Article 10 - Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Article 11 - Freedom of expression and information
Article 12 - Freedom of assembly and of association
Article 20 - Equality before the law
Article 21 - Non-discrimination
Article 39 - Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament
Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Article 48 - Presumption of innocence and right of defence
Article 49 - Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties
Article 50 - Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence
Key facts of the case:
The appellant, Mr José Ángel, was elected as a Member of the Parliament of Catalonia for the constituency of Barcelona in the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia held on 21 December 2017. In 2019 he was convicted by a non-final judgment, dated 19 December 2019, in the abbreviated procedure 1/2019, of the Civil and Criminal Chamber of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, which imposed on him, in addition to a fine, the penalty of special disqualification from holding elective public office, whether at local, regional, state or European level, for a period of one year and six months, for considering him the perpetrator of a crime of disobedience as defined in art. 410.1 of the Penal Code, a crime included in Title XIX of the Penal Code, which is entitled "Crimes against Public Administration". Alleging this circumstance, the Partido Popular, Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía and VOX lodged an appeal with the Central Electoral Board, requesting the annulment of the Agreement of the Barcelona Provincial Electoral Board and the declaration that José Ángel was ineligible under Article 6.2 b) of the Organic Law on the General Electoral System (LOREG). Upholding this appeal, the Central Electoral Board annulled Mr. José Ángel's credential and ordered the Barcelona Provincial Electoral Board to declare the vacancy and issue the credential to the next candidate on the Junts per Catalunya list, which was carried out in January 2020.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Court seeks to answer the legal question as to whether the appellant's alleged infringement of several fundamental rights is established and whether the dispute is governed by European Union law, in particular the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as the normative frame of reference.
Outcome of the case:
The Court considers that, from a principled perspective, and based on the mandate of Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution, there is no doubt that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and also the Rome Convention and its protocols, are of unquestionable relevance. It states that "there is no divergence or impairment between the rights guaranteed in Spain and those protected by the European Union or by the European Court of Human Rights. The legal, as well as ethical and civic heritage that fundamental rights entail is shared in the European Union and our legal system does not present any deficit in this respect, although it is always possible to make progress in its enrichment and preservation". In spite of all this, the Court considers that there are no elements in European Union law and in the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter and even by the Rome Convention and its protocols that offer greater guarantees than those offered directly by the Constitution, since the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was drawn up in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 covenants and the Rome Convention, among other international documents. Moreover, Article 10.2 of the Constitution requires that the rules of the Constitution relating to rights and freedoms be interpreted in accordance with the international treaties and agreements on the subject ratified by Spain. In short, the Court considers that the appellant's attempt to place the dispute in question within the scope of European Union law is not understandable, since what is at issue is a dispute concerning agreements adopted in respect of regional elections, in which the appellant does not in any way justify the relevance of European Union law.
- Declare that the appellant's fundamental right to equal access to public office (Article 23(2) of the Constitution and Article 39(2) of the Charter), as well as the rights to equal treatment (Article 14 of the Constitution and Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter), to ideological freedom (Articles 16. 1 of the Constitution and 10.1 of the Charter) and to freedom of expression ( Article 20.1.a of the Constitution and 11.1 of the Charter), to freedom of assembly ( Article 21 of the Constitution and 12 of the Charter), in conjunction with Article 23. 1 of the Constitution; as well as the fundamental rights provided for in Articles 24 and 25 of the Spanish Constitution, in particular with regard to the right to effective judicial protection, to an ordinary judge predetermined by law, to a trial with all guarantees, to the presumption of innocence and to a double criminal instance, in relation to the right to criminal legality and to the prohibition of procedural bis in idem, as well as the related rights of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Articles 47, 48, 49 and 50).
- The lawsuit states that '[...] the Chamber hearing this action lacks the independence guaranteed by Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [...]' ....
- The lawsuit insists on establishing European Union law as the normative framework of reference, and for this it uses two premises that it establishes at will. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Union by the Treaties [...]". A reading of the pprovision is sufficient to understand that the application has declined to explain in more detail the reason for its assertion that the dispute is subject to 'European Union law', given that we are dealing with agreements adopted in respect of regional elections, in which the appellant does not in any way justify the relevance of European Union law.
- Obviously, from the perspective of principles, and based on the mandate of Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution, there is no doubt that the Charter of Rights of the European Union, and also the Rome Convention and its protocols, are undoubtedly relevant. But from there to arguing that this is a case governed by European Union law is a conceptual and argumentative leap that the plaintiff refuses to explain, and immediately goes on to invoke the appellant's "[...] right to the presumption of innocence [...] in the terms in which this right is recognised by the European Union...". in the terms in which that right is recognised, in particular, by Articles 3 and 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on strengthening in criminal proceedings certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial, read in conjunction with Article 48. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [...]", all accompanied by the citation of a judgment of the Court of Cassation of the Italian Republic, which has no other value than that of comparative law.
