CJEU Case C-58/24 / Judgment

25. By its first three questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 11 of the EIA Directive, read in the light of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding a rule provided for by the law of a Member State whereby an action for annulment of a derogation licence, which has been issued pursuant to Article 16 of the Habitats Directive and which forms part of the development consent procedure for the purposes of Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA Directive, must be brought by the public concerned within a period of three months from the time when that public knew or could reasonably have become aware of such a derogation.

...

31. Furthermore, in view of its content, Article 11(1) of the EIA Directive also gives concrete expression to the Member States’ obligation to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by EU law as referred to in Article 47 of the Charter.

32. On the other hand, although the Habitats Directive does not contain a provision equivalent to Article 11 of the EIA Directive specifying the detailed procedural rules governing actions against a derogation decision, it should be recalled that, in so far as concerns a species protected by the Habitats Directive, it is for the national court, in order to ensure, in the fields covered by EU environmental law, effective judicial protection as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, to interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, according to which each party to that convention is to ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, C‑240/09, EU:C:2011:125, paragraph 50, and of 8 November 2022, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (Approval of motor vehicles), C‑873/19, EU:C:2022:857, paragraph 66).

...

43. Admittedly, challenging a derogation decision in isolation before the development consent procedure has been completed may necessitate a certain degree of coordination between the competent administrative and judicial authorities in order to ensure (i) that the authority empowered to consent to a project within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA Directive takes adequate account of partial assessments which have already been the subject of judicial proceedings, and (ii) the judicial review of the development consent decision within the meaning of Article 1(2)(c) of that directive. However, that fact cannot in itself undermine the principle of effectiveness, since, under the applicable national legislation, the compatibility of both the derogation decision under Article 16 of the Habitats Directive and that of the development consent decision within the meaning of Article 1(2)(c) of the EIA Directive with all provisions of EU law may be challenged by the public concerned and reviewed by the competent court, account being had of Article 47 of the Charter.

...

53. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first to third questions is that Article 11 of the EIA Directive, read in the light of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding a rule provided for by the law of a Member State whereby an action for annulment of a derogation licence, which has been issued pursuant to Article 16 of the Habitats Directive and which forms part of the development consent procedure for the purposes of Article 1(2)(a) of the EIA Directive, must be brought by the public concerned within a period of three months from the time when that public knew or could reasonably have become aware of such a derogation, provided that such a rule of law is not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and does not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness).