Article 7 - Respect for private and family life
Article 8 - Protection of personal data
Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
In response to a request for exchange of information made by the Belgian tax administration on 29 May 2020 in the context of an investigation concerning Mr X and his wife, the director of Luxembourg’s direct taxation administration issued to company Y a decisions ordering it to provide information regarding certain bank accounts and financial assets, as well as various legal, banking, financial and economic transactions that might have been carried out by Mr X and his wife. On 6 October 2020, Mr X and his wife filed an appeal before the administrative court
seeking the annulment of the injunction. On the same day they filed a request for the stay of execution of the injunction, relying, among others, on Article 47, as well as Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. (The present case law concerns the request for the stay of execution). In their request, the applicants referred to the recent judgment of the CJEU (joined cases C-245/19 Luxembourg State v B and C-246/19 Luxembourg State v B and Others, 6 October 2020) providing interpretation of the domestic law in the context of Article 47 of the Charter. The judgment puts forward that Member States may deny the taxpayer (subject of the tax investigation) the right to bring a direct action against the injunction, provided that there are other remedies available in the context of the tax investigation enabling him to obtain a review of the injunction. The applicants do not share the conclusions of this judgment arguing that it would be necessary to guarantee an effective direct remedy to the taxpayer against the injunction. On the merits, among others, they argued that the transmission of such sensitive and strictly personal information, namely banking information, would likely to infringe their right to respect for their private life and to the protection of personal data, guaranteed, in particular, by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. They also referred in this context to Article 47 of the Charter to assert that it provided legal framework offering effective protection of the rights guaranteed against, in particular, arbitrary acts of the public authorities.
“The CJEU, for its part, in the judgment of 6 October 2020, cited above, recalled that the protection in particular of natural persons against arbitrary or disproportionate interventions by public authorities in their sphere of private activity constitutes a general principle of Union law, the Charter thus explicitly enshrining the right to an effective remedy, the right to respect for private life and the right to the protection of personal data. As regards more particularly the communication of information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person to a third
party, including a public authority, as well as the measure which imposes or allows this communication, this is, according to the CJEU, without prejudice to their possible justification, a measures constituting interference in the right of this person to respect for his private life as well as in his right to the protection of personal data concerning him, regardless of whether this information are of a sensitive nature or not and regardless of their subsequent use, unless the said communication is made in compliance with the provisions of Union law and, where applicable, the provisions of domestic law provided for this purpose. However, according to the CJEU, respect for these three fundamental rights does not constitute an absolute prerogative, each of them having to be taken into consideration in relation to its function in society and may be the subject of a limitation, “on condition, first, that these limitations are provided for by law, second, that they respect the essential content of the rights and freedoms in question, and, third, that, while respecting the principle of proportionality, they are necessary and effectively meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. Still in the same judgment, the CJEU further insisted on the fact that the aim pursued by the exchange of information in tax matters, namely “to contribute to the fight against international tax fraud and evasion, by strengthening cooperation between competent national authorities in this field”, constitutes an objective of general interest recognized by the Union, capable of allowing a limitation to be made to the exercise of the guaranteed rights provided for, taken individually or jointly, the CJEU also emphasizing that the interest attached to the efficiency and speed of this cooperation, which concretizes the objective of combating international tax fraud and evasion underpinning Directive 2011/16, requires in particular to respect all the deadlines provided for in Article 7 of Directive 2011/16/EU, said article notably imposing, as a reminder, that the requested authority makes communications as quickly as possible, and no later than six months is from the date of receipt of the request from the requesting State.”
« La CJUE, de son côté, dans l’arrêt du 6 octobre 2020, précité, a rappelé que la protection notamment des personnes physiques contre des interventions arbitraires ou disproportionnées de la puissance publique dans leur sphère d’activité privée constitue un principe général du droit de l’Union, la Charte consacrant ainsi explicitement le droit à un recours effectif, le droit au respect de la vie privée et le droit à la protection des données à caractère personnel. En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la communication d’informations relatives à une personne physique identifiée ou identifiable à un tiers, y compris une autorité publique, ainsi que la mesure qui impose ou permet cette communication, il s’agit-là, selon la CJUE, sans préjudice de leur éventuelle justification, de mesures constitutives d’ingérences dans le droit de cette personne au respect de sa vie privée ainsi que dans son droit à la protection des données à caractère personnel la concernant, indépendamment du point de savoir si ces informations présentent un caractère sensible ou non et quelle que soit leur utilisation ultérieure, sauf si ladite communication intervient dans le respect des dispositions du droit de l’Union et, le cas échéant, des dispositions du droit interne prévues à cet effet. Toutefois, selon la CJUE, le respect de ces trois droits fondamentaux ne constitue pas une prérogative absolue, chacun d’entre eux devant, en effet, être pris en considération par rapport à sa fonction dans la société et pouvant faire l’objet d’une limitation, « à condition, premièrement, que ces limitations soient prévues par la loi, deuxièmement, qu’elles respectent le contenu essentiel des droits et des libertés en cause, et, troisièmement, que, dans le respect du principe de proportionnalité, elles soient nécessaires et répondent effectivement à des objectifs d’intérêt général reconnus par l’Union ou au besoin de protection des droits et des libertés d’autrui ». Toujours dans le même arrêt, la CJUE a encore insisté sur le fait que le but poursuivi par les échanges de renseignements en matière fiscale, à savoir « contribuer à la lutte contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales internationales, en renforçant la coopération entre les autorités nationales compétentes en ce domaine », constitue un objectif d’intérêt général reconnu par l’Union, susceptible de permettre qu’une limitation soit apportée à l’exercice des droits garantis prévisés, pris individuellement ou conjointement, la CJUE soulignant encore que l’intérêt attaché à l’efficacité et à la rapidité de cette coopération, qui concrétise l’objectif de lutte contre la fraude et l’évasion fiscales internationales sous-tendant la directive 2011/16, impose notamment de respecter l’ensemble des délais prévus à l’article 7 de la directive 2011/16/UE14, ledit article imposant notamment, pour rappel, que l’autorité requise effectue les communications le plus rapidement possible, et au plus tard six mois à compter de la date de réception de la demande de l’Etat requérant. »
