CJEU Case C‑797/23 / Judgment

Meta Platforms Ireland Limited v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Grand Chamber)
Typ
Decision
Decision date
12/05/2026
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2026:395
  • CJEU Case C‑797/23 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Intellectual property – Copyright and related rights – Directive (EU) 2019/790 – Article 15 – Protection of press publications concerning online uses – National legislation providing for the publishers of those publications to be entitled to ‘fair compensation’ – Obligations imposed on information society service providers – Powers conferred on an independent administrative authority – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 16 – Freedom to conduct a business – Limitation on the exercise of that freedom – Article 52(1) – Justification – Weighing of that freedom against other fundamental rights – Article 11(2) – Freedom and pluralism of the media – Article 17(2) – Protection of intellectual property

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, and Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

    must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which:

    –        confers on publishers of press publications the right to obtain fair remuneration in return for the authorisation to use their publications granted to information society service providers;

    –        imposes on those providers, which use or intend to use such publications, the obligation to enter into negotiations with those publishers, the obligation not to limit the visibility of their content in search results during the negotiations and the obligation to make available to those publishers and to a public authority the information necessary to determine the amount of such fair remuneration;

    –        empowers that authority to define the benchmark criteria to be used to determine that remuneration and, in the absence of agreement between the parties before it, to determine the amount of that remuneration and to monitor compliance with the obligation to provide information incumbent on those providers as well as to impose administrative fines on them in the event of failure to comply with that obligation,

    provided that that legislation does not deprive publishers of press publications of the possibility of refusing to grant such authorisation or that of granting it free of charge, that it does not impose on information society service providers any payment obligation unrelated to the use of such publications, and that the obligations and any penalties imposed on those providers observe the principle of proportionality.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    30. The Danish Government questions the admissibility of the third question, alleging that the requirements laid down in Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure are not met. It submits, first, that Article 109 TFEU, to which that question refers, does not enshrine the principle of free competition mentioned by the referring court. Second, as regards Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter, to which that question also refers, it claims that the referring court does not sufficiently explain how the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a disproportionate interference with the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business.

    ...

    32. For its part, also as regards the third question, the Belgian Government, without formally raising a plea of inadmissibility, questions the applicability of Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter in the present case, in so far as the national measures at issue in the main proceedings fall, at least in part, outside the scope of Directive 2019/790 and, consequently, do not constitute the implementation of EU law, within the meaning of the case-law relating to Article 51 of the Charter.

    ...

    39. By contrast, as regards, in the second place, the interpretation that is sought of Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter, it is apparent from paragraphs 19 to 21 of the present judgment that the request for a preliminary ruling sets out succinctly but clearly the reasons which led the referring court to inquire about the interpretation of those provisions of EU law. Furthermore, it is apparent from that request that Article 43-bis of Law No 633/1941, the compatibility of which with EU law is called into question, is the result of an amendment of the Italian legislation by a legislative decree adopted with the express aim of implementing Directive 2019/790 into Italian law. In that regard, the referring court states that Article 43-bis transposes Article 15 of that directive into Italian law.

    40. As the Court has already held, the transposition of a directive by the Member States is covered, in any event, by the situation, referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, in which the Member States are implementing EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Spiegel Online, C‑516/17, EU:C:2019:625, paragraph 20), such that that transposition must be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. It follows that the provisions of the Charter are applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.

    41. Consequently, the third question is admissible in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter.

    42.   By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 and Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which:

    –        confers on publishers of press publications the right to obtain fair remuneration in return for the authorisation to use their publications granted to information society service providers;

    –        imposes on those providers, which use or intend to use such publications, the obligation to enter into negotiations with those publishers, the obligation not to limit the visibility of their content in search results during the negotiations and the obligation to make available to those publishers and to a public authority the information necessary to determine the amount of such fair remuneration;

    –        empowers that authority to define the benchmark criteria to be used to determine that remuneration and, in the absence of agreement between the parties before it, to determine the amount of that remuneration and to monitor compliance with the obligation to provide information incumbent on those providers as well as to impose administrative fines on them in the event of failure to comply with that obligation.