- Furthermore, as we have already said in our judgment of 10 June 2020 (appeal 271/2019), there are no elements in European Union law and in the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter and even by the Rome Convention and its protocols that offer greater guarantees than those offered directly by the Constitution, given that the 1978 constitutional text was drafted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 covenants and with the Rome Convention, among other international documents. Furthermore, Article 10.2 of the Constitution, as we have said before, requires that the rules of the Constitution relating to rights and freedoms be interpreted in accordance with the international treaties and agreements on the subject ratified by Spain. Therefore, as we stated in our judgment of 10 June 2020, cit., "[...] there is no divergence or impairment between the rights guaranteed in Spain and those protected by the European Union or by the European Court of Human Rights. The legal, as well as ethical and civic, heritage that fundamental rights entail is shared in the European Union and our legal system does not present any deficit in this respect, although it is always possible to make progress in its enrichment and preservation [...]" (FL 6).
- Se declare que se ha vulnerado el derecho fundamental del recurrente a acceder a los cargos públicos en condiciones de igualdad ( artículo 23.2 de la Constitución y 39.2 de la Carta), así como los derechos a la igualdad de trato ( artículo 14 de la Constitución y 20 y 21 de la Carta), a la libertad ideológica ( artículos 16.1 de la Constitución y 10.1 de la Carta) y a la libertad de expresión ( artículo 20.1.a de la Constitución y 11.1 de la Carta), a la libertad de reunión ( artículo 21 de la Constitución y 12 de la Carta), en relación con el artículo 23.1 de la Constitución; así como los derechos fundamentales previstos en los artículos 24 y 25 de la Constitución española, en particular en lo relativo al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, al juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a un proceso con todas las garantías, a la presunción de inocencia y a la doble instancia penal, enrelación con el derecho a la legalidad penal y a la prohibición del bis in idem procesal, así como los conexos de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea (artículos 47, 48, 49 y 50).
- La demanda afirma que "[...] La Sala que viene conociendo del presente recurso carece de la independencia que garantizan el artículo 19 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, así como en el artículo 47 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea [...]"…
- La demanda insiste en establecer, como marco normativo de referencia, el Derecho de la Unión Europea, y para ello se vale de dos premisas que fija a su voluntad. En primer lugar, dice, por aplicación del artículo 51.1 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea que dispone que "[...] 1. Las disposiciones de la presente Carta están dirigidas a las instituciones, órganos y organismos de la Unión, dentro del respeto del principio de subsidiariedad, así como a los Estados miembros únicamente cuando apliquen el Derecho de la Unión. Por consiguiente, éstos respetarán los derechos, observarán los principios y promoverán su aplicación, con arreglo a sus respectivas competencias y dentro de los límites de las competencias que los Tratados atribuyen a la Unión [...]". Basta la lectura del precepto para comprender que la demanda haya renunciado a explicar de manera más detallada el porqué de su afirmación del sometimiento del litigio al "Derecho de la Unión Europea", dado que estamos ante acuerdos adoptados respecto a elecciones autonómicas, en las que de ninguna forma justifica el recurrente que pueda alcanzar relevancia el Derecho de la Unión Europea.
- Obviamente, desde una perspectiva de los principios, y a partir del mandato del art. 10.2 de la Constitución española, sin duda que la Carta de Derechos de la Unión Europea, y también el Convenio de Roma y sus protocolos, tienen una relevancia indudable. Pero de ahí a sustentar que estamos ante un litigio que se rige por el Derecho de la Unión Europea hay una salto conceptual y argumentativo que la demandante renuncia a explicar, para pasar inmediatamente a invocar el "[...] derecho a la presunción de inocencia del recurrente [...] en los términos en que este derecho viene reconocido, singularmente, por los artículos 3 y 4 de la Directiva (UE) 2016/343 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 9 de marzo de 2016, por la que se refuerzan en el proceso penal determinados aspectos de la presunción de inocencia y el derecho a estar presente en el juicio, en relación con lo previsto en el artículo 48.1 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea [...]", todo ello acompañado con la cita de una sentencia de la Corte de Casación de la República Italiana, que carece de otro valor que el de Derecho Comparado.
- A mayor abundamiento, como ya hemos dicho en nuestra sentencia de 10 de junio de 2020 (recurso 271/2019) no hay en el Derecho de la Unión Europea y en los derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la Carta e, incluso, por el Convenio de Roma y sus protocolos elementos que ofrezcan una mayor garantía que las que ofrece directamente la Constitución, puesto que el texto constitucional de 1978 se elaboró de conformidad con la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y los pactos de 1966 y con el Convenio de Roma, entre otros documentos internacionales. Además, su artículo 10.2, ya lo hemos dicho antes, obliga interpretar las normas de la Constitución relativas a derechos y libertades de conformidad con los tratados y acuerdos internacionales sobre la materia ratificados por España. Por ello, como afirmamos en nuestra sentencia de 10 de junio de 2020, cit., "[...] no hay divergencia ni menoscabo entre los derechos garantizados en España y los protegidos por la Unión Europea o por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. El patrimonio jurídico, además de ético y cívico, que comportan los derechos fundamentales es compartido en la Unión Europea y nuestro ordenamiento no presenta ningún déficit al respecto aunque siempre sea posible avanzar en su enriquecimiento y preservación [...]" (FD 6).
