30. By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU, read in combination with Articles 12 and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, by making the admissibility of an action for annulment challenging the appointment of prosecutors competent to conduct criminal prosecutions against judges subject to the existence of a legitimate private interest, excludes, in practice, such an action from being brought by professional associations of judges seeking to defend the principle of the independence of the judiciary.
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35. The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law. In that regard, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring for individuals compliance with their right to effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law. The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and to which Article 47 of the Charter corresponds (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others, C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19 and C‑840/19, EU:C:2021:1034, paragraph 219 and the case-law cited).
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46. Taking account of Article 12 of the Charter, which is cited by the referring court, does not justify a different outcome, since that article merely enshrines the freedom of association, without however requiring that associations necessarily be granted standing to bring judicial proceedings to defend a general interest objective.
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48. To ensure that bodies that may be called upon to rule on questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU law are in a position to ensure the effective judicial protection required under that provision, maintaining their independence is essential, as confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy (judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 194 and the case-law cited).
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53. Thus, first of all, that requirement of independence means that, in accordance with that case-law, the disciplinary regime must provide the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions. In that respect, rules that provide for the involvement of an independent body in accordance with a procedure that fully safeguards the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, notably the rights of the defence, and enshrine the possibility to challenge disciplinary bodies’ decisions by way of legal proceedings, form part of a set of guarantees essential to safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 198 and the case-law cited).
54. Similarly, transfer measures without consent, adopted outside of a disciplinary regime, must be open to legal challenge, in accordance with a procedure which fully safeguards the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, W.Ż. (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court – Appointment), C‑487/19, EU:C:2021:798, paragraph 118).
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57. In that context, it should be borne in mind, as regards the appointment of prosecutors competent to conduct criminal prosecutions against judges, that Member States are required, in order notably to avoid such doubts arising, to provide an overarching guarantee that the action of those prosecutors is taken within a framework of effective rules which fully comply with the requirement of the independence of the judiciary. Rules adopted for that purpose must, inter alia, like those on the disciplinary liability of judges, provide the guarantees necessary to ensure that such proceedings cannot be used as a system of political control over the activity of those judges and fully safeguard the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 213).
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60. Furthermore, a right for professional associations of judges to initiate legal proceedings against measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings also cannot be derived from Article 47 of the Charter.
61. The recognition of the right to an effective remedy, in a given case, presupposes that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law or that that person is the subject of proceedings constituting an implementation of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 34).
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64. Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU, read in combination with Articles 12 and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, by making the admissibility of an action for annulment challenging the appointment of prosecutors competent to conduct criminal prosecutions against judges subject to the existence of a legitimate private interest, excludes, in practice, such an action from being brought by professional associations of judges seeking to defend the principle of the independence of the judiciary.