Article 18 - Right to asylum
Key facts of the case:
The plaintiff, a Russian citizen, had been living in Ukraine with a resident permit for 30 years. The plaintiff, with his/her adult daughter, a Russian citizen and his/her Ukrainian mother, left their residence in Ukraine after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. They applied for temporary protection, but only the mother’s application was granted. The application of the plaintiff and his/her daughter was dismissed as the defendant found that they had not established their entitlement to asylum status due to the absence of a legally recognised family relationship with the Ukrainian citizen. Subsequently, the plaintiff and his/her daughter filed an application for temporary protection, stating that the plaintiff and his/her Ukrainian mother lived in the same household and in a community property in Ukraine. The defendant dismissed the plaintiff’s application and decided not make a non-refoulement order. Pursuant to Section 1 of the 86/2022. (III. 7.) Government Decree “beneficiaries of temporary protection: persons granted temporary protection by Hungary under point a) of Section 19 of Act LXXX. of 2017 on Asylum who are … c) family members of persons referred to in points a) and b), as defined by Article 2(4) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 (hereinafter: Decision). According to Article 2(1) of the Decision, the Decision applies to the following categories of persons displaced from Ukraine on or after 24 February 2022, as a result of the military invasion by Russian armed forces that began on that date: (a) Ukrainian nationals residing in Ukraine before 24 February 2022; … (c) family members of the persons referred to in points (a) and (b). Under paragraph 1, point (c), the following persons shall be considered to be part of a family, in so far as the family was already present and residing in Ukraine before 24 February 2022: … (c) other close relatives who lived together as part of the family unit at the time of the circumstances surrounding the mass influx of displaced persons, and who were wholly or mainly dependent on a person referred to in paragraph 1, point (a) or (b) at the time.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Court had to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to temporary protection and whether he/she was not entitled to be sent back.
Outcome of the case:
The Court held that the defendant was correct in finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to temporary protection as the material dependence for basic subsistence cannot be justified between the plaintiff and his/her mother. However, the defendant committed a material breach of the duty to clarify and assess the facts by assessing the existence of the non-refoulement obligation not on the basis of the applicant’s current situation but on the basis of the general situation, four years earlier.
“On the other hand, in Article 2 (4) (c) of the Decision, the phrase “wholly or mainly dependant on a person” can only be interpreted as referring to material dependence for basic subsistence or other interdependence of the same level as that of necessity, such as in the case of severe disability, where the family member, in the absence of the capacity to provide for himself or herself, is predominantly responsible for the care and maintenance of the patient on a permanent and lifelong basis. The French wording “à la charge de” is the most appropriate way of showing that the condition of ‘maintenance’ in the Hungarian version can only be understood as a relationship of responsibility and burden which implies full or almost full financial dependence. If mere emotional attachment, cohabitation and joint household management were sufficient to confer the status of temporary protection on a family member, the EU and the nation legislator would have provided for this, rather than a much more restrictive dependency relationship. There is nothing in the Guidelines or the Charter to suggest otherwise.”
„Másrészt a Határozat 2. cikk (4) bekezdés c) pontjában a „teljes vagy jelentős mértékben (…) tartott el” kitétel csakis az elemi létfenntartást szolgáló anyagi függőségre vagy az azzal kényszerűségben azonos szintű olyan egyéb egymásra utaltságra értelmezhető, mint pl. a súlyos fogyatékosság esete, amikor önellátási képesség hiányában döntő részben a családtag gondoskodik folyamatosan, életvitelszerűen a beteg gondozásáról és ápolásról. A francia szövegváltozat „à la charge de” megfogalmazása érzékelteti legmegfelelőbben, hogy a magyar szövegváltozatban „tartásként” megjelenő állapoton csakis olyan felelősségi, terheltségi viszonyt lehet érteni, ami teljes vagy ahhoz közelítő anyagi függőséget takar, avagy olyan személyes ápolást vagy gondozást, ami szorosságában a teljes vagy majdnem teljes anyagi eltartottsággal egyenértékű. Ha pusztán az érzelmi kötődés, az együttélés és közös háztartásvezetés is elegendő lenne a családtagnak járó menedékes státuszhoz, úgy az uniós és hazai jogalkotó erről rendelkezett volna, nem pedig az ennél sokkal szigorúbb függőségi-eltartotti viszonyról. Sem az Iránymutatásból, sem a Chartából nem lehet ezzel ellentétes álláspontra következtetni.”
