Slovenia / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia / Decision Up-558/20 / ECLI:SI:USRS:2024:Up.558.20
-
Slovenia / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia / Decision Up-558/20 / ECLI:SI:USRS:2024:Up.558.20
Key facts of the case:
The complainants were minority shareholders of the company AMZS, d. d., Ljubljana. After a successful takeover bid, the company's general meeting adopted a resolution to exclude (squeeze out) the remaining minority shareholders. Since it was a so-called post-takeover exclusion, i.e. exclusion within a period of three months after a successful takeover bid, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Takeovers Act (Zakon o prevzemih, 14 July 2006, and subsequent modifications),1minority shareholders who were squeezed out received financial compensation in the amount of the takeover price. The appellants filed a motion requesting a judicial review of the amount of the financial compensation received on the grounds that it was set too low. The first instance court dismissed their motion, as it took the view that in the case of a so-called post-takeover exclusion, a judicial review of the adequacy of the financial compensation is not permitted, because the presumption is that the price offered in the takeover bid is fair. The Higher Court upheld this view and found against the complainants. Regarding the possibility of a judicial review of the financial compensation, it adopted the position that this is only possible in situations where the majority shareholder could be accused of abuse, otherwise the presumption is irrebuttable. The Supreme Court did not allow a revision. The complainants subsequently approached the Constitutional Court. Due to the adopted positions of lower courts regarding the irrebuttable presumption of fair monetary compensation, they alleged a lack of substantive judicial protection and deprivation of an effective legal remedy. Thus, their property (shares) was allegedly encroached upon without adequate monetary compensation, the adequacy of which would be subject to a judicial review.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Constitutional Court considered a special provision of the Takeovers Act transposing Directive 2004/25/EC. This provision governs post-acquisition exclusion (i.e. squeeze-out) of minority shareholders during the three-month period following a successful takeover bid. During this period, minority shareholders are entitled to financial compensation equal to the acquisition price set out in the takeover bid, because the presumption is that the price set out in the takeover bid is fair. The Constitutional Court considered whether the price stated in the takeover bid and the financial compensation given to minority shareholders is subject to judicial review, that is – whether the presumption of fair price is rebuttable.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court, amongst others, observed that the relevant provisions of the Takeovers Act under review transpose Directive 2004/25/EC into Slovenian legal order, and established that the matter at hand undoubtedly fell within the scope of the EU law. Furthermore, the applicability of EU law inherently includes the application of fundamental rights laid down in the EU Charter. Namely, Article 47 of the Charter ensures that anyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. Amongst others, it also guarantees the right to have one’s case decided fairly, publicly, and within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. While noting that the relevant legal term (i.e. “shall be deemed” (“se šteje”)) used in Slovenian translation of the Directive includes presumption that the financial compensation granted in cases of post-takeover squeeze out is fairly set cannot be subject to rebuttal, the Constitutional Court held that EU law cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of the Slovenian language version, since all language versions are equally authentic. The court performed language and comparative law interpretations showing a different picture across Member States. Indeed, in some Member States, the presumption of fair price is rebuttable, while there are also national contexts where the presumption is only rebuttable in the event of abuse, or the issue remains open. Furthermore, legal theory is divided on this issue, and the CJEU has not yet interpreted this particular provision of Directive 2004/25/EC. As a result, the Constitutional Court criticised the lower courts’ failure to properly engage with the complexity of EU law. In doing so, the lower courts failed to observe the requirements set out in Article 22 of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of rights. It annulled the decisions by the District and Higher Courts, respectively, and remanded the matter to the District Court for retrial. According to the Constitutional Court, in the proceedings, the courts will have to interpret the Takeovers Act in line with European Union law. If they find that the relevant Directive 2004/25/EC is insufficiently clear regarding the presumption of the fairness of the financial compensation or it is even inconsistent with Article 47 of the EU Charter, they will have to consider referring the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
-
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
12. The provisions of the ZPre-1 Act constitute implementing provisions of EU law. As set out in Article 2 of ZPre-1, the Act transposes Directive 2004/25/EC into the legal order of the Republic of Slovenia. The requirements for uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality mandate that terms derived from specific provisions of EU law, which do not explicitly refer to the law of Member States for their interpretation, are generally interpreted autonomously and uniformly across the EU (5), taking into account the wording of the provision, its context, and the objectives of the regulation it forms part of. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 3a of the Constitution, it must, when deciding on matters concerning the implementation of law, consider both primary and secondary EU law, as well as the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Republic of Slovenia has transferred the exercise of part of its sovereign rights to the EU, including legislative authority in specific areas, which must be taken into account in judicial decisions. Moreover, the CJEU has already taken the view that there cannot be cases in which national legislation falls within the scope of EU law without the fundamental rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also being applied (OJ C 202, 7. 6. 2016 – hereinafter the Charter). The applicability of EU law inherently includes the application of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. (6) It is indisputable that the case at hand involves a situation where EU law is decisive. The CJEU has already established that this is a matter governed by EU law and that the Charter applies, even when the proceedings in question, such as the constitutional complaint under consideration, are conducted under national legislation transposing Directive 2004/25/EC. Therefore, the Constitutional Court must, in this case, consider the aforementioned Directive as well as the Charter in its deliberations.
