Slovakia / Constitutional Court / III. ÚS 72/2024 / ECLI:SK:USSR:2024:3.US.72.2024.2

XY
Policy area
Consumers
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Type
Decision
Decision date
30/07/2024

Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea

  • Slovakia / Constitutional Court / III. ÚS 72/2024 / ECLI:SK:USSR:2024:3.US.72.2024.2

    Key facts of the case:

    XY was a consumer under enforcement procedure for the nonpayment of a debt under a consumer credit agreement. The creditor, using unfair commercial practices, retrieved from XY an acknowledgment of a time-barred debt, which formed the basis for an enforcement order issued by the Arbitral Tribunal. During the enforcement phase, XY requested the Enforcement Court to suspend the enforcement on the ground that the Arbitral Tribunal had issued a null and void judgment as it failed to apply the relevant provisions of consumer protection legislation to assess the existence of the creditor's claim, resulting in a substantively erroneous decision.  The Enforcement Court dismissed the application of XY on the ground that it lacked competence to review the merits of the arbitral tribunal's decision at the enforcement stage, as XY had at his/her disposal another tool for remedy of doing so. XY then filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court for violation of the right to a fair trial, arguing that the Enforcement Court erred in applying the consumer protection legislation. The Constitutional Court was called to assess whether the Enforcement Court, by refusing a substantive review of the enforcement order from the point of view of the protection of consumer rights, violated XY's right to a fair trial under Article 46(1) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 

    Key legal question raised by the Court:

    Has the State, represented by the Enforcement Court, provided the XY as a consumer with effective remedies to prevent the application of unfair contract terms or unfair commercial practices? 

    The key legal question was complemented by additional legal questions: 

    Is it possible to enforce a time-barred debt arising from a consumer contract?

    Did a creditor, by retrieving of acknowledgment of time-barred debt, applied an unfair commercial practice?

    Can the Enforcement Court review the merits of the writ of the execution during the enforcement phase?

    Did the Enforcement Court comply with the principle of a high level consumer protection? 

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Charter established the principle of enhanced judicial protection of consumers. The courts of Member State were, in this regard, empowered with the competence to review and assess the nature of unfair contract terms on their own motion. To comply with this principle, courts must actively verify whether the contractual terms are fair and must interpret national law in compliance with EU law.

    By failing to provide XY with an effective remedy to prevent the application of unfair commercial practices, and by failing to comply with the EU principle of a high level of  consumer protection, which also entails an enforcement court’s review on its own motion the merits of the execution writ during the enforcement,  violatedXY´s right to a fair trial under Article 46(1) of the Constitution and Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 

    The case was remitted to the Enforcement Court for a fresh decision, considering the legal opinions of the Constitutional Court. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    20. The principle of enhanced judicial protection for consumers can be abstracted from Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 169(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 93/13/EEC. To achieve this objective, the courts of the Member States of the European Union have been entrusted with the power to examine ex officio the nature of unfair terms in consumer contracts.  The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union ('the Court of Justice') (e.g. judgment in Case C-168/05 of 25.10.2006 (Mostaza Claro)) also makes it possible to abstract from the case-law the requirement to ensure effective consumer protection, a prerequisite for which is an active approach to the exercise of that power. The court hearing the case is therefore obliged to interpret and apply the national law in question in a Euroconform manner (e.g. Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Case no. III. ÚS 1996/13). The Court of Justice has even expressed the view that 'in view of the nature and importance of the general interest underlying the protection of consumers which Directive 93/13 ensures, Article 6 thereof must be regarded as equivalent to national rules which, in the context of the national legal order, have the legal force of rules of public policy' (judgment in Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL [2009] ECR C-40/08, paragraph 52).

