Article 37 - Environmental protection
Article 38 - Consumer protection
Article 51 - Field of application
Article 52 - Scope and interpretation
Key facts of the case:
The proposer believed that the Article 72, paragraph 4 of the Waste Management Act (WMA) is not in accordance with Articles 3, 5, Paragraphs 1, 14, 28 and 29, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, given that certain prerequisites for the fair application of that provision have not been created, namely, the provisions in terms of determining responsibility for the actions of third parties, and the obligation to pay a contractual penalty as a consequence of the irresponsible behaviour of the public service user or some other person. The proposer argued that it is not fair that the responsible user pays a contractual penalty for another who is responsible for the violation, and claims that there are numerous situations in which it is impossible to determine the responsibility of an individual user for improperly fulfilling the obligations from the WMA, as it is not prescribed how it will be determined who improperly deposited waste in a specific container. Given that the WMA harmonizes the domestic legislative framework with a number of EU regulations in this area, the Constitutional Court emphasizes that its provisions must be interpreted and applied in the light of the aforementioned EU regulations and the existing practice of the Court of the EU. Considering that the specific issue undeniably falls within the scope of application of EU law, the Court in its assessment took into account and paid due attention to the relevant provisions of the Charter in accordance with its obligation from Article 141c of the Constitution.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Constitutional Court considered the question of the constitutionality of the contested contractual penalty mechanism at two levels - at the first level, the question of the constitutionality of the contractual penalty mechanism per se is raised. At this level, the constitutionality of the application of the contractual penalty was questioned for everyone, i.e. equally for individual owners and co-owners of the property for which the communal service was contracted. On the second level, the question of the constitutionality of the identical application of the contractual penalty mechanism to groups of citizens - unique owners on the one hand and co-owners on the other - who are in a different situation regarding the possibility of controlling the container from which the waste is removed for which they are individually responsible, is raised.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court concluded that the legislative and executive authorities have an obligation to provide a legal framework that will ensure that waste management rests on a relationship of personal responsibility and proportionality. Within the scope of this case, the Constitutional Court concludes that it has not identified reasons that would suggest that the application of the concept of contractual penalty in the context of the method of collecting public municipal waste collection services is inconsistent with the Constitution, provided that the contractual penalty is in line with the principle of proportionality. However, the Constitutional Court indicates that in this case, by prescribing "collective contractual penalty", the legislator completely ignores the "polluter pays" principle, as well as the position from judgment number: C-335/2016. The legislator neglected to determine the conditions under which an individual user of the service can prove that he is not responsible for improper disposal in order to determine the specific responsible debtor, which is particularly important when the principle of personal responsibility is taken into account, and point of view from the judgment of the EU court C-355/16, i.e. that a special compensation can be determined, but taking into account special criteria related to the type of real estate in which the beneficiaries are located. The above leads to obvious uncertainty both about the true purpose of the contested provisions and the manner of their application, thus leading to a constitutionally unacceptable level of legal uncertainty. In the case of a contested legal norm, it is not a matter of it being indeterminate or unclear in itself. However, what makes this legal provision unclear, and at the same time constitutionally unacceptable, is the fact that it evidently does not correspond to its legitimate, publicly declared normative goal and purpose, but by going beyond the framework of its nominal purpose, it leads to illegitimate outcomes. In other words, it leads to a violation of the guarantee from Articles 3, 5 and 16 of the Constitution.
7.1. In this constitutional court proceeding, the Constitutional Court took into account the relevant legal framework of the EU in its assessment of the constitutionality of the contested legal provision. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Official Journal" C 326, October 26, 2012; Croatian translation: OJ C 202, 7 June 2016; hereinafter referred to as the Charter) imposes a positive obligation on Member States regarding environmental protection.
7.2. Article 37 of the Charter reads: “Article 37 Environmental protection High levels of environmental protection and improvement of environmental quality must be integrated into the Union's policies and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development."
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8.2. The Constitutional Court also emphasizes that, based on the above, the issues it considers in this proceeding undoubtedly fall within the scope of the application of EU law, as determined by the decision of the EU Court in the judgment of February 26, 2013, Fransson, C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.: "17 In light of these assertions, it should be recalled that the scope of the Charter concerning the actions of Member States is defined by its Article 51(1), according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed only to the Member States when they are implementing European Union law.
18 This article of the Charter thus confirms the Court's case law on the extent to which the actions of Member States must comply with the requirements arising from the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union.
