Slovenia / Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia / I Up 92/2025
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Slovenia / Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia / I Up 92/2025
Key facts of the case:
The case concerned a third-country national who applied for international protection in Slovenia. The Ministry of the Interior declared his application inadmissible pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, having determined that the Republic of Croatia was the Member State responsible for examining his asylum claim. The applicant challenged that decision before the Administrative Court, contending that his transfer would expose him to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, both on account of alleged systemic deficiencies in the Croatian asylum system and in light of his individual circumstances, in particular his state of health (as a result of blows inflicted by Croatian police officers, he has difficulties with his right eye). The Administrative Court dismissed the action. It accepted the Ministry’s assessment that the conditions described by the applicant in the Croatian reception facilities – although undoubtedly unpleasant – did not amount to systemic deficiencies capable of engaging the prohibition on transfer under Article 3(2)(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. The court further endorsed the Ministry’s conclusion that the applicant’s allegations concerning the denial of medical care were not substantiated.
The applicant subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. While reiterating his complaints regarding reception conditions and the conduct of Croatian officials – namely that the asylum centre was infested with parasites and cockroaches, had a malfunctioning toilet, and provided food of poor quality, and that officials and other staff behaved towards him in an insulting manner, with one official allegedly instructing him to leave Croatia – he placed particular emphasis on a material deterioration in his medical condition that had occurred after the Administrative Court had delivered its judgment. He explained that he had been diagnosed with a retinal detachment and a retinal tear in his right eye, had undergone surgery under general anaesthesia, and required ongoing post-operative treatment, including protection from physical exertion and sudden changes in atmospheric pressure, as well as regular follow-up examinations. According to the applicant, his immediate transfer would jeopardise his recovery and could lead to permanent and irreparable loss of vision. He relied expressly on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular the judgment in C. K. and Others, to argue that a transfer in such circumstances could, of itself, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.
Key legal question of the case:
The Court was required to determine whether the national authorities could proceed with the transfer of the applicant to the responsible Member State, or whether such a transfer would expose the applicant to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.
Outcome of the case:
The Supreme Court began by affirming that, in so far as the circumstances at the time when the Administrative Court gave its ruling were concerned, that court’s decision was legally sound. It agreed that the applicant’s account of the living conditions in the Croatian reception facility, even if accepted as accurate, did not attain the high threshold required to establish the existence of systemic deficiencies within the meaning of Article 3(2)(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. The Supreme Court likewise rejected the contention that the Administrative Court had failed to engage with the applicant’s submissions concerning verbal abuse, encouragement to leave Croatia, or the alleged denial of medical care. The Supreme Court emphasised that, under Slovenian procedural law, the Administrative Court is entitled – provided that it expressly records this in its judgment – to rely on the reasoning of the administrative authority where the claimant merely reiterates arguments that have already been considered and rejected at the administrative stage.
The Supreme Court then turned to the applicant’s medical condition as it stood at the time of the appeal. It observed that the medical documentation submitted demonstrated the emergence of new and potentially decisive facts after the Administrative Court had delivered its judgment, namely that the applicant had been diagnosed with a retinal detachment and a retinal tear in his right eye and had undergone surgical intervention. Drawing extensively on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Supreme Court recalled that Article 4 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding the transfer of an asylum seeker where that transfer would give rise to a genuine and substantiated risk of a significant and irreversible deterioration in the individual’s state of health, even in the absence of substantial grounds for believing that systemic deficiencies exist in the Member State responsible for examining the asylum application. In such circumstances, national authorities are under a duty to dispel any serious doubts as to the impact of the transfer by adopting all necessary preventive measures. Where such measures prove insufficient, the execution of the transfer must be deferred for as long as the individual’s state of health so requires. Furthermore, where recovery cannot reasonably be expected in the short term, or where a prolonged suspension of the procedure would itself risk causing harm, the requesting Member State may decide to assume responsibility for examining the application by invoking the discretionary clause set out in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal. It set aside the judgment of the Administrative Court, annulled the decision of the Ministry of the Interior, and remitted the matter to the Ministry for fresh determination. In the renewed proceedings, the Ministry is required to assess the newly arisen medical circumstances, in particular whether the applicant’s condition constitutes a ‘particularly serious illness’, and, where necessary, to obtain specific assurances from the Croatian authorities that any transfer would be carried out in a manner ensuring adequate and sufficient protection of the applicant’s health. Having regard to all the relevant circumstances, the Ministry also retains the option of deciding to postpone the execution of the transfer for such time as the applicant’s medical condition does not permit it.