    21. According to the case law of the Court of Justice, the system of protection introduced by Directive 93/13 is based on the idea that the consumer is at a disadvantage compared with the seller or supplier in terms of bargaining power and level of information, and that this situation leads him or her to agree to terms and conditions prepared in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence their content (judgments of 4 June 2009, Pannon GSM, C 243/08, EU:C:2009:350, paragraph 22, and of 17 May 2018, Karel de Grote - Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C 147/16, EU:C:2018:320, paragraph 26). In view of the disadvantaged position, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 provides that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer. It is a mandatory provision aimed at replacing the formal balance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties established by the contract with a genuine balance intended to reestablish equality between the contracting parties (judgment of 17 May 2018, Karel de Grote - Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C 147/16, EU:C:2018:320, paragraph 27, and the case-law cited above).).

    22. In its judgment C-600/19, the Court of Justice ruled that Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 June 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, by virtue of the effect of res judicata and time-barring, neither allows a court to examine of its own motion whether contractual terms are unfair in the course of mortgage enforcement proceedings, nor a consumer, after the expiry of the period for lodging an objection, to raise the unfairness of those terms in those proceedings or in subsequent declaratory proceedings, where the potential unfairness of those terms has already been examined by the court of its own motion, at the stage when the mortgage enforcement proceedings were initiated, but the judicial decision authorizing the mortgage enforcement does not contain any grounds, even of a summary nature, attesting to the existence of that examination, nor state that the assessment of that court at the end of that examination could no longer be called into question if an objection were not lodged within the aforementioned period.

    23. In its judgment in Case C-421/14 (in para. 52), the Court of Justice held that, where, in a previous examination of a contract in dispute which led to the adoption of a decision which has become res judicata, the national court limited itself to examining of its own motion, with regard to Directive 93/13, one or certain terms of that contract, that directive requires a national court, such as the one in the main proceedings, before which a consumer has properly lodged an objection to enforcement proceedings, to assess, at the request of the parties or of its own motion where it is in possession of the legal and factual elements necessary for that purpose, the potential unfairness of other terms of that contract. In the absence of such a review, consumer protection would be incomplete and insufficient and would not constitute either an adequate or effective means of preventing the continued use of that term, contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 60). 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    20. Z čl. 38 Charty základných práv Európskej únie, čl. 169 ods. 1 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie, ako aj z citovaných čl. 6 a 7 smernice 93/13/EHS možno abstrahovať princíp zvýšenej súdnej ochrany spotrebiteľa. Súdom členských štátov Únie bolo na naplnenie tohto cieľa zverené oprávnenie skúmať povahu neprijateľných podmienok v spotrebiteľských zmluvách z úradnej moci.  Z judikatúry Súdneho dvora Európskej únie (ďalej len ,,Súdny dvor“) [napr. rozsudok vo veci C-168/05 z 25. 10. 2006 (Mostaza Claro)] možno zároveň abstrahovať požiadavku na zabezpečenie efektívnej ochrany spotrebiteľa, čoho nevyhnutným predpokladom je aktívny prístup k využívaniu spomínaného oprávnenia. Vo veci konajúci súd je preto dotknuté vnútroštátne právo povinný interpretovať a aplikovať eurokonformným spôsobom (napr. Ústavný súd Českej republiky sp. zn. III. ÚS 1996/13). Súdny dvor dokonca vyslovil právny názor, podľa ktorého „vzhľadom na povahu a význam všeobecného záujmu, na ktorom sa zakladá ochrana spotrebiteľov, ktorú smernica 93/13 zabezpečuje, jej článok 6 musí byť považovaný za ustanovenie, ktoré je rovnocenné s vnútroštátnymi pravidlami, ktoré v rámci vnútroštátneho právneho poriadku majú právnu silu noriem verejného poriadku“ [rozsudok vo veci C-40/08 zo 6. 10. 2009 (Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL), bod 52].

