Corporate responsibilities at the nexus of human rights - climate and the environment
TABLE OF CONTENT
- Foreword
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Key findings
- Legal developments supporting an integrated approach to the human rights-environment-climate nexus
- Corporate environmental and climate impacts on human rights
- Corporate human rights and environmental responsibilities under EU law
- Persistent fragmentation in corporate practice
- Human rights dimensions of the just green transition
- Accountability at the human rights-environment-climate nexus
- Introduction
- 1. Environment and human rights
- 2. Climate and human rights
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3. Human rights and the environment in corporate due diligence frameworks
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3.1. Key interactions
- 3.1.1. Integrated human rights and environmental due diligence
- 3.1.2. Environment and climate-related human rights harms
- 3.1.3. Climate vulnerability and environmental degradation as risk factors
- 3.1.4. The environmental dimension of heightened due diligence
- 3.1.5. Human-rights-compliant green transition of companies
- 3.2. Implementing integrated human rights and environmental due diligence – insights from corporate practice
- 3.3. Conclusions
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3.1. Key interactions
- 4. Addressing adverse human rights impacts in businesses’ climate transition
- 5. Human rights, environment and climate considerations in selected EU sustainability legislation
- 6. Accountability and remedy at the human rights-environment-climate nexus
- Conclusion
- Annex 1: Methodology
- Abbreviations
- Country codes
- About this publication
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Environmental protection also encompasses climate change, which is increasingly recognised as a human rights issue under international, European and national law. While states remain the primary duty-bearers for climate mitigation and adaptation under international law, legal developments highlight the evolving role of businesses in the climate transition, with growing implications for corporate responsibilities and HREDD.
As parties to international human rights, environmental and climate treaties, States are subject to concurrent and mutually reinforcing obligations in these fields. Climate obligations under instruments such as the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement – which expressly refers to human rights – are implemented in part through the regulation of business conduct. These developments also have implications for businesses, whose impacts on the climate may result in human rights harms.
The link between climate change, environment and human rights protection has been recognised by human rights mechanisms and confirmed by international tribunals. The ICJ in its advisory opinion on obligations of states in respect of climate change opined that the obligations of states with respect to climate change included obligations under climate change treaties, customary international law relating to climate change and international human rights law, which are mutually legally relevant and reinforcing. The UN General Assembly subsequently called on states to comply with their obligations through ‘measures to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment’ [25]
UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 May 2026 – Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of states in respect of climate change, Resolution A/RES/80/263, 29 May 2026, para. 2(c).
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The case-law of international tribunals on climate change, human rights and environmental protection – albeit different in scope and in extent to which they elaborate the standards of corporate conduct – also clarifies the contours of state obligations and corporate responsibility in the climate crisis [26]
At the time of completing this manuscript (July 2026), advisory proceedings were also pending before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR): AfCHPR, Request by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of states with respect to the climate crisis, 2 May 2025.
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The ICJ in its advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 underlined that climate change is an ‘urgent and existential’ threat [27]
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on obligations of states in respect of climate change, para. 73.
. It confirmed that states must exercise due diligence to prevent significant harm to the climate system and employ all means at their disposal to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause such harm, including via the regulation of private actors. The court affirmed that a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is a precondition for the enjoyment of many human rights (para. 393).
States must … take their obligations under international human rights law into account when implementing theirobligations under the climate change treaties and other relevant environmental treaties and under customary international law, just as they must take their obligations under the climate change treaties and other relevant environmental treaties and under customary international law into account when implementing their human rights obligations.
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on the obligations of states in relation to climate change, para. 404.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s advisory opinion of 21 May 2024 held that states have binding legal obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to prevent marine pollution caused by GHG emissions and protect marine ecosystems from climate impacts [28]
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Advisory opinion on climate change, Case No 31, 21 May 2024.
. The EU and all Member States are parties to the convention.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has, in its 2017 advisory opinion (AO 23/17), acknowledged the autonomous right to a healthy environment under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and, in its 2025 opinion (AO-32/25), has recognised that this includes the right to a stable and safe climate system [29]
IACtHR, Advisory opinion AO-32/25 of 29 May 2025 on climate emergency and human rights, paras 298–304.
(see Legal corner: Explainer: how is the IACtHR opinion relevant to EU law and businesses operating in the EUand Section 2.1.2.).
Further, the 2024 ECtHR judgment in the KlimaSeniorinnen case found violations of the right to private and family life (Article 8 of the ECHR) and of the right to a fair trial (Article 6(1) of the ECHR) and affirmed that states must effectively shield people from grave climate-related threats to life and well-being [30]
ECtHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland [GC], No 53600/20, 9 April 2024.
. It has also addressed questions of the admissibility of climate change claims, including victim status and territorial jurisdiction in Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and Carême v France [31]
ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others, No 39371/20, 9 April 2024, paras 208 and 229–230; ECtHR, Carême v France [GC], No 7189/21, 9 April 2024.
. In Greenpeace Nordic and Others v Norway [32]
ECtHR, Greenpeace Nordic and Others v Norway, No 34068/21, 28 October 2025.
, the ECtHR found no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR but clarified that states must assess whether new fossil fuel extraction is compatible with their climate obligations under the ECHR and ensure that environmental impact assessments cover combustion emissions, including from exported fuels [33]
See more in FRA and ECtHR, ‘Climate change – ECtHR and CJEU case-law’, No 8069338, Vienna, 2025.
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Under international human rights law, states have certain extraterritorial obligations to protect human rights outside their territory [34]
Some of the treaties include an explicit jurisdiction clause (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 2(1), CPC Art. 2(1)). The scope of jurisdiction and responsibility is further developed in the jurisprudence of relevant human rights bodies. See for example Teshome, R. G., ‘Extraterritorial human rights obligations of states for transboundary climate harm: New developments and unanswered questions’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2026, pp 229–252.
. Moreover, the no-harm principle under international environmental law and customary international law requires states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause extraterritorial environmental harm [35] ICJ, § 272-279. See also Sands, P., Peel, J., Fabra, A. and MacKenzie, R., Principles of International Environmental Law, 4th edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 201–209.
. In the above-mentioned climate opinions, the international tribunals confirmed that this duty encompasses climate harms – including those related to actions of private actors under the jurisdiction or control of that state. The ICJ referred to the extraterritorial obligations of states in the context of international human rights law but did not expand on how these apply in the context of climate harm (paras 394–402) [36]
Jamali, A. H., ‘The ICJ’s cautious approach to extraterritorial human rights obligations in the climate context’, Climate Rights and Remedies website, 7 August 2025, accessed 5 June 2026; Teshome, R. G., ‘Extraterritorial human rights obligations of states for transboundary climate harm: New developments and unanswered questions’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2026, pp 229–252.
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Emerging international case-law acknowledges the role and responsibility of businesses in addressing climate change and imposes an obligation on states to regulate corporate conduct in order to prevent human rights, environmental and climate harms.
In clarifying their obligations under international law, and affirming the mutual relevance of IHRL and international climate law, the ICJ affirmed that states are bound to prevent significant harm to the climate system. States should employ all means at their disposal to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause such harm – including by regulating the activities of private actors [37]
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on obligations of states in respect of climate change, para. 457 and 428.
. The ICJ also stated that a breach of ‘any of the obligations’ set out in its advisory opinion could amount to an internationally wrongful act, triggering the international responsibility of the state in question [38]
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on obligations of states in respect of climate change, paras 207 and 457.
. This may apply if a state fails to ‘take appropriate action to protect the climate system from GHG emissions — including through fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies’ [39]
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on obligations of states in respect of climate change, para. 427.
. With respect to private conduct, this means that a state may incur responsibility if it fails to exercise due diligence in regulating private activities, including by failing to adopt the necessary legislative or regulatory measures to curb GHG emissions from the operations of companies or other private actors under its jurisdiction or control [40]
International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on obligations of states in respect of climate change, para. 428.
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Business enterprises are called on to play an essential role in addressing the climate emergency.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, advisory opinion of 29 May 2025 on climate emergency and human rights, para. 345.
Corporate responsibilities at the human rights–climate nexus are even clearer in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, which has stated unequivocally that companies have an essential role to play in addressing the climate emergency, as states are obligated to regulate business conduct in this respect [41]
IACtHR, Advisory opinion OC‑32/25 of 29 May 2025 on climate emergency and human rights, paras 345, 350 and 353.
. It indicated that major emitters should be subject to stricter obligations, reflecting their greater contribution to climate change [42]
IACtHR, Advisory opinion OC‑32/25 of 29 May 2025 on climate emergency and human rights, para. 350.
. The court confirmed companies also ‘have obligations and responsibilities with regard to climate change and [its] impacts … on human rights’ [43]
IACtHR, Advisory opinion OC‑32/25 of 29 May 2025 on climate emergency and human rights, para. 346, citing UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Information note on climate change and the guiding principles on business and human rights’, New York, 2023, p. 5.