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
3. The claimant (hereinafter: the appellant) lodges an appeal against this judgment on all appellate grounds. He proposes that the Supreme Court amend the contested judgment by upholding the action and setting aside the respondent’s decision; alternatively, he proposes that the Court annul the judgment and remit the case to the Administrative Court for a new procedure. He draws attention to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU), namely that a transfer of an applicant shall not be carried out in circumstances where there are substantial grounds for believing that, during or following the transfer, the applicant would be exposed to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: the Charter). In the appellant’s case, such a circumstance is his state of health. Already at his personal interview, and again in the action, he stated that, as a result of blows inflicted by Croatian police officers, he has difficulties with his right eye (impaired vision and flashes of light) and with his head. After the issuance of the contested judgment, the Eye Clinic of the University Medical Centre Ljubljana established that he had a retinal detachment and tear in that eye, and he underwent surgery under general anaesthesia on 19 March 2025. Following the procedure, he was prescribed ocular therapy and advised to avoid substantial physical exertion and lifting heavy loads for one month. His eye must be protected from external influences and rapid changes in atmospheric pressure. The expected period of sick leave after such a procedure is one month, and the appellant has frequent follow-up examinations at the Eye Clinic; he has already had four and is currently scheduled for further appointments on 9 April 2025 and 21 May 2025. Without treatment or therapy, he may go blind or suffer irreversible damage to his eyesight. The appellant’s state of health is therefore such that the transfer could jeopardise his treatment and give rise to a risk of a significant and irreversible deterioration of his medical condition (in this regard he relies on the CJEU judgment in C. K. and Others). The appellant already had his request for medical assistance refused in Croatia, and it cannot be concluded on the basis of the AIDA report and the standardised response to the request for acceptance that appropriate medical care will be provided there. He maintains that systemic deficiencies within the meaning of Article 3(2)(2) of the Dublin III Regulation also exist in Croatia, as living conditions and food in the asylum centre there were poor. The Administrative Court did not adequately address the asserted facts that he left Croatia upon the instruction of an official person, that these persons behaved insultingly towards him, and that he was refused medical care. He emphasises that he is telling the truth.
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6. Article 3(2)(2) of the Dublin III Regulation provides that where the transfer of an applicant to the Member State initially designated as responsible is impossible because there are substantial grounds for believing that systemic deficiencies exist in that Member State’s asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants, which could result in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, the Member State carrying out the procedure to determine the responsible Member State shall continue to examine the criteria under Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible. Stated differently, an applicant may not be transferred to the responsible Member State if systemic deficiencies exist there in relation to the asylum procedure and the conditions for the reception of applicants, which could expose the applicant to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.
7. The Supreme Court notes that the appellant challenges the Administrative Court’s finding that no such deficiencies exist in Croatia primarily by reiterating the allegations in the action concerning poor living conditions in the Croatian asylum centre (which allegedly housed parasites, cockroaches, a malfunctioning toilet, and provided poor-quality food). Since the appellant merely repeats the allegations made in the action and does not explain why the Administrative Court’s findings in this respect are erroneous, the Supreme Court can only concur with the respondent and with the Administrative Court (paras. 7 and 56 of the reasoning of the contested judgment) that the above-described conditions, although unpleasant, do not meet the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment. Given that this finding is based primarily on the assumption that, even if everything the appellant alleges about the living conditions in the Croatian asylum centre is true, it does not constitute a breach of Article 4 of the Charter, the appellate arguments concerning his truthfulness are irrelevant.
