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CJEU - C 212/13 / Judgment

František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
COURT (Fourth Chamber)
Decision date
  • CJEU - C 212/13 / Judgment
    Key facts of the case:
    (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 95/46/EC — Protection of individuals — Processing of personal data — Concept of ‘in the course of a purely personal or household activity’)
    Results (sanctions) and key consequences of the case:
    36. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
    On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
    The second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter


    28. In that connection, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the protection of the fundamental right to private life guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) requires that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (see IPI, C‑473/12, EU:C:2013:715, paragraph 39, and Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 52).

    29. Since the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter (see Google Spain and Google, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 68), the exception provided for in the second indent of Article 3(2) of that directive must be narrowly construed.