Portugal / Supreme Court of Justice / 25/25.3YFLSB
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Portugal / Supreme Court of Justice / 25/25.3YFLSB
Key facts of the case:
A. is a defendant in a high-profile criminal case in Portugal. Weeks before the start of A.’s trial, the Attorney General, head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, gave an interview stating that A. should be given the opportunity “to prove his innocence”. This public statement, combined with a history of official press releases by the Public Prosecutor’s Office detailing alleged crimes, investigative facts, and procedural acts related to the case but without mentioning the presumption of innocence, led A. to file a motion seeking to dismiss the Attorney General from the case. A. argued that the Attorney General hierarchical authority over the team of public prosecutors assigned to the case created a serious risk of bias and violated his presumption of innocence. Since national law permits the Attorney General and public prosecutors to issue public statements under certain conditions but does not require reference to the presumption of innocence or provide remedies for violations, A. requested that the Supreme Court of Justice to issue a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The aim was to clarify whether EU law (specifically Directive 2016/343 on the presumption of innocence, Articles 47 and 48 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union) forbids public statements by prosecutorial authorities that imply guilt, and whether national courts must exclude a public prosecutor from exercising hierarchical authority in such circumstances to safeguard fundamental rights. The Attorney General opposed the motion, arguing that public prosecutors act independently under judicial supervision and that the recusal request was unfounded.
Key legal question raised by the court:
The Supreme Court of Justice was asked to assess the dismissal of the Attorney General from the case, and to issue a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union, inquiring whether EU law requires national courts to prevent a public prosecutor who has publicly implied a defendant’s guilt from exercising hierarchical authority over public prosecutors during the trial, in order to safeguard the defendant’s presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial.
Outcome of the case:
The Court began by examining the request to dismiss the current Attorney General from intervening in a criminal case. It started by reiterating that the legal framework of refusals, impediments, and disqualifications set in place for judges also applies to public prosecutors, with necessary adaptations, to ensure impartiality and objectivity in the prosecution, particularly during the investigative phase of a case. Therefore, for a dismissal to be valid, the public prosecutor must have direct involvement in the specific case under consideration. The court emphasised that the Attorney General’s exercise of coordination powers under Article 92 of the Statute of the Public Prosecutor's Office, namely appointing public prosecutors to the trial team, does not constitute procedural intervention and does not make the Attorney General the direct superior of the trial team in a manner that could justify dismissal. Furthermore, the press releases indicated by AA. could not serve as grounds for dismissal because the current Attorney General had no involvement in their issuance, since their predecessors issued them. The Court further stated that the statements made by the Attorney General at the interview were not an attempt to influence the trial or the public prosecutors, but a comment on procedural fairness and the long duration of the case. The court concluded that these statements did not compromise the presumption of innocence or create a reasonable basis for suspicion.
Finally, the court also addressed the proposed preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union, finding it inappropriate because the questions raised were primarily factual and concerned the interpretation of the Attorney General’s statements, rather than matters of EU law. Thus, the requested preliminary ruling was not necessary for resolving the case. Ultimately, the court dismissed the case.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
The applicant states that none of the press releases made any mention of the presumption of innocence of the defendants and raises doubts as to the compatibility of national legislation "under which a leading body of the Public Prosecutor's Office, such as the Attorney General's Office, may issue successive official press releases on a specific criminal case before the final decision has become final, referring to the facts investigated therein, the crimes allegedly committed by the defendants, the means of evidence and evidence obtained and to be obtained, and other procedural acts that have taken place in the case (such as the filing of charges and the application of coercive measures), without any mention of the presumption of innocence of the defendants" and Articles 4(1) and (3), 10 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 and Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The applicant also invokes Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, citing the judgments delivered in Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, §§ 38 and 41, Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984/07, 22 April 2010, § 159, and G.C.P. v. Romania, no. 20899/03, 20 December 2011, § 60.
The case of Allenet de Ribemont v. France (no. 15175/89) concerned a press conference given by the Minister of the Interior, the Director of the Judicial Police of the Paris Police Headquarters and the Head of the Criminal Investigation Department, broadcast by two French television stations, in which, when questioned about the murder of a former minister which had taken place a few days earlier, those responsible designated Allenet de Ribemont, - “sans nuance ni réserve”; “without any qualification or reservation” - as one of the instigators of the murder, which amounted to a declaration of guilt on the part of that citizen.
In the case of Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan (no. 40984/07), the case concerned a statement made by a public prosecutor a few days after the start of the investigation, in which he unequivocally indicated a journalist - “sans nuance ni réserve”; “without any qualification or reservation” - as having written an article containing a threat of terrorism.
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In the case in question, the statements issued under Article 86(13)(b) of the CCP by the Attorney General's Office concerning the so-called “...” essentially provide information on: the occurrence of arrests; the occurrence of searches; the constitution of defendants; the application of coercive measures; the alteration of coercive measures; the challenge of the nullity of a judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal; the authorisation of access to the case files for all parties to the proceedings; the filing of an appeal; the issuance of various orders by the Attorney General regarding deadlines for the conclusion of the investigation and their extension; the issuance of the final order; the filing of a motion to recuse a judge.
