Hungary / Curia / Mfv.X.10.049/2021/16

Plaintiff v. Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal and National Judicial Office
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Curia
Type
Decision
Decision date
02/06/2021
  • Hungary / Curia / Mfv.X.10.049/2021/16

    Key facts of the case: 

    The general background of the case is that due to some extensive changes to the law on the judiciary enacted in 2011, the president of the National Judicial Office (NJO) was entrusted with extensive powers. The regulation was criticised by several bodies of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union. In particular, the Group of States against Corruption called for minimising the potential risks of discretionary decisions by the president of the NJO. The National Judicial Council (NJC) – a collective body of Hungarian judges functioning as an oversight instance to control the president of the NJO – concluded in 2018 that the practice of the president of the NJO with regard to declaring calls for applications to judicial positions and senior positions unsuccessful was unlawful.

    In this particular case the President of the NJO published a call for applications (Resolution No. 87.E/2017 (II. 17) OBHE) to fill a vacancy at the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla). Even though the plaintiff received the highest scores in the evaluation process, the President of the NJO declared the application procedure unsuccessful (Resolution No. 322.E/2017 (V. 22) OBHE) at the request of the head of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal.  

    The President of the NJO published another call for applications (Resolution No. 300.E/2017 (V. 19) OBHE) to fill another vacacy at the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal. The plaintiff received the highest scores in this evaluation process again, but the President of the NJO declared this application procedure too unsuccessful (Resolution No. 589.E/2017 (IX. 6) OBHE) at the request of the head of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal. 

    The plaintiff challenged the resolution of the NJO President. The first instance court annulled the resolutions of the President of the NJO. The second instance appellate court terminated the judicial procedure on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claim was not justiciable. 

    In its judgment no. Mfv.X.10.251/2019/12 the Curia concluded that the plaintiff’s right to an effective remedy against the resolutions of the NJO President had to be guaranteed. The justices found that the relevant Hungarian legislation was in compliance with EU law – in particular, Artilce 47 of the Charter –, therefore the initiation of a preliminary reference procedure was not necessary. The Curia quashed the second instance judgment and referred the case back to the second instance court to decide the plaintiff’s appeal on the merits.

    In the repreated procedure, the second instance court concluded that – based on the rule of law principle and the right to an effective remedy – the plaintiff had the right to initiate a procedure against the President of the NJO, even though this right had no explicit legal basis in the Hungarian legislation. The second instance court also determined the legal consequences of its decision and ordered the President of the NJO (alternatively): (i) to transfer the plaintiff to the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal, or (ii) to ask for permission from the NJC to fill the vacant position with another candidate (despite the fact that the plaintiff had the highest scores), or (iii) to declare the application procedure unsuccessful in a duly reasoned decision.

    An appeal in cassation was submitted by the second and the third defendants against the second instance judgment.  

     

    Key legal question raised by the Court: 

    This case had two central issues. The first one was whether the plaintiff had the right to initiate a procedure against the President of the NJO. The other issue was whether the second instance court in the repeated procedure determined the legal consequences lawfully, i.e. whether the orders of the second instance court addressed to the President of the NJO were lawful. Only the first issue concerned the EU Charter.

     

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Curia quashed the decision of the second instance court delivered in the repeated procedure and rejected the plaintiff’s petition.

    Firstly, the Curia concluded that the plaintiff had the right to challenge the resolutions of the NJO President at court on the grounds of the general right to an effective judicial protection enshrined in the TFEU, the EU Charter and the Fundamental Law of Hungary – even though it had no explicit legal basis in the Hungarian legislation.

    However, the Curia also noted that the plaintiff was not entitled to initiate court proceedings directly against the President of the NJO.  The Curia remarked that this situation did not constitute a violation of the right to an effective judicial protection enshrined in the TFEU and the EU Charter, because the plaintiff still had the right to initiate judicial proceedings against the third defendant (i.e. the employer).

    Secondly, the Curia also declared that the second instance court determined the legal consequences unlawfully, because it decided the case ultra petita and also because the legal consequences determined by the judge had no legal basis in the applicable Hungarian legislation.
    Secondly, the Curia also declared that the second instance court determined the legal consequences unlawfully. The second instance court ordered the President of the NJO (alternatively): (i) to transfer the plaintiff to the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal, or (ii) to ask for permission from the NJC to fill the vacant position with another candidate (despite the fact that the plaintiff had the highest scores), or (iii) to declare the application procedure unsuccessful in a duly reasoned decision. The Curia concluded that this decision was unlawful for two reasons. On the one hand, these legal consequences had no legal basis in the Hungarian legislation. On the other, the second instance court decided the case ultra petita, i.e. it exceeded the limits of the plaintiff’s petition when it ordered some legal consequences not requested by the plaintiff. The Curia’s decision on this second issue was not related to the EU Charter.
     

