Portugal / Constitutional Court / 785/2025
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Portugal / Constitutional Court / 785/2025
Key facts of the case:
The case concerns a preventive review of constitutionality requested by the President of the Portuguese Republic to the Constitutional Court. The President submitted for review several provisions of Decree 6/XVII of the Parliament, which amends Law 23/2007 (legal framework governing the entry, stay, exit, and removal of foreign nationals in Portugal). The challenged norms aimed to change the rules on family reunification, conditions for residence authorisation, and judicial protection in migration procedures.
The amendments seek to tighten the rules on family reunification in Portugal. They limit reunification to minors who entered the country legally and specify that residents must wait two years before applying to bring family members from abroad. The reforms also redefine the material conditions for reunification, introducing requirements such as “adequate housing” and “sufficient means of subsistence,” leaving these criteria to be defined later by government decree. Additionally, the time granted to the Agency for Migration and Asylum (AIMA – Agência para a Integração Migrações e Asilo) to decide on applications is extended from three to nine months, and the system of tacit approval, whereby applications are automatically accepted if no decision is made by the deadline, is abolished. Finally, access to judicial remedies, such as the intimation for the protection of rights, freedoms and guarantees, is limited and to be used only in cases of serious, direct, and irreversible harm caused by the actions or inactions of the Agency for Migration and Asylum.
The request contends that these amendments may violate several constitutional guarantees and go against EU law and principles. Specifically, the request argues that the changes could infringe the right to family unity and the protection of children (Article 36), the principle of equality and non-discrimination (Article 13), the principles of proportionality and legal certainty (Articles 2 and 18), the right to effective judicial protection and access to justice (Article 20), and the principle of administrative efficiency and timeliness (Article 266) all of them enshrined in the Portuguese Constitution. Furthermore, the request asserts that the amendments conflict with EU law, particularly Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the right to an effective remedy) and the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC).
Lastly, the request also raises concerns about the legislative procedure, noting that certain entities legally required to be consulted (such as judicial bodies) were not heard during the process. Although such procedural omissions fall outside the Constitutional Court’s scope in preventive constitutional review, the request notes that this failure undermines the democratic legitimacy of Decree 6/XVII and could compromise its effective implementation.
Key legal question raised by the court:
The key legal question in this case is whether the amendments to Law 23/2007 introduced by Decree 6/XVII, particularly the new restrictions on family reunification, the extended administrative deadlines for residence decisions and the limitations on judicial remedies against administrative inaction, are compatible with the Portuguese Constitution and EU law and principles. Essentially, the Constitutional Court was asked to determine whether the amendments unjustifiably restrict constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to family unity, equality and non-discrimination, legal certainty, effective judicial protection and administrative celerity, and whether they comply with Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Family Reunification Directive.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court firstly observed that although the request for preventive constitutional review challenged the lack of mandatory consultations during the legislative process, such omissions relate to issues of legality rather than constitutionality and therefore fall outside its preventive review power. The Court further clarified that although the contested norms fall within the scope of EU law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, mere incompatibility with EU law alone does not amount to unconstitutionality. Instead, the Court’s review is limited to the interpretation of the constitutional principles in harmony with EU law.
The Court focused on several key issues. Regarding changes to family reunification rules, the Court found that the requirement for foreign residents to wait two years before applying to bring family members from abroad was disproportionate, as it violated constitutional rights including the right to start a family (Article 36), the right to the social protection of the family (Article 67), the right to parenthood (Article 68) and the right to childhood (Article 69). Consequently, the Court concluded that the two-year residence rule was unconstitutional, affirming that legislative discretion in regulating immigration must not undermine the core constitutional protection of family life and children's best interests.
The Court further addressed the criteria for family reunification, such as “adequate housing” and “sufficient means of subsistence” and found them sufficiently clear and specific, since the provisions in question also defined “adequate housing” as either owned or rented, and established formulas for “sufficient means of subsistence”. Therefore, only technical details, such as comparability indicators for housing or exact calculations for subsistence, were delegated to government ordinances, preventing the administration from expanding or redefining substantive requirements and ensuring applicants understand the criteria. In this respect, the Court found the provisions to align with the constitutional right to family life, respecting Parliament’s legislative authority under Articles 2 and 165(1)(b), and confirmed compliance with Directive 2003/86/EC. However, the Court expressed concern regarding the newly introduced requirement for compliance with integration measures, including learning Portuguese, understanding constitutional values, and ensuring children’s education. The provision lacked clarity regarding whether these measures must be completed before or after the reunification application and whether non-compliance could affect already granted reunification. Furthermore, using the term ‘namely’ within the provision rendered the listed measures illustrative, allowing the administration to impose additional requirements. Because these conditions directly affect fundamental rights related to family life and child protection, they fall within the exclusive legislative competence of Parliament, and delegating them to government ordinances violates Article 165(1)(b) of the Constitution.