    21. Podľa judikatúry Súdneho dvora systém ochrany zavedený smernicou č. 93/13 vychádza z myšlienky, že spotrebiteľ sa v porovnaní s predajcom alebo dodávateľom nachádza v znevýhodnenom postavení, pokiaľ ide o vyjednávaciu silu, ako aj o úroveň informovanosti, a táto situácia ho vedie k pristúpeniu na podmienky vopred pripravené predajcom alebo dodávateľom bez toho, aby mohol vplývať na ich obsah (rozsudky zo 4. 6. 2009, Pannon GSM, C 243/08, EU:C:2009:350, bod 22, a zo 17. 5. 2018, Karel de Grote – Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C 147/16, EU:C:2018:320, bod 26). Vzhľadom na znevýhodnené postavenie čl. 6 ods. 1 smernice č. 93/13 stanovuje, že nekalé podmienky nie sú pre spotrebiteľa záväzné. Ide o kogentné ustanovenie smerujúce k nahradeniu formálnej rovnováhy medzi právami a povinnosťami zmluvných strán, ktorú nastolila zmluva, skutočnou rovnováhou, ktorá má znovu zaviesť rovnosť medzi zmluvnými stranami (rozsudok zo 17. 5. 2018, Karel de Grote – Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C 147/16, EU:C:2018:320, bod 27 a citovaná judikatúra).

    22. Súdny dvor v rozsudku C‑600/19 rozhodol, že čl. 6 ods. 1 a čl. 7 ods. 1 smernice č. 93/13/EHS z 5. apríla 1993 o nekalých podmienkach v spotrebiteľských zmluvách sa majú vykladať v tom zmysle, že bránia vnútroštátnej právnej úprave, ktorá z dôvodu účinku právnej sily rozhodnutej veci a preklúzie neumožňuje ani súdu preskúmať ex offo nekalú povahu zmluvných podmienok v rámci konania o výkone rozhodnutia týkajúceho sa nehnuteľnosti zaťaženej hypotékou, ani spotrebiteľovi po  uplynutí lehoty na podanie námietky dovolávať sa nekalej povahy týchto podmienok v tomto konaní alebo v neskoršom určovacom konaní, pokiaľ uvedené podmienky už boli pri začatí konania o výkone rozhodnutia týkajúceho sa nehnuteľnosti zaťaženej hypotékou predmetom preskúmania ich prípadnej nekalej povahy vykonaného súdom ex offo, ale ak súdne rozhodnutie povoľujúce výkon rozhodnutia týkajúceho sa nehnuteľnosti zaťaženej hypotékou neuvádza žiadne odôvodnenie, aspoň v stručnej forme, preukazujúce toto preskúmanie, a ani neuvádza, že posúdenie vykonané týmto súdom po uvedenom preskúmaní už nebude možné spochybniť bez podania námietky v uvedenej lehote.

    23. Súdny dvor v rozsudku C-421/14 (v bode 52) uviedol, že za predpokladu, že počas predchádzajúceho preskúmania spornej zmluvy, ktoré viedlo k prijatiu rozhodnutia s právnou silou rozhodnutej veci, sa vnútroštátny súd obmedzil na preskúmanie ex offo z pohľadu smernice 93/13 jedinej alebo len niektorých z podmienok tejto zmluvy, táto smernica ukladá vnútroštátnemu súdu, akým je súd v konaní vo veci samej, ktorý pravidelne rozhoduje v sporoch spotrebiteľov v rámci incidenčnej námietky, povinnosť posúdiť na návrh účastníkov konania alebo ex offo, hneď ako je oboznámený s právnymi a so skutkovými okolnosťami potrebnými na tento účel, prípadne nekalú povahu ostatných podmienok tejto zmluvy. Pri neexistencii takéhoto preskúmania by totiž bola ochrana spotrebiteľa neúplná a nedostatočná a nepredstavuje dostatočný ani účinný prostriedok na zabránenie používania tohto druhu podmienok, čo je v rozpore s tým, čo vyžaduje čl. 7 ods. 1 smernice 93/13 (rozsudok zo 14. 3. 2013, Aziz, C 415/11, EU:C:2013:164, bod 60).