Slovenia / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia / No. U-I-52/22 and U-I-202/23

Group of MPs and Human Rights Ombudsman (request for constitutional review)
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia
Type
Decision
Decision date
02/04/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:SI:USRS:2025:U.I.52.22
  • Slovenia / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia / No. U-I-52/22 and U-I-202/23

    Key facts of the case:

    In 2021, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (Državni zbor Republike Slovenije) adopted amendments to Articles 10a and 10b of the Foreigners Act (Zakon o tujcih). Article 10a introduces the definition of a ‘complex migration crisis’ and establishes the procedure for its declaration, whereas Article 10b determines the special legal regimes applicable upon such a declaration.

    Under Article 10b, one set of rules applies to foreigners who do not meet the conditions for entry into the Republic of Slovenia or who have entered its territory unlawfully, while another applies to those who express an intention to apply for international protection. This regime substantially suspends the application of the International Protection Act, the legislation laying down the fundamental principles and procedural guarantees governing the granting of international protection.

    Following the adoption of these amendments, a group of Members of Parliament, and subsequently the Human Rights Ombudsman, lodged requests for constitutional review before the Constitutional Court. The deputies argued, inter alia, that the amendments violated the principle of non-refoulement, as enshrined in Article 18 of the Constitution, as well as the prohibition of collective expulsion under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Ombudsman further contended that the legal regime introduced by the amendments was incompatible with EU law, including the Dublin Regulation, the Asylum Procedures Directive, and the Return Directive.

    Key legal question raised by the court:

    The Constitutional Court examined whether the second paragraph of Article 10a of the Foreigners Act was consistent with Article 2 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of a state governed by the rule of law, principally in light of the requirement of legislative clarity.

    Furthermore, the Court assessed whether the second to fourth paragraphs of Article 10b were compatible with the principle of non-refoulement, as guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution (prohibition of torture), Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Article 18 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

    The Court also examined the conformity of the first paragraph of Article 10b with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, noting that Article 19(1) of the Charter has the same meaning and scope.

    The relevant second paragraph of Article 10a reads as follows:

    (2) If, based on the information gathered by the authorities and institutions referred to in the preceding paragraph, the ministry responsible for the interior assesses that a complex crisis has arisen in the Republic of Slovenia as a result of the changed migration situation or other circumstances referred to in paragraph six of Article 20 of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia [Uradni list RS], Nos. 24/05 – official consolidated version, 109/08, 38/10, 8/12, 21/13, 47/13, 65/14, and 55/17), it shall propose to the Government of the Republic of Slovenia that it adopt a decision to perform crisis management and governance in the complex crisis pursuant to the eighth paragraph of Article 20 of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia Act (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 24/05 – official consolidated text, 109/08, 38/10, 8/12, 21/13, 47/13, 65/14, and 55/17).

    The relevant provisions of Article 10b read as follows:

    (1) If the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopts a decision referred to in the third paragraph of the preceding Article, the police shall not allow entry to foreigners who do not comply with the conditions for entry and shall bring to the state border foreigners who illegally entered the Republic of Slovenia after the entry into force of such decision and are illegally staying in the area where this Article is implemented, and direct them to the country from which they illegally entered the Republic of Slovenia.

    (2) If a foreigner who is attempting to illegally enter the territory of the Republic of Slovenia at a border crossing point or who has illegally entered its territory from a neighbouring country and is staying in the area where this Article is being implemented declares, after the entry into force of the decision of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia referred to in the third paragraph of the preceding Article, his or her intention to file an application for international protection, the police shall establish the identity of the foreigner in accordance with the Act governing police tasks and powers and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Act governing international protection, shall ascertain whether:

    – it has been established that there exist systemic deficiencies in the neighbouring country from which the foreigner has entered which are related to the procedure for granting international protection and the conditions for the reception of applicants and might expose them to the risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment;

    – the foreigner has individually, plausibly, and substantially demonstrated in the course of the procedure that he or she is personally threatened with a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in a neighbouring country and that he or she was unable to apply for international protection in that country for valid reasons;

    – the health condition of the foreigner or a member of his or her family clearly makes it impossible for him or her to be directed to a neighbouring country;

    – the appearance, behaviour, or other circumstances of a person indicate that he or she is an unaccompanied minor.

    (3) If, after carrying out the procedure, the police establish that the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph do not apply to the case of a foreigner referred to in the preceding paragraph, the police shall reject the statement of intent to file an application for international protection by an order. An appeal shall be allowed against such an order, but it shall not stay the execution of the order. Appeals shall be decided on by the ministry responsible for the interior. Where one of the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph exists, the foreigner shall be allowed to file an application for international protection, while proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the law governing international protection relating to the preliminary procedure.

    (4) On the basis of the enforceable order referred to in the preceding paragraph, the police shall take the foreigner to the state border and direct him or her to the safe neighbouring country from which the foreigner entered. If the safe neighbouring country from which the foreigner entered refuses the foreigner's entry into its territory, the order shall be revoked and the foreigner shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of the law governing international protection.

