Malta / First Hall of the Civil Court (Constitutional Jurisdiction) / 75/2018

Nicola Micallef vs Avukat Ġenerali
Policy area
Justice, freedom and security
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
First Hall of the Civil Court (Constitutional Jurisdiction)
Typ
Decision
Decision date
23/03/2021
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:MT:KOST:2021:126039
  • Malta / First Hall of the Civil Court (Constitutional Jurisdiction) / 75/2018

    Key facts of the case: 

    On 29 October 2015, Nicola Micallef was found guilty by the Court of Magistrates of smuggling, keeping, and selling untaxed and uncustomed cigarettes, tobacco, and alcoholic drinks of a total amount of €6,037.72. 

    Mr. Micallef was fined €1,500, sentenced to two years in prison with a suspension of four years, and the vehicle he used for the smuggling was confiscated. 

    In the action, Mr. Micallef complains about the severity of the imposed sentence, stressing that it is disproportionate to the offence committed. He refers to the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, claiming that the statutory provisions of Chapters 37, 382, and 406 of the Laws of Malta are contrary to this principle. 

    In his response, the State Advocate argued that the applicant had failed to meet the Charter requirement of exhausting all ordinary domestic legal remedies before the National Courts, prior to seeking retribution. The State Advocate further denied the applicability of Article 49 (3) of the Charter and determined there is no relation to the implementation of EU law as per Article 51 of the Charter.

    In the final decision, citing substantial case law from the European Court of Human Rights, the First Hall of the Civil Court (in its constitutional jurisdiction) concluded that the punishment had a legitimate purpose and was justified.  

     

    Key legal question raised by the Court: 

    Did the convicting and sentencing of the applicant (Mr. Micallef) infringe upon the applicant’s rights to a proportionate sentence as prescribed in Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter, or represent torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as per Article 3 and 35 (3) of the European Convention on Human Rights?

     

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Court followed the reasoning of the State Advocate and ruled that the applicant cannot rely on Article 49 (3) of the Charter, because according to Article 51 of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter “are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law”. Having failed to demonstrate a link between his case and EU Law, the applicant’s reliance on the Charter was invalid. 
    The Court further ruled that Article 35 (3) of the ECHR is inapplicable due its lack of incorporation into Maltese Law. The ECHR therefore, applies only to bodies of the Council of Europe, and not to Maltese courts. The Court also concluded that the State had not been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as per Article 3 of ECHR, because the applicant was sentenced by the Court of Magistrates after being found guilty “in flagrante delicto” (caught in the act of wrongdoing) for the possession of smuggled cigarettes and alcohol. 
     
    The Court dismissed all claims made by the applicant and described allegations raised as “frivolous and vexatious” as per Article 46 (5) of the Constitution of Malta, and Article 4 (5) of Chapter 319 of the Laws of Malta. Therefore, the Court confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court of Magistrates.
     

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    8. The Court observes that the applicant´s present action is based on Article 49 (3) of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Subsequently, the applicant was authorised, by order of 26 February 2020, to add another request to his original application. He requested to add the Articles 3 and 35 (5) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

    9. It is apparent that, by the present action, the applicant complains about the severity of the imposed sentence, stressing that it is disproportionate with the offence committed. Therefore, through the present action, he is attacking the Articles 60 (a) (b) (c) (k), 62 (a) (b) (c) (d) (f) (g) (h) (i) (k), 68 (1) paragraph (a), and Article 62 of Chapter 37 of the Laws in Malta, Article 16 (1) and 17(a), Regulation 13, Section b, Regulation 7, Part C, Sixth Amendment of Chapter 382 of the Laws of Malta and Article 80 of Chapter 406 of the Laws of Malta by arguing that these provisions are contrary to Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 3 and 35 (3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

    (...)

    19. However, it should be noted that in the present case, the applicant complains that the provisions of Chapter 37, 382 and 406 of the Laws of Malta are contrary to Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights regarding the fact that his vehicle was confiscated by the decision of the Court of Magistrates.

    (...)