Concerning administrative procedures, the Court scrutinised extending the decision-making period from three to nine months and eliminating tacit approval of applications. While the general administrative rules require that extensions be objectively justified and communicated to applicants, the cumulative effect of these procedural changes, combined with the two-year residence requirement, could result in a waiting period for family reunification exceeding three and a half years. The Court found this disproportionate, particularly in light of the constitutional right to family life and children's best interests. Drawing on EU law, including Article 8 of Directive 2003/86/EC and relevant CJEU and ECHR jurisprudence, the Court concluded that although individual administrative delays may be justified, the total minimum waiting period imposed excessive restrictions on the fundamental rights to family unity and child protection, even if it did not independently violate principles of equality or administrative efficiency.
Finally, regarding limitations on judicial remedies against administrative inaction, the Court noted that the restrictions could prevent urgent judicial protection of time-sensitive rights, such as family reunification for foreigners abroad, where provisional measures are insufficient and ordinary administrative actions are too slow. The Court held that the justification for these restrictions, based on administrative capacity and many pending cases, failed to satisfy constitutional principles of adequacy, necessity, and proportionality. Consequently, the Constitutional Court found the restrictions unconstitutional, as they violated the right to effective judicial protection and related constitutional principles.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“CFR”) constitutes a catalogue of fundamental rights which binds, first and foremost, the European Union itself (Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union [“TEU”]; Article 51(1) of the CFR). Its purpose is to ensure that the exercise of public powers through the institutions of the European Union does not entail the deprivation of citizens’ protection, since the organs and institutions of the European Union are bound by a body of fundamental rights. However, because the institutions do not execute their own acts – such task being entrusted to national authorities (cf. Article 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [“TFEU”]) – the CFR also binds the Member States when they apply European Union law (Article 51 CFR). This occurs, according to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), whenever the Member States act in fulfilment of obligations arising from the Treaties (…) when they intervene as agents of the European Union in implementing its rules – namely by transposing directives; when they exercise the margin of discretion granted to them by European Union law (CJEU judgment of 21.12.2011, N.S., joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, paras. 65 to 69); or when they legislate in fields covered by European rules. This means that the provisions whose declaration of unconstitutionality is requested are indisputably within the scope of application of European Union law and, therefore, of the CFR: they concern judicial actions relating to the decisions or omissions of AIMA with regard to the entire Chapter VI of Law No. 23/2007 – Residence in National Territory –, thereby encompassing areas expressly regulated by European Union law, such as all the directives transposed by Law No. 23/2007 and listed in its Article 2.
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The issue of the relevance of European Union law, particularly the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), to the assessment of the constitutionality of national rules falling within the scope of the CFREU is not new to the Constitutional Court. In Judgment No. 268/2022, it was concluded:
‘[...] the Constitutional Court ruled out early on the possibility of including European law provisions in the parameters of unconstitutionality. It clarified not only that “the classification of the incompatibility of domestic law with Community law as a situation of ‘unconstitutionality’ that the Constitutional Court is responsible for assessing” must be rejected (Judgment No. 621/98), but also that 'the Community legal order, which is broadly accepted by Portuguese law by means of a clause in the constitutional text itself - Article 8(2) - includes a judicial body primarily dedicated to the protection of Community law, which does not operate solely at the level of inter-state or intergovernmental relations, concentrating in that body the power to ensure the uniform application and prevalence of the respective rules, which would make it incongruous for another body of the same or similar type, such as the Constitutional Court, to intervene at the domestic level for the same purpose (Judgment No. 93/2001).
It is clear that this is the case. This solution is the only one that ensures the uniform application of European law and leads to the harmonisation of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court with that of the Court of Justice, safeguarding the autonomy of European Union law and its primacy in the application to the specific case (with possible intervention by the CJEU in a preliminary ruling) without this circumstance being considered a violation of the Constitution. In fact, not only is the very nature of the principle of primacy aimed at resolving conflicts of application at the level of effectiveness - as the Court of Justice has repeatedly stated - but the referral of a conflict with European rules to a question of constitutionality would call into question the uniform application of European law, since the non-application of national rules contrary to European rules would depend on the system of constitutional review in force in that Member State.
