Hungary continues implementing return policies – namely escorting all apprehended irregular migrants back to the outer side of the fence at its southern border – which the CJEU (C-808/18) found to be in violation of EU law in December 2020. 

Other Member States discussed or adopted new legislation to make returns more effective, by restricting rights, as two examples show. In Greece, Law No. 5226/2025, introduced prolonged imprisonment under national criminal law for irregular entry or stay and the increase of the maximum length of pre-removal detention to two years, exceeding what EU law allows. Legislative amendments in Sweden raised the duration of entry bans.

The European Commission initiated infringement procedures for the improper implementation of the EU return acquis against Belgium, Germany, Greece and Spain.

Council recommendations on addressing deficiencies identified during Schengen evaluations identified several return-related shortcomings in national laws, policies and practices. For example, the recommendations (98) and (99) for Croatia following an evaluation in 2024, ask that appeals against a return decision have a suspensive effect when their enforcement may violate the principle of non-refoulement and that information and procedural safeguards be respected. A recommendation (59) for Czechia following its evaluation at the end of 2024 stresses that prolonged detention periods, notably those longer than three months, must be subject to an ex officio judicial supervision; whereas a recommendation (82) from Poland’s 2024 evaluation asks that returnees be afforded an effective remedy to seek review of return-related decisions.

Member States continued to promote assisted voluntary returns (AVR). For instance, media in Germany reported that nearly 17,000 returnees used the AVR scheme in 2025, which is 60% higher than the year before. In Italy, voluntary departures increased from 789 in 2024 to 1,313 in 2025, according to official data reported by the press. To promote AVR, in France, a new decree on return and reintegration assistance tripled the lump sum grant under its voluntary return scheme for certain categories of irregular migrants who have crossed the Channel to €2,200, or €3,500 in special cases (Article 1). Cyprus has invested considerably in voluntary returns and runs an assisted voluntary return programme which offers various reintegration packages, with incentives depending on a variety of factors, as Caritas Cyprus informs. It reported one of the highest rates of voluntary returns in the EU in 2025 – over 75 % of those ordered to leave did so voluntarily, according to Eurostat.

Following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, UNHCR facilitates voluntary return but maintains its 2024 moratorium on forced return of refugees. Innovative programmes have emerged. In summer 2025, the Asylum Service in Cyprus ran a special programme, according to which the husband or father is allowed to stay in Cyprus under a special work permit for two years (renewable for one year), while the wife and children return to Syria with a financial benefit of €2,000 for the wife/mother and €1,000 for each child. FRA does not have information on how sustainable these returns from Cyprus to Syria have been, and whether they led to secondary displacement, meaning a subsequent forced movement, for example due to lack of safety or sustainable living conditions.

Frontex has become a more prominent actor not only in removals but also in voluntary returns: the EU Reintegration Programme (EURP) is active in 38 third countries of origin. Through Frontex, returnees can access short-term financial support and long-term in-kind post-return packages for 12 months.

Work on concluding and/or updating EU-level readmission agreements and other non-legally binding arrangements with third countries, as listed by Statewatch, continues, including talks with Guinea, Somalia, Senegal, Ethiopia, and The Gambia as well as formal negotiations with Kazakhstan, as authorised by the Council of the EU.

Some Member States (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands) are, according to media reports, actively pursuing offshore return centres in third countries. These so called ‘return hubs’ have sparked significant discussions, with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Observations on the new EU returns framework, March 2026), UNHCR (The Need for Effective Returns Systems and the Potential Role of Return Hubs, March 2025), and the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (A/80/302, August 2025) recalling the numerous limitations that human rights law imposes.

In February 2025, FRA issued a legal position paper on return hubs, concluding that the planned creation of return hubs in third countries as a measure to increase effective returns is only compatible with EU law if accompanied by a clear and robust set of safeguards.

A growing number of Member States are placing stronger emphasis on the swift removal of migrants in an irregular situation who pose public security risks. The Austrian Ministry of the Interior reported about the resumption of removals of criminal offenders to Afghanistan. One Austrian media outlet reported about removals to Syria and another media source about returns to Somalia. Similarly, Germany resumed returns of Afghan nationals with criminal records in February 2026. Denmark announced in the press in January 2026 the intention to impose tougher rules regarding returns of non-EU nationals sentenced to a year or more for serious crimes. The media also reported in February 2026 that Denmark plans to start cooperation on forced returns at a technical level with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which raised concerns about potential breaches of the principle of non-refoulement.

On 26 March 2026, in D.M. v. Sweden, the ECtHR noted that although serious, the general security and human rights situation in Afghanistan were not sufficient on their own to conclude that any removal to that country would necessarily breach the principle of non-refoulement. In the concrete case, which did not concern a person posing a security threat, the ECtHR found that the removal from Sweden of an Afghan of Hazara ethnicity violated Article 3 of the ECHR (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment).

Member States continue to struggle with resolving the situation of migrants in an irregular situation whom they cannot remove due to practical or legal obstacles, in some cases leading to stricter policies. For example, in Denmark, amendments to the Aliens Act in December 2024 abolished relevant sections that had allowed non-returnable third-country nationals to obtain a temporary one-year residence permit if they had cooperated with the return authorities for 18 months. The NGO Danish Refugee Council voiced criticism that the new rules would result in situations of limbo, with people residing in reception centres for indefinite periods without legal status.

Treatment of stateless persons in return procedures remains poorly documented. The European Network on Statelessness flagged the lack of consistent referrals to statelessness determination procedures of those returnees who lack a nationality – and the limited availability of such dedicated procedures across EU Member States – as a persistent gap.

Pursuant to Article 8 (6) of the Return Directive, Member States must provide for an effective forced return monitoring system. For over ten years, FRA has regularly reported on the functioning of national forced return monitoring systems. Although the above EU law obligation has been in force since 2010, significant gaps persist. In 2024, five Member States did not monitor any forced return operation. In eight Member States, fewer than ten forced return operations were monitored. In some Member States, the monitoring entity is embedded within the authority responsible for returns, raising independence issues. A significant number of Member States still do not publish key findings from their monitoring.

Frontex has a pool of forced return monitors with approximately 70 monitors, all but two affiliated with the national entity in charge of forced return monitoring and formally appointed to this Frontex-governed pool. In practice, over 93 % of Frontex charter flights were monitored in 2025. However, under Article 50 (5) of the EBCG Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 every return operation organised or coordinated by the Agency must be monitored. The Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer convened a meeting of forced return monitors in November 2025, calling for a more structured, integrated EU-level forced return monitoring system, with complementarity between EU-level and national-level monitoring.