CJEU Case C-‑338/24 [LF] / Opinion

LF v Sanofi Pasteur SA
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Opinion
Decision date
19/06/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2025:467
  • CJEU Case C-‑338/24 [LF] / Opinion

    Key facts of the case: 

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 85/374/EEC – Consumer protection – Liability for defective products – Article 13 – Relationship with the general system of fault-based liability – Failure to exercise vigilance with respect to the risks associated with the product – Article 11 – 10-year limitation period – Expiry of the limitation period – Complex and progressive medical condition – Right of access to a court – Article 10 – Three-year limitation period – Point in time at which the limitation period begins – Establishment of a stabilisation date

    Outcome of the opinion: 

    In view of the foregoing, I propose that the Court should answer the questions referred by the cour d’appel de Rouen (Court of Appeal, Rouen, France) as follows:

    (1)      Article 13 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, read in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 April 2002, González Sánchez (C‑183/00, EU:C:2002:255), must be interpreted as meaning that the person injured by a defective product may seek compensation for his or her injury from the producer under a national general system of fault-based liability, to the extent that such a system is not based exclusively on the defectiveness of the product. The fault may consist, in particular, in maintaining a product in circulation despite the producer being aware of its defectiveness or in a failure to exercise vigilance with respect to the risks associated with the product, despite the producer having been notified of those risks.

    (2)      Article 11 of Directive 85/374, under which the rights conferred on an injured person by that directive are extinguished on expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which the harmful product was put into circulation, is invalid in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in so far as its application has the effect of extinguishing the right to claim compensation of injured persons suffering from a progressive disease who, according to medical evidence, due to the progressive nature of their medical condition, cannot fully evaluate the damage caused to them and have therefore been unable to initiate proceedings against the producer within that period, thereby depriving those persons of their right of access to a court.

    (3)      Article 10(1) of Directive 85/374 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the situation of a progressive disease, the three-year limitation period established in that provision starts to run on the date of stabilisation of the damage, defined as the moment from which, according to medical evidence, the condition of the injured person is no longer evolving

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    44.      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 11 of Directive 85/374, according to which the rights conferred on an injured person by that directive are extinguished upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which the harmful product was put into circulation, is contrary to the right of access to a court guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter, to the extent that it deprives an injured person suffering from a progressive disease caused by a defective product of the right of access to a court.

    51.      In the context of the present case, the doubts of the referring court concern whether Article 11 of Directive 85/374 is compatible with Article 47 of the Charter in so far as the expiry period it lays down applies to injured persons suffering from a progressive disease.

    54.      In order to address the issue of the compatibility of Article 11 of Directive 85/374 with Article 47 of the Charter, it is necessary to determine, at the outset, whether the time limit for bringing proceedings interferes with a right guaranteed by EU law.

    55.      The Netherlands Government, the Commission and the Council assert in their written observations that the setting of the expiry period does not constitute a limitation of a right guaranteed by EU law. That is so, they submit, because when the relevant period has elapsed the injured person’s right to claim damages is extinguished. Since there is no right, the victim can no longer rely on rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law and there can therefore be no infringement of Article 47 of the Charter. The expiry period is to be understood, according to that view, simply as a temporal limitation of the rights that the injured persons have under Directive 85/374, and once it has elapsed the Charter does not apply.

    56.      I cannot subscribe to that approach in the interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter.

    57.      Article 51(1) of the Charter confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law. 

    58.      The first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article.

    59.      It is also clear from the settled case-law of the Court that the right to an effective remedy may be invoked solely on the basis of Article 47 of the Charter, without there being a need for the content thereof to be made more specific by other provisions of EU law or by provisions of the domestic law of the Member States. The recognition of that right, in a given case, presupposes, as is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law. 

    60.      The situation of a person injured by a defective product, claiming compensation from the producer under the liability without fault established by Directive 85/374, clearly falls under EU law. By relying on the right to compensation under that directive, the injured person relies on the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter.

    61.      The fact that Article 11 of Directive 85/374 provides for an expiry period after which the right to compensation is extinguished does not mean that the latter provision can escape any review of its compatibility with Article 47 of the Charter. Indeed, the extinguishment of the substantive right is merely the effect of application of the expiry period laid down by that directive. A review of the validity of Article 11 of Directive 85/374 in the light of Article 47 of the Charter should concentrate on the very fact that an expiry period is laid down and on its characteristics, including its length, the moment in time at which it begins and the events that can suspend or interrupt it.

