CJEU Case C-353/16 / Judgment

MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Policy area
Asylum and migration
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Grand Chamber)
Type
Decision
Decision date
24/04/2018
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2018:276
  • CJEU Case C-353/16 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling — Asylum policy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 4 — Directive 2004/83/EC — Article 2(e) — Eligibility for subsidiary protection — Article 15(b) — Risk of serious harm to the psychological health of the applicant if returned to the country of origin — Person who has been tortured in the country of origin.

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    Articles 2(e) and 15(b) of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a third country national who in the past has been tortured by the authorities of his country of origin and no longer faces a risk of being tortured if returned to that country, but whose physical and psychological health could, if so returned, seriously deteriorate, leading to a serious risk of him committing suicide on account of trauma resulting from the torture he was subjected to, is eligible for subsidiary protection if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate care for the physical and mental after-effects of that torture, that being a matter for the national court to determine.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    36) In that regard, it should be recalled that Article 15(b) of Directive 2004/83 must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is consistent with the rights guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), which enshrines one of the fundamental values of the Union and its Member States and is absolute in that that value is closely linked to respect for human dignity, the subject of Article 1 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 85 to 87; and 16 February 2017, C.K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 59).

    37) Moreover, it should be recalled that, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, in so far as the rights guaranteed by Article 4 thereof correspond to those guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are the same as those laid down by Article 3 of the ECHR.

    ...

    41) Similarly, Article 4 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the removal of a third country national with a particularly serious mental or physical illness constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment, within the meaning of that article, where such removal would result in a real and demonstrable risk of significant and permanent deterioration in the state of health of the person concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 February 2017, C.K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 74). The same conclusion can be drawn as regards the application of Article 19(2) of the Charter, which provides that no one may be removed to a State where there is a serious risk that he would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.

    42) In that regard, the Court has held that, particularly in the case of a serious psychiatric illness, it is not sufficient to consider only the consequences of physically transporting the person concerned from a Member State to a third country; rather, it is necessary to consider all the significant and permanent consequences that might arise from the removal (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 February 2017, C.K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 76). Moreover, given the fundamental importance of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, particular attention must be paid to the specific vulnerabilities of persons whose psychological suffering, which is likely to be exacerbated in the event of their removal, is a consequence of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in their country of origin.

    43) It follows that Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter, as interpreted in the light of Article 3 of the ECHR, preclude a Member State from expelling a third country national where such expulsion would, in essence, result in significant and permanent deterioration of that person’s mental health disorders, particularly where, as in the present case, such deterioration would endanger his life.

    44) Moreover, the Court has previously held that, in such exceptional cases, the removal of a third country national suffering from a serious illness to a country in which appropriate treatment is not available may constitute an infringement of the principle of non-refoulement and, therefore, an infringement of Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, read in the light of Article 19 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 December 2014, Abdida, C‑562/13, EU:C:2014:2453, paragraph 48).

    ...

    58) It follows from the foregoing that Articles 2(e) and 15(b) of Directive 2004/83, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a third country national who in the past has been tortured by the authorities of his country of origin and no longer faces a risk of being tortured if returned to that country, but whose physical and psychological health could, if so returned, seriously deteriorate, leading to a serious risk of him committing suicide on account of trauma resulting from the torture he was subjected to, is eligible for subsidiary protection if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate care for the physical and mental after-effects of that torture, that being a matter for the national court to determine.

    ...

    59) Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    Articles 2(e) and 15(b) of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a third country national who in the past has been tortured by the authorities of his country of origin and no longer faces a risk of being tortured if returned to that country, but whose physical and psychological health could, if so returned, seriously deteriorate, leading to a serious risk of him committing suicide on account of trauma resulting from the torture he was subjected to, is eligible for subsidiary protection if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate care for the physical and mental after-effects of that torture, that being a matter for the national court to determine.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)