Article 10 - Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Article 20 - Equality before the law
Article 21 - Non-discrimination
Article 22 - Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity
Article 52 - Scope and interpretation
Key facts of the case:
Both Flanders and the Walloon region introduced a ban on slaughter without stunning. Several Jewish and Muslim associations brought this ban before the Constitutional Court because they considered it to be in violation of the right to freedom of religion. This case is about the Flanders Ban on slaughter without stunning. Another court was brought in relation to the Wallon Ban in which the Court had the same reasoning.
The Constitutional Court refers to the earlier ruling of the EU Court of Justice (C-336/19) , which states that Member States can impose a stunning method to promote animal welfare in ritual slaughter. Interestingly, the EU Court went against its own Advocate General, who was of the opinion that stricter animal welfare rules were allowed if the "core" religious practice was not encroached upon.
The Constitutional Court’s decision to follow the EU Court of Justice in this reasoning caused criticism among Jewish communities in Belgium.
Key legal question raised by the case:
The Constitutional Court assessed whether or not the ban was in violation of EU Regulation 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing, read in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution (right to equality and non-discrimination), as persons of Jewish or Muslim faith were deprived of the guarantee in Art. 4 (4) of that Directive which entails that ritual slaughter cannot be subject to the requirement of prior anaesthesia.
The Court also had to determine whether the ban was in violation of the right to freedom of religion, by preventing persons of the Jewish and Muslim faith, on the one hand, from slaughtering animals in accordance with the rules of their religion and, on the other, from obtaining meat from animals slaughtered in accordance with those religious rules. When assessing the scope of the right to freedom of religion, the Court considers to be part of the relevant legal framework: Article 19 of the Belgian Constitution, in conjunction with Article 9 European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 18 and 27 International Covenant on Civil and Policital Rights, Article 18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Articles 10 and 22 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court refers to the earlier ruling of the EU Court of Justice, which states that Member States can impose a stunning method to promote animal welfare in ritual slaughter. It concluded that the ban does restrict the right of groups to express their religious beliefs, however, finds that it meets a pressing societal need and pursues the legitimate aim of protecting animal welfare and is therefore proportionate. The Court stressed that neither freedom of thought, conscience and religion, nor the separation of Church and State, nor the government's duty of neutrality, result in an obligation for the government to accommodate any ideological precept, religious or otherwise, in its laws.
With regard to the conformity of the ban with EU Regulation 1099/2099, the Court followed the reasoning of the EU Court of Justice. Namely, that Member States may adopt national rules aimed at ensuring more extensive protection of animals at the time of killing than those contained in that regulation. In addition, it emphasized that the ban on slaughter without stunning is provided by law, and is limited to one specific aspect of ritual slaughter. Ritual slaughter is not prohibited as such. Therefore the Court concluded the ban was not in violation of Art. 26(2)(c) of the Regulation, read in the light of Article 13 TFEU and Article 10(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
I.e. By intermediary judgment No 53/2019 of 4 April 2019, (…), the Court referred the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling:
(...)
(2) If the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be answered in the affirmative, does Article 26(2), first subparagraph, (c) of the aforementioned regulation, as interpreted in the first question, infringe Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
(3) 3. If the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is to be answered in the affirmative, does the first subparagraph of Article 26(2)(c) of Regulation No 1798/2003, read in conjunction with Article 4(4) thereof, as interpreted in the first question, infringe Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in that, with regard to the killing of animals by special methods required for religious rites, provision is made only for a conditional exemption from the obligation to stun the animal (Article 4, Article 4(4) in conjunction with Article 26(2)), whereas in the case of the killing of animals during hunting, fishing and sporting and cultural events, for the reasons set out in the recitals to the regulation, provisions have been laid down which exclude those activities from the scope of the regulation or exempt them from the requirement to be stunned on slaughter (second subparagraph of Article 1(1) and Article 1(3))?
B.8.3. It appears from recital 18 of the regulation that the exception in question is motivated by the intention to respect the freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
B.8.4. Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that : Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states: (...)
B.12.1. It follows from that judgment that point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, read in the light of Article 13 TFEU and Article 10(1) of the Charter, does not preclude legislation of a Member State which, in the case of ritual slaughter, provides for a method of anaesthesia that is reversible and does not lead to the death of the animal.
B.15.5. In so far as the legal grounds are derived from the infringement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in its judgment of 17 December 2020 in the case of Centraal Israelitisch Consistorie van België and Others (C-336/19) that Article 10(1) of the Charter does not preclude legislation of a Member State which, in the case of ritual slaughter, imposes a method of anaesthesia 'which is reversible and cannot lead to the death of the animal' (see supra, B.11).
