Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Recovery and resolution of credit institutions – Directive 2014/59/EU – Decision to take a crisis management measure in respect of a credit institution – Article 85(3) – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to an effective remedy of all persons affected by that decision – Compliance with a reasonable time limit – Requirement of an expeditious judicial review – Provision of national law requiring that all the actions be joined – Article 3(3) – Combining of functions by the resolution authority – Guarantee of operational independence
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
62. By its second question, which it is appropriate to examine first, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, must be interpreted as precluding the application of a national procedural rule under which a court with jurisdiction to hear actions against the decision of the national resolution authority to take a crisis management measure must join all the actions brought before it against that decision, where the application of that rule could make it excessively difficult, if not impossible, to give judgment within a reasonable time, as the result of the large number of actions against that decision.
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67. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU obliges Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection for individual parties in the fields covered by EU law (judgment of 21 December 2021, Randstad Italia, C‑497/20, EU:C:2021:1037, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). That requirement for effective legal protection must be understood, in particular, within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C‑791/19, EU:C:2021:596, paragraph 57). Moreover, recitals 88 and 130 of Directive 2014/59 make clear that the directive respects the rights, freedoms and principles recognised by the Charter, in particular the right to an effective remedy, and that the parties concerned are entitled, among other matters, to an effective remedy against the measures affecting them.
68. In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, the right to an effective remedy includes the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of the period for delivering judgment must be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties. The list of relevant criteria is not exhaustive (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 212, and of 16 July 2009, Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland v Commission, C‑385/07 P, EU:C:2009:456, paragraphs 181 and 182 and the case-law cited).
69. As regards the right to bring proceedings against decisions to take crisis management measures made by the national resolution authorities, Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59 embodies the right of any person to a hearing within a reasonable time, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, by requiring that the judicial review available to any person affected by a decision to take such a measure must be ‘expeditious’.
72. In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59 was implemented, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, in the applicable national legislation by the obligation placed on the various persons involved to comply with the short time limits laid down in Article 104 of the BGF Law, that is to say, time limits restricted, in principle, to 7 days for notifying the BGF of an action, to 14 days for the BGF to lodge that action accompanied by the BGF’s defence, to 30 days for the decision of the administrative court to be issued and to 2 months for a ruling to be made on any appeal on a point of law. The Court therefore considers that the present question concerns the interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter.
73. The referring court nevertheless states that a national procedural provision of general application, namely Article 111(1) of the Law on procedure before the administrative courts, seems to be such as to prevent the court seised of the matter from respecting the right, of an individual, to a hearing within a reasonable time, since that provision requires cases relating to actions brought against the same decision to be joined for the purposes of being heard and ruled on together. The referring court explains that the number of actions brought against the decision at issue in the main proceedings is equivalent to the total number of actions usually brought before it in two years, and that to hear them together would delay the delivery of a judgment beyond what constitutes a reasonable time.
74. Notwithstanding the fact that as a general rule the joinder of connected cases can contribute to the proper administration of justice, the same is not so of actions brought against decisions to take a crisis management measure, which are liable to affect a considerable number of persons and, therefore, to give rise to numerous actions. In that situation, such joinder can prevent any judicial review from taking place for a number of years, thereby infringing the right to a hearing within a reasonable time enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
77. In the present case, the provisions of Article 47 of the Charter must be considered to have direct effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2021, Braathens Regional Aviation, C‑30/19, EU:C:2021:269, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).
78. Accordingly, the referring court must, inter alia, if necessary, disapply the provisions of national procedural law that would prevent it from disjoining the actions at issue in the main proceedings, where those provisions cannot be interpreted in a manner which respects the right to a hearing within a reasonable time enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
79. Furthermore, at the hearing before the Court, the Polish Government stated that, in relation to cases such as those at issue in the main proceedings, Polish law allows those cases to be disjoined where the joinder is invalid. However, according to that government, in the event of disjoinder, those cases would be heard simultaneously by different judges, which would involve a risk of irreconcilable judgments, since there is no detailed procedural rule able both to avert that risk and to ensure respect for the right of any person to a hearing within a reasonable time enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
80. In that regard, it should be noted that the requirement for effective legal protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter applies, inter alia, to the definition of detailed procedural rules relating to actions based on the rights that individuals derive from EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 May 2022, Ibercaja Banco, C‑600/19, EU:C:2022:394, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
81. In the absence of EU legislation in that area, the detailed rules implementing the right to an effective remedy of persons affected by the decision of a national authority to take a crisis management measure are a matter for the national legal order of the Member States, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, but must be consistent with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 October 2018, XC and Others, C‑234/17, EU:C:2018:853, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
82 In order to satisfy the requirements of the principle of effective legal protection enshrined in Article 47(1) of the Charter, the national court must, in accordance with Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59, take the necessary procedural and organisational measures, weighing up the various interests involved and assessing the effect of those measures on any person that has validly brought an action against the decision of the national resolution authority. Accordingly, in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the subsequent judicial decision as regards the existence of the rights invoked on the basis of EU law, the national court must, in the event of disjoinder, be able to take the necessary measures making it possible both to ensure respect for the right of any person to a hearing within a reasonable time, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, and to prevent the risk of irreconcilable judgments delivered by different judges.
83. In the present case, it is for the referring court to verify whether the hearing, initially, of one or more cases relating to one or more actions against a decision of the resolution authority such as the decision at issue in the main proceedings, while the other cases relating to the same decision are suspended, is necessary in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the subsequent judicial decision on the existence of the rights invoked on the basis of EU law.
84. Having regard to all the foregoing, the answer to the second question is that Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding the application of a national procedural rule under which a court with jurisdiction to hear actions against the decision of the national resolution authority to take a crisis management measure must join all the actions brought before it against that decision, where the application of that rule infringes the right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
93. Consequently, it must be found that, by its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a national court has been seised of more than one action against the decision of the national resolution authority to take a crisis management measure, and one of those actions was brought by an organ of the institution under resolution, the substantive hearing of that one action alone permits the inference that the right to an effective remedy has been upheld with regard to any other person which has also brought an action against that decision, provided that the national court, first, carries out a review of legality in which it is not bound by the pleas in law, forms of order sought or the legal basis of the action it is hearing and, second, delivers a judgment that has erga omnes effect, on which any person affected by that decision may rely for the purposes of obtaining compensation for the harm caused to that person by the decision in question.
98. In that regard, it is settled case-law of the Court that although, admittedly, fundamental rights, such as the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, that is nevertheless so only provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not involve, in the light of the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which impairs the very substance of the rights guaranteed (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 September 2013, Texdata Software, C‑418/11, EU:C:2013:588, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).
102. The answer to the first question is therefore that Article 85(3) of Directive 2014/59, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a national court has been seised of more than one action against the decision of the national resolution authority to take a crisis management measure, and one of those actions was brought by an organ of the institution under resolution, the dismissal as unfounded of that one action alone does not permit the inference that respect for the right to an effective remedy has been ensured with regard to any other persons affected by that decision which have also brought actions against it, relying on pleas which have not been taken into account in the judgment given and which, in any event, have not been the subject of an exchange of arguments which enabled those persons to present their case.