. It clarified that states should require companies to address climate change and related human rights impacts, enact due diligence legislation that covers their value chains and require emissions disclosure and reduction measures. States should also adopt safeguards against greenwashing and corporate interference in climate policymaking and protect human rights defenders [44]
IACtHR, Advisory opinion OC‑32/25 of 29 May 2025 on climate emergency and human rights, para. 347, and see also paras 348 and 349.
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The EU and all Member States are parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and have committed to climate neutrality in the EU by 2050. The European Green Deal [45]
European Commission, European Green Deal, accessed 2 October 2026.
sets the EU’s overarching pathway to climate neutrality by 2050, supported by European Climate Law [46]
Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj).
with its binding emission reduction targets of at least 55 % by 2030 and 90 % by 2040, and the objective of achieving a just transition. Complementary measures such as Effort Sharing Regulation [47]
Regulation (EU) 2023/857 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement, and Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (OJ L 111, 26.4.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/857/oj).
and Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry Regulation [48]
Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/841/oj).
, together with market-based instruments like the EU emission trading system and its extension, the emissions trading system 2, aim to reduce emissions across sectors. [49]
European Commission, EU emission trading system, accessed 2 October 2026.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Regulation [50]
Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 52, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/956/oj).
further aims to prevent emission leakage outside the EU [51]
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is designed to ‘prevent “carbon leakage” – the shift of emissions-intensive production out of the EU to jurisdictions with more lenient policies’. See Bahí, A., Fuchs, M. and Reverdy, C., ‘Carbon pricing beyond borders: Assessing climate policy spillovers from the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism’, Bruegel Working Papers, No 05/2026, Bruegel, Brussels, 2026.
. Given the continued reliance on fossil fuels (which made up 67.4 % of the EU energy mix in 2023 [52]
Eurostat, Energy statistics - an overview, Gross available energy by fuel, 2023, Eurostat (nrg_bal_c), accessed 5 October 2026.
, the transition requires phasing out both the supply of and demand for fossil fuels, with companies playing a key role.
At the national level, 19 Member States and 2 observer countries have adopted binding climate laws, and in others legislative initiatives are pending (Austria, Estonia) (see Table 2). Only few of these laws explicitly acknowledge the obligation to protect the climate as being directly linked to the obligation to protect human rights (France, Greece, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia), but fundamental rights obligations to protect the climate are further clarified by national courts (see the paragraphs that follow).
Table 2 – Binding climate laws in the Member States and FRA observer countries
|
Country |
Climate law |
Country |
Climate law |
|
AL |
Law on climate change 155/2020 |
IE |
|
|
AT |
No (draft Climate Act) [53] |
IT |
No |
|
BE |
No federal law [54] |
LT |
|
|
BG |
LU |
||
|
CY |
No |
LV |
|
|
CZ |
No |
MK |
No |
|
DE |
MT |
||
|
DK |
NL |
||
|
EE |
No (draft Climate Resilient Economy Act) [55] |
PL |
No |
|
EL |
National Climate Law 4936/2022 |
PT |
|
|
ES |
RO |
No |
|
|
FI |
Climate Act 423/2022 |
RS |
|
|
FR |
Climate and Resilience Law 2021-1104 |
SE |
|
|
HR |
SI |
||
|
HU |
SK |
No |
Source: FRA (2026), based on Franet data.
Recent national case-law against Member States also confirms the growing legal recognition of climate change as a human rights issue and clarifies the obligations and accountability of both states and business actors when it comes to climate and environmental harms. Landmark domestic decisions have advanced the interpretation of states’ obligations under constitutional and international human rights law. In Urgenda, the Dutch Supreme Court found that the Dutch government’s failure to sufficiently reduce emissions violated its duty of care under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR [56]
Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands, 20 December 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007.
. In Neubauer, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court held that the climate law in force inadequately protected future generations’ rights under the Basic Law (Germany’s constitution) [57]
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Neubauer et al. v Germany, Cases 1 BvR 2656/18, 1 BvR 78/20, 1 BvR 96/20 and 1 BvR 288/20, Order of 24 March 2021.
. In Belgium, the Klimaatzaak ruling found that the Belgian government was in breach of Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR due to its insufficient climate action [58]
Brussels Court of Appeal (Cour d’appel de Bruxelles), VZW Klimaatzaak v Kingdom of Belgium and Others, 30 November 2023.
. In the Bonaire climate case, the District Court of The Hague found that the inadequate and discriminatory climate protection of Bonaire violated Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No 12, confirming that both climate mitigation and adaptation obligations derive from human rights law [59]
District Court of The Hague (Rechtbank Den Haag), Greenpeace Netherlands and eight citizens of Bonaire vThe Netherlands, Case No C/09/659832/HA ZA 24-53, 28 January 2026 (first instance), ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347.