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12. The CJEU has already clarified that Article 4 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that:
- even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that systemic deficiencies exist in the Member State responsible for examining an application for asylum, the transfer of an asylum applicant under the Dublin III Regulation may be carried out only in circumstances in which that transfer cannot give rise to a real and proven risk that the person concerned would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of that Article;
- in circumstances where the transfer of an asylum applicant suffering from a particularly serious mental or physical illness would entail a real and proven risk of a significant and irreversible deterioration in the person’s state of health, such a transfer would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of that Article;
- the authorities of the Member State required to carry out the transfer, and, depending on the circumstances of the case, its courts, must dispel any serious doubts regarding the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking the necessary preventive measures to ensure that the transfer is carried out in a manner that affords appropriate and adequate protection of that person’s state of health. If, having regard to the particular severity of the applicant’s illness, the adoption of such preventive measures would not suffice to ensure that the transfer does not give rise to a real risk of a significant and irreversible deterioration in the applicant’s health, the authorities of the Member State concerned must postpone the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s condition does not allow him to undergo such a transfer; and
- depending on the circumstances of the case, the requesting Member State, should it establish that the health of the asylum applicant concerned will not improve in the short term or that a prolonged suspension of the procedure could worsen the applicant’s condition, may decide to examine the application itself by applying the ‘discretionary clause’ under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
3. Tožnik (v nadaljevanju pritožnik) zoper to sodbo vlaga pritožbo iz vseh pritožbenih razlogov. Vrhovnemu sodišču predlaga, naj izpodbijano sodbo spremeni tako, da tožbi ugodi in sklep toženke odpravi; podrejeno, naj jo razveljavi in vrne zadevo Upravnemu sodišču, da opravi nov postopek. Opozarja na stališče Sodišča Evropske Unije (v nadaljevanju SEU), da se predaja prosilca ne izvede v vseh okoliščinah, v katerih obstajajo utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bo prosilec med predajo ali po njej izpostavljen nevarnosti nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja v smislu člena 4 Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (v nadaljevanju Listina). V pritožnikovem primeru je takšna okoliščina njegovo zdravstveno stanje. Že na osebnem razgovoru in v tožbi je navedel, da ima zaradi udarcev hrvaških policistov težave z desnim očesom (poslabšan vid in bliskanje) ter glavo. Po izdaji izpodbijane sodbe so na Očesni kliniki UKC Ljubljana ugotovili, da ima na tem očesu odstop in raztrganino mrežnice, ter ga 19. 3. 2025 operirali v splošni anesteziji. Po posegu so mu določili očesno terapijo in mu svetovali, naj se en mesec izogiba večjim fizičnim obremenitvam in dvigovanju težkih bremen. Oko mora zaščititi pred zunanjimi vplivi in hitrimi spremembami atmosferskega tlaka. Predvidena bolniška odsotnost po takšnem posegu je en mesec, pritožnik pa ima pogoste kontrolne preglede na Očesni kliniki, imel je že štiri, zaenkrat je naročen še 9. 4. 2025 in 21. 5. 2025. Brez zdravljenja oziroma terapije lahko oslepi ali si vid nepopravljivo okvari. Pritožnikovo zdravstveno stanje je torej takšno, da bi predaja lahko ogrozila njegovo zdravljenje in povzročila nevarnost za znatno in nepopravljivo poslabšanje njegovega zdravstvenega stanja (v tej zvezi se sklicuje na sodbo SEU v zadevi C. K. in ostali). Pritožniku so na Hrvaškem zdravniško pomoč že zavrnili, zgolj na podlagi poročila AIDA in tipskega odgovora na zahtevo za sprejem pa ni mogoče sklepati, da bo za njegovo zdravljenje tam ustrezno poskrbljeno. Vztraja, da na Hrvaškem obstajajo tudi sistemske pomanjkljivosti v smislu člena 3(2)(2) Uredbe Dublin III, saj so bile bivanjske razmere in hrana v tamkajšnjem azilnem domu slabe. Upravno sodišče se ni ustrezno opredelilo do zatrjevanih dejstev, da je Hrvaško zapustil po navodilu uradne osebe, da so se te do njega vedle žaljivo in da so mu zavrnili zdravniško oskrbo. Poudarja, da je resnicoljuben.
