parties and other stakeholders should identify and curb gender-based discriminatory rhetoric and actions that lead to the negative portrayal of women and affect their equal participation.⁷

Age

Average age of candidates in EP elections was 46.7 years (ranging from 21 to 85 years of age). Candidates aged 21-30 comprised 9.4% of all candidates running for an EP seat. Candidates aged 31-45 comprised 37.3% of all, candidates aged 46-65 comprised 45.45% of all and candidates aged 66+ comprised 7.8% of all.⁸ Elected MEPs are 42.3 years old on average with the youngest being 30 years old and the oldest being 55 years old.⁹

National minorities

As observed by ODIHR, Hungarian minority voters were targeted through bilingual campaign materials, addresses during rallies and debates, and visits to minority-populated areas, especially ahead of the second round.¹⁰

People with disabilities and elections

The Office of the Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities did not observe any challenges/gaps in the equal enjoyment of the right to vote, active or passive, by persons with disabilities during

⁵ Slovakia, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Štatistický úrad SR) (2024), '[Voľby do Európskeho parlamentu 2024. Zoznam kandidujúcich politických subjektov](#)'.

⁶ Slovakia, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Štatistický úrad SR) (2024), '[Voľby do Európskeho parlamentu 2024. Mandáty pridelené politickým subjektom](#)'.

⁷ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024, p. 17.

⁸ Calculations made based on data published at Slovakia, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Štatistický úrad SR) (2024), '[Voľby do Európskeho parlamentu 2024. Zoznam kandidátov](#)'.

⁹ Calculations made based on data published at Slovakia, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (Štatistický úrad SR) (2024), '[Voľby do Európskeho parlamentu 2024. Zoznam kandidátov](#)'.

¹⁰ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024, p. 7-8.

the 2024 Presidential and 2024 European Parliament elections. Nor has the Office of the Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities received any complaints in which persons with disabilities would have raised concerns that access to the active or passive right to vote has been hindered or prevented.¹¹

The most recent survey on the accessibility of polling stations was carried out during the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 30 September 2023. The Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has long raised issues and challenges in relation to the accessibility of polling stations and therefore the right to vote for persons with disabilities.

For the presidential election, the Commissioner made recommendations on accessibility of polling stations, referring to the Autumn 2023 survey on architectural accessibility of polling stations.

The Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has long advised local governments and election organizers to select appropriate buildings or remove any potential barriers that may prevent or impede access to polling places. As accessibility cannot be ensured overnight, the Commissioner believes that at least mitigating measures should be used to preserve dignity. At the same time, the gradual removal of barriers is necessary not only for electoral purposes, but also for the purposes of general access for people with reduced mobility to public facilities (schools, municipal and town offices, houses of culture, etc.). According to Commissioner, these are often simple measures that do not require major interventions or a lot of money but can greatly improve the process of exercising the right to vote for many people.¹²

In their report ODIHR stated, that many polling premises visited were not barrier-free for persons with reduced mobility. They further state, that none of the candidates' websites contained accessibility functionalities, and sign language interpretation was provided only during Mr. Korčok's campaign events.¹³

However, instructional videos for persons with hearing impairments were broadcast for the presidential elections. Videos included text that was simultaneously loaded and interpreted into Slovak sign language, which ensured accessibility also for persons with visual impairments. Ten spots (When will the elections take place? Who can vote? How to vote? Voting card, Electoral moratorium, Electoral surveys and polls, Portable box for voting, Help with voting, Validity of

¹¹ Information provided by the Office of the Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities via email on 12 November 2024.

¹² Slovakia, Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (*Komisár pre osoby so zdravotným postihnutím*) (2024), '[Odporúčania komisárky k bezbariérovosti volieb](#)', 22 March 2024.

¹³ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024.

ballot papers and Electoral decalogue) were broadcast as part of the electoral information service. Spots were prepared by Radio and Television of Slovakia.¹⁴

Roma people and elections

Government Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities and the Vice President of the Police Corps for Internal Order and Security issued a joint statement in which they appealed to the public to approach the EP elections responsibly. Since, in the past, they have recorded cases of vote-buying in the Roma minority. They also called on politicians to avoid such practices and not to exploit the vulnerability of the Roma for their own benefit. They also called on the Roma population not to be manipulated into such behaviour.¹⁵

The media and some actors have long drawn attention to the low participation of marginalised Roma in elections. There has been minimal interest in voting in the EP elections, particularly in areas where Roma communities live. The reasons for non-participation range from the distance of polling stations to frustration, disinterest or bad experience with election rigging in the past.¹⁶ Low turnout was also reported in the presidential election. According to the Government Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities, the weak motivation of voters is the reason why Roma communities were not interested in the first round of the presidential elections.¹⁷

In their report ODIHR also stated, that outreach to Roma voters was limited, and their general awareness of voters' rights, election procedures and access to easily understandable information was insufficient. According to the report, relevant authorities should develop, in cooperation with Roma organizations, long-term civic education and election awareness programmes to encourage meaningful and informed electoral participation by Roma voters.¹⁸

¹⁴ Slovakia, Government Council for Persons with Disabilities (*Rada vlády SR pre osoby so zdravotným postihnutím*) (2024), '[Záznam z 5. Zasadnutia](#)', 27 February 2024.

¹⁵ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR*) (2024), '[Varovanie pred voľbami do EP: kupovanie hlasov je trestný čin](#)', 7 June 2024.

¹⁶ TA3 television (2024), '[Nechcelo sa mi, mám to ďaleko, Matovič nás oklamal, znie z rómskych osád. Eurovoľby ich k urnám nepritiahli](#)', 10 June 2024.

¹⁷ SpravyRTVS.sk(2024), '[Rómovia o prezidentské voľby zatiaľ neprejavili záujem. Podľa splnomocnenca im chýba motivácia](#)', 5 April 2024.

¹⁸ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024.

2. Violence and intimidation during 2024 elections

The public authorities asked for information did not record specific incidents of violence and intimidation in connection with the 2024 elections¹⁹.

However, having consulted many information sources, following examples of violent and intimidating action can be mentioned that might have had impact on the elections.

In May 2024, the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Róbert Fico, was shot during a meeting with the inhabitants of Handlová²⁰. After the attack, his condition was very serious and required several operations and several weeks of treatment. As of the end of 2024, the attack on the Prime Minister was still under investigation and no detailed information or conclusions from the investigation have been made public, nor have charges been brought to court yet. The attacker, who was an elderly man, is being prosecuted in detention.