19 The established case law of the Court essentially states that fundamental rights guaranteed by the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations. In this regard, the Court has already noted that it has no authority to examine the compliance with the Charter of national legislation that falls outside the scope of EU law. On the other hand, if such legislation falls within the scope of EU law, the Court, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance on the interpretation necessary for the national court to determine whether that legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures (see, inter alia, in this regard, Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] I-2925, paragraph 42; Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629, paragraph 15; Case C- 309/96 Annibaldi [2007] ECR I-7493, paragraph 13; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25; Case C-349/07 Sopropé [ 2008.] ECR I-10369, paragraph 34; Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others [2011] ECR I-11315, paragraph 72; and Case C-27/11 Vinkov [2012] ECR, paragraph 58.). 20 This definition of the scope of application of the fundamental rights of the European Union is supported by explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, must be taken into account for the purpose of its interpretation (see in this regard Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849, paragraph 32.). According to these explanations, 'the requirement to respect the fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union binds the Member States only when they act within the scope of Union law.'
21 Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must be respected where national legislation is covered by European Union law, there cannot be situations that are in that way covered by European Union law, where these fundamental rights are not applicable. The applicability of European Union law implies the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
22 On the other hand, when the legal situation does not fall within the scope of European Union law, the Court is not competent to decide on it, and any provisions of the Charter invoked cannot, in themselves, constitute the basis for such competence (see, in this regard, Case C-466/11 Currà and Others [2012.] ECR, paragraph 26.)."
8.3. For the purpose of environmental protection, Article 37 of the Charter expresses the principle stating that high levels of environmental protection and improvement of environmental quality must be integrated into the Union's policies and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. Also, from the explanations drafted as guidelines for the interpretation of this Charter, which the courts must take into account in applying the Charter, in accordance with Article 52(7) of the Charter, it follows that Article 37 expresses the principle. Therefore, in accordance with Article 52(5) of the Charter, the Constitutional Court used the provision of Article 37 in interpreting the relevant directives and the implementation provisions of the Waste Management Act itself. Furthermore, since the specific case involves the contractual relationship between the waste collection service provider, on the one hand, and citizens as users of that service, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court also took into account the fact that Article 38 of the Charter guarantees a high level of consumer protection in the European Union.
9. …
The Constitutional Court does not dispute the legislator's authority to prescribe that individuals or waste producers participate in achieving the goals of waste management, i.e., environmental protection and the right to a healthy life. This is in line with the provision of Article 15(1) of the Directive on Waste, which imposes on Member States the obligation to take the necessary measures to ensure that waste producers, due to their contribution to its production, participate in the investments needed to achieve environmental protection goals. The financial obligation determined by the state under this authority reflects the fact that users of the public waste collection service contribute to waste generation, and consequently, to the occurrence of the risk of environmental pollution or the risk of endangering not only their health but also the health of other citizens. This fact is particularly expressed through the importance of the "polluter pays" principle in the waste management system governed by common rules at the EU level. It should not be disputed that the responsibility imposed on citizens as active contributors to waste generation by the "polluter pays" principle reflects the principle of a high level of environmental protection from Article 37 of the Charter.
12.1. …
The contested provision of Article 72 of the Waste Management Act is not a mandatory provision and is the result of an appropriateness assessment that is allowed to the legislator by the directive itself for its implementation. As such, it is subject to regular independent review of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court. At the same time, as explained in points 8 - 8.4. of this decision, considering that the specific issue undoubtedly falls within the scope of the application of EU law, the Constitutional Court, in its assessment, also took into account and duly considered the relevant provisions of the Charter in accordance with its obligation under Article 141c of the Constitution.
14.3. The principle of personal responsibility of each individual user for compliance with communal waste management rules in a specific community constitutes the essence of the "polluter pays" concept. As mentioned earlier, it is closely related to the fact that the Constitution explicitly states in paragraph 3 of Article 69 that everyone is obliged, within their powers and activities, to dedicate special care to the protection of the health of people, nature, and the human environment.
Consequently, in the context of the specific case, everyone in the Republic of Croatia is obliged to proportionally bear the costs of the waste for which they are personally responsible, but at the same time, they are not obliged to bear the costs incurred by the production of waste for which someone else is responsible. This relationship of personal responsibility for the generation of waste on one hand, and the proportionality of the costs of generating that waste on the other hand, aligns with the requirement for the protection and improvement of environmental quality from Article 37 of the Charter, according to which an increased level of environmental protection and improvement of its quality should be part of EU policy and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. The legislative and executive authorities have an obligation to ensure a legal framework that will ensure that waste management is based on this relationship of personal responsibility and proportionality.