    Outcome of the case:

    The Court first examined the second paragraph of Article 10a in light of Article 2 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of the clarity and precision of legislation. It held that the term ‘complex migration crisis’ refers to a situation in which increased regional migration seriously endangers the effective functioning of a state governed by the rule of law, the maintenance of public order and security, economic stability, and the protection of life and health. The level of threat must be such as to necessitate government intervention, though not so severe as to justify the declaration of a state of emergency. As the meaning of the term could be ascertained through established methods of legal interpretation – namely linguistic, systematic, historical, and teleological interpretation – the Court found no inconsistency with Article 2 of the Constitution.

    The Court then proceeded to assess the second, third, and fourth paragraphs of Article 10b in light of the principle of non-refoulement, as guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution (prohibition of torture), Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as Article 18 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention. In doing so, it took into account the jurisprudence of both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court emphasised, amongst others, that: (i) the state must address a migration crisis in cooperation with the European Union and its institutions; (ii) it must continuously monitor the situation and adopt timely measures to respond to the crisis, although it may not take steps that would curtail rights and guarantees established by EU law; (iii) an increase in the number of migrants or applicants for international protection does not absolve the state of its obligations arising from the principle of non-refoulement, as established in the case law of the European courts; and (iv) a ‘complex migration crisis’ does not entail such a degree of systemic dysfunction as to warrant the declaration of a state of emergency, meaning that the constitutionality of the special regime in question must be assessed according to the criteria applicable under normal circumstances.

    On this basis, the Court found that the legislature had failed to establish adequate safeguards to protect the rights guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution. In particular, it held that the presumption of the safety of a third country could not be effectively rebutted in cases of indirect refoulement, where an individual might be denied genuine access to an asylum procedure or a substantive examination of their claim. Furthermore, the Foreigners Act did not provide essential procedural guarantees, including the rights to information, interpretation, legal assistance, and a personal interview. Consequently, the Court declared the second, third, and fourth paragraphs of Article 10b inconsistent with Article 18 of the Constitution and abrogated them.

    The Court subsequently examined the first paragraph of Article 10b, which governs the treatment of foreigners who do not meet the conditions for entry or are unlawfully present in Slovenia. As the Constitution does not expressly prohibit collective expulsion, the Court conducted its review with reference to Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, noting that Article 19(1) of the EU Charter has the same meaning and scope.

    The Court emphasised, amongst others, that: (i) the relevant Convention provision applies both to situations in which a foreigner is already present in a state’s territory and the authorities seek to remove them, and to situations in which a foreigner attempts to enter the state, including instances of refusal of entry at the border, when border authorities decline to accept an application for international protection, or when assessing the conduct of police officers managing large groups of migrants; (ii) the principal purpose of this provision is to prevent states from removing groups of foreigners without examining their individual circumstances or allowing them the opportunity to present arguments against the measure adopted by the competent authority, including evidence of any risk of exposure to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR as a consequence of refusal of entry or expulsion; (iii) the decisive criterion for classifying an expulsion as collective is the absence of an objective and individualised assessment of each foreigner’s situation within the group, and once an expulsion is deemed collective, it constitutes a violation of the relevant human right; and (iv) a state cannot, however, be held responsible for collective expulsion where the persons crossing the border act in an organised and violent manner, deliberately exploiting the size of the group, or where the refusal of entry results solely from the conduct of the foreigner concerned.

    The Court found that the first paragraph of Article 10b did not guarantee foreigners the right to an individual decision, access to information, interpretation, legal assistance, or an effective remedy. As the provision failed to ensure access to an individualised procedure – even for those attempting lawful entry – it was deemed unconstitutional. Although the text referred to individual foreigners, the Court held that, in practice, it introduced a collective measure, as it failed to distinguish between situations where refusal of entry was a consequence of a foreigner’s own conduct and those involving the use of force by groups. The legislature should therefore have established two distinct legal regimes to reflect these differences. By failing to ensure individualised treatment and to differentiate between such situations, the first paragraph of Article 10b amounted to a prohibited collective expulsion, inconsistent with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR. Consequently, it also contravened Article 153(2) of the Constitution, which requires laws to conform to international treaties ratified by the National Assembly. The Court therefore abrogated the first paragraph of Article 10b of the Foreigners Act.

    As a consequence of this annulment, the fifth paragraph of Article 10b lost its legislative purpose. The Constitutional Court thus abrogated this provision as well, thereby invalidating Article 10b of the Foreigners Act in its entirety. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    8. The first applicant alleges that the measures provided for in Article 10b of the FoA-2 will be applied to large groups of foreigners who find themselves in a similar situation, as they will be removed from the country without a procedure in which they are provided individualised consideration of their personal circumstances. The expulsion of foreigners without informing them, in the presence of an interpreter, of the possibility of submitting an application for international protection prior to their expulsion is indicative of the collective nature of such conduct, and therefore the above-mentioned legislation is allegedly contrary to the prohibition of collective expulsions, which are expressly prohibited by Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Official Gazette RS, No. 33/94, MP, No. 7/94 – hereinafter referred to as the ECHR) and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 202, 7 June 2016 – hereinafter referred to as the Charter). Although the Constitution does not contain an explicit prohibition of collective expulsions, in the first applicant 's view, protection is guaranteed under Articles 18 and 48 of the Constitution. The regulation allegedly also interferes with the right determined by Article 34 of the Constitution.