Subsequently, the Government of the Slovak Republic tightened security measures (monitoring of shopping centres, places with increased presence of people, dwellings of public officials, state administration buildings and other buildings of public importance and monitoring hate speech on social media)²¹ and adopted legislation that restricted certain aspects of public assembly (the so-called LEX ATENTÁT)²².

¹⁹ Information provided by the Ministry of Interior (on 22 November 2024), the Public Defender of Rights (on 15 November 2024), Slovak National Human Rights Centre (on 22 November 2024) via e-mail upon request.

²⁰ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR*) (2024), '[Na predsedu vlády SR bol spáchaný atentát](#)', 15 May 2024.

²¹ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR*) (2024), '[Po atentáte na predsedu vlády je výkon polície navýšený o 30 až 40 percent](#)', 19 May 2024.

²² Slovakia, [Act No. 166/2024 Coll. on certain measures to improve the security situation in the Slovak Republic](#) (*Zákon č. 166/2024 Z.z. o niektorých opatreniach na zlepšenie bezpečnostnej situácie v Slovenskej republike*), 27 June 2024.

In connection with the attack on the Prime Minister, the police recorded more than 150 cases of hate speech or endorsement of the crime of attempted murder of the Prime Minister. Most of these took the form of endorsements of the attack on social media²³.

The National Council of the Slovak Republic approved a statement condemning the attack²⁴.

In March 2024, a young woman broke into the home of then-President Zuzana Čaputová at night. The woman was behaving deranged and under the influence of alcohol. The woman was subsequently detained and taken to hospital, and the case was further investigated by the police²⁵.

This incident was not an isolated one that Zuzana Čaputová faced during her presidency (2019 – 2024). Protests were held outside her private house on several occasions, a bomb was reported in her home, and she faced numerous other attacks and threats²⁶.

During her term in office, Zuzana Čaputová has been the target of various disinformation campaigns and hate speeches, also spread by several political parties and politicians. As a result of these campaigns, she has also faced numerous threats and even physical attacks. For example, the chairman of the SMER - SSD party repeatedly spread the lie about her that she was an American agent and that she had consulted the American embassy about the composition of the government of officials²⁷. Back in 2022, the district court (and later higher courts) ruled that a member of the SMER - SSD party could not publish and disseminate false claims about the President that she was a traitor, an agent of foreign powers, or that she was controlled by the United States²⁸. According to Zuzana Čaputová, this incitement to hatred has been translated from social networks into reality in the form of specific hate speeches and threats that have had to be dealt with by the police.

²³ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR*) (2024), [‘NAKA rieši až 153 prípadov nenávisťných prejavov či schvaľovania zločinu pokusu o vraždu predsedu vlády’](#), 24 May 2024.

²⁴ Slovakia, National Council of the Slovak Republic (*Národná rada SR*) (2024), [Uznesenie Národnej rady SR z 21. mája 2024 k atentátu na predsedu vlády Slovenskej republiky Róberta Fica](#).

²⁵ Slovakia, Police of the Slovak Republic (*Polícia SR*), [FB post from 4 March 2024](#).

²⁶ SME Daily (2024), [‘Čaputovej sa dobíjali do domu uprostred noci, Hegerov byt si prišiel obhliadnuť útočník zo Zámockej’](#), 16 May 2024.

²⁷ Slovakia, President of the Slovak Republic (*Prezidentka SR*) (2023), [FB post from 9 May 2023](#).

²⁸ Slovakia, President of the Slovak Republic (*Prezidentka SR*) (2023), [FB post from 24 March 2022](#).

In June 2023, a year before the end of her first mandate, Zuzana Čaputová announced that she would no longer run for President of the Slovak Republic for the next electoral term²⁹. Officially, she justified her decision not to run again mainly by the fact that she had served her mandate in a very difficult period, which was marked mainly by the Covid-19 pandemic, the outbreak of war in Ukraine and frequent changes of governments in Slovakia, and that she did not have enough strength to continue in the next term. However, in media interviews, she admitted that the personal reasons and the attacks experienced by her closest family also weighed³⁰.

²⁹ Slovakia, President of the Slovak Republic (*Prezidentka SR*) (2023), [FB post from 20 June 2023](#).

³⁰ SME Daily (2023), [‘Zuzana Čaputová exkluzívne pre SME: Prečo som sa rozhodla nekandidovať’](#), 20 June 2023.

3. Attempts at online and offline disinformation and manipulation of voters during 2024 elections

2024 ODIHR report on presidential elections in Slovakia states that disinformation is widespread and has a clear impact on voters' attitudes on important issues such as the war in Ukraine or the general role of the EU. Efforts by the state to combat the spread of disinformation have faced setbacks due to personnel reshuffles within the strategic communication departments of the Government Office and various ministries and the cancellation of a governmental grant scheme to support media literacy and combat disinformation³¹.

However, no specific reports, research or studies by government or other public authorities have been published on the topic of disinformation and manipulation of voters. No specific attempts to manipulate voters through disinformation and other manipulative techniques were officially recorded by the public authorities.³² The last relevant report on efforts to undermine the transparency and credibility of electoral processes and to influence elections through disinformation was issued by the Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats (which is the unit of the Ministry of Interior) in October 2023 after the parliamentary elections³³.

The report from 2023 states that, in particular, narratives were circulated prior to the elections that questioned the legitimate conduct of the parliamentary elections, resulting in opinion polls suggesting that up to 53% of people thought the election would be rigged. There were several misleading and deceptive content disseminated before and during the 2023 parliamentary elections. For instance - deepfake video alleged conversation between the chair of the political party Progressive Slovakia (*Progresívne Slovensko*) and journalist was circulating on social media. At the same time, according to this report, several other narratives were spread - for example, the information that the US was trying to manipulate the elections in favour of the aforementioned Progressive Slovakia. A number of disinformation was also

³¹ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2024), [Slovak Republic. Presidential elections 23 March and 6 April 2024. ODIHR election expert team final report](#), 22 November 2024, p. 14.

³² Based on information requests sent to relevant public authorities, such as Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Public Defender of Rights, Slovak National Human Rights Centre, etc.

³³ Slovakia, Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats, Institute of Administrative and Security Analyses of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Centrum boja proti hybridným hrozbám, Inštitút správnych a bezpečnostných analýz Ministerstva vnútra SR*) (2023), [Analýza šírenia klamlivého a zavádzajúceho obsahu súvisiaceho s voľbami do Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky](#), October 2023.

spread about the conduct of the elections themselves in order to cast doubt on their legitimacy and democratic process³⁴.