    24. It follows that, by the current proceedings, the applicant alleges infringement of Article 49 (3) of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, when he was convicted and sentenced according to the above-mentioned provisions of Chapters 37, 382 and 406 of the Laws of Malta. 

    (...)

    44. This Court will now proceed to examine the appellant´s complaint on the basis of Article 49 (3) of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the light of the defence raised by the State Advocate.

    45. In his defence, the State Advocate argued that Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights cannot be used because the case did not relate to the implementation of any EU Law in accordance with Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In his submission, the State Advocate referred to Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa vs Regione Sicilia Sopritendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo decided by the ECJ on 6 March 2014, and also referred to the case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson, in which the European Court of Justice referred to the case law within the scope of Human Rights in the European Union and the explanation related to Article 51 of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which the rights guaranteed by the Charter apply exclusively when linked to EU Law.  

    46. Article 49 (3) of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides: “The severity of the punishment shall not be disproportionate to the offence.”

    47. Article 51 of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides: “1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties. 2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.”

    48. Here, the Court considers it appropriate to point out that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, although not incorporated into specific national law, is applicable and has an effect on our country. It is also clear that through Article 3 of Chapter 460, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is binding in Malta and part of the national law. This was affirmed in the case of Raymond Caruana v. Attorney General (16/2011) decided on 28 February 2013, in which the Court stated the following: 
    “That the Court agrees with the appellant that said Charter today forms part of Maltese domestic law and that the Maltese Courts must regard and embrace them as they do any other law in the bye-law which has direct effect.”
    “That, although the applicant refers to ‘a certain provision contained in the Charter’ he seems to be referring to Article 49 thereof, which speaks of principles of legality and proportionality of Offences and Penalties. In particular, reference is made to the provisions of sub-article 3 of the said article which states that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the offenses to which it applies.”
    (...)
    “However, as the respondent rightly submitted, the operation of the provisions of the said Charter provides that (1) The provisions of this Charter are intended for the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union in respect for the principle of subsidiarity and for the Member States also only when implementing Union law. They must therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote their application, in accordance with their respective competences and respecting the limits of the Union’s competences as conferred on it in the Treaties”
    (...)
    (See also Mario Pace Axiaq and Others v The Honorable Prime Minister and Others (63/2019) decided by the First Hall Civil Court on 3 May 2019; Cecil Herbert Jones vs Advocate General (95/2018) decided by the First Hall Civil Court (Constitutional Jurisdiction) Court on 15 February 2019.)

    49. The Court observes that, in line with the above, it should be understood that a breach of a provision of theEU Charter of Fundamental Rights can be only examined by the national Courts if the infringement concerns EU Law.

    50. Therefore, in view of the above, the Court agrees with the submission of the State Attorney that the appellant cannot rely on Article 49 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights because this Article applies only when the complaint concerns the scope of EU Law. In the current case, the applicant did not in any way link his complaint to EU Law, although he sought to argue that the national law was adopted as a result of the transposition of EU Law, a claim that has hardly been proven. 
     

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    8. Il-Qorti tosserva illi r-rikors odjern tar-rikorrent ġie msejjes fuq l-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Bniedem. Sussegwentement, madanakollu, fil-mori tal-każ, permezz ta’ digriet datat 26 ta’ Frar 2020, ir-rikorrent ġie awtorizzat iżid talba oħra mar-rikors oriġinali tiegħu, fejn żdied talbiet ai termini tal-artikolu 3 u 35(3), tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem. 

    9. Jirriżulta, mill-provi prodotti, illi permezz tal-azzjoni preżenti, r-rikorrent qiegħed jilmenta dwar is-severita` tal-piena li ngħata, fejn saħaq li mhijiex proporzjonata mar-reat kommess. Għalhekk, permezz tal-azzjoni preżenti, qiegħed jattakka l-artikoli 60(a)(b)(c)(k), 62(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(g)(h)(i)(k) 68(1), 69(1)(2) paragrafu (a) Artikolu 62 tal-Kap 37 tal-Liġijiet ta’ Malta, l-Artikolu 16 (1) u 17(a), Regolament 13, Taqsima B, Regolament C, Taqsima C, Sitt Skeda tal-Kap 382 tal-Liġijiet ta’ Malta u l-Artikolu 80 tal-Kap 406 tal-Liġijiet ta’ Malta billi qed isostni li dawn id-disposizzjonijiet imorru kontra l-artikolu 49 subartikolu (3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Bniedem (Charter of Fundamental Rights) u tal-artikolu 3 u 35(3) tal-Konvenzjoni Ewropea tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem.