    ...

    14. The second applicant further opines that the first paragraph of Article 10b of the FoA-2 is also contrary to EU law. EU law allegedly regulates the procedure for dealing with migrants who are not applicants for international protection and allegedly governs the obligations of EU Member States and institutions in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons. The second applicant draws attention to the fact that, on the basis of Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version, OJ C 202, 7 June 2016 – hereinafter referred to as the TFEU), the EU is developing a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection with a view to offering an appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. On the basis of the first paragraph of Article 79 of the TFEU, the EU also develops a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring the efficient management of migration flows. EU law allegedly places particular emphasis on the safeguards afforded to individuals in these procedures. Allegedly, the Charter must also be taken into account. An EU country allegedly must not unilaterally derogate from EU law. The second applicant opines that the Republic of Slovenia has circumvented EU law by the regulation determined by Articles 10a and 10b of the FoA-2.

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    64. It follows from the above that the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 10b of the FoA-2 fall within the scope of regulation under EU law, as they regulate the treatment of persons who have expressed an intention to apply for international protection in times of a migration crisis. From the third paragraph of Article 3a of the Constitution there follows the requirement that all public authorities, including the Constitutional Court, must apply EU law in the exercise of their competences in accordance with the legal regulation of that organisation. The Constitutional Court must take into account Article 3a of the Constitution when assessing regulations that fall within the scope of EU law. On the basis of the third paragraph of Article 3a of the Constitution, it must take into account primary and secondary EU legislation and the case law of the CJEU. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Charter, EU Member States also apply the provisions of the Charter when implementing EU law. Since the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 10b of the FoA-1 cover the field of EU law, the Constitutional Court must take into account primary EU law, in particular the Charter, the applicable secondary EU law, and the case law of the CJEU when defining the content of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although the regulations of the revised asylum system are not yet binding at the time of the Constitutional Court's decision-making, the Constitutional Court must ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that its interpretation of the Constitution does not jeopardise the full effect of the regulations of the revised asylum system once they have begun to apply.

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    67. Article 4 of the Charter prohibits torture, stating that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Protection in the event of removal, expulsion, or extradition is also guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 19 of the Charter. Under this provision of the Charter, no one may be removed from a country, expelled from a country, or extradited to a country where he or she would be in serious danger of being subjected to the death penalty, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 18 of the Charter recognises the right to asylum, with due respect for the Geneva Convention, which also covers the non-refoulement principle determined by Article 33 of the Geneva Convention.

    68. The CJEU adopted the position that the common European asylum system is based on the full and universal application of the Geneva Convention and on ensuring that no one is sent back to an area where he or she could be persecuted again. The fundamental right guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR is part of the general principles of EU law. The CJEU adopted the position that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment determined by Article 4 of the Charter corresponds to the prohibition in Article 3 of the ECHR and that, in this context, its content and scope in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 53 of the Charter are identical to those determined by the ECHR. It stated that the right determined by Article 4 of the Charter is absolute in nature. The CJEU also adopted the position that in interpreting Article 4 and the second paragraph of Article 19 of the Charter, the case law of the ECtHR must be taken into account.

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    77. The transfer of an individual between EU Member States on the basis of the Dublin III Regulation implies the application of the safe third country concept, where the safety of the third country (an EU Member State) is determined in general terms. The CJEU has adopted the position that EU law is based on the basic premise that each Member State shares with all other Member States a set of common values on which the EU is founded, and recognises that other Member States share them. This premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States in recognising these values and therefore respecting EU law, which implements them. Member States' legal systems are able to ensure equal and effective protection of the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, in particular by Articles 1 and 4, which determine one of the fundamental values of the EU and its Member States. Therefore, in the context of the common European asylum system and in particular the Dublin III Regulation, which is based on the principle of mutual trust and aims to speed up the processing of applications for international protection by streamlining it in the interests of the applicants and the countries concerned, it should be presumed that the processing of applicants for such protection in each Member State is in conformity with the requirements of the Charter and the Geneva Convention.

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    79. It is clear from the case law of the CJEU that the transfer of an individual to another EU Member State can only be carried out in circumstances where the transfer cannot give rise to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of the person concerned within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. The CJEU adopted the position that the authorities of a Member State, including its courts, may not, in the context of a transfer, neglect to assess the elements by which it can be demonstrated that the transfer would entail a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.