In 2024, two elections were held. There were two rounds of presidential elections in March and April 2024, and elections to the European Parliament in June. Although no comprehensive studies on disinformation and efforts to manipulate these elections have been published, several organisations monitored the situation regularly and the Ministry of the Interior issued warnings before both elections about the possible spread of disinformation.

Election of the President of the Slovak Republic

Prior to the presidential elections, the Ministry of the Interior issued a press release on the possibility of spreading disinformation and deepfake videos. The Ministry appealed to citizens to be cautious when dealing with information related to the presidential elections. According to the Ministry, fraudulent and false information, including deepfake recordings, are becoming part of attempts to manipulate public opinion before and during the elections.³⁵

These threats were also highlighted by the National Security Authority in March 2024, which warned of an increased risk of cybersecurity incidents and other harmful activities in cyberspace in the wake of the presidential elections. It has advised all entities involved in the electoral process, including all registered candidates, to implement measures to secure their accounts, sites and information systems³⁶.

However, neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the National Security Authority published an analysis of the election process, the actual spread of disinformation or cyber-attacks after the elections.

The InfoSecurity.sk portal (which is a project and organisational unit of the civic organisation Adapt Institute) regularly monitors the spread of disinformation and hoaxes in public space. In the period after the first round of the presidential elections, in their regular monitoring they reported that disinformation was mainly related to one of the candidates, with many disinformation coming directly from the government coalition, which was subsequently massively disseminated in the disinformation scene on the Internet. "The attempt was to portray this candidate as a betrayer of Slovakia and a person who defends the interests of the Western powers, as a warmonger who acts contrary to the interests of Slovakia" (more information about this disinformation campaign is mentioned in the next sub-section of this

³⁴ Slovakia, Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats, Institute of Administrative and Security Analyses of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Centrum boja proti hybridným hrozbám, Inštitút správnych a bezpečnostných analýz Ministerstva vnútra SR*) (2023), [Analýza šírenia klamlivého a zavádzajúceho obsahu súvisiaceho s voľbami do Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky](#), October 2023.

³⁵ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR*) (2024) '[Vyzývame na ostrážitosť v súvislosti s možným šírením deepfake obsahu pred voľbami](#)', 20 March 2024.

³⁶ Slovakia, National Security Authority (*Národný bezpečnostný úrad*) (2024) '[Hrozia útoky, deepfake videá aj pokusy o ovplyvňovanie verejnej mienky](#)', 18 March 2024.

report).³⁷ At the same time, during this period, a ruling party member shared a video on his social networks before the first round of the presidential elections in which he shared false information about the manipulation of opinion poll results. In the video, the polling agency was described as an 'ally of George Soros' and the candidate who was leading the poll at the time was labelled as an agent of foreign (Western) powers. The video was subsequently shared on the official Facebook page of the ruling party³⁸.

Before the second round of the presidential elections, the Infosecurity.sk portal carried out a qualitative analysis of online content related to the elections. Out of 347 analysed posts, 243 were classified as manipulative. The manipulation was mainly related to the fact that one candidate was portrayed as a supporter of "war" and the other candidate as a "supporter of peace". According to these narratives, the victory of one of the candidates would lead to Slovakia 'being drawn into war'. The most manipulative posts appeared on Facebook, Telegram and YouTube³⁹.

During the elections, a fake website of one of the candidates was also published, which copied the visuals of the candidate's official website, using the same colours and fonts. However, the fraudulent page contained a number of fictional quotes intended to manipulate the perception of the presidential candidate⁴⁰.

The Slovak Governance Institute (NGO), which verifies the correctness of information disseminated in the public space within the Demagog.sk portal, has also stated that during the presidential elections many misleading information was disseminated. One of these was the information about the manipulation of the vote count, which was supposed to have occurred in the last phase of the vote count and was supposed to have been the responsibility of the software company ESET, which, according to these messages, was trying to manipulate the elections. The portal Demagog.sk analysed these narratives and pointed out their falsity and misleading⁴¹.

A specific example of the spread of disinformation during the Presidential election campaign

The example concerns the pre-election disinformation campaign against Ivan Korčok, a presidential candidate, who ran in the presidential elections as an independent with the support of the opposition and about whom various false claims and disinformation were

³⁷ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Korčok, Európska únia a RTVS. Dezinformační aktéri na Slovensku pokračujú v budovaní atmosféry strachu a nenávisti](#)`, 30 March 2024.

³⁸ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Korčok, Európska únia a RTVS. Dezinformační aktéri na Slovensku pokračujú v budovaní atmosféry strachu a nenávisti](#)`, 30 March 2024.

³⁹ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Bičovanie emócií a budovanie strachu z vojny. Prinášame prehľad dezinformačných posolstiev druhého kola prezidentských volieb](#)`, 3 June 2024.

⁴⁰ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Bičovanie emócií a budovanie strachu z vojny. Prinášame prehľad dezinformačných posolstiev druhého kola prezidentských volieb](#)`, 3 June 2024.

⁴¹ Jursová Prachárová, V. (2024), `[Prezidentské voľby neboli sfaľované](#)`, demagog.sk, 28 March 2024.

spread during the campaign. The campaign against him was conducted not only by various disinformation media, but also by the coalition political parties and their politicians. The narrative of disinformation campaign was saying that he supported war as such, had in the past allegedly declared his support for various military conflicts in the world and was currently supporting the war in Ukraine, in which he also wanted to drag Slovakia into and sent Slovak soldiers to Ukraine⁴².

In line with this narrative, the Minister of the Interior from the political party HLAS - Social Democracy (from the same party was a rival candidate for the presidency) published more than 20 paid posts on social networks during the election campaign between 24 March and 4 April 2024, which were viewed more than 800,000 times by users of social networks. In response to the involvement of the Minister of the Interior in the campaign, civil society organisations (MEMO98, Transparency International Slovakia, Stop Corruption Foundation) have filed a complaint with the State Commission for Elections⁴³. They argued that there may have been a violation of the Election Campaign Act⁴⁴, which prohibits the involvement of third parties in election campaigns. In their view, the Minister of the Interior had campaigned as a third party against one of the presidential candidates.

The State Commission for Elections forwarded the complaint to the Bratislava District Office and the Ministry of the Interior for administrative proceedings⁴⁵. The Bratislava District Office (which falls under the Ministry of the Interior) decided on 28 August 2024 that there was no violation of the law⁴⁶. The civic organisations have once again asked the State Commission for Elections to take a position on the case in accordance with its competences and have also asked the General Prosecutor's Office to investigate the legality of the procedure of the public

⁴² Infosecurity.sk (2024), [‘Bičovanie emócií a budovanie strachu z vojny. Prinášame prehľad dezinformačných posolstiev druhého kola prezidentských volieb’](#), 3 June 2024.