7.1. U ovom je ustavnosudskom postupku Ustavni sud u svojoj ocjeni ustavnosti osporavane zakonske odredbe uzeo u obzir i relevantni pravni okvir EU-a. Povelja Europske unije o temeljnim pravima ("Službeni list" C 326, 26. listopada 2012.; hrvatski prijevod: SL C 202, 7. lipnja 2016.; u daljnjem tekstu: Povelja) stavlja pred države članice pozitivnu obvezu u pogledu zaštite okoliša.
7.2. Članak 37. Povelje glasi: Zaštita okoliša Visoka razina zaštite okoliša i poboljšavanje kvalitete okoliša moraju biti uključeni u politike Unije i osigurani u skladu s načelom održivog razvoja."
8.2. Ustavni sud također ističe kako iz navedenog slijedi da pitanja koja razmatra u okviru ovog postupka bez sumnje ulaze u doseg primjene prava EU-a kako je to određeno odlukom Suda EU-a u presudi od 26. veljače 2013., Fransson, C‐617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.:
"17 U svjetlu tih tvrdnji treba podsjetiti da je područje primjene Povelje u pogledu djelovanja država članica definirano njezinim člankom 51. stavkom 1., prema kojem su odredbe Povelje upućene samo državama članicama kada provode pravo Europskeunije.
18 Taj članak Povelje stoga potvrđuje sudsku praksu Suda u odnosu na doseg u kojem radnje država članica moraju biti u skladu sa zahtjevima koji proizlaze iz temeljnih prava zajamčenih u pravnom poretku Europske unije.
19 Ustaljena sudska praksa Suda doista navodi, u biti, da su temeljna prava zajamčena pravnim poretkom Europske unije primjenjiva u svim situacijama uređenim pravom Europske unije, ali ne i izvan takvih situacija. U tom pogledu Sud je već primijetio da nema ovlasti ispitivati usklađenost s Poveljom nacionalnog zakonodavstva koje je izvan dosega prava Europske unije. S druge strane, ako takvo zakonodavstvo spada u djelokrug prava Europske unije, Sud, kada se od njega zatraži da donese prethodnu odluku, mora dati sve smjernice u pogledu tumačenja koje je potrebno kako bi nacionalni sud utvrdio je li to zakonodavstvo kompatibilno s temeljnim pravima čije poštivanje Sud osigurava (vidi, između ostalog, u tom smislu, predmet C-260/89 ERT [1991.] I-2925, stavak 42.; predmet C-299/95 Kremzow [1997.] ECR I- 2629, stavak 15; Predmet C- 309/96 Annibaldi [2007] ECR I-7493, stavak 13; Predmet C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, stavak 25; Predmet C-349/07 Sopropé [ 2008.] ECR I-10369, stavak 34.; predmet C-256/11 Dereci i drugi [2011.] ECR I-11315, stavak 72.; i predmet C-27/11 Vinkov [2012.] ECR, stavak 58.).
20 Ta definicija područja primjene temeljnih prava Europske unije potkrijepljena je objašnjenjima koja se odnose na članak 51. Povelje, koji u skladu s trećim podstavkom članka 6. stavka 1. UEU-a i članka 52. stavka 7. Povelje, moraju se uzeti u obzir u svrhu njezina tumačenja (vidi u tom smislu predmet C-279/09 DEB [2010.] ECR I-13849, stavak 32.). Prema tim objašnjenjima, 'zahtjev za poštovanjem temeljnih prava definiranih u kontekstu Unije obvezuje države članice samo kada djeluju u okviru prava Unije'.
21 Budući da se temeljna prava zajamčena Poveljom stoga moraju poštovati tamo gdje je nacionalno zakonodavstvo obuhvaćeno pravom Europske unije, ne mogu postojati situacije koje su na taj način obuhvaćene pravom Europske unije, a da ta temeljna prava nisu primjenjiva. Primjenjivost prava Europske unije podrazumijevaprimjenjivost temeljnih prava zajamčenih Poveljom.
22 S druge strane, kada pravna situacija ne ulazi u područje primjene prava Europske unije, Sud nije nadležan o njoj odlučivati i bilo koje odredbe Povelje na koje se poziva ne mogu same po sebi činiti temelj za takvu nadležnost (vidi, u tom smislu predmetu C-466/11 Currà i drugi [2012.] ECR, stavak 26.)."