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6. Člen 3(2)(2) Uredbe Dublin III določa, da kadar predaja prosilca v državo članico, ki je bila prvotno določena za odgovorno, ni mogoča zaradi utemeljene domneve, da v tej državi članici obstajajo sistemske pomanjkljivosti vzvezi z azilnim postopkom in pogoji za sprejem prosilcev, ki bi lahko povzročile nevarnost nečloveškega ali poniževalnega ravnanja v smislu člena 4 Listine, država članica, ki izvede postopek določanja odgovorne države članice, še naprej preučuje merila iz poglavja III, da bi ugotovila, ali je mogoče določiti drugo državo članico kot odgovorno. Povedano drugače, prosilca se odgovorni državi članici ne sme predati, če tam obstajajo sistemske pomanjkljivosti v zvezi z azilnim postopkom in pogoji za sprejem prosilcev, ki bi zanj lahko povzročile nevarnost nečloveškega ali poniževalnega ravnanja.
7. Vrhovno sodišče ugotavlja, da pritožnik ugotovitvi Upravnega sodišča, da na Hrvaškem takšne pomanjkljivosti ne obstajajo, najprej nasprotuje s ponavljanjem tožbenih navedb o slabih bivanjskih razmerah v hrvaškem azilnem domu (tam naj bi bili zajedavci, ščurki, pokvarjeno stranišče in slaba hrana). Ker pritožnik tožbene navedbe zgolj ponovi, ne pojasni pa, zakaj naj bi bile izpodbijane ugotovitve Upravnega sodišča v tej zvezi zmotne, lahko Vrhovno sodišče le pritrdi toženki in Upravnemu sodišču (7. in 56. točka obrazložitve izpodbijane sodbe), da zgoraj opisane razmere, četudi neprijetne, ne dosegajo standarda nečloveškega ali poniževalnega ravnanja. Glede na to da ta ugotovitev primarno temelji na predpostavki, da tudi če vse, kar pritožnik zatrjuje glede bivanja v hrvaškem azilnem domu, drži, ne gre za kršitev 4. člena Listine, so pritožbeni ugovori, ki se nanašajo na njegovo resnicoljubnost, nerelevantni.
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12. SEU je že pojasnilo, da je treba 4. člen Listine razlagati tako, da
- tudi če ni podana utemeljena domneva o obstoju sistemskih pomanjkljivosti v državi članici, odgovorni za obravnavo prošnje za azil, je predajo prosilca za azil v okviru Uredbe Dublin III mogoče opraviti le v okoliščinah, v katerih ta predaja ne more povzročiti dejanske in izkazane nevarnosti, da bi se z zadevno osebo ravnalo nečloveško ali ponižujoče v smislu tega člena;
- bi v okoliščinah, v katerih bi predaja prosilca za azil s posebej hudo duševno ali fizično boleznijo povzročila dejansko in izkazano nevarnost za znatno in nepopravljivo poslabšanje zdravstvenega stanja zadevne osebe, ta predaja pomenila nečloveško in ponižujoče ravnanje v smislu navedenega člena;
- morajo organi države članice, ki mora opraviti predajo, in glede na okoliščine primera njena sodišča, odpraviti vsakršen resen pomislek v zvezi z učinkom predaje na zdravstveno stanje zadevne osebe s tem, da sprejmejo potrebne preventivne ukrepe, da bo predaja te osebe potekala na način, ki bo omogočal ustrezno in zadostno varstvo njenega zdravstvenega stanja. Če ob upoštevanju posebne resnosti bolezni zadevnega prosilca za azil sprejetje navedenih preventivnih ukrepov ne bi zadostovalo za zagotovitev, da njegova predaja ne bo povzročila dejanske nevarnosti za znatno in nepopravljivo poslabšanje njegovega zdravstvenega stanja, morajo organi zadevne države članice odložiti izvršitev predaje zadevne osebe za tako dolgo, dokler ji njeno stanje ne bo omogočalo, da bo zmožna za tako predajo, in
- bi se glede na okoliščine primera država članica, ki je podala zahtevo, če bi ugotovila, da se zdravstveno stanje zadevnega prosilca za azil kratkoročno ne bo izboljšalo ali da bi se zaradi dolgotrajne prekinitve postopka stanje zadevne osebe lahko poslabšalo, lahko odločila, da bo sama obravnavala njeno prošnjo z uporabo "diskrecijske klavzule" iz člena 17(1) Uredbe Dublin III.