15. The question of how to interpret the third subparagraph of Article 15(5) of Directive 2004/25/EC, specifically whether the presumption contained in that provision of the directive can be interpreted in such a way that the presumption of fairness of financial compensation is not rebuttable and therefore cannot be subject to judicial review, and if it is rebuttable, whether that rebuttal is unlimited or is possibly limited to specific cases, may also be relevant from the perspective of primary EU law, specifically Article 47 of the Charter. It regulates the right to an effective remedy and an impartial tribunal. Its first paragraph ensures that anyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a court, under the conditions laid down in this Article, while its second paragraph guarantees the right to have one’s case decided fairly, publicly, and within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. According to the CJEU’s jurisprudence, Article 47 of the Charter is sufficient in itself and does not require further elaboration by EU or national law in order to confer on individuals a right they may invoke. (26) Article 47 is based on Article 6(1) and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 33/94, IT, No. 7/94 – hereinafter the ECHR). (27) According to the position of the Commission of Human Rights in the Bramelid case, minority shareholders have the right to challenge the independent price set by arbitrators before the ordinary courts in the event of their (corporate) exclusion, because mandatory arbitration under Swedish law did not provide the guarantees of Article 6 of the ECHR. (28) It should also be noted that, in accordance with the settled case law of the CJEU, national courts must ensure, on the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union (consolidated version, OJ C 202, 7. 6. 2016 – hereinafter TEU), judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law. (29) Furthermore, Article 19(1) of the TEU obliges Member States to provide the remedies necessary to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law. (30) This obligation on Member States corresponds to the right laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, according to which everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. (31) It is therefore necessary not only to establish a legal remedy and thereby ensure judicial protection, but also to design this legal remedy in such a way that it is effective in accordance with the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes confirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection. (32) The fact that the presumption of a fair price is irrebuttable, or is only rebuttable in specific cases, could conflict with the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter, as it preclude or restrict individuals from obtaining judicial protection of their right to fair compensation in cases of squeeze-out, as guaranteed under by EU law, specifically Directive 2004/25/EC, which obliges Member States under first subparagraph of Article 15(5) to ensure fair price.
22. The Constitutional Court has already taken the view that the fact that a court has violated EU law in a specific procedure cannot in itself justify a constitutional complaint, except in cases where this would violate a human right or fundamental freedom. (61) Thus, the breach of EU law must be sufficiently serious to reach the level of protecting human rights or fundamental freedoms under the Constitution or obligations arising from generally applicable rules of international law and international treaties binding on the Republic of Slovenia. In the case at hand, the matter concerns the right to judicial protection. The courts interpreted Article 68(2) of the ZPre-1, which transposes fifth subparagraph of Article 15(5) of Directive 2004/25/EC into Slovenian law, and thus concerns the implementation of EU law. (62) As explained in the reasoning of this decision (see points 12 to 14) , this provision specifically addresses the presumption of fair monetary compensation, yet the courts failed to consider it in interpreting Article 68(2) of ZPre-1 (see in particular points 13 to 17 of the reasoning of the decision of the Higher Court and point 19 of the reasoning of the decision of the court of first instance). Such conduct is not without impact on the complainants' right to judicial protection under Article 23(1) of the Constitution and their right to an effective remedy and impartial tribunal under Article 47 of the Charter, corresponding to Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, as well as their right to private property under Article 33 of the Constitution and Article 17 of the Charter, corresponding to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. The interpretation of whether the presumption of fair monetary compensation is rebuttable determines the scope of the right to judicial protection in cases of post-takeover exclusion of minority shareholders (see in particular point 15 of the reasoning of this decision). According to the established constitutional court assessment, the exclusion of minority shareholders constitutes an interference with their right to private property, which is proportionate precisely because of the possibility of judicial review of the fairness of the monetary compensation (see in particular point 9 of the reasoning of this decision). In view of the above, the courts failed to respect the requirements of Article 22 of the Constitution in the circumstances of the given case.