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In several Member States’ jurisdictions, it has been established that companies have legal obligations to address climate change and are accountable for their climate impacts (see Legal corner: Case-law: access to domestic civil courts for human rights, environmental and climate-related harm resulting from corporate activities). Importantly, emerging national case-law places the role of companies in the climate transition in the context of their corporate responsibility to respect human rights and their HREDD obligations, and points to climate transition plans as relevant measures in fulfilling these obligations.
Climate risks, as they entail a serious, present and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights according to the common viewpoint of scientists and international courts, must be taken into account by companies in their vigilance plans, as long as their identification is part of preventing serious human rights violations …
Paris Judicial Court, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v TotalEnergies, 25 June 2026, paras 138 and 139 (own translation) [60]
Paris Judicial Court, Notre Affaire à Tous and Others v TotalEnergies, 25 June 2026.
, with references to the ECtHR’s KlimaSeniorinnen case decision and the ICJ’s advisory opinion.
Climate transition plans are important tools that enable companies to show how their activities align with EU climate objectives, while reducing the human rights and environmental risks related to their climate impacts [61]
Marcu, A., Mehling, M. and Ruiz, A., Evaluation of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition, Brussels, 2024, p. 22.
. European Commission sectoral decarbonisation pathways provide guidance for preparing credible plans aligned with the European Climate Law [62]
European Commission: Directorate-General for Climate Action, ICF and Climact, European Climate Law-aligned Transition Pathways – Guidance document, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2025.
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Climate transition planning is provided for in several EU sustainability and financial regulatory frameworks through different types of obligations. The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive requires the disclosure of material climate mitigation plans and related environmental and just transition impacts (European Sustainability Reporting Standards E1-1, E3-E4, S1-S4) [63]
The Commission Delegated Regulation of 3 July 2026 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2772 as regards the simplification of certain sustainability reporting standards (OJ L, 2026/1563, 21.9.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2026/1563/oj) (not yet in force as of 2 October 2026) preserves these requirements. See also the EU Platform on Sustainable Finance, Building Trust in Transition: Core elements for assessing corporate transition plans, European Commission, Brussels, 2025; and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), Managing climate risks and impacts through due diligence for responsible business conduct – A tool for institutional investors, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2023.
. The Emissions Trading System Directive makes the allocation of free allowances for high-emitting installations conditional on the adoption of a climate neutrality plan, and the Industrial Emissions Directive 2.0 requires operators of installations in scope to adopt transformation plan [64]
Articles 10(a) and 10(b) of Directive (EU) 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87/oj); and Article 27(d) of Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste (OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj).
. Sustainable finance and prudential frameworks enshrine related obligations [65]
See, for example, European Central Bank, Segoin, D., Menegat, M. and O'Connell, M., ‘Human rights, the climate emergency, and the financial system: Reflections on the relevance of the KlimaSeniorinnen ruling for Union institutions and the European financial sector’, European Central Bank Legal Working Paper Series, No 23, 2025, Frankfurt, p. 45; and EU Platform on Sustainable Finance, Building Trust in Transition: Core elements for assessing corporate transition plans, European Commission, Brussels, 2025, pp. 11–18.
. While the CSDDD does not contain a stand-alone climate transition plan obligation [66]
The obligation to adopt a climate transition plan was enshrined in the version of the CSDDD originally adopted and subsequently removed by the ‘Omnibus I’ amendment: Directive (EU) 2026/470 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting requirements and certain corporate sustainability due diligence requirements (OJ L, 2026/470, 26.2.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/470/oj).
, climate-related risks and impacts remain relevant to HREDD (see Box: Human rights in climate transition planning). Together, these frameworks reinforce the role of transition planning as a tool for managing climate-related risks and supporting alignment with the EU’s climate neutrality objectives [67]
See also, for example, World Benchmarking Alliance, Advancing corporate transition planning to enable a fossil free future, Amsterdam, 2026.
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Climate change is directly relevant to human rights obligations under international and EU law. States have concurrent and mutually reinforcing obligations to prevent climate harm and protect individuals from its adverse impacts. The obligations to protect the climate stemming from IHRL and other international law inform both the implementation of existing legislation and new legislative initiatives, not least because states are required to control private actors whose emissions undermine human rights. The foregoing legal developments shape expectations for corporate responsibility and accountability in the EU and are increasingly codified into mandatory due diligence frameworks. Emerging case-law and international standards further clarify that companies are expected to prevent, mitigate and address their contributions to climate change as part of their responsibility to respect human rights.