Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Asylum policy — Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection — Directive 2013/32/EU — Articles 14 and 34 — Obligation to give applicants for international protection the opportunity of a personal interview before the adoption of a decision declaring the application to be inadmissible — Failure to comply with that obligation in the procedure at first instance — Consequences.
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:
Articles 14 and 34 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which failure to comply with the obligation to give an applicant for international protection the opportunity of a personal interview before the adoption of a decision on the basis of Article 33(2)(a) of that directive declaring the application to be inadmissible does not lead to that decision being annulled and the case being remitted to the determining authority, unless that legislation allows the applicant, in the appeal procedure against that decision, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees set out in Article 15 of that directive, and those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.
49) Where the determining authority is inclined to find that an application for international protection is inadmissible on the ground referred to in Article 33(2)(a) of the Procedures Directive, the personal interview on the admissibility of the application is intended to give the applicant the opportunity not only to state whether international protection has in fact already been granted to him or her in another Member State, but in particular to present all of the factors which differentiate his or her specific situation in order to enable the determining authority to rule out the possibility that the applicant, if transferred to that other Member State, would be exposed to a substantial risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
50) In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s case-law, Article 33(2)(a) of the Procedures Directive precludes a Member State from exercising the option granted by that provision to reject an application for international protection as being inadmissible on the ground that the applicant has already been granted international protection by another Member State where the living conditions that that applicant could be expected to encounter as the beneficiary of international protection in that other Member State would expose him or her to a substantial risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Ibrahim and Others, C‑297/17, C‑318/17, C‑319/17 and C‑438/17, EU:C:2019:219, paragraph 101, and order of 13 November 2019, Hamed and Omar, C‑540/17 and C‑541/17, not published, EU:C:2019:964, paragraph 43).
51) In that context, the Court has previously stated that the particularly high level of severity required by Article 4 of the Charter will be attained where the indifference of the authorities of a Member State would result in a person wholly dependent on State support finding him or herself, irrespective of his or her wishes and his or her personal choices, in a situation of extreme material poverty that does not allow him or her to meet his or her most basic needs, such as, inter alia, food, personal hygiene and a place to live, and that undermines his or her physical or mental health or puts him or her in a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity (judgment of 19 March 2019, Ibrahim and Others, C‑297/17, C‑318/17, C‑319/17 and C‑438/17, EU:C:2019:219, paragraph 90, and order of 13 November 2019, Hamed and Omar, C‑540/17 and C‑541/17, not published, EU:C:2019:964, paragraph 39).
52) Thus, where the authorities of a Member State have available to them evidence produced by the applicant in order to establish the existence of such a risk in the Member State that has previously granted international protection, those authorities are required to assess, on the basis of information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights that is guaranteed by EU law, whether there are deficiencies which may be systematic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 March 2019, Ibrahim and Others, C‑297/17, C‑318/17, C‑319/17 and C‑438/17, EU:C:2019:219, paragraph 88, and order of 13 November 2019, Hamed and Omar, C‑540/17 and C‑541/17, not published, EU:C:2019:964, paragraph 38). Furthermore, it cannot be entirely ruled out that an applicant for international protection may be able to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances which are unique to him or her and which would mean that being sent back to the Member State which previously granted international protection would expose him or her, because of his or her particularly vulnerability, to a risk of treatment that is contrary to Article 4 of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 March 2019, Jawo, C‑163/17, EU:C:2019:218, paragraph 95)
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54) The personal interview on the admissibility of the application, provided for in Article 14(1) and Article 34(1) of the Procedures Directive, is therefore of fundamental importance in order to ensure that Article 33(2)(a) of that directive is in fact applied in full compliance with Article 4 of the Charter. The personal interview enables the determining authority to assess the applicant’s specific situation and degree of vulnerability and satisfy itself that the applicant has been invited to set out all of the considerations which are capable of demonstrating that being sent back to the Member State that previously granted international protection would expose him or her to a risk of treatment that is contrary to Article 4 of the Charter.
