Article 41 - Right to good administration
Article 51 - Field of application
Key facts of the case:
In April 2019, following several rejected asylum and immigration applications, Mr. Z applied for the status as a stateless person, defined under Article 1 of the New York Convention of 28 September 1954 relating to the status of stateless persons. The application was rejected by the Minister for Immigration and Asylum in August 2019, on the basis that he had not provided concrete evidence of either having lost his original nationality, never having been in possession of a nationality or not being considered a national by any country. In November 2019, Mr. Z brought an action for annulment before the Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Administratif) against this decision, which also contained an implicit order to leave the Luxembourgish territory. In July 2021, the Administrative Tribunal declared the appeal inadmissible regarding the order to leave the territory and unfounded regarding the refusal of the statelessness status (judgement in Case 43809).
In August 2021, Mr. Z lodged the current appeal before the Administrative Court (Cour Administrative) against the decision of the Administrative Tribunal relating to the Minister’s decision to refuse the statelessness status (Case 46365C). He relied, among others, on the ground that the Administration had breached its obligations of diligence, impartiality and fairness under the general principle of the right to good administration, notably in the framework of the statelessness procedure. According to the appellant, the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), is a general principle of EU law that Member States must respect when implementing that law, as in the current circumstances where he had been refused asylum and was subject to a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2008/115/EC (Return Directive). In this regard, he made reference to Article 51 of the Charter and the judgement of the European Court of Justice in Joined Cases C225/19 and C226/19.
Key legal questions raised by the Court:
i) the field of application of the Charter
ii) whether, in a statelessness procedure, Member states apply EU law and are therefore bound by the obligations stemming from the Charter and
iii) whether question ii) calls for a different answer when the statelessness decision under appeal relates to a rejected asylum seeker subject to a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of the Return Directive.
Outcome of the case:
The Administrative Court started by clarifying that, while in accordance to the wording it is clear that Article 41 (1) of the Charter is not addressed to Member States, but only to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, the European Court of Justice has also said that Article 41 of the Charter reflects a general principle of EU law, which is applicable to Member States when they are implementing that law (judgement in Joined Cases C225/19 and C226/19).
The Administrative Court went on to clarify that the appellant could not rely on Article 41 of the Charter since the contested decision refusing the recognition of statelessness status did not implement EU law and was not governed by EU law. Furthermore, it was not in dispute that the appellant did not have and had never had the nationality of a Member State of the EU and, consequently, the status of citizen of the Union, with the result that he did not fall within the ambit of EU law, as per the judgement of the European Court of Justice in Case C-135/08.
Concurrently, the Administrative Court clarified that the appeal was aimed at the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Asylum that had refused the recognition of statelessness status and not a return decision or its enforcement. This meant that the appellant could not rely on Article 41 of the Charter as the provisions of the Return Directive did not apply to the statelessness procedure and, consequently, the decision of the Minister did not implement EU law.
As such, the Administrative Court considered the ground relied upon by the appellant according to which the Administration had breached its obligations under Article 41 of the Charter in the framework of the statelessness procedure an invalid plea in law.
The remaining grounds relied upon by the appellant were also considered unfounded. The Administrative Court therefore declared the appeal unfounded and confirmed the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. As a result, the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Asylum refusing the statelessness status to Mr. Z was maintained.
“Referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 24 November 2020, R.N.N.S. and K.A. (C-225/19), he emphasises that the right to good administration, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, hereinafter «the Charter», is a general principle of EU law, which includes, in particular, «the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time» by the administration. He considers that Member States must respect this right to good administration when implementing EU law, as was the case in this instance, since he had been refused asylum and was the subject of a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of the Return Directive. (...)
The appellant further insists, in the reply, on the applicability of EU law in this case, arguing that, under Article 2 of the Return Directive, the latter applies to third-country nationals residing illegally on the territory of a Member State, which was his case, insofar as his asylum application had been rejected and he was subject to a return decision. The Return Directive was therefore applicable and, as a result, the Charter would also apply in accordance with Article 51, which provides that the provisions of the Charter shall apply to Member States only when they are implementing Union law. He also relies on a judgment of 19 March 2012 (n. º 00146) in which the Constitutional Court stated that «the ECHR and the Charter form a common basis together with the fundamental principle of the rule of law and the principles of access to the courts and effective remedy», in order to deduce that he was entitled to invoke the fundamental rights enshrined in EU law. If there was to be a doubt in this respect, the appellant suggests that a preliminary question be referred to the CJEU.
The appellant further insists on the applicability of the principle of good administration, as enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter, while also referring to the above-mentioned judgment of the CJEU of 24 November 2020. (...)