⁴³ MEMO98 – Transparency International Slovensko – Nadácia Zastavme korupciu (2024), [Preskúmanie obsahu podnetov mimovládnych organizácií a žiadosť o stanovisko](#), 17 October 2024.

⁴⁴ Slovakia, [Act No. 181/2014 Coll on election campaign and on amendment and supplementation of Act No. 85/2005 Coll. on political parties and political movements, as amended](#) (Zákon č. 181/2014 Z.z. o volebnej kampani a o zmene a doplnení zákona č. 85/2005 Z. z. o politických stranách a politických hnutiach v znení neskorších predpisov), 29 May 2014.

⁴⁵ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic/State Commission for Elections and Control of Political Party Financing (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR/Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovanie politických strán*) (2024), [Uznesenia z 5. zasadnutia](#), 6-7 April 2024.

⁴⁶ MEMO98 (2024), [Rozhodnutie Okresného úradu Bratislava z 28. augusta 2024](#).

authorities⁴⁷. In December 2024, the Bratislava I District Prosecutor's Office sided with the opinion of the civic organizations and challenged the decision of the Bratislava District Office⁴⁸.

European Parliament elections

Similarly to the presidential elections, the Ministry of the Interior has issued an appeal for caution before the EP elections against the spread of disinformation and deepfake videos created by artificial intelligence. At the same time, it issued recommendations for voters on how not to be influenced by disinformation.⁴⁹

Before the European Parliament elections, a survey of voters' pre-election concerns was conducted by the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO). This research compared the views of V4 citizens on possible influence on the elections. While respondents in the Czech Republic perceived the greatest likelihood of foreign governments or international institutions influencing the June EP elections in the order of Russia (44%), the European Union itself (40%) and the United States (36%), **respondents in Slovakia expressed their expectations of a possible influence on the elections in the order of the European Union (39%), the United States (38%) and Russia as the third actor (36%)**. In Hungary, Russia (54%) is perceived as the most likely actor in terms of influence on the elections, In Poland, the largest share of respondents expressed expectations of Russian influence (63%).⁵⁰

The Adapt Institute, an analytical think-tank that focuses on defence and security policy, published an analysis before the European elections, according to which there was more mobilisation for the EP elections than in other years, but often at the cost of spreading disinformation. Paradoxically, according to this analysis, several political parties tried to mobilise their voters by criticising the EU and spreading disinformation about the potential loss of Slovakia's sovereignty. Research shows that a third of people in Slovakia perceive their values to be threatened by the EU and as many as 66% think that "the EU dictates what we should do and we cannot influence it". This creates room for the reinforcement of such narratives and the spread of disinformation, which, according to this analysis, was also used by a number of parties in the election campaign.⁵¹

⁴⁷ MEMO98 – Transparency International Slovensko – Nadácia Zastavme korupciu (2024), '[Preskúmanie obsahu podnetov mimovládnych organizácií a žiadosť o stanovisko](#)', 17 October 2024.

⁴⁸ Transparency International Slovensko (2024), '[Prokuratúra dala za pravdu mimovládkam, v predovolebných platených statusoch Šutaja Eštoka vidí porušenie zákona](#)', 19 December 2024.

⁴⁹ Slovakia, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo vnútra SR*) (2024), '[Polícia prijala opatrenia na zabezpečenie ochrany verejného poriadku, života a zdravia počas volieb do európskeho parlamentu](#)', 6 June 2024,

⁵⁰ Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO) (2024), '[More than a third of the citizens of the V4 countries perceive foreign attempts to influence European elections as a big problem](#)'.

⁵¹ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), '[Európske voľby v zajatí dezinformácií](#)', 16 May 2024.

In April 2024, the InfoSecurity.sk portal pointed out that the dissemination of disinformation is becoming more active even before the European elections. Paradoxically, it was mainly politicians who were also running for a seat in the European Parliament who were spreading disinformation. In their communications, they mainly used themes such as the potential loss of sovereignty and the protection of traditional values. The narratives that directly pit the European Union and Russia against each other have dominated the Slovak information space. In the context of protecting traditional values, Brussels and the EU have long been portrayed as a threat to traditional Slovak values and sovereignty. The other polarising narratives were related to LGBTI+, gender or faith⁵².

In May and June 2024, these narratives intensified, with some of the MEP candidates in particular starting to spread them more prominently. According to the analysis of InfoSecurity from May 2024, the EP elections were falsely interpreted as a choice between 'war and peace'. A qualitative analysis of social media posts showed that political actors became significantly more active in the European Parliament election campaign during this period. Their communication, which often used non-factual information and manipulative techniques, focused in particular on polarisation and themes undermining the image of the European Union in the voters' minds⁵³.

At the same time, at the height of the campaign, narratives related to the migration pact and its potentially negative impacts began to appear much more on disinformation websites, as well as on the candidates' websites. Other narratives related to the Green Deal and LGBTI "ideology" were presented mainly by representatives of the far-right movements, but also by other political parties running for the European Parliament.⁵⁴

⁵² InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Strach z vojny a démonizácia Bruselu. Dezinformační aktéri na Slovensku naďalej polarizujú spoločnosť](#)`, 21 April 2024.

⁵³ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Strašenie Západom, démonizácia pomoci Ukrajine a útoky na médiá. Prokremeľskí aktéri sa pred eurovoľbami vracajú do starých koľají](#)`, 6 May 2024.

⁵⁴ InfoSecurity.sk (2024), `[Kampaň eurovoľieb vrcholila zneužívaním atentátu na Fica. Pokračovali aj útoky na Brusel a médiá](#)`, 15 June 2024.

