CJEU Joined Cases C-221/24 and C-222/24 / Judgment

Naturvårdsverket v UQ and IC
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Decision
Decision date
23/10/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2025:818
  • CJEU Joined Cases C-221/24 and C-222/24 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    References for a preliminary ruling – Environment – Waste – Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 – Article 24(2) – Shipment – Take-back when a shipment is illegal – Take-back of the waste by the competent authority of dispatch – Obligation or possibility for that authority to recover or dispose of the waste despite opposition by the initial dispatcher – Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to property – Validity

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

    1. The first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste

      must be interpreted as meaning that (i) points (c) and (d) of that subparagraph are to be applied alternatively, with point (d) being applied where point (c) is not applicable, and (ii) point (c) of that subparagraph requires the competent authority of the country of dispatch, where it discovers a shipment which it considers to be illegal, to recover or dispose of the waste taken back following such a shipment.

    2. Consideration of the third question has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    57. By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, inasmuch as it requires the recovery or disposal of waste taken back by the competent authority of the country of dispatch, despite opposition by the initial dispatcher, is valid in the light of the protection of the right to property enshrined in Article 17(1) of the Charter.

    58. In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are to be the same as those laid down by that convention. That provision does not, however, prevent EU law from providing more extensive protection. It follows that, for the purpose of interpreting Article 17(1) of the Charter, it is necessary to take into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, which establishes the protection of the right to property (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, Neves 77 Solutions, C‑351/22, EU:C:2024:723, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

    59. Article 17(1) of the Charter contains three distinct rules. The first rule, which is set out in the first sentence of that provision and is of a general nature, gives concrete expression to the principle of respect for property. The second rule, which is set out in the second sentence of that provision, refers to a person being deprived of his or her possessions and makes that deprivation subject to certain conditions. As regards the third rule, which is set out in the third sentence of that provision, it recognises that the Member States have the power to regulate the use of property in so far as is necessary for the general interest. Those rules are not, however, unrelated to each other. Indeed, the second and third rules relate to specific examples of infringements of the right to property and must be interpreted in the light of the principle enshrined in the first rule (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 144 and the case-law cited).

    ...

    62. In those circumstances, it cannot be held, in view of the alternative nature of the intervention by the competent authority, that the take-back, by that competent authority, of waste which has been the subject of an illegal shipment constitutes a person being ‘deprived of his or her possessions’ for the purposes of Article 17(1) of the Charter. Indeed, the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 gives the notifier precedence in respect of the take-back of the waste.

    63. The fact remains that such a measure constitutes a limitation on the exercise of the right to property which forms part of the regulation of the use of property within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 17(1) of the Charter, given that the fate of that waste must necessarily be recovery or disposal.

    64. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter is not absolute and that the exercise of that right may, under the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) thereof, be subject to restrictions which are justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited).

    65. In the first place, it must be pointed out that, in this instance, the requirement laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter that restrictions of the exercise of the right to property must ‘be provided for by law’ is met, because it is apparent from the answer to the first two questions referred that point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 must be interpreted as requiring the competent authority of dispatch to recover or dispose of the waste taken back, which may restrict the right to property of the owners of that waste. While an act which permits interference with the exercise of fundamental rights must itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned, the Court may, where appropriate, specify, by means of interpretation, the actual scope of the limitation in the light of the very wording of the EU legislation in question, as well as its general scheme and the objectives it pursues (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains, C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).

    ...

    71. In that regard, first, according to the case-law of the Court, the protection of human health takes precedence over economic considerations, with the result that it may justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). In the same vein, under Article 35 of the Charter, a high level of human health protection is to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities and, under Article 37 thereof, a high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.

    ...

    75. Consequently, the interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, as derived from the answer given to the first and second questions referred, enables a high level of protection of the environment and human health to be guaranteed – an objective also pursued by the Charter – and is thus consistent with Article 17(1) of the Charter.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)