As regards, first of all, the alleged breach of the principle of good administration of Article 41(1) of the Charter, which provides that: «[e]very person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union», it is clear from the wording of this provision that it is not addressed to Member States, but only to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (cf. CJEU judgement of 26 March 2020, Hungeod and Others, C-496/18 and C-497/18, paragraph 63). However, the CJEU has also held that Article 41 of the Charter reflects a general principle of EU law, which is applicable to Member States when they are implementing that law (see CJEU judgment of 24 November 2020, R.N.N.S. and K.A., C-225/19 and C-226/19, paragraph 34).
The appellant argues that Article 41 of the Charter is applicable in this case, which implements EU law, since he was subject to a return decision within the meaning of Article 3(4) of the Return Directive. (...)
The appellant cannot therefore rely either on the provisions of the Return Directive, which are not applicable to the procedure for recognition of stateless status, or on Article 41 of the Charter, since the contested decision refusing the recognition of stateless status does not implement EU law and is not governed by EU law. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the appellant does not have and has never had the nationality of a Member State of the EU and, consequently, the status of citizen of the Union, with the result that he that he does not fall within the ambit of EU law (cf. CJEU, judgment of 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C-135/08)”.
“Se référant à l’arrêt de la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) du 24 novembre 2020, R.N.N.S. et K.A. (C-225/19), il souligne que le droit à une bonne administration, consacré à l’article 41 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, ci-après « la Charte », serait un principe général du droit de l’Union comportant notamment « le droit de voir ses affaires traitées impartialement, équitablement et dans un délai raisonnable » par l’administration. Il estime que les Etats membres doivent respecter ce droit à une bonne administration lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l’Union, tel que cela serait le cas en l’espèce, puisqu’il aurait été débouté du droit d’asile et ferait l’objet d’une décision de retour au sens de l’article 3, paragraphe 4, de la directive retour. (…)
L’appelant insiste encore, en termes de réplique, sur l’applicabilité du droit de l’Union en l’espèce en faisant valoir qu’en vertu de l’article 2 de la directive retour, celle-ci s’appliquerait aux ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier sur le territoire d’un Etat membre, ce qui serait son cas, dans la mesure où il aurait été débouté de sa demande d’asile et où il serait sous le coup d’une décision de retour. La directive retour serait donc applicable et, par voie de conséquence, la Charte trouverait également application conformément à son article 51 qui dispose que les dispositions de la Charte s’appliquent aux Etats membres uniquement lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l’Union. Il se prévaut encore d’un arrêt du 19 mars 2012 (n° 00146) dans lequel la Cour Constitutionnelle a dit que « la CEDH et la Charte forment avec le principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit et les principes d’accès au juge et de recours effectif un socle commun », pour en déduire qu’il serait en droit d’invoquer les droits fondamentaux consacrés par le droit de l’Union. Si un doute devait persister à cet égard, l’appelant suggère de poser une question préjudicielle à la CJUE.
L’appelant insiste encore sur l’applicabilité du principe de bonne administration, tel que consacré à l’article 41-1 de la Charte, tout en renvoyant à l’arrêt précité de la CJUE du 24 novembre 2020. (…)
En ce qui concerne tout d’abord la prétendue violation du principe de bonne administration de l’article 41-1 de la Charte qui prévoit que : « Toute personne a le droit de voir ses affaires traitées impartialement, équitablement et dans un délai raisonnable par les institutions et organes de l’Union », il ressort clairement du libellé de cette disposition que celle-ci ne s’adresse non pas aux Etats membres, mais uniquement aux institutions, aux organes et aux organismes de l’Union (cf. arrêt CJUE du 26 mars 2020, Hungeod e.a., C-496/18 et C-497/18, point 63). La CJUE a toutefois également dit que l’article 41 de la Charte reflète un principe général du droit de l’Union, ayant vocation à s’appliquer aux Etats membres lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre ce droit (cf. arrêt CJUE du 24 novembre 2020, R.N.N.S. et K.A., C-225/19 et C-226/19, point 34).
L’appelant soutient que l’article 41 de la Charte serait applicable en l’espèce qui mettrait en œuvre le droit de l’Union, dès lors qu’il serait sous le coup d’une décision de retour au sens de l’article 3, paragraphe 4, de la directive retour. (…)
L’appelant ne saurait dès lors se prévaloir ni des dispositions de la directive retour qui ne sont pas applicables à la procédure de reconnaissance du statut d’apatride, ni de l’article 41 de la Charte, dès lors que la décision litigieuse portant refus de reconnaissance du statut d’apatride ne met pas en œuvre le droit de l’Union et qu’elle n’est pas régie par le droit de l’Union. En plus, il est constant que l’appelant n’a pas et n’a jamais eu la nationalité d’un Etat membre de l’Union et, par voie de conséquence, le statut de citoyen de l’Union, de sorte qu’il ne relève pas du droit de l’Union (cf. CJUE, arrêt du 2 mars 2010, Rottmann, C-135/08).”
