CJEU Case C-572/23 P / Opinion

Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v European Parliament
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar
Typ
Opinion
Decision date
04/09/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2025:658
  • CJEU Case C-572/23 P / Opinion

    Key facts of the case:

    Appeal – Institutional law – Members of the European Parliament – Privileges and immunities – Request for waiver of immunity submitted in the context of criminal proceedings – Investigation of the request by the Parliament – Impartiality – Criteria for waiver of immunity – Discretion of the Parliament – Decision to waive a Member’s immunity – Action for annulment – Appellant’s continuing interest in bringing proceedings following the expiry of his parliamentary mandate

    Outcome of the case:

    In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should:

    • declare that there is no need to adjudicate on the appeal lodged by Mr Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó and Ms Clara Ponsatí i Obiols;
    • in relation to the appeal lodged by Mr Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó and Ms Clara Ponsatí i Obiols, order the parties each to bear their own costs;
    • reject the third, fifth and sixth grounds of the appeal lodged by Mr Antoni Comín i Oliveres.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    50. The rules laid down in the Rules of Procedure and in Notice No 11/2019, as well as the manner in which they are applied by the Parliament, must be consistent with primary law. In that regard, I should point out that the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), provides that every person has the right, inter alia, to have his or her affairs handled impartially and fairly by the institutions of the European Union. The application of that provision to the procedures for waiver of immunity cannot, in my view, be excluded.

    ...

    55. The appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by taking the view, in paragraphs 229 to 238 of the judgment under appeal, that the impartiality and the fairness of the procedure had not been breached, despite the fact that a single rapporteur was appointed for the three immunity cases. In their view, the Parliament thus disregarded points 6 and 8 of Notice No 11/2019 and infringed Article 41(1) and Article 39(2) of the Charter, given inter alia the lack of impartiality of the person appointed as rapporteur. They claim that the only document attached to Notice No 1/2020 was the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) of 14 October 2019 and that the General Court distorted evidence by referring to that judgment as a ‘cover note’. Furthermore, the appellants criticise the General Court’s findings, in paragraph 237 of the judgment under appeal, to the effect that points 6 and 8 of Notice No 11/2019 do not enshrine a right in favour of the Members of the Parliament. In that regard, they argue that if a different rapporteur had been appointed for each immunity case, at least one of them could have been impartial. In the appellants’ view, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, only an explicit provision adopted pursuant to Rule 9(13) of the Rules of Procedure would have permitted the Parliament to appoint a single rapporteur.

    ...

    65.  The appellants allege that the General Court erred in law by rejecting as unfounded, in paragraphs 244 to 257 of the judgment under appeal, their argument based on the rapporteur’s lack of impartiality and alleging, therefore, infringement of Article 41(1) and Article 39(2) of the Charter, as well as the principles arising from point 8 of Notice No 11/2009. They raise five complaints in this part.

    ...

    80. The appellants do not put forward any argument in support of their claims, they assert that a lack of objective impartiality is sufficient for the purposes of Article 41(1) and Article 39(2) of the Charter, and they merely refer to matters raised in the context of other complaints. This complaint is, therefore, inadmissible in so far as it lacks adequate reasoning.

    ...

    102. I note that the fourth part of the third ground of appeal was presented in paragraphs 147 to 162 of the application for annulment, in section IV.3.4 entitled ‘Effects of the confidential nature of the procedure. Infringement of Article 15 TFEU, in conjunction with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. Illegality of Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure’. It is true that the appellants do refer, in paragraphs 147 to 151 of the application, to the confidentiality of the procedure, not in abstracto and in general, but in the context of the difficulties encountered in determining the influence of the Chair of the JURI committee and the rapporteur on the outcome of that procedure.

    103. However, in the subsequent paragraphs of the application, the appellants submitted general comments on the validity of Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure and stated, in the second sentence of paragraph 162, that the confidential nature of the procedure constituted a breach of Article 15 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with the rights of the defence.

    ...

    107. In the second place, the appellants state in their application for annulment that Rule 9(11) of the Rules of Procedure constitutes an unlawful interference with their rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. They do not, however, put forward any reasons in that regard. Those arguments should therefore be rejected.

    ...

    129. In the fourth complaint in the first part of the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants submit, first, that, contrary to what is stated in paragraphs 135 to 143 of the judgment under appeal, the decisions at issue constitute interference with their fundamental rights enshrined in Article 6, Article 39(2) and Article 45 of the Charter. Secondly, they criticise the General Court for having taken the view, in paragraphs 126 and 127 of that judgment, that the legality of the European arrest warrants issued against them had no bearing on the examination of a request for waiver of immunity intended to allow those warrants to be executed. In that regard, the appellants claim that the Parliament was obliged to assess the risks of infringement of their fundamental rights, just like the executing judicial authority in the context of surrender procedures under Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.

    ...

    133. In paragraph 138 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that immunity cannot constitute a fundamental right granted to Members of the Parliament since it is granted exclusively in the interests of the Parliament. The fact that a decision to waive immunity alters the legal position of a Member is irrelevant in that regard. The General Court went on to find, in paragraphs 140 and 141 of that judgment, that the waiver of parliamentary immunity does not in itself have any effect on the exercise of the mandate nor on the appellants’ freedom, in particular their freedom of movement, and does not infringe their right to respect for the presumption of innocence. Lastly, the General Court concluded in paragraph 142 of the judgment under appeal that, as a consequence, the argument seeking to establish that such interference does not comply with the requirements laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter are ineffective and must be rejected on that ground.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)