Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Article 51 - Field of application
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Decision 2006/928/EC – Mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption – Article 2 TEU – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Rule of law – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 47 – Independence of judges – National legislation altering the scheme for the promotion of judges.
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
1. Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption constitutes an act of an institution of the Union which is amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU. As regards its legal nature, content and temporal effects, that decision falls within the scope of the Treaty between the Member States of the European Union and the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union. The benchmarks set out in the annex to that decision are intended to ensure that Romania complies with the value of the rule of law, set out in Article 2 TEU, and are binding on that Member State, in the sense that it is required to take the appropriate measures for the purpose of meeting those benchmarks, taking due account, under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, of the reports drawn up by the European Commission on the basis of that decision, and in particular the recommendations made in those reports.
2. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a piece of national legislation relating to the scheme for the promotion of judges is required to ensure compliance with the principle of the independence of judges.
3. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as not precluding a piece of national legislation pursuant to which the scheme for the promotion of judges to a higher court is based on an assessment, carried out by a board composed of (i) the president of that higher court and (ii) members of that court, of the work and conduct of the persons concerned, provided that the substantive conditions and procedural rules governing the adoption of decisions relating to effective promotion are such that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before them, once they have been promoted.
4. Decision 2006/928 must be interpreted as not precluding a piece of national legislation altering the scheme for the promotion of judges when, in the reports drawn up under that decision, the European Commission has not made any recommendation relating to such an alteration.
52) In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court is hearing a dispute relating to the lawfulness of a piece of national legislation concerning the scheme for the promotion of judges. It is precisely because that court is experiencing doubts as to the compatibility of that scheme with (i) the requirement for independence stemming from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and from Article 47 of the Charter and (ii) Decision 2006/928 that it has been prompted to question the Court of Justice as to the interpretation of those provisions of EU law. Therefore, the third and fourth questions are related to the actual facts of the main action. As for the arguments put forward by the SCM to contest the admissibility of those questions, they concern the substantive response to be given thereto.
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57) By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, is to be interpreted as meaning that a piece of national legislation relating to the scheme for the promotion of judges is required to ensure compliance with the principle of the independence of judges.
59) The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law. In that regard, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring for individuals compliance with their right to effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law. The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and is now reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter.
60) It follows that, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, every Member State must ensure that the bodies which are called upon, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to rule on questions related to the application or interpretation of EU law, and which thus come within its judicial system in the fields covered by EU law, meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, it being clarified that that provision refers to the ‘fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of the circumstances in which the Member States are implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.
61) To guarantee that such a court or tribunal is in a position to ensure the effective judicial protection thus required under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, maintaining its independence and impartiality is essential, as is confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy.
67) Consequently, the answer to the second question is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a piece of national legislation relating to the scheme for the promotion of judges is required to ensure compliance with the principle of the independence of judges.
68) By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, is to be interpreted as precluding a piece of national legislation pursuant to which the scheme for the promotion of judges to a higher court is based on an assessment, carried out by a board composed of (i) the president of that higher court and (ii) members of that court, of the work and conduct of the persons concerned.
89) Consequently, the answer to the third question is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding a piece of national legislation pursuant to which the scheme for the promotion of judges to a higher court is based on an assessment, carried out by a board composed of (i) the president of that higher court and (ii) members of that court, of the work and conduct of the persons concerned, provided that the substantive conditions and procedural rules governing the adoption of decisions relating to effective promotion are such that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests before them, once they have been promoted.