    (...)

    19. Madanakollu, jiġi osservat li fil-każ odjern, ir-rikorrent qed jilmenta li d-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Kap 37 tal-Kap 382 u 406 tal-Liġijiet ta’ Malta jmorru kontra l-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea peress illi qed jikkontesta l-fatt li ġiet konfiskata l-vettura tiegħu u d-deċiżjoni f’dan ir-rigward ingħatat mill-Qorti tal-Maġistrati.

    (...)

    24. Jirriżulta illi, permezz tal-proċeduri odjerni, r-rikorrenti qed jikkontendi li hemm ksur tal-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea meta huwa nstab ħati u ngħata l-piena ai termini tad-disposizzjonijiet imsemmija fir-rikors promotur u ċioe` d-disposizzjonijiet tal-Kap 37, 382 u 406 tal-Liġijiet ta’ Malta hawn fuq imsemmija.

    (...)

    44. Din il-Qorti ser tgħaddi issa biex teżamina l-ilment tar-rikorrent abbażi tal-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea fl-ottika anke tad-difiża sollevata mill-Avukat tal-Istat.

    45. Illi ġie eċċepit fl-ewwel lok fir-risposta tal-Avukat tal-Istat li l-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Bniedem ma tistax tintlaqa’ għax mhijiex marbuta mal-implimentazzjoni ta’ xi liġi tal-Unjoni Ewropea skont l-Artikolu 51 tal-istess Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Fis-sottomissjonijiet tiegħu, l-Avukat tal-Istat irrefera għall-kawża C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa vs regione sicilia Sopritendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo deċiża mill-ECJ fis-6 ta’ Marzu 2014, liema każ irrefera wkoll għall-każ C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson fejn il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Ġustizzja rreferiet għall-każistika
    tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, fejn id-dritt garantit mill-istess Karta jrid ikun abbinat ma’ liġi tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

    46. L-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea jipprovdi: “Is-severita` tal-piena m’għandhiex tkun sproporzjonata għar-reat.”

    47. L-Artikolu 51 tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea jipprovdi li:
    1. Id-disposizzjonijiet ta’ din il-karta huma intiżi għall-istituzzjonijiet, għall-korpi u għall-aġenziji tal-Unjoni fir-rispett tal-prinċipju ta’ sussidjarjeta`u għall-Istati Membri wkoll biss meta ikunu qed jimplimentaw il-liġi tal-Unjoni. Huma għandhom għaldaqstant jirrispettaw id-drittijiet, josservaw il-prinċipji u jippromwovu l-applikazzjoni tagħhom, skont il-kompetenzi rispettivi tagħhom u fir-rispett tal-limiti tal-kompetenzi tal-Unjoni kif mogħtija lilha fit-Trattati.
    2. Il-karta ma testendix il-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tal-liġi tal-Unjoni lil hinn mill-kompetenzi tal-Unjoni, u ma timmodifikax il-kompetenzi tal-Unjoni jew ma tistabbilixxi ebda setgħa jew kompitu ġdid għall-Unjoni, u ma timmodifikax il-kompetenzi definiti fit-Trattati.