    80. The CJEU stressed that the prohibition on transferring an individual to another EU Member State on the basis of the second subparagraph of the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Dublin III Regulation follows from the general and absolute prohibition determined by Article 4 of the Charter. It follows therefrom that the transfer of an applicant to that Member State does not take place in all circumstances in which there are reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant will be exposed to such a risk during or after the transfer. For the purposes of the application of Article 4 of the Charter, it is irrelevant whether the serious risk that the person concerned will be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment as a result of being transferred to the responsible Member State under the Dublin III Regulation arises at the time of transfer or during or after the procedure for granting international protection.

    81. The CJEU also adopted the position that, in conformity with Article 4 of the Charter, an EU Member State cannot restrict itself to taking into consideration solely the declarations of the requesting third state or the accession to treaties by the latter state, guaranteeing, in principle, respect for fundamental rights. The competent authority of the requested Member State must rely, for the purposes of that verification, on information that is objective, reliable, specific, and properly updated, which may follow, inter alia, the judgments of international courts, such as ECtHR judgments, the judgments of courts of the requesting third state, and also decisions, reports, and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or within the framework of the United Nations.

    82. It follows from the case law of the CJEU that the right to information laid down in Article 4 of the Dublin III Regulation must also be respected in all transfer procedures under the Dublin III Regulation and that a personal interview is mandatory.The CJEU stressed in this respect that a personal interview can verify whether an individual is at risk of a violation of Article 4 of the Charter as a result of a transfer. The CJEU stated that a personal interview makes it possible to prevent a third-country national or a stateless person from being identified as an illegally staying person, while in fact he or she was intending to lodge an application for international protection.

    83. The CJEU also stressed that one of the objectives of the Procedures Directive II is to ensure that a person making an application for international protection has a real possibility to file an application as soon as possible. In this respect, it stressed that a third-country national acquires the status of an applicant by the very act of expressing his or her wish to apply for international protection before any public authority, and not only by formally filing an application that requires certain formalities. The right to file an application for international protection is a prerequisite for it to be registered and formally filed. This also ensures the effective exercise of the right to asylum determined by Article 18 of the Charter. The CJEU stressed that, although the submission and filing of an application for international protection are successive and separate stages, there exists a close link between these two actions, since their purpose is to ensure effective access to a procedure that enables an application for international protection to be examined and Article 18 of the Charter to be effectively implemented. National legislation which would prevent an individual from making or lodging an application for international protection solely on the grounds that he or she is unlawfully present in the territory of the country prevents that individual from effectively exercising the right determined by Article 18 of the Charter. The CJEU stressed that, in principle, each application must be considered individually. The competent national authorities must make a careful and cautious case-by-case assessment of the well-foundedness of the applicant's fear of persecution, and solely on the basis a concrete assessment of the facts and circumstances, in order to determine whether the facts and circumstances as established constitute such a threat that the person concerned may, in the light of his or her personal situation, have a well-founded fear that he or she would be a real victim of acts of persecution if he or she were to be returned to his or her country of origin. The requirement to examine an application for international protection on a case-by-case basis is based on the presumption that the competent national authorities must adapt the manner in which they examine the facts and evidence to the circumstances and characteristics of each application.

    ...

    94. It also follows from the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU that the state must ensure effective access to a procedure that allows an application for international protection to be examined. Individuals must not be prevented from making and filing an application for international protection on the sole ground that they are attempting to enter or are unlawfully present in the territory of a country.Therefore, individuals must have sufficient procedural guarantees to be able to effectively exercise their right under Article 18 of the Charter. In this respect, both the ECtHR and the CJEU emphasise the right to information, the right to a personal interview and the importance of interpretation and access to legal assistance. It follows from the case law of the ECtHR that, when assessing the effectiveness of access to procedures for the recognition of international protection and the conduct of states that refuse to allow foreigners to enter the country at the border or to return foreigners to third countries within a short period of time after entry, particular attention must be paid to the procedural guarantees afforded to foreigners (information, interpretation, legal assistance) (see paragraphs 75, 82, and 85 of the reasoning).

    ...

    100. The legislature also did not ensure, in the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 10b of the FoA-2, that procedural guarantees would be guaranteed to foreigners who have expressed their intention to apply for international protection. The right to information, the right to a personal interview, the right to an interpreter, and the right to legal assistance have not been regulated by the legislature. A statutory regulation that does not regulate the mentioned procedural guarantees does not ensure effective access to the procedure for examining an application for international protection. This means that effective exercise of the right determined by Article 18 of the Charter, which also includes the principle of non-refoulement determined by Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, is rendered impossible. 

    ...

    106. At a time when a complex migration crisis has been declared, the regulation determined by the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 10b of the FoA-2 does not guarantee foreigners who express an intention to file an application access to a fair and effective procedure in which the individual will be provided a substantive assessment that the transfer to a neighbouring EU Member State cannot give rise to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of the person concerned. Hence, already at the abstract level, the legislature failed to provide procedural safeguards to foreigners who express an intention to file an application for international protection that would ensure the effective exercise of their right determined by Article 18 of the Charter, which also includes respect for the non-refoulement principle. Nor do the mentioned provisions allow an individual to rebut the presumption that a third country is safe by stating circumstances that could justify that he or she is at risk of so-called indirect return to the third country. The regulation determined by the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 10b of the FoA-2 is an interconnected whole of the substantive and procedural provisions which, taken together, do not allow for the effective exercise of the right determined by Article 18 of the Constitution, and therefore the second through fourth paragraphs of Article 10b of the FoA-2 interfere with the right determined by Article 18 of the Constitution.

