Germany / Federal Labour Court / 2 AZR 296/22

Employee vs. Employer
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Federal Labour Court
Type
Decision
Decision date
29/06/2023
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:DE:BAG:2023:290623.U.2AZR296.22.0
  • Germany / Federal Labour Court / 2 AZR 296/22

    Key facts of the case:

    X was employed in a foundry. His employer accused him, among other things, of not having worked a so-called overtime shift on 2 June 2018 a. According to X, he entered the factory premises on the relevant day. However, according to the employer’s submission, the recordings made by a video camera at a gate to the factory premises, which was marked by a pictogram and which could not be overlooked in any other way, showed that X had left the premises before the start of the shift. The employer terminated the employment relationship of the parties. In his action against this termination, X claimed that he had worked on 2 June 2018 and that the findings from the video surveillance were subject to a prohibition of the use of facts and evidence and could therefore not be taken into account in the dismissal protection suit. The lower courts upheld the action. The Regional Labour Court further dismissed the employer’s application for dissolution. The employer appealed seeking the dismissal of the action or, in the alternative, the judicial dissolution of the parties' employment relationship.

    Key legal question raised by the Court:

    The key legal question is whether there is a prohibition of the use of a recording from an open video surveillance in a court proceeding if the recording is intended to prove a conduct of the employee which is intentionally in breach of contract and the surveillance measure does not fully comply with the requirements of data protection law.

    Outcome of the case:

    The appeal of the employer was successful. The court held that the Regional Labour Court dismissed the appeal against the first-instance judgement on the grounds of an error of law stating that there were no significant grounds for the extraordinary termination within the meaning of section 626(1) of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) and referred the case back to another chamber of the Regional Labour Court for a new hearing and decision. Within the framework of a secondary burden of proof X did not sufficiently dispute the employer’s argument that he did not work the overtime shift on 2 June 2018 with the intention to deceive. X claimed that the use of the recordings was unlawful as the video surveillance was not intended to record and monitor employees, and as the information plates on the gate stated that the recordings would only be kept for 96 hours. However, even though in principle, according to Art. 17(1) GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), personal data shall be deleted when it was unlawfully processed or collected, Art. 17(3) provides for an exception for those cases in which processing is still necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. Art. 17(3) requires a balancing of interests oriented by proportionality. As a matter of fact, the defence of one’s rights before courts is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 47(2) of the Charter. Thus, the data subject’s fundamental rights to privacy and data protection (Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter) need to be seriously threatened in order to justify an erasure. The court held that this is not the case as the plaintiff was not limited in his behaviour by the video surveillance. To the contrary, despite being aware of the cameras, he committed a disciplinary offence. Data protection is not protection of unlawful conducts.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    28. (1) The Senate can assume in favour of the employee affected by an open video surveillance that - although it seems rather doubtful - the characteristic of necessity in Art. 17(3)(e) of the GDPR requires a full proportionality test. Since the provision would otherwise be empty and Article 47(2) of the Charter guarantees the right to effective judicial protection and, in particular, to a fair trial, according to which the parties to civil proceedings must, as a matter of principle, be able to sufficiently substantiate and prove their legal protection objective ..., the judicial processing of personal data of the plaintiff employee unlawfully collected by the employer could in any event only be found to be unreasonable (disproportionate in the strict sense) if the monitoring measure were found to be a serious breach of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter under Union law and other possible sanctions for the employer (e.g. damages under Article 82 of the GDPR and imposition of fines under Article 83 GDPR) were wholly insufficient.

    33. (bb) Aspects of general prevention could at most lead to a prohibition of exploitation with regard to intentional misconduct of the employee if the employer's surveillance measure as such, despite its open implementation, constitutes a serious violation of the right protected by Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz - GG) …. In view of the presumed requirements in favour of the employee in Article 17(3)(e) of the GDPR in conjunction with Article 7 and Article 8 of the GRC (para. 28), this complies with Union law with sufficient clarity, which the Senate can decide without a reference for a preliminary ruling on this matter under Article 267(3) TFEU.

    34. cc) Finally, a prohibition to examine incriminated image sequences from an open video surveillance does not exist because it possibly does not show any conduct of the employee that constitutes an intentional violation of the employer's legal interests or yet indicates such a violation. Since Article 103(1) of the Basic Law and Article 47(2) of the Charter require that substantial evidence be taken, evidence may not be withheld on the mere possibility that it violates fundamental rights. In this respect, too, there are sufficient other protective mechanisms for the employee concerned. If the inspection reveals "nothing at all" on the part of the employer, the employer not only loses the case. Rather, the further processing of - clearly - irrelevant sequences and their introduction into a legal dispute may constitute a serious violation of personal rights for which the employer is liable for monetary compensation … under the conditions of section 823(1) of the Civil Code in conjunction with Art. 2(1) in conjunction with Art. 2(2) of the Basic Law or for non-material damages under Art. 82 of the GDPR ….