Thus, the incompatibility of a certain national rule with European Union law does not automatically imply a judgement of unconstitutionality; rather, it affects its effectiveness at the domestic level, insofar as it contradicts European rules that can be invoked simultaneously. And, as defined by European Union law, this effect occurs regardless of the source of the conflicting rules: whether the European rule is part of primary law (such as the CFREU, under Article 6 of the TEU) or secondary law (such as a directive or regulation); or whether the national rule is part of a regulatory act, a legislative act or even the Constitution.
Therefore, demonstrating that the contested rules are inconsistent with European Union law does not allow us to infer that they are unconstitutional. The ruling of unconstitutionality – and, thus, the invalidity of the national rule – depends on the non-compliance of the rules under review with their hierarchically superior parameter – namely, the Constitution.
The fact that the alleged incompatibility of the rules under consideration with primary European Union law (the CFREU) does not automatically lead to a ruling of unconstitutionality (see, among many others, Judgments Nos. 354/1997, 122/1998, 624/1998, 650/1998, 682/2014, 268/2022, 651/2022, 6/2023 and 597/2024), does not mean that the CDFUE is irrelevant to the ruling requested from this Court. Firstly, because placing the rules under review within the scope of application of the CDFUE, the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union) requires that the Constitutional Court, in determining the meaning to be given to the constitutional parameters of validity of internal rules, give priority to consistency with European rules, with any conflicts being resolved “by seeking to interpret the Constitution according to Community law”
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Foreigners residing in Portugal who come from countries outside the European Union also benefit from the protection afforded by the CFREU.
In terms not very different from those set out in Article 15 of the Constitution, the Charter reserves the rights relating to citizenship (Articles 39 to 46), making the others dependent only on the condition of personhood, with the exception of those that are recognised only to those who reside and move legally within the Union, such as the right to social security benefits and social advantages (Article 34(2)). By virtue of the principle of universality underlying the enshrinement of most of the rights recognised in the Charter, everyone has ‘the right to respect for his or her family life [...] (Article 7), the ‘right to marry and the right to found a family’ (Article 9), and all children, on equal terms, have ‘the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both parents, unless this is contrary to their interests’ (Article 24(3)), which also falls within the scope of the legal, economic and social protection of the family, which must be ensured (Article 33).
Precisely in order to protect family unity and facilitate the integration of citizens from countries outside the European Union, Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 enshrined a set of measures relating to family reunification to be adopted by Member States in accordance with their obligation to protect the family and respect family life enshrined in numerous instruments of international law, notably Article 8 of the ECHR and the CFEU itself (Recital 2).
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Furthermore, everyone within the territory of the Union whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by Union law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal, and to have their case heard fairly, publicly and within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, with legal aid being granted to those who lack sufficient resources, insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). According to the settled case law of the CJEU, ‘recognition in a given case of the right to legal remedy provided for in Article 47 of the Charter presupposes that the person invoking it relies on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law’ (Krasiliva, judgment of 27 February 2025, case C-753/23, § 35), and a violation of that right should be considered to have occurred when there is no means of redress provided for in national law. The modalities of that remedy are, however, as the CJEU has repeatedly stated, a matter for national legislators, in accordance with the principle of procedural and institutional autonomy of the Member States established since the Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn case (judgment of 3 April 1968, Case 28/67). This idea was particularly developed in the judgment of 13 December 2017 (Case C-403/16, Soufiane El Hassani) concerning the granting of visas for entry into the territory of the Union, with the CJEU stating that Article 47 of the Charter ‘imposes on Member States an obligation to provide for a review procedure against decisions refusing visas, the modalities of which are defined by the legal order of each Member State in compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness’ (paragraph 42). Thus, the internal procedural rules to be established by Member States cannot be formulated in such a way as to make it impossible or excessively difficult for foreign nationals to exercise the rights conferred on them by the legal order of the Union (R.N.N.S. and K.A, cases C-225/19 and C-226/19, § 49).
