Article 7 - Respect for private and family life
Article 21 - Non-discrimination
Key facts of the case:
The Court of Bolzano had initiated proceedings for the constitutional legitimacy of Article 262(1) of the Italian Civil Code. The provision was criticised in so far as it does not allow parents, by mutual agreement, to transmit to their child, at the time of birth, only the mother's surname. In the case in question, the Court of Bolzano had been called upon to rule on the appeal lodged by the Public Prosecutor's Office, in order to obtain the rectification of the birth certificate of a child, to whom the parents, not married, had agreed to give only the mother's surname, confirming this intention also during the proceedings before the Court of Bolzano. However, this choice is precluded by Article 262, paragraph I, of the Civil Code, which had recognised the possibility of adding the mother's surname to the patronymic, while in this case the will of both parents is aimed at the acquisition of only the mother's surname.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
According to the referring court, the prohibition envisaged by Article 262(1) of the Italian Civil Code is contrary to Article 2 of the Constitution, in terms of the protection of personal identity; Article 3 of the Constitution, in terms of equality between men and women; Article 117(1) of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which correspond to Articles 7 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU).
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court had already intervened in this field with the decision No. 286/2016, establishing that parents can decide to add the mother’s surname to the father’s one. The Court had already encouraged the legislator to introduce legislative reforms to innovate this field in the view of the principle of gender equality. This invitation was never received by the legislator. With this Ordonnance, the Constitutional Court decided that the issues raised by the Court of Bolzano are relevant since the in-force discipline might violate the above-mentioned fundamental rights and principles. For this reason, the Court admitted the constitutional legitimacy question raised by the Court of Bolzano, and decided to issue a future decision on the case. Such decision will be relevant since, if the Court of Bolzano argumentation will be accepted, the challenged disposition of the Italian Civil Code will be deemed unconstitutional, and parents will be allowed to decide which surname to assign to their child(ren).
“This preclusion would be contrary, first of all, to Article 2 of the Constitution, from the point of view of the protection of personal identity; it would also violate Article 3 of the Constitution, from the point of view of the equality of women and men, as already noted by this Court in judgment no. 286 of 2016; finally, it is denounced the violation of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, ratified and made enforceable by Law No. 848 of 4 August 1955, which correspond to Articles 7 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 and adapted in Strasbourg on 12 December 2007”
“The provision censured is also contrary to the first paragraph of Article 117 of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, in relation to Articles 8 and 14 ECHR; in this regard, reference is made to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 7 January 2014 (Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy), which held that the impossibility for parents to attribute to their child, at birth, the surname of the mother, instead of that of the father, constitutes a violation of Art. 14 (Prohibition of discrimination), read in conjunction with Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) of the ECHR, principles that correspond to Articles 7 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which are also in question.”
“Considering that this preclusion would be in conflict, first of all, with Article 2 of the Constitution, in terms of the protection of personal identity; it would also violate Article 3 of the Constitution, in terms of the equality of women and men, as already noted by this Court in judgment no. 286 of 2016; finally, it is denounced the violation of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, ratified and implemented by Law No. 848 of 4 August 1955, which correspond to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, ratified and implemented by law no. 848 of 4 August 1955. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, ratified and made enforceable by Law No. 848 of 4 August 1955, which correspond to Articles 7 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 and adapted in Strasbourg on 12 December 2007.”
“Ritenuto che questa preclusione si porrebbe in contrasto, in primo luogo, con l’art. 2 della Costituzione, sotto il profilo della tutela dell’identità personale; sarebbe, inoltre, violato l’art. 3 Cost., sotto il profilo dell’uguaglianza tra donna e uomo, come già rilevato da questa Corte nella sentenza n. 286 del 2016; è denunciata, infine, la violazione dell’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., in relazione agli artt. 8 e 14 della Convenzione per la salvaguardia diritti dell’uomo e libertà fondamentali (CEDU), firmata a Roma il 4 novembre 1950, ratificata e resa esecutiva con legge 4 agosto 1955, n. 848, che trovano corrispondenza negli artt. 7 e 21 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea (CDFUE), proclamata a Nizza il 7 dicembre 2000 e adattata a Strasburgo il 12 dicembre 2007”
“Ritenuto che la disposizione censurata sarebbe, altresì, in contrasto con l’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., in relazione agli artt. 8 e 14 CEDU; al riguardo, è richiamata la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo del 7 gennaio 2014 (Cusan e Fazzo contro Italia), che ha affermato che l’impossibilità per i genitori di attribuire al figlio, alla nascita, il cognome della madre, anziché quello del padre, integra la violazione dell’art. 14 (Divieto di discriminazione), in combinato disposto con l’art. 8 (Diritto al rispetto della vita privata e familiare) CEDU, principi che trovano corrispondenza negli artt. 7 e 21 CDFUE, che pure verrebbero in rilievo”
“Considerato che questa preclusione si porrebbe in contrasto, in primo luogo, con l’art. 2 della Costituzione, sotto il profilo della tutela dell’identità personale; sarebbe, inoltre, violato l’art. 3 Cost., sotto il profilo dell’uguaglianza tra donna e uomo, come già rilevato da questa Corte nella sentenza n. 286 del 2016; è denunciata, infine, la violazione dell’art. 117, primo comma, Cost., in relazione agli artt. 8 e 14 della Convenzione per la salvaguardia diritti dell’uomo e libertà fondamentali (CEDU), firmata a Roma il 4 novembre 1950, ratificata e resa esecutiva con legge 4 agosto 1955, n. 848, che trovano corrispondenza negli artt. 7 e 21 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea (CDFUE), proclamata a Nizza il 7 dicembre 2000 e adattata a Strasburgo il 12 dicembre 2007”