Annex 1 – Promising practice

Promising practice	
Title (original language)	No promising practices were identified.
Title (EN)	
Organisation (original language)	
Organisation (EN)	
Government / Civil society	
Funding body	
Reference (incl. URL, where available)	
Indicate the start date of the promising practice and the finishing date if it has ceased to exist	
Type of initiative	
Main target group	
Indicate level of implementation: Local/Regional/National	
Brief description (max. 1000 chars)	
Highlight any element of the actions that is transferable (max. 500 chars)	

Promising practice	
Give reasons why you consider the practice as sustainable (as opposed to 'one off activities')	
Give reasons why you consider the practice as having concrete measurable impact	
Give reasons why you consider the practice as transferable to other settings and/or Member States?	
Explain, if applicable, how the practice involves beneficiaries and stakeholders in the design, planning, evaluation, review assessment and implementation of the practice	
Explain, if applicable, how the practice provides for review and assessment	

Frnet national contribution to the Fundamental Rights Report 2025

Effectively protecting women victims of violence

Slovakia

Contractor's name: Centre for the Research of Ethnicity and
Culture

Author's name: Elena Gallo Kriglerová, Alena Holka Chudžíková,
Jana Kadlečíková, Michaela Píšová

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2. Standing of victims of gender-based violence during criminal proceedings	12
3. Annex 1 – Promising practice	15
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1. Legal and Policy measures to address violence against women including its criminalisation

If relevant, please describe what measures were taken to ratify or implement the Istanbul Convention or prepare for the transposition of the VAW Directive. If relevant, please describe particular aspects of these measures relating to:

- a. Technology-facilitated gender-based violence, specifically non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material (Art. 5 VAW Directive), cyber stalking (Art. 6 VAW Directive), cyber harassment (Art. 7 VAW Directive) and cyber incitement to violence or hatred (Art. 8 VAW Directive).
- b. Reporting crimes of violence against women, including third party reporting and/or the use of technology to report (online or in-app reporting) (Art. 14(1) VAW Directive).
- c. Secondary victimization (e.g. negative treatment of victims by the police/criminal justice system) and repeat victimisation (e.g. common in intimate partner relationships), including adoption of immediate response measures such as barring orders (Art. 50 - 52 of the Istanbul Convention and Art. 16 (5) and 19 VAW Directive), restraining and protection orders (Art 53 Istanbul Convention and Art. and 19 VAW Directive), and other measures such as protecting victims against intimidation (Art. 56 Istanbul Convention and Art. 18, 20 and 21 VAW Directive).
- d. Women victims of violence who are public representatives, journalists or human rights defenders (for example allowing this to be regarded as an aggravating circumstance, Art. 11 (n) VAW Directive).

Table 1 – Legislative and policy measures

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
Slovakia, Act amending Act No. 544/2010 Coll. on subsidies within the competence of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of	§ 9a Subsidy for the promotion of equality of women and men and equal opportunities (1)	In April 2024, the Government approved an amendment to the Subsidies Act that responded to the need to more effectively support women experiencing violence through so-called "safe houses".

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
<p>the Slovak Republic, as amended (Zákon, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 544/2010 Z. z. o dotáciách v pôsobnosti Ministerstva práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov), 25 April 2024</p>	<p>A subsidy to promote equality between women and men and equal opportunities may be granted for activities or actions aimed at (g) preventing and supporting the coping with domestic violence and other threatening behaviour by other physical persons.</p> <p>(5) A subsidy for the promotion of equality between women and men and equal opportunities under (1) g may be granted to an applicant in the relevant financial year up to a maximum of EUR 150 000.</p>	<p>According to the author of the amendment, the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, the aim of the amendment is to provide more significant support for activities aimed at preventing and supporting the tackle of domestic violence and other threats to the behaviour of other natural persons by increasing the maximum amount of the subsidy for the promotion of equality between women and men and equal opportunities for these activities and activities from EUR 20 000 to EUR 150 000 in the relevant budget year. In order to strengthen the protection of the fundamental human rights of victims of domestic and partner violence, it is necessary to support emergency housing facilities, namely women's safe houses and counselling centres, so that they can continue to provide these services to victims of domestic violence on a continuous basis¹.</p> <p>At the same time, the aim of this measure is to ensure the sustainability of the provision of specialised services and to support the creation of new services to ensure that women experiencing violence and their children are provided with</p>

¹ Slovakia, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (*Ministerstvo práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny SR*) (2024) `Návrh zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 544/2010 Z. z. o dotáciách v pôsobnosti Ministerstva práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov, predkladacia správa`, 9 april 2024.

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
		adequate and accessible crisis assistance and long-term support. ²
<p>Slovakia, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic (<i>Ministerstvo práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny SR</i>), 'Správa o plnení úloh Národného akčného plánu pre prevenciu a elimináciu násilia na ženách na roky 2022 – 2027 – návrh', material No. UV-22745/2024, 29 May 2024.</p> <p>Slovakia, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic (<i>Ministerstvo práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny SR</i>), 'Národný akčný plán pre prevenciu a elimináciu násilia na ženách na roky 2022 – 2027', December 2021.</p>	<p>Priority area 1 - Protection of women experiencing violence</p> <p>Priority Area 2 - Prevention of violence against women</p>	<p>Report on the implementation of the tasks of the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Elimination of Violence against Women for 2022-2027 provides information on measures implemented in 2022 and 2023. Similar report is to be published in 2025 for 2024.</p> <p>With respect to Priority area 1, in 2023, there were a total of 21 accredited facilities, 10 of which were intervention centres providing assistance and support to women experiencing violence. Counselling and support for women experiencing violence was also provided by regional information offices for victims of crime.</p> <p>In Priority Area 2, a Methodology for Understanding Key Concepts and Theories on Domestic Violence and Sexualized</p>

² Slovakia, Ministry of Labour, social Affairs and Family (*Ministerstvo práce, sociálnych vecí a rodiny SR*) (2024) '[Schválená novela zákona o dotáciách prinesie efektívnejšiu podporu pre ženy zažívajúce násilie](#)', press release, 24 April 2024.

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
		<p>Violence against Women³ was published. The aim of this methodology is to introduce methods to protect victims of gender-based violence from secondary victimization.</p> <p>In 2023, the Judicial Academy also organized several trainings for judges, prosecutors and senior judicial officials on various aspects of gender-based violence, including the prevention of secondary victimization.</p> <p>Training workshops were also provided by the Coordination and Methodology Centre for the Prevention of Violence against Women. They targeted public administration staff and supported the provision of qualified assistance and strengthening the non-victimising approach. In 2023, the Coordination and Methodology Centre also published an online course for experts and professionals⁴, in particular front-liners providing support to victims of violence against women and domestic violence. Coordination and Methodology Centre also created an accredited specialisation training for police investigators.</p>

³ Burajová, B. (2023), '[Metodika k porozumeniu kľúčových pojmov a teórií o problematike domáceho násillia a sexualizovaného násillia na ženách](#)', Bratislava, Institute for Labour and Family Research.

⁴ Slovakia, Coordination and Methodology Centre for the Prevention of Violence against Women (*Koordináčno-metodické centrum pre prevenciu násillia na ženách*) (2024), [Online vzdelávanie o domácom násillí na ženách](#).

