Czechia / Supreme Administrative Court / 6 Azs 368/2023-40
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Czechia / Supreme Administrative Court / 6 Azs 368/2023-40
Key facts of the case:
The Ministry of the Interior considered inadmissible the applicant’s request for temporary protection under § 5(1)(d) of Act No. 65/2022 Coll. (“Lex Ukraine”) as she had obtained a residence document tied to temporary protection in another Member State. The Municipal Court in Prague held that the judicial review could not have been excluded and that the national inadmissibility rule – §5(1)(d) of Lex Ukraine – conflicts with EU law. The Municipal Court in Prague annulled the Ministry’s decision and remitted the case back to the Ministry. The Ministry lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Administrative Court. The Court applied Article 47 of the Charter (considering CJEU C-753/23, Krasiliva): persons enjoying temporary protection have a right to an effective judicial remedy against a state measure returning their request for a residence permit under Article 8 of the Temporary Protection Directive as inadmissible. Therefore, the statutory exclusion of judicial review in § 5(2) cannot be applied, and returns for inadmissibility are subject to court review. The Supreme Administrative Court then addressed whether § 5(1)(d) (inadmissibility for prior protection elsewhere) is itself compatible with EU law and outlined how authorities must proceed; it confirmed the unlawfulness of the return in the applicant’s case and ordered the authority to accept and examine the request.
Key legal question raised by the court:
Does Article 47 of the Charter require judicial review of a return decision that labels a temporary-protection application inadmissible under national law? And is the national inadmissibility ground compatible with EU law?
Outcome of the case:
The Supreme Administrative court dismissed the cassation complaint, and upheld the decision of the Municipal Court in Prague. The Supreme Administrative Court held that § 5(2) of Lex Ukraine’s exclusion of a review is incompatible with EU law (Article 47 of the Charter) and may not be applied; refusals to register applications for inadmissibility are reviewable. It also provided guidance for processing “secondary relocation” cases under the Directive.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
11. The Supreme Administrative Court first examined the exclusion of judicial review of the return of an inadmissible application for temporary protection under § 5(2) of the Lex Ukraine, which provides that in the case of the return of an application for temporary protection by the applicant on the grounds of its inadmissibility, judicial review is excluded. In the contested judgment, the Municipal Court concluded that this exclusion is not compatible with Union law. The complainant raised no objections to that conclusion. Nevertheless, it is a key question that must be addressed. The Supreme Administrative Court had in the past found this exclusion to be in conformity both with European Union law and with the Czech constitutional order (judgment of 12 October 2022, file no. 2 Azs 178/2022-46). However, the Court of Justice, in its judgment in the case Krasiliva, clearly stated that, under Article 8(1) of the Temporary Protection Directive, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, a person enjoying temporary protection has the right to an effective remedy before a court against the act by which a Member State returns a request for a residence permit within the meaning of Article 8 of that Directive as inadmissible. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore agrees with the Municipal Court that the exclusion of judicial review under § 5(2) of the Lex Ukraine is incompatible with Union law, as it impermissibly denies such persons that right. It therefore cannot be applied, and the return of an application for temporary protection by the authority on grounds of its inadmissibility under § 5(1) of the Lex Ukraine is subject to judicial review.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
11. Nejvyšší správní soud se nejprve zabýval výlukou ze soudního přezkumu vrácení nepřijatelné žádosti o dočasnou ochranu podle § 5 odst. 2 lex Ukrajina, který stanoví, že v případě vrácení žádosti o dočasnou ochranu stěžovatelem z důvodu její nepřijatelnosti je soudní přezkum vyloučen. Městský soud v napadeném rozsudku dospěl k závěru, že tato výluka není slučitelná s unijním právem. Stěžovatel proti tomuto závěru nevznesl námitky. Jedná se však o stěžejní otázku, kterou je třeba posoudit. Nejvyšší správní soud v minulosti shledal uvedenou výluku konformní jak s právem Evropské unie, tak s českým ústavním pořádkem (rozsudek ze dne 12. 10. 2022, č. j. 2 Azs 178/2022‑46). Soudní dvůr však v rozsudku ve věci Krasiliva jednoznačně vyslovil, že podle článku 8 odst. 1 směrnice o dočasné ochraně ve spojení s článkem 47 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie má osoba požívající dočasné ochrany právo na účinný prostředek nápravy před soudem proti postupu, jímž členský stát vrací žádost o udělení povolení k pobytu ve smyslu článku 8 této směrnice jako nepřijatelnou. Nejvyšší správní soud proto souhlasí s městským soudem, že výluka ze soudního přezkumu podle § 5 odst. 2 lex Ukrajina není slučitelná s unijním právem, neboť osobám požívajícím dočasné ochrany toto právo nepřípustně odepírá. Nelze jej proto aplikovat a vrácení žádosti o dočasnou ochranu stěžovatelem z důvodu její nepřijatelnosti podle § 5 odst. 1 lex Ukrajina lze přezkoumat.