    ..

    118. Although the Schengen Borders Code, the Visa Code, and the Return Directive do not expressly regulate a mass influx of foreigners seeking to enter the territory of a Member State, the first paragraph of Article 10a of the FoA-2 undoubtedly falls within the scope of the application of EU law, as it regulates the entry of foreigners who do not fulfil the conditions and return of foreigners who are unlawfully present in the territory of the country. From the reasoning, it already follows that Member States must resolve a migration crisis situation in cooperation with the EU and its institutions (paragraphs 54–59 and 62 of the reasoning). States have a duty to monitor the situation and take timely action to address the crisis situation, including by using all instruments that provide the state with the possibility to benefit from EU solidarity measures. The EU has placed even more emphasis on joint migration management in its recast asylum legislation (see paragraphs 60 and 61 of the reasoning). When reviewing a regulation that is relevantly connected to EU law or in respect of which EU law imposes certain obligations on Member States even in the absence of specific secondary legislation, the Constitutional Court must take into account Article 3a of the Constitution and, when determining the content of human rights and fundamental freedoms, primary EU law, in particular the Charter, the applicable secondary EU law, and the case law of the CJEU. In such cases, the Constitutional Court may apply national standards regarding fundamental rights protection only if such application does not compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the CJEU, and the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law.

    ...

    127. The prohibition of collective expulsion is also regulated by the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Charter. From the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ C 303, 14 December 2007), it follows that the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Charter has the same meaning and scope of application as Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR. Its purpose is to ensure that every decision is based on a specific consideration and that not all persons who have the nationality of a particular state can be expelled by one single measure.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    8. Prvi predlagatelj zatrjuje, da se bodo ukrepi iz 10.b člena ZTuj-2 uporabljali zoper večje skupine tujcev, ki se bodo znašli v podobni situaciji, saj bodo odstranjeni iz države brez postopka, v katerem bi jim bila zagotovljena individualna obravnava njihovih osebnih okoliščin. Izgon tujcev, ne da bi bili ti pred izgonom ob prisotnosti tolmača obveščeni o možnosti podaje prošnje za mednarodno zaščito, kaže na kolektivno naravo takega ravnanja, zato naj bi bila navedena ureditev v nasprotju s prepovedjo kolektivnih izgonov, ki so izrecno prepovedani v 4. členu Protokola št. 4 h Konvenciji o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin (Uradni list RS, št. 33/94, MP, št. 7/94 – v nadaljevanju EKČP) in 19. členu Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (UL C 202, 7. 6. 2016 – v nadaljevanju Listina). Čeprav Ustava ne vsebuje izrecne prepovedi kolektivnih izgonov, naj bi bilo po stališču prvega predlagatelja varstvo zagotovljeno v 18. in 48. členu Ustave. Ureditev pa naj bi posegala tudi v pravico iz 34. člena Ustave. 

    ...

    14. Drugi predlagatelj še meni, da je prvi odstavek 10.b člena ZTuj-2 tudi v nasprotju s pravom EU. Pravo EU naj bi urejalo postopek obravnave migrantov, ki niso prosilci za mednarodno zaščito, in naj bi urejalo obveznosti držav članic in institucij EU v primeru množičnega prihoda razseljenih oseb. Drugi predlagatelj opozarja, da na podlagi 78. člena Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (prečiščena različica, UL C 202, 7. 6. 2016 – v nadaljevanju PDEU) EU oblikuje skupno politiko o azilu, subsidiarni zaščiti in začasni zaščiti z namenom ponuditi ustrezen status vsem državljanom tretjih držav, ki potrebujejo mednarodno zaščito, in zagotoviti skladnost z načelom nevračanja. Na podlagi prvega odstavka 79. člena PDEU EU oblikuje tudi skupno politiko priseljevanja, s katero zagotovi učinkovito upravljanje migracijskih tokov. Pravo EU naj bi dajalo poseben poudarek jamstvom, ki jih imajo posamezniki v navedenih postopkih. Pri tem naj bi bilo treba upoštevati tudi Listino. Država članica EU naj ne bi smela enostransko odstopiti od prava EU. Drugi predlagatelj meni, da je Republika Slovenija z ureditvijo v 10.a in 10.b členu ZTuj-2 zaobšla pravo EU.