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
		<p>Under the Priority area 2, discussions were held under the auspices of the Police of the Slovak Republic and the Coordination and Methodology Centre for the public, educational institutions and employees of local and regional governments.</p> <p>In June 2023, Presidium of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic updated the methodological manual "Methodology of the police procedure in cases of domestic violence", which is intended for first contact officers and for police investigators. The update was mainly focused on the work and communication with victims of domestic violence to ensure the protection of particularly vulnerable victims from secondary victimisation and re-victimisation.</p>
<p>Slovakia, Act No. 40/2024 Coll. amending Act No. 300/2005 Coll., the Criminal Code and Act No. 301/2005 Coll. the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zákon č. 40/2024 Z.z. ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 300/2005 Z. z. Trestný zákon v znení neskorších predpisov a ktorým sa menia a</p>	<p>§76a of the Criminal Code §446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure</p>	<p>Until this amendment, there were almost no rules concerning protective treatment or outpatient treatment of perpetrators whose detention has been suspended on grounds of insanity. It was not clear what a healthcare facility carrying out outpatient treatment should do if the patient does not communicate and does not comply with the deadlines for examinations. At the same time, a very long time could elapse between the prosecutor's proposal to order inpatient treatment and the court's decision, when the offender was at</p>

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
<p>dopĺňajú niektoré zákony), 6 August 2024.</p>		<p>large and in a legal vacuum. These problems have been particularly evident in cases of violence against women.⁵</p> <p>The new §76a of the Criminal Code introduces the so-called protective supervision, which can be imposed on an offender of an otherwise criminal offence who is not criminally liable due to insanity and imposes protective treatment in an outpatient form. §76a regulates the procedure to be followed by both mediation and probation officers and health care facilities when the offender fails to comply with the conditions of outpatient treatment.</p> <p>The amendment to §446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for a preliminary order to be issued for the placement of a convicted person in a health care facility, which must be justified, upon the proposal of the public prosecutor or a health care institution. Prior to the decision being made, the convicted person shall be heard, if his/her state of health so permits. The decision to issue a preliminary order shall be made within 48 hours of receipt of the proposal by the court. Execution of the preliminary order must follow immediately without delay.</p>

⁵ Denník N (2024), [‘Prípád únoscu študentky v Bratislave môžu znovu otvoriť. Nové argumenty spochybňujú jeho nepríčetnosť’](#), 24 July 2024.

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
Slovakia, Government of the Slovak Republic (<i>Vláda SR</i>) (2024), Resolution No. 589/2024 of 2 October 2024 on the proposal for the designation of the central government authorities and certain public authorities responsible for the transposition and application of the Directives.	B.24 of the Resolution	The Government instructs the Minister of Justice, in cooperation with the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, to submit to the Government for discussion draft legislation to ensure the transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence by 30 June 2026.
Allocation of funds for the operation of national helplines for persons in an adverse social situation, at risk of violence or persons with mental health risks, including children, by providing remote crisis assistance under the National Project "Prevention and elimination of violence and social exclusion through national helplines". ⁶	Activity 1.2 - Preventing the threat of violence and promoting non-discrimination against women through the National Hotline for Women Experiencing Violence Activity 1.3. - Promoting mental health through the National Mental Health Helpline	The National Project "Prevention and elimination of violence and social exclusion through national helplines" is aimed at providing anonymous chat, e-mail and telephone distance counselling, crisis intervention and prevention in the field of protection of children from violence, mental health and protection of women against violence. The project is implemented from 01/2024 to 12/2026 by the Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family in cooperation with two partners: Ministry of Health and Institute the Research of Labour and Family. The project is funded by EU funds under the Slovakia Programme. The project will support the funding of existing national helplines. On 10 October 2024, the national helplines that submitted an application for a non-refundable financial contribution under the call for proposals published from the national project established for the

⁶ Slovakia, Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo zdravotníctva SR*) (2024), '[Prevenčia a eliminácia násillia a sociálneho vylúenia prostredníctvom národných liniek pomoci](#)', press release.

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
		<p>funding of the helplines received a positive notification of approval of the projects. This is the first time in the history of the Slovak Republic that financial resources have been allocated specifically for the activities of the helplines. The grants relate only to the costs associated with achieving a minimum standard, i.e. two counsellors will work on the line simultaneously. However, a law is expected to be adopted later that will define what the minimum standards are and what types of entities can be called a helpline to be eligible for funding from the subsidy scheme, which will allow a sustainable funding for the helplines after this pilot from the EU funds has ended.⁷</p>
<p>Grants for accredited organisations to provide specialized professional assistance to victims of domestic violence and for Intervention centres for 2025⁸</p>		<p>At the end of November 2024, the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic has opened two calls for grant applications organisations providing assistance to victims of gender-based violence. One call is intended for accredited organisations that provide specialized assistance to victims of violence. The second call is intended for so-called Intervention centres providing assistance for victims of domestic violence. Both types of organisations can submit their grant application for funding their activities in 2025. The calls are announced based on the Act No. 302/2016 Coll. on the provision of</p>

⁷ Slovakia, Mental Health League (*Liga za duševné zdravie*), '[Schválenie žiadosti na financovanie liniek pomoci otvára dvere k ďalšej spolupráci medzi štátom a tretím sektorom](#)', press release, 17 October 2024.

⁸ Slovakia, Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic (*Ministerstvo spravodlivosti SR*) (2024), [Dotácie pre akreditované subjekty – Výzva pre akreditované subjekty na rok 2025 a Výzva pre intervenčné centrá na rok 2025](#).

Legislative act / Policy measure (including web-link)	Specific provision / paragraph / page	Briefly describe the specific focus on women as victims of violence (including specific aspects asked about in a-d)
		subsidies by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic⁹ and Decree of the Ministry of Justice No. 322/2016 Coll.¹⁰ and Act No. 274/2017 Coll. on victims of crime¹¹ .

⁹ Slovakia, [Act No. 302/2016 Coll. on the provision of subsidies by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic and amending and supplementing other acts, as amended](#) (Zákon č. 302/2016 Z.z. o poskytovaní dotácií v pôsobnosti Ministerstva spravodlivosti Slovenskej republiky a o zmene a doplnení ďalších zákonov v znení neskorších predpisov), 25 October 2016.

¹⁰ Slovakia, [Decree of the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic No. 322/2016 Coll. on the composition, decision-making, organisation of work and procedure of the Commission for the evaluation of applications for subsidies and the criteria for the evaluation of applications for subsidies](#) (Vyhláška Ministerstva spravodlivosti Slovenskej republiky č. 322/2016 Z.z. o zložení, rozhodovaní, organizácii práce a postupe komisie pri vyhodnocovaní žiadostí o poskytnutie dotácie a o kritériách pre vyhodnocovanie žiadostí o poskytnutie dotácie), 18 November 2016.