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
A Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia («CDFUE») constitui um catálogo de direitos fundamentais que vincula, em primeiro lugar, a própria União Europeia (n.º 1 do artigo 6.º do Tratado da União Europeia [«TUE»]; n.º 1 do artigo 51.º da CDFUE). Trata-se de assegurar que o exercício de poderes estaduais através das instituições da União Europeia não comporta uma desproteção dos cidadãos, já que os órgãos e instituições da União Europeia ficam vinculados a um corpo jusfundamental. Ora, porque as instituições não executam os seus próprios atos - cabendo tal missão às autoridades nacionais (cf. artigo 291.º do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia [«TFUE»]), a CDFUE vincula também os Estados-Membros quando estes apliquem direito da União Europeia (artigo 51.º CDFUE). Tal sucederá, nos termos da jurisprudência do Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia («TJUE»), sempre que os Estados-Membros atuam para cumprimento das obrigações decorrentes dos Tratados (…) quando os Estados intervêm como agentes da União Europeia, efetivando as suas normas - designadamente transpondo diretivas; quando utilizam a margem decisória para apreciação nacional conferida por regras de direito da União Europeia (Acórdão do TJUE de 21.12.2011, N.S., proc. C-411/10 e C-493/10, nos. 65 a 69); ou ainda quando legislam em domínios cobertos por regras europeias. Quer isto dizer que as normas cuja pronúncia de inconstitucionalidade é pedida estão indiscutivelmente no âmbito de aplicação do direito da União Europeia e, assim, da CDFUE: trata-se de regras relativas às ações judiciais relativas às decisões ou omissões da AIMA quanto a todo o Capítulo VI da Lei n.º 23/2007 - Residência em Território Nacional -, abrangendo assim domínios expressamente regulados pelo direito da União Europeia, como sejam todas as diretivas transpostas pela Lei n.º 23/2007 e enumeradas no respetivo artigo 2.º.
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O problema da relevância do direito da União Europeia, mormente da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia (CDFUE) para a apreciação da constitucionalidade de normas nacionais que se coloquem sob o domínio de aplicação da CDFUE não é inédito para o Tribunal Constitucional. No Acórdão n.º 268/2022 concluiu-se:
«[...] o Tribunal Constitucional desde cedo excluiu a possibilidade de incluir as normas de direito europeu nos parâmetros de inconstitucionalidade. Esclareceu-se não só que «é de rejeitar a “qualificação da incompatibilidade do direito interno com o direito comunitário como uma situação de ‘inconstitucionalidade’ que ao Tribunal Constitucional caiba apreciar”» (Acórdão n.º 621/98) como que «a ordem jurídica comunitária, globalmente recebida pelo direito português, por via de uma cláusula do próprio texto constitucional - n.º 2 do artigo 8.º - compreende uma instância jurisdicional precipuamente vocacionada para a tutela de direito comunitário, que não funciona apenas no plano das relações interestaduais ou intergovernamentais, concentrando nessa instância a competência para velar pela aplicação uniforme e pela prevalência das respectivas normas, o que tornaria incongruente que, para o mesmo efeito, se fizesse intervir, no plano interno, uma outra instância do mesmo ou semelhante tipo, como seria o Tribunal Constitucional» (Acórdão n.º 93/2001).
Percebe-se que assim seja. Tal solução é a única que assegura a uniformidade de aplicação da ordem jurídica europeia e que conduz à harmonização da competência do Tribunal Constitucional com a do Tribunal de Justiça, salvaguardando a autonomia do direito da União Europeia e a primazia na aplicação ao caso concreto (com eventual intervenção do TJUE em sede de reenvio prejudicial) sem que se impute a tal circunstância uma transgressão da Constituição. Na verdade, não só a própria natureza do princípio do primado se dirige a dirimir conflitos aplicativos ao nível da eficácia - como o Tribunal de Justiça repetidamente tem afirmado - como a recondução de uma contrariedade a normas europeias a uma questão de constitucionalidade poria em causa a uniformidade de aplicação do direito europeu, já que a desaplicação das normas nacionais contrárias a regras europeias ficaria dependente do sistema de controlo de constitucionalidade vigente nesse Estado-Membro.
Deste modo, a incompatibilidade de certa norma nacional com o direito da União Europeia não implica, de forma automática, um juízo de inconstitucionalidade; provoca, ao invés, uma afetação da sua eficácia no plano interno, na medida em que contradiga regras europeias simultaneamente mobilizáveis. E, nos termos como o direito da União Europeia o define, este efeito dá-se independentemente da fonte das normas conflituantes: quer a norma europeia conste de direito originário (como a CDFUE, nos termos do artigo 6.º do TUE) ou derivado (como uma diretiva ou um Regulamento); quer a norma nacional conste de ato regulamentar, de ato legislativo ou mesmo da Constituição.
Pelo que a demonstração da contradição das normas em crise com o direito da União Europeia não permite inferir uma conclusão pela respetiva inconstitucionalidade. O juízo de inconstitucionalidade - e, assim, da invalidade da norma nacional - depende da desconformidade das normas fiscalizadas com o seu parâmetro hierarquicamente superior - maxime, a Constituição».