All communications were issued by the ‘Attorney General's Office’ or the ‘Office of the Attorney General,’ i.e., by the offices of the predecessors of the current Attorney General.
Assuming that information relevant to the drafting of the statements was gathered from the Central Department of Investigation and Penal Action (DCIAP), where the investigation was being conducted, there is no doubt that responsibility for their content and issuance belonged to the Office of the Attorney General in office at the time.
Consequently, given that, in the period from 22 November 2014 to 12 September 2019, the person targeted by the refusal did not represent the Attorney General's Office, what can be inferred from the aforementioned press releases in relation to the principle of the presumption of innocence is clearly insufficient to determine the meaning of the decision regarding the present incident, which specifically targets the current Attorney General – who is not responsible for those press releases.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
Diz o requerente que em nenhum dos comunicados fez-se qualquer menção à presunção de inocência dos arguidos e expõe dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade da legislação nacional “por força da qual um órgão de liderança do MP, como uma Procuradoria-Geral da República, pode emitir sucessivos comunicados oficiais para a imprensa sobre um específico processo criminal, antes do trânsito em julgado da respetiva decisão final, referindo os factos nele investigados, os crimes alegadamente cometidos pelos arguidos, meios de prova e de obtenção de prova obtidos e a obter e outros atos processuais ocorridos no referido processo (como a dedução da acusação e a aplicação de medidas de coação), sem qualquer menção à presunção de inocência dos arguidos” e os artigos 4.º, n.º 1 e 3, 10.º, da Diretiva (UE) 2016/343 e o artigo 48.º, n.º 1, da Carta de Direitos Fundamentais.
Convoca também o requerente o artigo 48.º, n.º 1, da Carta de Direitos Fundamentais, à luz da jurisprudência do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos (TEDH) sobre o artigo 6.º, n.º 2, da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos Humanos, invocando as decisões proferidas em Allenet de Ribemont c. França, 10 de fevereiro de 1995, §§ 38 e 41, Fatullayev c. Azerbeijão, n.º 40984/07, 22 de abril de 2010, § 159, e G.C.P. c. Roménia, n.º 20899/03, 20 de dezembro de 2011, § 60.
No processo Allenet de Ribemont c. França (n.º 15175/89) estava em causa uma conferência de imprensa do Ministro do Interior, do Diretor da Polícia Judiciária da sede da polícia de Paris e do Chefe do Departamento de Investigação Criminal, transmitida por duas estações de televisão francesas, em que, sendo questionados sobre o caso do assassínio de um antigo ministro, ocorrido dias antes, aqueles responsáveis designaram Allenet de Ribemont, - “sans nuance ni réserve”; “without any qualification or reservation” - como um dos instigadores do homicídio, o que se traduziu numa declaração de culpabilidade daquele cidadão.
No processo Fatullayev c. Azerbeijão (n.º 40984/07) estava em causa a declaração de um procurador-geral produzida poucos dias após o início das investigações, na qual indicou, inequivocamente, um jornalista - “sans nuance ni réserve”; “without any qualification or reservation” - como tendo elaborado um artigo que continha uma ameaça de terrorismo.
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No caso em apreço, os comunicados emitidos ao abrigo do disposto no artigo 86.º, n.º 13, alínea b), do CPP, pela Procuradoria-Geral da República, relativos à designada “..., informam, essencialmente, sobre: a ocorrência de detenções; a ocorrência de buscas; a constituição de arguidos; a aplicação de medidas de coação; a alteração de medidas de coação; a arguição de nulidade de acórdão proferido pelo Tribunal da Relação; a autorização de acesso aos autos a todos os intervenientes processuais; a interposição de recurso; a prolação de diversos despachos da Procuradora-Geral da República sobre prazos para a conclusão da investigação e a sua prorrogação; a prolação do despacho final; a apresentação de requerimento de recusa de juiz.
Todos os comunicados foram emitidos pela “Procuradoria-Geral da República”, “Gabinete da Procuradora-Geral da República”, ou seja, pelos Gabinetes das antecessoras do atual Procurador-Geral da República.
Admitindo-se que fossem colhidas junto do Departamento Central de Investigação e Ação Penal (DCIAP), onde corria a investigação, informações pertinentes para a redação dos comunicados, dúvidas não há de que a responsabilidade pelo teor e emissão dos mesmos pertenceu ao Gabinete da Procuradora-Geral da República na altura em funções.
Por conseguinte, constatando-se que, no período de 22.11.2014 a 12.09.2019, o visado pela recusa não representava a Procuradoria-Geral da República, o que se possa extrair dos mencionados comunicados na sua relação com o princípio da presunção de inocência é manifestamente insuscetível de determinar o sentido da decisão quanto ao presente incidente, que visa concretamente o atual Procurador-Geral da República – que desses comunicados não é responsável.