    43. In its written observations, Meta submits that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings must be assessed in the light not only of Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 and Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter, but also of Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 2015/1535 and Article 3 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1). It claims, in that regard, first, that the measures introduced by that legislation were not notified to the Commission, even though they constitute ‘technical regulations’ within the meaning of Directive 2015/1535, and, second, that those measures do not comply with the principle of the country of origin, enshrined in Article 3 of Directive 2000/31.

    ...

    47. It follows that the request for a preliminary ruling must be analysed in the light of Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 and of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

    ...

    84. In accordance with paragraph 40 of the present judgment, in order to assess the compatibility with EU law of national legislation which, like that at issue in the main proceedings, is intended to implement EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, account must also be taken of the requirements flowing from the protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.

    85. As regards, in particular, the freedom to conduct a business, which is specifically the subject matter of the referring court’s questions, it should be noted that Article 16 of the Charter provides that the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices is recognised. The protection afforded by that article covers the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and free competition (see judgments of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraph 42, and of 30 April 2024, Trade Express-L and DEVNIA TSIMENT, C‑395/22 and C‑428/22, EU:C:2024:374, paragraph 76).

    86. In that regard, it must be borne in mind, first, that any measure liable to have a sufficiently direct and significant effect on the freedom of the operators concerned to exercise a trade or profession constitutes a limitation on the exercise of the freedom to conduct a business. Second, the protection afforded by Article 16 of the Charter also includes, by virtue of freedom of contract, the freedom to choose with whom to do business and the freedom to determine the price for a service, and the imposition of an obligation to contract constitutes a substantial limitation on the freedom of contract enjoyed, in principle, by economic operators (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraph 43, and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraphs 211 and 212).

    87. Having regard to the wording of Article 16 of the Charter, which provides that the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices is recognised and thus differs from the wording of the provisions enshrining, in Title II of the Charter, other fundamental freedoms, yet is similar to that of certain provisions of Title IV of the Charter, that freedom may therefore be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of public authorities which may, in the public interest, limit the exercise of economic activity. That circumstance is reflected, in particular, in the way in which EU legislation and national legislation and practices should be assessed in the light of the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter (see judgments of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraphs 46 and 47, and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 141 and the case-law cited).

    88.  In accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, must be necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

    ...

    90. By contrast, both the obligation incumbent on information society service providers to provide certain data, failing which an administrative fine may be imposed on them, and the requirement that they must not limit the visibility of press publications in the search results during the negotiations, as well as the powers conferred on AGCOM in that regard, are liable to limit the exercise of their freedom to conduct a business, guaranteed in Article 16 of the Charter.

    91. As regards the justification for such limitations, first, it is common ground that they are provided for by law, within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter, in so far as they are set out in Law No 633/1941.

    ...

    94. Fourth, as to the limitation of the freedom enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter being subject to the principle of proportionality, it appears, first of all, that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is appropriate for achieving the objective which it pursues.

    ...

    96. Lastly, as to whether that legislation is proportionate in the strict sense, it is necessary to ascertain whether the measures provided for are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued, bearing in mind that, where several fundamental rights are at hand, such as, in the present case, the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed in Article 16 of the Charter, on the one hand, and the right to intellectual property enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter and the right to freedom and pluralism of the media guaranteed in Article 11(2) of the Charter, on the other, that assessment must be carried out with a view to the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those different rights and a fair balance between them (see judgments of 29 January 2008, Promusicae, C‑275/06, EU:C:2008:54, paragraphs 65 and 66, and of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraph 60).

    97. In that regard, it is necessary, first, to take account of the importance both of the right to intellectual property enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter and the right to freedom and pluralism of the media guaranteed in Article 11(2) of the Charter, since Article 11 of the Charter constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society and is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the European Union is founded (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 April 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑401/19, EU:C:2022:297, paragraph 47, and of 26 February 2026, Commission v Hungary (Right to provide media services in a radio frequency), C‑92/23, EU:C:2026:108, paragraph 369 and the case-law cited). Second, account must be taken of the considerations set out in paragraph 87 of the present judgment, relating to the freedom to conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)