    65.      The Court has already held that the principle of effective judicial protection laid down in that Article 47 of the Charter, consists of various elements, including the right of access to the courts. 

    66.      Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). 

    67.      In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are to be the same as those laid down by that convention, although the foregoing does not preclude EU law from affording more extensive protection. Therefore, when interpreting Article 47 of the Charter, the Court must take account of the corresponding rights guaranteed by Article 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, as the minimum threshold of protection. 

    68.      It is clear from the case-law of the Court that the right of access to a court is not an absolute right and that, consequently, it may involve proportionate restrictions that pursue a legitimate aim and do not adversely affect the very essence of that right. As can be seen from Article 52(1) of the Charter, that provision allows limitations to be placed on the exercise of those rights, provided that those limitations are provided for by law, that they respect the essence of those rights and that, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 

    70.      In the second place, as regards respect for the essence of the right of access to a court, the Court has ruled that the essence of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter includes, among other aspects, the possibility, for the person who holds that right, of accessing a court or tribunal with the power to ensure respect for the rights guaranteed to that person by EU law and, to that end, to consider all the issues of fact and of law that are relevant for resolving the case before it.

    73.      The difficulty I see with that position is that it renders the examination of a provision of EU law conditional on rights and remedies which may be available under national law. As pointed out above, the essence of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter includes, among other aspects, the possibility, for the person who holds that right, of accessing a court or tribunal with the power to ensure respect for the rights guaranteed to that person  by EU law. In that regard, as the German Government put it at the hearing, that possibility is independent of the rights guaranteed to the person by the national law on tortious liability. Moreover, in view of the complete harmonisation brought about by Directive 85/374, the right to claim damages under the product liability system put in place by that directive is extinguished after the expiry period in respect of any injured person. If Member States provide for the right to claim damages after that period, that right cannot have the same foundation as that established by that directive. The persons concerned may no longer benefit from the system of strict liability in relation to a defective product, and particularly from the rules on the burden of proof.

    83.      Following that line of reasoning, the unconditional application of the expiry period provided in Article 11 of Directive 85/374 to all injured persons, and in particular those suffering from a progressive disease who, according to medical evidence, could not know the full extent of their injury, appears liable to impair the very essence of their right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.

    88.      Second, the approach consisting in leaving the matter to national procedural autonomy does not appear to be capable of addressing the risk that the establishment by EU law of an unconditional expiry period will create unsuccessful claims. If injured persons are obliged to bring their action prematurely, before they are able to evaluate their illness, they run the risk of not having access to all the information.  LF’s counsel submitted at the hearing that, without all the information available, the injured person will obtain an unfavourable expert report. The injured person’s action is then destined to result in incomplete compensation or, worse, to fail. Such an outcome would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, which guarantees the possibility for the person who holds the right to prepare and bring an effective action. In the words of European Court of Human Rights case-law, the right of access to a court must be ‘practical and effective’, not ‘theoretical or illusory’. 

    89.      For those reasons, I consider that the unconditional application of the expiry period established in Article 11 of Directive 85/374 to all injured persons, without consideration of the particular circumstances of those persons suffering from a progressive disease whose illness has not stabilised before expiry of that period, does not respect the essence of the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.

    91.      The principle of proportionality requires that the limitations which may, in particular, be imposed by acts of EU law on rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to meet the legitimate objectives pursued or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous. In addition, an objective of general interest may not be pursued without having regard to the fact that it must be reconciled with the fundamental rights affected by the measure, by properly balancing the objective of general interest against the rights at issue, in order to ensure that the disadvantages caused by that measure are not disproportionate to the aims pursued.

    95.      Legal certainty and the sound administration of justice constitute, therefore, objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter, which justify a limitation on the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.

    105. In the light of the foregoing, I take the view that Article 11 of Directive 85/374, under which the rights conferred on an injured person by that directive are extinguished on expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which the harmful product was put into circulation, is invalid in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, in so far as its application has the effect of extinguishing the right to claim compensation of injured persons suffering from a progressive disease who, according to medical evidence, due to the progressive nature of their medical condition, cannot fully evaluate the damage caused to them and have therefore been unable to initiate proceedings against the producer within that period, thereby depriving those persons of their right of access to a court.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)