Article 49 - Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties
Article 51 - Field of application
Key facts of the case:
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Protection of the financial interests of the European Union – Article 325(1) TFEU – PFI Convention – Article 2(1) – Obligation to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union by taking effective deterrent measures – Obligation to provide for criminal penalties – Value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Serious VAT fraud – Limitation period for criminal liability – Judgment of a constitutional court invalidating a national provision governing the grounds for interrupting that period – Systemic risk of impunity – Protection of fundamental rights – Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law – Requirements of foreseeability and precision of criminal law – Principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law (lex mitior) – Principle of legal certainty – National standard of protection of fundamental rights – Duty on the courts of a Member State to disapply judgments of the constitutional court and/or the supreme court of that Member State in the event that they are incompatible with EU law – Disciplinary liability of judges in the event of non-compliance with those judgments – Principle of the primacy of EU law)
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
1. Article 325(1) TFEU and Article 2(1) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, signed in Brussels on 26 July 1995 and annexed to the Council Act of 26 July 1995
must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State are not required to disapply the judgments of the constitutional court of that Member State invalidating the national legislative provision governing the grounds for interrupting the limitation period in criminal matters, as a result of a breach of the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law, as protected under national law, as to its requirements relating to the foreseeability and precision of criminal law, even if, as a consequence of those judgments, a considerable number of criminal cases, including cases relating to offences of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union, will be discontinued because of the expiry of the limitation period for criminal liability.
However, those provisions of EU law must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of that Member State are required to disapply a national standard of protection relating to the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law (lex mitior) which makes it possible, including in the context of appeals brought against final judgments, to call into question the interruption of the limitation period for criminal liability in such cases by procedural acts which took place before such a finding of invalidity.
2. The principle of the primacy of EU law
must be interpreted as precluding national legislation or a national practice under which the ordinary national courts of a Member State are bound by the decisions of the constitutional court and by those of the supreme court of that Member State and cannot, for that reason and at the risk of incurring the disciplinary liability of the judges concerned, disapply of their own motion the case-law resulting from those decisions, even if they consider, in the light of a judgment of the Court, that that case-law is contrary to provisions of EU law having direct effect.
101) In that regard, it should be recalled, in the first place, that, as is apparent from settled case-law, the obligation to ensure the effective collection of the European Union’s resources does not dispense national courts from the necessary observance of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter and of the general principles of EU law, given that the criminal proceedings instigated for VAT offences amount to an implementation of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.
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103) In the EU legal order, the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law and the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law (lex mitior) are enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter.
106) Lastly, in accordance with the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law (lex mitior) requires that, if, after the commission of an offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty must be applied.
109) Consequently, the obligation for national courts to disapply judgments No 297/2018 and No 358/2022 of the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court) and judgment No 67/2022 of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice) is not such as to undermine either the principle of foreseeability, precision and non-retroactivity of offences and penalties or the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law (lex mitior), as guaranteed in Article 49(1) of the Charter.
110) In the second place, it must be borne in mind that, where, as in the present case, a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not entirely determined by EU law, implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised.