CJEU C-196/23 / Judgement

CL, GO, GN, VO, TI, HZ, DN, DL v DB, acting in the capacity of sole successor to FC, Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa)
Policy area
Employment and social policy
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Second Chamber)
Decision date
11/07/2024
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2024:596
  • CJEU C-196/23 / Judgement

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Social policy – Directive 98/59/EC – Collective redha! undancies – Article 1(1)(a) and Article 2– Obligation to inform and consult workers’ representatives – Scope – Termination of employment contracts on the ground of the employer’s retirement – Articles 27 and 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

    Outcome of the case: 

    On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:

    1.      Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, read together,

    must be interpreted as precluding a national law pursuant to which the termination of the employment contracts of a number of workers greater than that provided for in that Article 1(1), as a result of the retirement of the employer, is not classified as a ‘collective redundancy’ and does not give rise to the obligation to inform and consult the workers’ representatives provided for in that Article 2.

    2.      EU law must be interpreted as not requiring a national court, hearing proceedings between individuals, to disapply a national law, such as that referred to in point 1 of the present operative part, in the event that it is contrary to the provisions of Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    48. Finally, it is necessary to examine the respective scopes of Article 27 and Article 30 of the Charter in order to determine, in accordance with the referring court’s request in its order for reference, whether either or both of those provisions must be interpreted as meaning that they may be invoked, either on their own or together with Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59, in a dispute between individuals, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, so as to require a national court to set aside a national law that is held to be contrary to those provisions of that directive. 

    49. As regards, first, Article 27 of the Charter, entitled ‘Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking’, which provides that workers must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in the cases and under the conditions provided for by EU law and national laws and practices, it suffices, in the present case, to recall that the Court has held that it is clear from the wording of that provision that, for that article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law (judgments of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 6 November 2018, Bauer and Willmeroth, C‑569/16 and C‑570/16, EU:C:2018:871, paragraph 84). 

    50. In that regard, rules such as those contained in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59, addressed to the Member States and defining the situations in which a procedure of information and consultation of workers’ representatives must take place in the event of collective redundancies of those workers, as well as the substantive and procedural conditions that must be satisfied by that information and consultation, cannot be inferred, as directly applicable rules of law, from the wording of Article 27 of the Charter (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paragraph 46). 

    51. Accordingly, Article 27 of the Charter cannot, as such, be invoked in a dispute between individuals, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in order to conclude that the national provisions which are not in conformity with Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59 should not be applied (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paragraph 48). 

    52. That finding cannot be called into question by considering Article 27 of the Charter in conjunction with Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59, given that, since that article by itself does not suffice to confer on individuals a right which they may invoke as such, it could not be otherwise if it is considered in conjunction with those provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paragraph 49). 

    53. As regards, secondly, Article 30 of the Charter, which provides that every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, it must be held that the reasons set out in paragraphs 49 to 52 of the present judgment must, mutatis mutandis, lead to a conclusion analogous to that resulting from those paragraphs concerning Article 27 of the Charter. 

    54. In the same way as was recalled in paragraph 49 in respect of Article 27, it is clear from the wording of Article 30 of the Charter that, in order for that provision to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law. 

    55. Accordingly, irrespective of whether the failure to comply with the rules on information and consultation of workers’ representatives in the event of collective redundancies, such as the rules provided for in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59, is capable of falling within the material scope of Article 30 of the Charter and the concept of ‘unjustified dismissal’ within the meaning of that provision, it suffices to find that such rules, which are addressed to the Member States and define the situations in which a procedure of information and consultation of workers’ representatives must take place in the event of collective redundancies of those workers, as well as the substantive and procedural conditions that must be satisfied by that information and consultation, cannot be inferred, as directly applicable rules of law, from the wording of Article 30 of the Charter. 

    56. Therefore, and analogously with the reasoning set out in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the present judgment in respect of Article 27 of the Charter, Article 30 thereof cannot be invoked, either by itself or in conjunction with Article 1(1) and Article 2 of Directive 98/59, in a dispute between individuals, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in order to conclude that the national provisions which are not in conformity with Directive 98/59 should not be applied.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)