23. For these reasons, the Constitutional Court annulled the decisions of the first- and second-instance courts to the extent specified in Point 1 of the operative part and remanded the case to the Ljubljana District Court for retrial (Point 1 of the operative part). In the renewed proceedings, the courts must interpret Article 68(2) of ZPre-1 in conformity with EU law, that is – they must consider the third subparagraph of Article 15(3) of Directive 2004/25/EC. Should the courts find the provision insufficiently clear or invalid due to non-compliance with Article 47 of the Charter, they may refer the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling (Article 267(2) of the TFEU).
-
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
12. Določbe ZPre-1 so izvedbene določbe prava EU. Kot izhaja tudi iz 2. člena ZPre-1, se z ZPre-1 v pravni red Republike Slovenije prenaša Direktiva 2004/25/ES. Zahteve enotne uporabe prava EU in načela enakosti nalagajo, da se pojmi iz posameznih določb prava EU, ki za določitev njihovega pomena in obsega ne napotujejo izrecno na pravo držav članic, običajno v vsej EU razlagajo neodvisno in enotno, (5) ob upoštevanju besedila te določbe ter sobesedila in ciljev, ki jih uresničuje ureditev, katere del je. Ustavno sodišče je že večkrat sprejelo stališče, da mora na podlagi tretjega odstavka 3.a člena Ustave pri odločanju o zadevi, ki pomeni odločitev na področju izvajanja prava, upoštevati primarno in sekundarno zakonodajo EU ter sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije (v nadaljevanju SEU). Republika Slovenija je izvrševanje dela svojih suverenih pravic prenesla na EU. Nanjo je prenesla tudi normativno urejanje na nekaterih področjih, ki ga je treba upoštevati pri odločanju. Še več, SEU je že sprejelo stališče, da ne morejo obstajati primeri, v katerih nacionalna ureditev spada na področje uporabe prava EU, ne da bi se uporabljale tudi temeljne pravice iz Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (UL C 202, 7. 6. 2016 – v nadaljevanju Listina). Dejstvo, da se uporabi pravo EU, vključuje uporabo temeljnih pravic, ki jih zagotavlja Listina. (6) Da gre v obravnavanem primeru za položaj, ko je pravno odločilno tudi pravo EU, ne more biti sporno. Že SEU je namreč sprejelo stališče, da gre za položaj, ki ga ureja pravo EU, in se uporablja Listina, tudi kadar gre za postopek, ki se tako kot ta, ki je predmet ustavne pritožbe, vodi na podlagi določb nacionalnega prava, s katerimi je prenesena Direktiva 2004/25/ES. (7) Zato mora Ustavno sodišče pri svoji presoji v obravnavanem primeru upoštevati tako navedeno direktivo kot tudi Listino.
15. Vprašanje, kako razlagati tretji pododstavek petega odstavka 15. člena Direktive 2004/25/ES, ali je mogoče domnevo, ki jo vsebuje navedena določba direktive, razlagati na način, da domneva pravičnosti denarnega nadomestila ni izpodbojna in torej ne more biti predmet sodnega preizkusa, in če je izpodbojna, ali je ta izpodbojnost neomejena, ali pa je morebiti omejena na specifične primere, pa je lahko pomembno tudi z vidika primarnega prava EU, konkretno 47. člena Listine. Ta ureja pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva in nepristranskega sodišča. V svojem prvem odstavku zagotavlja, da ima vsakdo, ki so mu kršene pravice in svoboščine, zagotovljene s pravom EU, zagotovljeno pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva pred sodiščem, v skladu s pogoji, določenimi v tem členu, v drugem pa vsakomur zagotavlja pravico, da o njegovi zadevi pravično, javno in v razumnem roku odloča neodvisno, nepristransko in z zakonom predhodno ustanovljeno sodišče. Iz sodne prakse SEU izhaja, da je 47. člen Listine dovolj sam po sebi in ga ni treba pojasnjevati z določbami prava EU ali nacionalnega prava, da bi se posameznikom podelila pravica, na katero se lahko sklicujejo. (26) Člen 47 Listine temelji na prvem odstavku 6. člena in 13. členu Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin (Uradni list RS, št. 33/94, MP, št. 7/94 – v nadaljevanju EKČP). (27) Po stališču Komisije za človekove pravice v zadevi Bramelid imajo manjšinski delničarji v primeru svoje (korporativne) izključitve pravico pred rednimi sodišči izpodbijati neodvisno ceno, ki so jo določili arbitri, ker obvezna arbitraža po švedski zakonodaji ni zagotavljala jamstev iz 6. člena EKČP. (28) Upoštevati je treba tudi, da morajo nacionalna sodišča v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso SEU na podlagi načela lojalnega sodelovanja, ki je določeno v tretjem odstavku 4. člena Pogodbe o Evropski uniji (prečiščena različica, UL C 202, 7. 6. 2016 – v nadaljevanju PEU), zagotoviti sodno varstvo pravic, ki jih imajo posamezniki na podlagi prava EU. (29) Poleg tega pa prvi odstavek 19. člena PEU državam članicam nalaga, naj določijo pravna sredstva, ki so potrebna za zagotovitev učinkovitega sodnega varstva na področjih, ki so zajeta s pravom EU. (30) Ta obveznost držav članic ustreza pravici iz 47. člena Listine, v skladu s katerim ima vsakdo, ki so mu kršene pravice in svoboščine, zagotovljene s pravom EU, pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva pred sodiščem. (31) Zato je treba ne le določiti pravno sredstvo in s tem zagotoviti sodno varstvo, temveč to pravno sredstvo oblikovati tako, da bo učinkovito v skladu z zahtevami 47. člena Listine, ki pomeni potrditev načela učinkovitega sodnega varstva. (32) Neizpodbojnost domneve o pravični ceni oziroma izpodbojnost, omejena na specifične primere, bi lahko trčila ob pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva iz 47. člena Listine, saj izključi oziroma omeji možnost, da posameznik doseže sodno varstvo svoje pravice do poštenega nadomestila zaradi iztisnitve, ki mu jo zagotavlja pravo EU, konkretno Direktiva 2004/25/ES, ki v prvem pododstavku petega odstavka 15. člena zavezuje države članice, da poskrbijo za zagotovitev pravične cene.