    38. (3) The use of the image sequence in question in the present legal dispute does not entail a change of purpose within the meaning of Article 6(4) of the GDPR. The relevant abstract purpose of the data collection (protection of the legitimate interests of the defendant and, failing that, enforcement of civil claims) is consistent with the purpose of the data processing in the present proceedings (enforcement of civil claims) …. Even if there were a change of purpose from the protection of property to the protection of assets, the weighing of the mutual interests - to be carried out by the national court ... - shows that the fundamental rights positions of the plaintiff under Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter do not outweigh the right of the defendant to effective judicial protection against an - allegedly - intentional misconduct of its employee, which is guaranteed by Article 47(2) of the Charter and which is to be valued particularly highly in concreto.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    „(1) Der Senat kann zugunsten des von einer offenen Videoüberwachung betroffenen Arbeitnehmers unterstellen, dass – obwohl es eher zweifelhaft erscheint – das Merkmal der Erforderlichkeit in Art. 17 Abs. 3 Buchst. e DSGVO eine volle Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung bedingt. Da die Vorschrift andernfalls leerliefe und Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC das Recht auf effektiven gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz und insbesondere auf ein faires Verfahren verbürgt, wonach die Parteien eines Zivilprozesses grds. in der Lage sein müssen, ihr Rechtschutzziel hinreichend zu begründen und unter Beweis zu stellen (…), könnte sich die gerichtliche Verarbeitung von rechtswidrig durch den Arbeitgeber erhobenen personenbezogenen Daten des klagenden Arbeitnehmers jedenfalls nur als unangemessen (unverhältnismäßig im engeren Sinn) darstellen, wenn sich die Überwachungsmaßnahme nach Unionsrecht als schwerwiegende Verletzung von Art. 7 und Art. 8 GRC erwiese und andere mögliche Sanktionen für den Arbeitgeber (zB Schadenersatz nach Art. 82 DSGVO und Verhängung von Geldbußen nach Art. 83 DSGVO) gänzlich unzureichend wären.“ (Rn. 28)

    „(bb) Aspekte der Generalprävention könnten allenfalls dann zu einem Verwertungsverbot in Bezug auf vorsätzliches Fehlverhalten des Arbeitnehmers führen, wenn sich die Überwachungsmaßnahme des Arbeitgebers als solche trotz ihrer offenen Durchführung als schwerwiegende Verletzung des durch Art. 2 Abs. 1 iVm. Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG geschützten Rechts darstellt (…). Das entspricht angesichts der zugunsten des Arbeitnehmers unterstellten Vorgaben in Art. 17 Abs. 3 Buchst. e DSGVO iVm. Art. 7 und Art. 8 GRC (Rn. 28) mit hinreichender Deutlichkeit dem Unionsrecht, was der Senat ohne ein darauf bezogenes Vorabentscheidungsersuchen nach Art. 267 Abs. 3 AEUV entscheiden kann.“ (Rn. 33)

    „cc) Ein Verbot, inkriminierte Bildsequenzen aus einer offenen Videoüberwachung in Augenschein zu nehmen, besteht schließlich nicht deshalb, weil sie womöglich gar kein Verhalten des Arbeitnehmers zeigen, das eine vorsätzliche Verletzung der Rechtsgüter des Arbeitgebers darstellt oder doch auf eine solche hindeutet. Da Art. 103 Abs. 1 GG und Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC grds. gebieten, einem erheblichen Beweisantritt nachzugehen, darf eine Beweiserhebung nicht auf die bloße Möglichkeit ihrer Grundrechtswidrigkeit hin unterbleiben. Auch insofern bestehen für den betroffenen Arbeitnehmer ausreichende andere Schutzmechanismen. Ergibt die Inaugenscheinnahme „rein gar nichts“ iSd. Arbeitgebers, verliert dieser nicht nur den Prozess. Vielmehr kann in der weiteren Verarbeitung – eindeutig – irrelevanter Sequenzen und deren Einführung in einen Rechtsstreit eine schwerwiegende Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung liegen, für die er unter den Voraussetzungen von § 823 Abs. 1 BGB iVm. Art. 2 Abs. 1 iVm. Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG eine Geldentschädigung (…) oder nach Art. 82 DSGVO immateriellen Schadenersatz schuldet (…).“ (Rn. 34)

    „(3) Mit der Verwertung der betreffenden Bildsequenz im vorliegenden Rechtsstreit ist keine Zweckänderung iSv. Art. 6 Abs. 4 DSGVO verbunden. Der maßgebliche abstrakte Zweck der Datenerhebung (Schutz der berechtigten Interessen der Beklagten und widrigenfalls Durchsetzung zivilrechtlicher Ansprüche) stimmt mit dem Zweck der Datenverarbeitung im vorliegenden Verfahren (Durchsetzung zivilrechtlicher Ansprüche) überein (…). Selbst wenn eine Zweckänderung vom Eigentums- hin zum Vermögensschutz vorläge, ergibt die – vom nationalen Gericht vorzunehmende (…) – Abwägung der wechselseitigen Interessen, dass die Grundrechtspositionen des Klägers aus Art. 7 und Art. 8 GRC nicht das durch Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC garantierte, in concreto besonders hoch zu bewertende Recht der Beklagten auf effektiven gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz gegenüber einem – vermeintlich – vorsätzlichen Fehlverhalten ihres Arbeitnehmers überwiegen.“ (Rn. 38)