B.22.5. The Court of Justice also ruled that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, like the European Convention on Human Rights, is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of the conditions under which life is lived and the conceptions which prevail in democratic states today, so that account must be taken of the evolution of the values and attitudes in the Member States, both social and legislative. The Court considers that animal welfare, a value to which contemporary democratic societies have been attaching increasing importance for a number of years, may, in the light of social developments, be taken into account to a greater extent in the context of ritual slaughter, thereby helping to justify the proportionality of legislation such as that contained in the contested decree (...).
B.48.1. It follows from the judgment cited that point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 is valid in the light of the principles of equality, non-discrimination and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity guaranteed by Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Charter, respectively, in so far as that regulation does not contain any similar provision on compulsory stunning for the killing of animals during hunting and fishing, or during sporting or cultural events.
B.48.2. It follows that the legal ground in Cases Nos 6820 and 6821 is not substantiated.
I. e. Bij tussenarrest nr. 53/2019 van 4 april 2019, (…), heeft het Hof de volgende prejudiciële vragen gesteld aan het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie :
(2) Schendt, indien de eerste prejudiciële vraag bevestigend dient te worden beantwoord, artikel 26, lid 2, eerste alinea, c), van de voormelde verordening, in de in de eerste vraag vermelde interpretatie, artikel 10, lid 1, van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie ?
(3) 3. Schendt, indien de eerste prejudiciële vraag bevestigend dient te worden beantwoord, artikel 26, lid 2, eerste alinea, c), in samenhang gelezen met artikel 4, lid 4, van de voormelde verordening, in de in de eerste vraag vermelde interpretatie, de artikelen 20, 21 en 22 van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, doordat voor het doden van dieren volgens speciale methodes die vereist zijn voor religieuze riten slechts is voorzien in een voorwaardelijke uitzondering op de verplichting het dier te verdoven (artikel 4, lid 4, juncto artikel 26, lid 2), terwijl voor het doden van dieren tijdens de jacht, de visserij en tijdens sportieve en culturele evenementen, om de redenen vermeld in de overwegingen van de verordening, is voorzien in bepalingen naar luid waarvan die activiteiten niet onder het toepassingsgebied van de verordening vallen, dan wel niet onder de verplichting het dier te verdoven bij het doden ervan (artikel 1, lid 1, tweede alinea, en lid 3) ?
B.8.3. Uit overweging 18 van de verordening blijkt dat de desbetreffende uitzondering is ingegeven door de bedoeling de vrijheid van godsdienst, gewaarborgd bij artikel 10 van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, te eerbiedigen.
B.8.4. Artikel 10, lid 1, van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie bepaalt : (…) Artikel 52 van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie bepaalt: (…)
B.12.1. Uit dat arrest blijkt dat artikel 26, lid 2, eerste alinea, c), van de verordening (EG) nr. 1099/2009, gelezen in het licht van artikel 13 van het VWEU en van artikel 10, lid 1, van het Handvest, zich niet verzet tegen een regeling van een lidstaat die voor rituele slachtingen in een verdovingsmethode voorziet die omkeerbaar is en niet tot de dood van het dier kan leiden.
B.15.5. In zoverre de middelen zijn afgeleid uit de schending van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, heeft de grote kamer van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie bij zijn arrest van 17 december 2020 in zake Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België e.a. (C-336/19) geoordeeld dat artikel 10, lid 1, van het Handvest zich niet verzet tegen een regeling van een lidstaat die voor rituele slachtingen een verdovingsmethode « oplegt » die omkeerbaar is en niet tot de dood van het dier kan leiden (zie supra, B.11).
B.22.5. Het Hof van Justitie oordeelde ook dat het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, net als het Europees Verdrag voor de rechten van de mens, een levend instrument is dat moet worden geïnterpreteerd in het licht van de huidige levensomstandigheden en de opvattingen die vandaag de dag in democratische staten heersen, zodat er rekening moet worden gehouden met de ontwikkeling van de waarden en opvattingen in de lidstaten, zowel op maatschappelijk als op normatief gebied. Volgens het Hof kan het dierenwelzijn, een waarde waaraan de hedendaagse democratische samenlevingen sinds enkele jaren steeds meer belang hechten, in het licht van de maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen in grotere mate in aanmerking worden genomen in het kader van het ritueel slachten en aldus mede rechtvaardigen dat een regeling als in het bestreden decreet evenredig is (…).
B.48.1. Uit het vermelde arrest blijkt dat artikel 26, lid 2, eerste alinea, c), van verordening (EG) nr. 1099/2009 geldig is in het licht van de beginselen van gelijkheid, non-discriminatie en verscheidenheid van cultuur, godsdienst en taal, zoals die respectievelijk worden gewaarborgd door de artikelen 20, 21 en 22 van het Handvest, in zoverre die verordening geen soortgelijke bepaling bevat over de verplichte bedwelming voor het doden van dieren tijdens de jacht en de visserij, of tijdens sportieve of culturele evenementen.
B.48.2. Hieruit volgt dat het eerste middel in de zaken nrs. 6820 en 6821 in die mate niet gegrond is.
