Luxembourg / Administrative Court / 46365C

Mr. Z v Minister for Immigration and Asylum (anonymised judgment)
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Administrative Court
Type
Decision
Decision date
25/01/2022
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:LU:CADM:2022:46365
  • Luxembourg / Administrative Court / 46365C

    Key facts of the case:

    In April 2019, following several rejected asylum and immigration applications, Mr. Z applied for the status as a stateless person, defined under Article 1 of the New York Convention of 28 September 1954 relating to the status of stateless persons. The application was rejected by the Minister for Immigration and Asylum in August 2019, on the basis that he had not provided concrete evidence of either having lost his original nationality, never having been in possession of a nationality or not being considered a national by any country. In November 2019, Mr. Z brought an action for annulment before the Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Administratif) against this decision, which also contained an implicit order to leave the Luxembourgish territory. In July 2021, the Administrative Tribunal declared the appeal inadmissible regarding the order to leave the territory and unfounded regarding the refusal of the statelessness status (judgement in Case 43809).

    In August 2021, Mr. Z lodged the current appeal before the Administrative Court (Cour Administrative) against the decision of the Administrative Tribunal relating to the Minister’s decision to refuse the statelessness status (Case 46365C). He relied, among others, on the ground that the Administration had breached its obligations of diligence, impartiality and fairness under the general principle of the right to good administration, notably in the framework of the statelessness procedure. According to the appellant, the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), is a general principle of EU law that Member States must respect when implementing that law, as in the current circumstances where he had been refused asylum and was subject to a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2008/115/EC (Return Directive). In this regard, he made reference to Article 51 of the Charter and the judgement of the European Court of Justice in Joined Cases C225/19 and C226/19.

    Key legal questions raised by the Court:

    i) the field of application of the Charter

    ii) whether, in a statelessness procedure, Member states apply EU law and are therefore bound by the obligations stemming from the Charter and

    iii) whether question ii) calls for a different answer when the statelessness decision under appeal relates to a rejected asylum seeker subject to a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of the Return Directive. 

    Outcome of the case:

    The Administrative Court started by clarifying that, while in accordance to the wording it is clear that Article 41 (1) of the Charter is not addressed to Member States, but only to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, the European Court of Justice has also said that Article 41 of the Charter reflects a general principle of EU law, which is applicable to Member States when they are implementing that law (judgement in Joined Cases C225/19 and C226/19). 

    The Administrative Court went on to clarify that the appellant could not rely on Article 41 of the Charter since the contested decision refusing the recognition of statelessness status did not implement EU law and was not governed by EU law. Furthermore, it was not in dispute that the appellant did not have and had never had the nationality of a Member State of the EU and, consequently, the status of citizen of the Union, with the result that he did not fall within the ambit of EU law, as per the judgement of the European Court of Justice in Case C-135/08. 

    Concurrently, the Administrative Court clarified that the appeal was aimed at the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Asylum that had refused the recognition of statelessness status and not a return decision or its enforcement. This meant that the appellant could not rely on Article 41 of the Charter as the provisions of the Return Directive did not apply to the statelessness procedure and, consequently, the decision of the Minister did not implement EU law. 

    As such, the Administrative Court considered the ground relied upon by the appellant according to which the Administration had breached its obligations under Article 41 of the Charter in the framework of the statelessness procedure an invalid plea in law. 

    The remaining grounds relied upon by the appellant were also considered unfounded. The Administrative Court therefore declared the appeal unfounded and confirmed the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. As a result, the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Asylum refusing the statelessness status to Mr. Z was maintained.