    48. Hawnhekk, il-Qorti tqis illi jkun tajjeb li jiġi puntwalizzat illi l-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, għalkemm mhux inkorporati fil-leġislazzjoni domestika speċifika, huwa applikabbli u għandu effett fuq pajjiżna. Jiġi wkoll ippreċiżat li permezz tal-artikolu 3 tal-Kap 460, il-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea torbot lil Malta u hija parti mil-liġi domestika nostrana. Dana ġie affermat mil-Qrati Maltin fil-każ Raymond Caruana vs L-Avukat Ġenerali (16/2011) deċiża fit-28 ta’ Frar 2013 fejn ingħad:
    “Illi l-Qorti taqbel mar-rikorrent li l-imsemmija Karta llum tagħmel parti mil-liġi domestika Maltija u li l-Qrati Maltin iridu iqisu u jħaddnu bħal ma jħaddnu kull liġi oħra fl-ordinament li għandha effett dirett". 
    “Illi għalkemm ir-rikorrent jirreferi għal ċertu provvediment li jinsab fiċ-Charter jidher li qiegħed jirreferi għall-Artikolu 49 tagħha, li jitkellem dwar prinċipji ta’ legalita` u proporzjonalita` ta’ Reati u ta’ Pieni. B’mod
    partikolari ssir referenza għad-disposizzjoni tas-sub-artikolu 3 tal-imsemmi artikolu li jgħid li l-ħruxija tal-pieni ma tridx tkun sproporzjonata mar-reati li għalihom tapplika.”
    (...)
    Iżda, kif sewwa issottometta l-intimat, it-tħaddim tad-disposizzjonijiet tal-imsemmija Karta jipprovdi li (1) Id-disposizzjonijiet ta’ din il-Karta huma intiżi għall-istituzzjonijiet, għall-korpi u għall-aġenziji tal-unjoni fir-rispett tal-prinċipju ta’ sussidjarjeta`u għall-Istati Membri wkoll biss meta ikun qed jimplimentaw il-liġi tal-unjoni. Huma għandhom għaldaqstant jirrispettaw id-drittijiet, josservaw il-prinċipji u jippromwovu l-applikazzjoni tagħhom, b’referenza għall-iskop tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem fl-Unjoni Ewropea u għall-ispjegazzjonijiet relatati mal-Artikolu 51 tal-Karta skont il-kompetenzi rispettivi tagħhom u fir-rispett tal-limiti tal-kompetenzi tal-unjoni kif mogħtija lilha fit-Trattati.”
    (...)
    (Ara wkoll Mario Pace Axiaq et vs L-Onorevoli Prim Ministru et (63/2019) deċiża mill-Prim’ Awla tal-Qorti Ċivili fit-3 ta’ Mejju 2019; Cecil Herbert Jones vs Avukat Ġenerali (95/2018) deċiża mill-Prim’ Awla tal-Qorti Ċivili (Sede Kostituzzjonali) fil-15 ta’ Frar 2019.

    49. Il-Qorti tosserva illi, in linea ma’ dak fuq indikat, għandu ikun mifhum li lment ta’ ksur ta’ provvediment tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea jista’ jiġi mistħarreġ biss mill-Qrati tagħna jekk il-ksur jirrigwarda liġi tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

    50. Għalhekk, in vista tas-suespost, din il-Qorti taqbel ma’ dak sottomess mill-intimat Avukat tal-Istat li r-rikorrent ma jistax jinvoka l-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea għaliex dan l-artikolu tal-Karta japplika biss meta l-ilment jirrigwarda it-tħaddim ta’ liġi tal-Unjoni. Fil-każ in eżami, ir-rikorrent bl-ebda mod ma rabat l-ilment tiegħu ma’ liġi tal-Unjoni Ewropea għalkemm jipprova jikkontendi illi l-liġi nostrana hija riżultat tat-trasposizzjoni ta’ liġi Ewropea, fatt li ftit li xejn ma ġie ippruvat.

    51. Madankollu, ir-rikorrent fis-sottomissjonijiet tiegħu sostna li l-Artikolu 49(3) tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandu jiġi kkunsidrat u għal dan il-għan irrefera għall-każ fl-ismijiet Jason James Agius vs L-Avukat Ġenerali (108/2018) deċiża fit-23 ta’ Jannar 2020 mill-Qorti Ċivili Prim’ Awla Sede Kostituzzjonali, liema każ ġie appellat u deċiż mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali fis-6 ta’ Ottubru 2020, fejn f’dan il-każ ġie abbraċċjat u affermat il-prinċipju ta’ proporzjonalita`.