¹¹ Slovakia, [Act no. 274/2017 Coll. on victims of crime and on amendment and supplementation of certain acts](#) (Zákon č. 274/2017 Z.z. o obetiach trestných činov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov), 12 October 2017.

2. Standing of victims of gender-based violence during criminal proceedings

Please briefly elaborate on the standing of victims of gender-based violence in 2024 during criminal proceedings (as witness, civil party, damaged party, auxiliary prosecutor or party to the proceedings).

The concept of a victim of a crime is regulated by Act no. 274/2017 Coll. on victims of crime¹². This Act defines the concept of a victim of crime, as well as the concept of a particularly vulnerable victim (Section 2) and the principles of protection and support of victims (Section 3). Any person who claims to be a victim is considered a victim until proven otherwise (Section 3 para 1). A particularly vulnerable victim is considered to be a. a person under 18 years of age, b. a person over 75 years of age, c. a person with a disability, d. a victim of a crime of trafficking in human beings, involuntary disappearance, cruelty to a close and public person, a crime committed by an organized group, certain crimes against human dignity and terrorism, and a crime of domestic violence. Furthermore, a particularly vulnerable victim is d. a victim of a crime committed by violence or threat of violence because of his or her gender, sexual orientation, nationality, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief; and f. a victim of another crime who is at a higher risk of repeated victimisation or secondary victimisation as determined by an individual assessment of the victim.

The mentioned Act further specifies that a victim of crime has the right to information (Section 4), the right to professional assistance in the form of general and/or specialized professional assistance (Section 5), the right to legal aid (Section 7), the right to protection from secondary and repeated victimization (Section 8), and the right to compensation in the event of a violent crime (Section 10). The Act further regulates the conditions and process of accreditation of victim support organisations. The process of accreditation of victim support organisations is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, which maintains a register of accredited providers. Organisations that meet the conditions for obtaining accreditation may apply for a subsidy for the provision of victim support. The procedure is regulated by the Act on

¹² Slovakia, [Act no. 274/2017 Coll. on victims of crime as amended](#) (*Zákon č. 274/2017 Z.z. o obetiach trestných činov v znení neskorších predpisov*), 12 October 2017.

the provision of subsidies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice¹³. For the year 2024, 9 victim support organisations have been supported with a total amount of EUR 382 thousand to provide assistance to victims¹⁴.

Under the Act on the victims of crime¹⁵, a victim has the status of a whistleblower, aggrieved or witness in criminal proceedings and is entitled to the rights and obligations provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure related to that status¹⁶.

The most extensive rights in criminal proceedings are granted by law to the aggrieved party (Chapter 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), who is a person who has been injured by a criminal offence, or whose property, moral or other damage has been caused, or whose other rights or freedoms protected by law have been violated or endangered. The aggrieved party has the right to claim damages, to present evidence, to inspect the files, to attend the main hearing and the public hearing held on appeal or on the plea agreement and sentence, to comment on the evidence taken, to make a closing speech and to lodge appeals within the scope defined by law. The victim shall have the right to be informed of the status of the criminal proceedings at any time during the criminal proceedings¹⁷.

In 2024, a major amendment to the criminal legislation was adopted, which lowered the penalties for economic, property and corruption offences and shortened the statute of limitations for certain offences. However, this amendment, adopted at the beginning of February 2024¹⁸, also included a reduction of the statute of limitations for

¹³ Slovakia, [Act no. 302/2016 Coll. on the provision of subsidies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice as amended](#) (Zákon č. 302/2016 Z.z. o poskytovaní dotácií v pôsobnosti Ministerstva spravodlivosti v znení neskorších predpisov), 25 October 2016.

¹⁴ Slovakia, Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic (Ministerstvo spravodlivosti SR) (2024), [Dotácie pre akreditované subjekty – Výzva na rok 2024](#).

¹⁵ Slovakia, [Act no. 274/2017 Coll. on victims of crime as amended](#) (Zákon č. 274/2017 Z.z. o obetiach trestných činov v znení neskorších predpisov), 12 October 2017, §3 (6).

¹⁶ Slovakia, [Act no. 301/2005 Coll. Code of Criminal Procedure as amended](#) (Zákon č. 301/2005 Z.z. Trestný poriadok v znení neskorších predpisov), 24 May 2005.

¹⁷ Slovakia, [Act no. 301/2005 Coll. Code of Criminal Procedure as amended](#) (Zákon č. 301/2005 Z.z. Trestný poriadok v znení neskorších predpisov), Chapter 7, 24 May 2005.

¹⁸ Slovakia, National Council of the Slovak Republic (Národná rada SR) (2024), [Government act amending Act No. 300/2005 Coll., the Criminal Code, as amended, and amending and supplementing certain acts](#) (Vládny návrh zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 300/2005 Z. z. Trestný zákon v znení neskorších predpisov a ktorým sa menia a dopĺňajú niektoré zákony), approved on 8 February 2024.

violent crimes. The limitation period was to be reduced from 20 years to 10 years for offences such as murder, manslaughter, bodily harm, gross coercion, abduction, rape, sexual violence, sexual abuse, torture or trafficking in human beings, or kidnapping and the production of child pornography. Following widespread criticism from the professional community, the President of the Slovak Republic, CSOs and opposition political parties¹⁹, the Government hastily tabled another amendment to the criminal legislation, which retained the previous statute of limitations for aforementioned violent crimes²⁰. This government amendment was approved by the National Council on 28 February 2024 and introduced the previously applicable limitation period (20 years) for violent crimes instead of the shortened period (10 years) approved at the beginning of February 2024.

¹⁹ Slovakia, President of Slovak Republic (*Prezidentka SR*), [Information published on official FB page of President of Slovak Republic on 9 February 2024](#); Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities (*Komisárka pre osoby so zdravotným postihnutím*) (2024), [‘Novela trestného zákona by sa nemala šiť horúcou ihlou’](#), 14 February 2024; *Možnosť voľby et al* (2024), [‘Napravte zásahy do práv obetí trestných činov. Stanovisko k prijatej novele trestného zákona’](#), 19 February 2024.

²⁰ Slovakia, National Council of the Slovak Republic (*Národná rada SR*) (2024), [Government act supplementing Act No 300/2005 Coll., the Criminal Code, as amended](#) (*Vládny návrh zákona, ktorým sa dopĺňa zákon č. 300/2005 Z. z. Trestný zákon v znení neskorších predpisov*), approved on 28 February 2024.