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    64. Iz navedenega izhaja, da drugi do četrti odstavek 10.b člena ZTuj-2 segajo na področje urejanja prava EU, saj urejajo postopanje z osebami, ki so podale namero vložiti prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito v času kriznih razmer na področju migracij. Iz tretjega odstavka 3.a člena Ustave izhaja zahteva, da morajo vsi državni organi, tudi Ustavno sodišče, pravo EU pri izvrševanju svojih pristojnosti uporabljati v skladu s pravno ureditvijo te organizacije. Ustavno sodišče mora pri presoji predpisov, ki spadajo na področje prava EU, upoštevati 3.a člen Ustave. Na podlagi tretjega odstavka 3.a člena Ustave mora upoštevati primarno in sekundarno zakonodajo EU ter sodno prakso SEU. Države članice EU skladno s prvim odstavkom 51. člena Listine uporabljajo tudi določbe Listine, ko izvajajo pravo EU. Ker drugi do četrti odstavek 10.b člena ZTuj-1 segajo na področje urejanja prava EU, mora Ustavno sodišče pri opredeljevanju vsebine človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin upoštevati primarno pravo EU, zlasti Listino, veljavno sekundarno pravo EU in sodno prakso SEU. Kljub temu da uredbe iz prenovljenega azilnega sistema v času odločanja Ustavnega sodišča še niso zavezujoče, mora Ustavno sodišče v največji možni meri zagotoviti, da ne bi z razlago Ustave ogrožalo polnega učinka uredb iz prenovljenega azilnega sistema po začetku njihove uporabe.

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    67. V 4. členu Listine je urejena prepoved mučenja, ki določa, da nihče ne sme biti podvržen mučenju ali nečloveškemu ali ponižujočemu ravnanju ali kaznovanju. Varstvo v primeru odstranitve, izgona ali izročitve je zagotovljeno tudi z drugim odstavkom 19. člena Listine. V skladu s to določbo Listine se nihče ne sme odstraniti iz države, izgnati iz države ali izročiti državi, v kateri obstaja zanj resna nevarnost, da bo podvržen smrtni kazni, mučenju ali drugemu nečloveškemu ali ponižujočemu ravnanju ali kaznovanju. Člen 18 Listine priznava pravico do azila ob upoštevanju Ženevske konvencije, s čimer je zajeto tudi načelo nevračanja iz 33. člena Ženevske konvencije.

    68. SEU je sprejelo stališče, da skupni evropski azilni sistem temelji na popolni in splošni uporabi Ženevske konvencije in zagotovitvi, da nihče ne bo poslan nazaj na območje, na katerem bi lahko bil ponovno preganjan. Temeljna pravica, ki je zagotovljena s 3. členom EKČP, je del splošnih načel prava EU. SEU je sprejelo stališče, da prepoved nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja iz 4. člena Listine ustreza tisti iz 3. člena EKČP ter da sta v tem okviru njena vsebina in obseg v skladu s tretjim odstavkom 53. člena Listine enaka kot tista, ki ju določa EKČP. Navedlo je, da je pravica iz 4. člena Listine absolutne narave. SEU je tudi sprejelo stališče, da je treba pri razlagi 4. člena in drugega odstavka 19. člena Listine upoštevati sodno prakso ESČP.

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    77. Predaja posameznika med državami članicami EU na podlagi Dublinske uredbe III pomeni uporabo koncepta varne tretje države, pri katerem je varnost tretje države (države članice EU) določena na splošno. SEU je sprejelo stališče, da pravo EU temelji na osnovni premisi, da vsaka država članica z vsemi drugimi državami članicami deli vrsto skupnih vrednot, na katerih temelji EU, in priznava, da jih druge države članice delijo z njo. Ta premisa pomeni in utemeljuje obstoj vzajemnega zaupanja med državami članicami v zvezi s priznavanjem teh vrednot in torej spoštovanjem prava EU, s katerim se te vrednote izvajajo. Pravni sistemi držav članic so zmožni zagotoviti enakovredno in učinkovito varstvo temeljnih pravic, priznanih z Listino, zlasti s 1. in 4. členom, ki določata eno temeljnih vrednot EU in njenih držav članic.Zato je treba v okviru skupnega evropskega azilnega sistema in zlasti Dublinske uredbe III, ki temelji na načelu medsebojnega zaupanja in želi z racionalizacijo prošenj za mednarodno zaščito pospešiti njihovo obravnavanje v interesu prosilcev in udeleženih držav, domnevati, da je obravnavanje prosilcev za tako zaščito v vsaki državi članici v skladu z zahtevami Listine in Ženevske konvencije.

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    79. Iz sodne prakse SEU izhaja, da je predajo posameznika drugi državi članici EU mogoče opraviti le v okoliščinah, v katerih predaja ne more povzročiti dejanske nevarnosti, da bi se z zadevno osebo ravnalo nečloveško ali ponižujoče v smislu 4. člena Listine. SEU je sprejelo stališče, da organi države članice, vključno z njenimi sodišči, pri predaji ne smejo zanemariti presoje elementov, s katerimi je mogoče izkazati, da bi predaja lahko pomenila dejansko nevarnost nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja v smislu 4. člena Listine.

