CJEU Case C-588/24 / Judgment

Imballaggi Piemontesi Srl v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Tenth Chamber)
Typ
Decision
Decision date
15/01/2026
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2026:14
  • CJEU Case C-588/24 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Competition – Article 101 TFEU – Prohibition of restrictive practices – Procedures for infringement of the rules of competition law conducted by the national competition authorities – Compliance with a reasonable time limit – Time limit for closure of the investigation stage of the infringement proceedings – National legislation allowing the national competition authority unilaterally to postpone that time limit on account of circumstances which lead to an extension of the subject matter of those proceedings or of the number of undertakings concerned – General principle of the right to good administration – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Principle of effective judicial protection – Rights of defence of undertakings – Principle of effectiveness

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby rules:

    Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the general principle of the right to good administration, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of effectiveness,

    must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, in the context of proceedings for a finding establishing an anti-competitive practice by a national competition authority, does not expressly provide that the time limit for closure of the investigation stage of those proceedings, set by that authority in the statement of objections, is mandatory, so that that authority may unilaterally postpone that time limit, by reasoned decisions, subject to judicial review, where circumstances arise which lead to an extension of the subject matter of those proceedings or of the number of undertakings covered by those proceedings, provided that such a postponement does not amount to a failure to observe the reasonable period within which that investigation stage must be concluded.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    36. In the first place, it should be noted that, in the present case, the referring court identifies Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter as provisions of EU law, which, in its view, require an interpretation.

    37. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the scope of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (see judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and of 6 March 2025, D.K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge), C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraph 38).

    ...

    39. In those circumstances, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an implementation of EU law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter. The latter is therefore applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.

    40. In the second place, since the question referred for a preliminary ruling also refers to Article 6 ECHR, it should be borne in mind that although, as Article 6(3) TEU confirms, the fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law and although Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that the rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR are to have the same meaning and scope as those laid down by that convention, the latter does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law (judgment of 18 April 2024, Préfet du Gers et Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, C‑716/22, EU:C:2024:339, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

    41. In those circumstances, the Court has held that the interpretation of EU law and examination of the legality of EU legislation must be undertaken in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (judgment of 18 April 2024, Préfet du Gers et Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, C‑716/22, EU:C:2024:339, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

    42. The principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, which is now set out in Article 47 of the Charter. Article 47 secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) and Article 13 ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47 (judgment of 16 May 2017, Berlioz Investment Fund, C‑682/15, EU:C:2017:373, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

    43. In the third place, as regards Article 41 of the Charter, it should be recalled that it is clear from the wording of that provision that it is addressed not to the Member States but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (judgment of 22 September 2022, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság and Others, C‑159/21, EU:C:2022:708, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

    44. However, in so far as the referring court raises the issue of compliance with a reasonable time limit in proceedings under EU competition law conducted by the national competition authorities, it must also be borne in mind that the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter, reflects a general principle of EU law which is intended to apply to Member States when they implement that law (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2022, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság and Others, C‑159/21, EU:C:2022:708, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

    45. It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court that compliance with a reasonable time limit in the conduct of administrative procedures relating to competition policy constitutes a general principle of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2006, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, C‑105/04 P, EU:C:2006:592, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited), and is, moreover, laid down as a component of the right to good administration by Article 41(1) of the Charter.

    ...

    47. In those circumstances, it must be held that, by its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the general principle of the right to good administration, Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, in the context of proceedings for a finding establishing an anti-competitive practice by a national competition authority, does not expressly provide that the time limit for closure of the investigation stage of those proceedings, set by that authority in the statement of objections, is mandatory, so that that authority may unilaterally postpone that time limit, by reasoned decisions, where circumstances arise which lead to an extension of the subject matter of those proceedings or of the number of undertakings covered by those proceedings.

    ...

    74. Lastly, in the third place, the postponement of the time limit for closure of the investigation stage of infringement proceedings must be capable of being subject, in accordance with the principle of effective judicial protection set out in Article 47 of the Charter, to judicial review in order to ascertain whether the decision postponing that time limit and setting a new time limit for closure was adopted in compliance with the principle that action must be taken within a reasonable time and the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned, which means, in particular, that that decision was communicated to that undertaking in good time and that reasons were duly provided for the occurrence of circumstances which made the investigation more complex than what the national competition authority had envisaged when setting the postponed time limit.

    ...

    79. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the general principle of the right to good administration, Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which, in the context of proceedings for a finding establishing an anti-competitive practice by a national competition authority, does not expressly provide that the time limit for closure of the investigation stage of those proceedings, set by that authority in the statement of objections, is mandatory, so that that authority may unilaterally postpone that time limit, by reasoned decisions, subject to judicial review, where circumstances arise which lead to an extension of the subject matter of those proceedings or of the number of undertakings covered by those proceedings, provided that such a postponement does not amount to a failure to observe the reasonable period within which that investigation stage must be concluded.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)