3. Annex 1 – Promising practice

Promising practice	
Title (original language)	No relevant promising practices have been identified.
Title (EN)	
Organisation (original language)	
Organisation (EN)	
Government / Civil society	
Funding body	
Reference (incl. URL, where available)	
Indicate the start date of the promising practice and the finishing date if it has ceased to exist	
Type of initiative	
Main target group	
Indicate level of implementation: Local/Regional/National	
Brief description (max. 1000 chars)	
Highlight any element of the actions that is transferable (max. 500 chars)	
Give reasons why you consider the practice as sustainable (as opposed to 'one off activities')	

Promising practice	
Give reasons why you consider the practice as having concrete measurable impact	
Give reasons why you consider the practice as transferable to other settings and/or Member States?	
Explain, if applicable, how the practice involves beneficiaries and stakeholders in the design, planning, evaluation, review assessment and implementation of the practice	
Explain, if applicable, how the practice provides for review and assessment	

4. Annex 2 - Case law

Case law	1
Deciding body (in original language)	European Court of Human Rights
Deciding body (in English)	European Court of Human Rights
Case number (also European Case Law Identifier ECLI , where applicable)	ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:1024JUD004858721
Parties	B.B. v. Slovakia
Decision date	24 October 2024
Web link to the decision (if available)	https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-237439
Which fundamental freedoms of (peaceful assembly, association and/or expression) were referred to in the case?	<p>Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms</p> <p>Article 4 – Prohibition of slavery and forced labour</p> <p>Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life</p>
Key facts of the case (max. 250 words)	<p>1. The applicant, a Slovak national of Roma origin, who grew up in state care, came to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as an adult with the help of a third party, where she engaged in prostitution. In the United Kingdom, she managed to make contact with the police, who recognized her as potential victim of trafficking in human beings and provided her with assistance. The applicant subsequently returned to Slovakia under the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) programme and was placed in the Slovak Catholic Charity's programme for victims of trafficking in human beings.</p> <p>The Slovak authorities have opened criminal proceedings following a report from the Slovak Catholic Charity in connection with a case of pimping linked to the arrangement of prostitution. In the criminal proceedings, a person who</p>

	<p>helped the applicant to get to the United Kingdom and profited from her prostitution was convicted of the offence of pimping. However, the applicant argued that the Slovak authorities failed to take into account that she had been identified as a victim of trafficking (the offence was classified as pimping and not trafficking in human beings, in addition, the applicant was removed from programme for the support and protection of victims of trafficking in human beings following the decision of the Ministry of Interior) and that the investigation was inadequate, which prevented her from obtaining support and compensation intended for victims of trafficking. She also claimed that the investigation was conducted in an insensitive manner, whereby she had to repeatedly testify about traumatic events regardless of her medical condition.</p> <p>2. The applicant lodged a complaint against the Slovak Republic with the ECHR under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The applicant complains under Article 4 and 8 of the Convention of (i) a lack of an effective investigation into the alleged offence of human trafficking; and (ii) a violation of the applicant's right to respect for her private life on account of the manner in which the criminal proceedings were conducted.</p>
<p>The key legal question raised by the Court</p>	<p>The case concerns proceedings that resulted in the conviction of an individual for the offence of pimping, committed against the applicant in circumstances indicative of human trafficking. Within the specific facts of the case, the Court considered the issue of whether there was a positive obligation under Article 4 of the Convention on the part of the respondent State to carry out an effective investigation into the latter offence (of trafficking) and, if such an obligation existed, whether the State complied with it.</p>
<p>Result of the case in terms of factual outcome, and in</p>	<p>The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Slovak authorities had failed to comply with their obligations under Article 4 of the Convention for the Protection of Human</p>

terms of assessment of the legal question raised	<p>Rights, which prohibits slavery and forced labour, and that the investigation had not been sufficiently thorough.</p> <p>On the basis of its findings, the ECHR awarded the applicant compensation of 26 thousand euros for non-pecuniary damage and 15 thousand euros for legal costs.</p>
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Case law	2
Deciding body (in original language)	Okresný súd Nitra
Deciding body (in English)	Nitra District Court
Case number (also European Case Law Identifier ECLI , where applicable)	4124011215 ECLI:SK:OSNR:2024:4124011215.2
Parties	Parties are anonymised in the court's decision.
Decision date	27 September 2024
Web link to the decision (if available)	https://www.justice.gov.sk/sudy-a-rozhodnutia/sudy/rozhodnutia/b8b7dac0-5483-497d-aaf9-564083e5dad2:7eac791a-c3aa-493f-b9c6-2295855ae570
Which fundamental freedoms of (peaceful assembly, association and/or expression) were referred to in the case?	The decision of the Court does refer to fundamental freedoms.
Key facts of the case (max. 250 words)	1. Between March 2023 and April 2024, defendant XY verbally and physically assaulted his wife and their two minor children while under the influence of alcohol. He regularly insulted and humiliated the victim AB with vulgar abuse and rude aggressive behaviour. From April onwards, the physical assaults began to escalate, and the accused threatened his wife and children with physical

	<p>assault and manslaughter. In addition, he took money and other items (e.g. food) from his wife and children and used them to buy alcohol. On 17 April 2024, the police evicted him from the shared household, which he violated on two occasions. As a result of the defendant's actions, the victim suffered from an adaptive depressive disorder and, together with the minor children, increased levels of stress, tension and disturbance of the family's overall peace, and the minors suffered from psychovegetative symptoms (headaches and stomach aches), which caused them psychological suffering.</p> <p>2. According to the Court, the defendant caused physical suffering and psychological suffering to a person close to him by beating, humiliating, causing fear and stress and other conduct endangering physical or psychological health, and he committed the offence in a more serious manner - against more than one person, and he committed repeated acts to frustrate the decision on eviction from the shared household issued under a special regulation.</p>
<p>The key legal question raised by the Court</p>	<p>According to the court's decision, the defendant committed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the crime of abuse of a close person and a person entrusted to him under section 208(1)(a), (3)(d) of the Criminal Code, with reference to section 138(j) of the Criminal Code, - and the offence of obstructing the execution of an official decision under section 348(1)(h) of the Criminal Code.

Result of the case in terms of factual outcome, and in terms of assessment of the legal question raised	The court sentenced the defendant to 5 years' imprisonment with a minimum custodial sentence and ordered the defendant to undergo protective treatment for alcoholism.
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