A circunstância de a invocada incompatibilidade das normas sob apreciação com o direito primário da União Europeia (a CDFUE) não determinar, de modo automático, um juízo de inconstitucionalidade (cf., entre muitos, Acórdãos nos. 354/1997, 122/1998, 624/1998, 650/1998, 682/2014, 268/2022, 651/2022, 6/2023 e 597/2024), não significa que a CDFUE seja irrelevante para a pronúncia solicitada a este Tribunal. Desde logo, porque colocando-se as normas fiscalizadas sob o domínio de aplicação da CDFUE, o princípio da cooperação leal (n.º 3 do artigo 4.º do Tratado da União Europeia) impõe que o Tribunal Constitucional, na fixação do sentido a dar aos parâmetros constitucionais de validade das normas internas, privilegie uma consonância com as normas europeias, sendo eventuais conflitos solucionados «by seeking to interpret the Constitution according to Community law».
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Os estrangeiros residentes em Portugal oriundos de países fora do território da União Europeia beneficiam igualmente da proteção concedida pela CDFUE.
Em termos não muito divergentes daqueles que decorrem do artigo 15.º da Constituição, a Carta reserva aos cidadãos da União Europeia a titularidade dos direitos relativos à cidadania (artigos 39.º a 46.º), tornando os demais dependentes apenas da condição de pessoa, com exceção daqueles que são reconhecidos somente aos que residam e se desloquem legalmente no interior da União, como o direito às prestações de segurança social e às regalias sociais (artigo 34.º, n.º 2). Em virtude do princípio da universalidade subjacente à consagração da generalidade dos direitos reconhecidos na Carta, todas as pessoas têm «direito ao respeito pela sua vida [...] familiar (artigo 7.º), o «direito de contrair casamento e o direito de constituir família» (artigo 9.º), assistindo a todas as crianças, em condições de igualdade, «o direito de manter regularmente relações pessoais e contactos diretos com ambos os progenitores, exceto se isso for contrário aos seus interesses» (artigo 24.º, n.º 3), o que releva também da proteção da família nos planos jurídico, económico e social, que deve ser assegurada (artigo 33.º).
Justamente em ordem a proteger a unidade familiar e facilitar a integração dos cidadãos de países não pertencentes à União Europeia, a Diretiva 2003/86/CE do Conselho de 22 de setembro de 2003, veio consagrar um conjunto de medidas relativas ao agrupamento familiar para serem ser adotadas pelos Estados-Membros de acordo com a sua obrigação de proteção da família e de respeito pela vida familiar consagrada em numerosos instrumentos de direito internacional, mormente no artigo 8.º da CEDH e na própria CDFUE (Considerando 2).
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Para além disso, todas as pessoas que se encontrem em território da União cujos direitos e liberdades garantidos pelo direito da União tenham sido violados têm direito a uma ação perante um tribunal, assim como a que a sua causa seja julgada de forma equitativa, publicamente e num prazo razoável, por um tribunal independente e imparcial, previamente estabelecido por lei, sendo concedida assistência judiciária a quem não disponha de recursos suficientes, na medida em que essa assistência seja necessária para garantir a efetividade do acesso à justiça (artigo 47.º da CDFUE). Segundo jurisprudência constante do TJUE, «o reconhecimento, num determinado caso, do direito à ação previsto no artigo 47.º da Carta pressupõe que a pessoa que o invoca se baseie em direitos ou liberdades garantidos pelo direito da União» (Krasiliva, acórdão de 27 de fevereiro de 2025, processo C-753/23, § 35), devendo considerar-se que ocorre a violação daquele direito quando não há um meio de recurso previsto na legislação nacional. As modalidades dessa via de recurso são, no entanto, como o TJUE repetidamente afirma, da competência dos legisladores nacionais, de acordo com o princípio de autonomia processual e institucional dos Estados-Membros fixado desde o caso Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn (acórdão de 03 de abril de 1968, processo 28/67). Esta ideia foi particularmente desenvolvida no acórdão de 13 de dezembro de 2017 (processo C-403/16, Soufiane El Hassani) relacionado com a concessão de vistos de entrada em território da União, tendo o TJUE afirmado que o artigo 47.º da Carta «impõe aos Estados-Membros a obrigação de prever um processo de recurso contra as decisões de recusa de vistos, cujas modalidades são definidas pela ordem jurídica de cada Estado-Membro no respeito pelos princípios da equivalência e da efetividade» (§ 42). Assim, as normas processuais internas a criar pelos Estados-Membros não podem ser formuladas de modo tal que possa tornar impossível ou excessivamente difícil o exercício por cidadãos estrangeiros dos direitos conferidos pela ordem jurídica da União (R.N.N.S. e K.A, processos C-225/19 e C-226/19, § 49).