    80. SEU je poudarilo, da prepoved predaje posameznika drugi državi članici EU na podlagi drugega pododstavka drugega odstavka 3. člena Dublinske uredbe III izhaja iz splošne in absolutne prepovedi, ki je določena v 4. členu Listine. Iz nje izhaja, da se predaja prosilca v to državo članico ne izvede v vseh okoliščinah, v katerih obstajajo utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bo prosilec med predajo ali po njej izpostavljen taki nevarnosti.Za namene uporabe 4. člena Listine ni pomembno, ali resna nevarnost, da bo zadevna oseba izpostavljena nečloveškemu ali ponižujočemu ravnanju zaradi predaje odgovorni državi članici na podlagi Dublinske uredbe III, nastane ob predaji, med postopkom za priznanje mednarodne zaščite ali po njem.

    81. SEU je tudi sprejelo stališče, da se država članica EU v skladu s 4. členom Listine pri presoji ne sme omejiti na to, da upošteva zgolj izjave tretje države, ali na to, da je ta država sprejela mednarodne pogodbe, ki načeloma zagotavljajo spoštovanje temeljnih pravic. Pristojni organ se mora za namen te preveritve opreti na objektivne, zanesljive, natančne in ustrezno posodobljene elemente, ki lahko med drugim izhajajo iz mednarodnih sodnih odločb, kot so sodbe ESČP, sodne odločbe tretje države prosilke ter odločbe, poročila in drugi dokumenti, ki jih pripravijo organi Sveta Evrope ali organi v okviru sistema Združenih narodov.

    82. Iz sodne prakse SEU izhaja, da je treba tudi v vseh postopkih predaje na podlagi Dublinske uredbe III spoštovati pravico do obveščenosti iz 4. člena Dublinske uredbe III in da je treba obvezno opraviti osebni razgovor. SEU je pri tem poudarilo, da se prav z osebnim razgovorom lahko preveri, ali pri posamezniku zaradi predaje obstaja tveganje za nastanek kršitve 4. člena Listine. SEU je navedlo, da osebni razgovor omogoča, da se prepreči, da bi bil državljan tretje države ali oseba brez državljanstva opredeljen kot oseba, ki prebiva nezakonito, čeprav je dejansko želel vložiti prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito.

    83. SEU je tudi poudarilo, da je eden od ciljev Postopkovne direktive II zagotoviti, da ima oseba, ki poda prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito, dejansko možnost, da jo vloži v najkrajšem času. Pri tem je poudarilo, da državljan tretje države pridobi status prosilca že s tem, da pred katerim koli državnim organom izrazi željo, da zaprosi za mednarodno zaščito, in ne šele s formalno vložitvijo prošnje, ki zahteva določene formalnosti. Pravica do podaje prošnje za mednarodno zaščito je predpogoj, da se ta prošnja evidentira in da se lahko formalno vloži. S tem se zagotovi tudi učinkovito izvrševanje pravice do azila iz 18. člena Listine. SEU je poudarilo, da čeprav sta podaja in vložitev prošnje za mednarodno zaščito zaporedni in ločeni fazi, obstaja tesna povezava med tema ravnanjema, ker je njun namen zagotoviti učinkovit dostop do postopka, ki omogoča obravnavanje prošnje za mednarodno zaščito in učinkovito izvrševanje 18. člena Listine. Nacionalna zakonodaja, ki bi posamezniku zgolj zato, ker se je nezakonito nahajal na ozemlju države, onemogočila podati ali vložiti prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito, preprečuje, da bi ta posameznik učinkovito izvrševal pravico iz 18. člena Listine. SEU je poudarilo, da je treba vsako prošnjo načeloma obravnavati posamično. Pristojni nacionalni organi morajo posamično presojo utemeljenosti strahu prosilca pred preganjanjem skrbno in previdno opraviti v vsakem primeru posebej, in sicer zgolj na podlagi konkretne ocene dejstev in okoliščin, da ugotovijo, ali ugotovljena dejstva in okoliščine pomenijo tako grožnjo, da se lahko zadevna oseba glede na svoj osebni položaj upravičeno boji, da bo dejansko žrtev dejanj preganjanja, če bi se vrnila v svojo izvorno državo. Zahteva po posamičnem obravnavanju prošnje za mednarodno zaščito temelji na predpostavki, da morajo pristojni nacionalni organi način preizkusa dejstev in dokazov prilagoditi okoliščinam in značilnostim vsake prošnje.

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    94. Iz sodne prakse ESČP in SEU tudi izhaja, da mora država zagotoviti učinkovit dostop do postopka, ki omogoča obravnavanje prošnje za mednarodno zaščito. Posameznikom se ne sme onemogočati podati in vložiti prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito le zato, ker poskušajo nezakonito vstopiti na ozemlje države ali se nezakonito nahajajo na njenem ozemlju. Zato mora imeti posameznik zadostna procesna jamstva, da lahko učinkovito izvršuje pravico iz 18. člena Listine. Tako ESČP kot SEU pri tem poudarjata pravico do informiranosti, pravico do osebnega razgovora ter pomen tolmačenja in dostopa do pravne pomoči. Iz sodne prakse ESČP izhaja, da je treba pri presoji učinkovitosti dostopa do postopkov za priznanje mednarodne zaščite in presoji ravnanj držav, ki zavračajo vstop tujcev v državo na meji ali pa tujce vračajo v tretje države v kratkem časovnem obdobju po vstopu, posebno pozornost nameniti procesnim jamstvom, ki so zagotovljena tujcem (informiranje, tolmačenje, pravna pomoč) (glej 75., 82. in 85. točko obrazložitve).

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    100. Zakonodajalec v drugem do četrtem odstavku 10.b člena ZTuj-2 tudi ni zagotovil, da bi bila tujcem, ki so izrazili namero podati prošnjo za mednarodno zaščito, zagotovljena procesna jamstva. Zakonodajalec ni uredil pravice do informiranosti, pravice do osebnega razgovora, pravice do tolmača in pravne pomoči. Zakonska ureditev, ki ne ureja omenjenih procesnih jamstev, ne zagotavlja učinkovitega dostopa do postopka, ki omogoča obravnavanje prošnje za mednarodno zaščito. To pomeni, da ni omogočeno učinkovito izvrševanje pravice iz 18. člena Listine, ki vključuje tudi načelo nevračanja iz 33. člena Ženevske konvencije.

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    106. Ureditev v drugem do četrtem odstavku 10.b člena ZTuj-2 tujcem, ki podajo namero vložiti prošnjo, v času razglasitve kompleksne krize na področju migracij ne zagotavlja dostopa do poštenega in učinkovitega postopka, v katerem bo posamezniku zagotovljena vsebinska presoja, da predaja v sosednjo državo članico EU ne more povzročiti dejanske nevarnosti, da bi se z zadevno osebo ravnalo nečloveško ali ponižujoče. Zakonodajalec torej že na abstraktni ravni tujcem, ki podajo namero vložiti prošnjo, ni zagotovil procesnih jamstev, s katerimi bi jim bilo zagotovljeno učinkovito izvrševanje pravice iz 18. člena Listine, ki vključuje tudi spoštovanje načela nevračanja. Navedene določbe tudi ne omogočajo, da bi posameznik domnevo o varnosti tretje države izpodbijal z okoliščinami, ki bi lahko utemeljile, da mu v tretji državi grozi t. i. posredno vračanje. Ureditev v drugem do četrtem odstavku 10.b člena ZTuj-2 je med seboj povezana celota materialnih in postopkovnih določb, ki skupaj ne omogočajo učinkovitega izvrševanja pravice iz 18. člena Ustave, zato drugi do četrti odstavek 10.b člena ZTuj-2 posegajo v pravico iz 18. člena Ustave.

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    118. Čeprav Zakonik o schengenskih mejah, Vizumski zakonik in Direktiva o vračanju izrecno ne urejajo množičnega prihoda tujcev, ki bi skušali vstopiti na ozemlje države članice, prvi odstavek 10.a člena ZTuj-2 brez dvoma sega na področje uporabe prava EU, saj ureja vstop tujcev, ki ne izpolnjujejo pogojev, in vrnitev tujcev, ki se nezakonito nahajajo na ozemlju države. Iz obrazložitve že izhaja, da mora država članica krizne razmere na področju migracij reševati v sodelovanju z EU in njenimi institucijami (54.–59. in 62. točka obrazložitve). Država je dolžna spremljati razmere in pravočasno sprejemati ukrepe za soočanje s kriznimi razmerami, vključno z uporabo vseh instrumentov, ki ji zagotavljajo možnost koriščenja solidarnih ukrepov v okviru EU. Še večji poudarek pa je EU skupnemu upravljanju migracij namenila v prenovljeni azilni zakonodaji (glej 60. in 61. točko obrazložitve). Ob presoji ureditve, ki je upoštevno povezana s pravom EU oziroma glede katere pravo EU tudi brez specifične sekundarne zakonodaje državam članicam nalaga določene obveznosti, mora Ustavno sodišče upoštevati 3.a člen Ustave in pri opredeljevanju vsebine človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin upoštevati primarno pravo EU, zlasti Listino, veljavno sekundarno pravo EU in sodno prakso SEU.V takih primerih lahko Ustavno sodišče uporabi nacionalne standarde glede varstva temeljnih pravic, če ta uporaba ne ogrozi ravni varstva iz Listine, kot jo razlaga SEU, niti ne posega v primarnost, enotnost in učinkovitost prava EU.

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    127. Prepoved kolektivnega izgona ureja tudi prvi odstavek 19. člena Listine. Iz Pojasnil k Listini (UL C 303, 14. 12. 2007) izhaja, da ima prvi odstavek 19. člena Listine enak pomen in področje uporabe kot 4. člen Protokola št. 4 k EKČP. Njegov namen je zagotoviti, da je vsaka odločitev utemeljena na posebni obravnavi in da z enim ukrepom ni mogoče izgnati vseh oseb, ki imajo državljanstvo posamezne države.