8.3. Sa svrhom zaštite okoliša Povelja u odredbi članka 37. izražava načelo u kojem se navodi da visoka razina zaštite okoliša i poboljšavanje kvalitete okoliša moraju biti uključeni u politike Unije i osigurani u skladu s načelom održivog razvoja. Također, iz objašnjenja koja su sastavljena kao smjernice za tumačenje ove Povelje, a koje su sudovi dužni uzimati u obzir pri primjeni Povelje, u skladu sa stavkom 7. člankom 52. Povelje, proizlazi da članak 37. izražava načelo. Stoga je Ustavni sud u skladu sa stavkom 5. člankom 52. Povelje, odredbu članka koristio pri tumačenju relevantnih direktiva odnosno samih implementacijskih odredbi Zakona o gospodarenju otpadom.
Nadalje, s obzirom na to da se u konkretnom predmetu razmatra pitanje ugovornog odnosa između pružatelja javne usluge odvoza otpada, s jedne strane, i građana kao korisnika te usluge, s druge strane, Ustavni sud uzeo je također u obzir činjenicu da Povelja u odredbi članka 38. jamči visoku razinu zaštite potrošača u Europskoj uniji.
Ustavni sud ne spori ovlast zakonodavca da radi ostvarenja ciljeva u gospodarenju otpadom, odnosno zaštiti okoliša i prava na zdrav život propiše da pojedinci, odnosno proizvođači otpada sudjeluju u ispunjenju ciljeva u zaštiti okoliša. To je u skladu s odredbom članka 15. stavka 1. Direktive o otpadu koji državama članicama nameće dužnost da poduzmu potrebne mjere kako bi osigurala da upravo proizvođači otpada, zbog svojeg doprinosa njegovoj proizvodnji, sudjeluju u ulaganjima koja su potrebna za ispunjenje ciljeva u zaštiti okoliša. Financijska obveza koju država u okviru ove ovlasti određuje korisnicima javne usluge odvoza otpada odražava činjenicu da korisnici doprinose stvaranju otpada, a time posljedično i nastanku rizika od onečišćenja okoliša odnosno rizika ugroze kako svog zdravlja tako i zdravlja ostalih građana i građanki. Ova činjenica posebno je izražena kroz važnost koje načelo "onečišćivač plaća" ima u sustavu gospodarenja otpadom koji je uređen zajedničkim pravilima na razini čitave Europske unije. Ne bi trebalo biti sporno da odgovornost koju načelo "onečišćivač plaća" stavlja pred građane kao aktivne doprinositelje nastanku otpada odražava načelo visoke razine zaštite okoliša iz članka 37. Povelje.
Osporavana odredba članka 72. ZGO-a nije mandatorna odredba i rezultat je ocjene prikladnosti koja je zakonodavcu dopuštena samom direktivom radi njezine implementacije. Kao takva podložna je redovnom samostalnom nadzoru ustavnosti Ustavnog suda. Istovremeno, kao što je obrazloženo u točkama 8. - 8.4. ove odluke, s obzirom na to da konkretno pitanje nesporno ulazi u doseg primjene prava EU-a, Ustavni sud u svojoj ocjeni uzeo je u obzir i pružio je dužnu pažnju i relevantnim odredbama Povelje u skladu sa svojom obvezom iz članka 141.c Ustava.
14.3. Načelo osobne odgovornosti svakog pojedinog korisnika za poštovanje zajedničkih komunalnih pravila gospodarenja otpadom u konkretnoj zajednici čini srž koncepta "onečišćivač plaća". Kao što je već navedeno, ono je usko vezano uz činjenicu da Ustav u stavku 3. članka 69. izričito navodi da je svatko dužan, u sklopu svojih ovlasti i djelatnosti, posvećivati osobitu skrb zaštiti zdravlja ljudi, prirode i ljudskog okoliša.
Posljedično, u kontekstu konkretnog predmeta, svatko je u Republici Hrvatskoj dužan razmjerno snositi troškove otpada za koji je osobno odgovoran, ali ujedno nije dužan na sebe preuzimati troškove koji nastaju proizvodnjom otpada za koji je odgovoran netko drugi. Ovaj odnos osobne odgovornosti za nastanak otpada, s jedne strane, i razmjernosti troškova nastanka tog otpada, s druge strane, usklađen je sa zahtjevom zaštite i poboljšanja kvalitete okoliša iz članka 37. Povelje, u skladu s kojim povećana razina zaštite okoliša i poboljšanje njegove kvalitete trebaju biti dio politike EU-a te osigurani u skladu s načelom održivog razvoja. Zakonodavna i izvršna vlast imaju obvezu osigurati pravni okvir koji će osigurati da gospodarenje otpadom počiva na ovom odnosu osobne odgovornosti i razmjernosti.