22. Ustavno sodišče je že sprejelo stališče, da dejstvo, da je sodišče v nekem konkretnem postopku kršilo pravo EU, samo po sebi ne more utemeljiti ustavne pritožbe, razen v tistih primerih, ko bi s tem bila kršena kakšna človekova pravica ali temeljna svoboščina. (61) Kršitev prava EU mora torej biti toliko kvalificirana, da doseže raven varstva človekovih pravic ali temeljnih svoboščin na ravni Ustave ali obveznosti iz splošno veljavnih pravil mednarodnega prava in mednarodnih pogodb, ki obvezujejo Republiko Slovenijo. V obravnavanem primeru je to vprašanje spoštovanja pravice do sodnega varstva. Sodišči sta razlagali drugi odstavek 68. člena ZPre-1, ki v slovenski pravni red prenaša peti pododstavek petega odstavka 15. člena Direktive 2004/25/ES in gre torej za izvajanje prava EU. (62) Kot je bilo pojasnjeno v obrazložitvi te odločbe (glej 12. do 14. točko), ta določba specifično ureja vprašanje domneve pravične denarne odpravnine, sodišči pa sta jo pri razlagi drugega odstavka 68. člena ZPre-1 povsem prezrli (glej zlasti 13. do 17. točko obrazložitve sklepa Višjega sodišča in 19. točko obrazložitve sklepa sodišča prve stopnje). Takšno ravnanje ni brez vpliva na pravico pritožnikov do sodnega varstva iz prvega odstavka 23. člena Ustave oziroma do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva in nepristranskega sodišča iz 47. člena Listine, ki ji ustrezata 6. in 13. člen EKČP, kot tudi na pravico do zasebne lastnine iz 33. člena Ustave ter 17. člena Listine, ki ji ustreza 1. člen Prvega protokola k EKČP. Od razlage vprašanja izpodbojnosti domneve pravičnega denarnega nadomestila je namreč odvisen obseg pravice do sodnega varstva v primeru poprevzemne izključitve manjšinskih delničarjev (glej zlasti 15. točko obrazložitve te odločbe). Izključitev manjšinskih delničarjev pa po ustaljeni ustavnosodni presoji pomeni poseg v njihovo pravico do zasebne lastnine, ki je sorazmeren prav zaradi možnosti sodnega preizkusa pravičnosti denarnega nadomestila (glej zlasti 9. točko obrazložitve te odločbe). Glede na navedeno sodišči v okoliščinah konkretnega primera nista spoštovali zahtev iz 22. člena Ustave.
23. Iz navedenega razloga je Ustavno sodišče sklepa sodišča prve in druge stopnje v obsegu, ki izhaja iz 1. točke izreka, razveljavilo in vrnilo zadevo Okrožnemu sodišču v Ljubljani v novo sojenje (1. točka izreka). V ponovljenem postopku bosta sodišči morali drugi odstavek 68. člena ZPre-1 razložiti skladno s pravom EU, kar pomeni, da bosta morali upoštevati peti pododstavek tretjega odstavka 15. člena Direktive 2004/25/ES. Če bosta pri razlagi te določbe presodili, da ni dovolj jasna ali da je celo neveljavna zaradi kršitve 47. člena Listine, bosta lahko zadevo predložili v predhodno odločanje SEU (drugi odstavek 267. člena PDEU).