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    [24] In its judgment [delivered in the repeated procedure] the second instance court referred to the decision [no. Mfv.X.10.251/2019/12] of the Curia which concluded that – in light of Article 47 of the Charter, Articles 2 and 19 of the Treaty on the European Union, the principles of rule of law and effective remedy, and the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice – the plaintiff had the right to challenge the resolutions declaring the application procedures unsuccessful on the basis of Articles 145 (1) and 146 of the [Act on the legal status and remuneration of judges]. 

    (...)

    [27] According to the reasoning [of the second instance court], even though the contested resolutions declaring the application procedures unsuccessful do not figure in the list of Article 76 (5) of the [Act on the organisation of the judiciary], the second sentence of Article 19(1) TEU and the first sentence of Article 47 of the Charter stipulate that the right to an effective judicial remedy must be guaranteed, which is supported by Article 6 on the right to a fair trial and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy – which is also a fundamental principle of the European Union based on the common constitutional heritage of the member states – of the European Convention on Human Rights (Rome, 4 November 1950). [The second instance court] noted – based on the case-law of the Court of Justice – that in light of the fundamental principles of the European Union, such as the rule of law, the right to an effective remedy and the principle of effective judicial protection, Articles 76 (5) and the 77/A (2) of the [Act on the organisation of the judiciary] must be interpreted in a way to allow the petitioner to initiate a procedure against the second defendant [i.e. President of the NJO] in order to challenge the resolutions of the second defendant [i.e. the President of the NJO] declaring the application procedures unsuccessful, regardless of the fact that it has no explicit legal basis in Hungarian law. Otherwise, the right to effective judicial protection would be rendered empty, contrary to the decision of the Curia.

    (...)

    [60] According to the interpretation of Articles 145-146 of the [Act on the legal status and remuneration of judges] provided by the Curia – in light of the principles discussed by the Court of Justice in the joint cases nos. C-585/18., C-624/18. and C-625/18, and enshrined in Article 3 and 9 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter - in its decision no. Mfv.X.10.251/2019/12., the plaintiff had the right to challenge the resolutions of the NJO President before a court independently of the provisions of black letter law. This is the interpretation that complies with the right to a judicial remedy enshrined in Article XXVIII (1) and (7) of the Fundamental Law.

    (...)

    [69] It follows from the lack of any legal provision that the plaintiff’s claim was not enforceable against the second defendant [NJO President]. However, the fact that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue the second defendant, does not constitute a violation of the right to an effective judicial protection enshrined in the TFEU and the EU Charter, because the plaintiff had the right to initiate judicial proceedings against the third defendant employer.
     

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    [24] A másodfokú bíróság [a megismételt eljárásban hozott] ítéletének indokolásában utalt arra, hogy a Kúria a [ Mfv.X.10.251/2019/12 számú]  felülvizsgálati határozatában az Európai Unió Alapjogi Chartája 47. cikke hatékony jogorvoslat – az Európai Unióról szóló szerződés 2., 19. cikke, a jogállamiság és hatékony jogvédelem elvei, valamint az azokat értelmező európai bírósági ítéletek alapján megállapította, hogy a felperest a pályázatokat eredménytelenné nyilvánító II. rendű alperesi határozatokkal szemben a Bjt. 145. § (1) bekezdése, 146. §-a alapján megilleti a keresetindítási jog. 

    (...)

    [27] [A másodfokú bíróság] érvelése szerint a Bszi. 76. § (5) bekezdése felsorolásában ugyan nem szerepel a keresetben közvetlenül vitássá tett, a pályázatot eredménytelennek nyilvánító határozat megjelölése, ugyanakkor az EUSZ 19. cikke (1) bekezdésének 2. mondata és az Alapjogi Charta 47. cikk 1. mondata alapján a fél számára biztosítani kell a bíróság előtti hatékony jogorvoslathoz való jogot, amely az Emberi jogok és alapvető szabadságok védelméről szóló Egyezmény (Róma, 1950. november 4.) tisztességes tárgyaláshoz való jogot előíró 6. cikke és a hatékony jogorvoslathoz való jog követelményét rögzítő 13. cikke – mint az uniós tagállamok közös alkotmányos hagyományain alapuló uniós jogi alapelv – is megerősít. [A másodfokú bíróság] az Európai Bíróság eseti döntéseire utalva is kifejtette, hogy a jogállamiság, a hatékony jogorvoslathoz való jog és a hatékony bírói jogvédelem uniós jogi alapelvei alapján a Bszi. 76. § (5) bekezdése és 77/A. § (2) bekezdése az uniós jogi normák követelményeire tekintettel úgy értelmezhető, hogy a felperesnek a II. rendű alperes pályázatokat eredménytelennek nyilvánító határozataival szemben az azokat meghozó II. rendű alperes elnöke II. rendű alperessel szemben van kereshetőségi joga, függetlenül attól, hogy a nemzeti jog kifejezetten és közvetlenül ezt nem teszi lehetővé. Ennek elvitatása ugyanis kiüresítené azt a hatékony bírói jogvédelemhez való jogot, amelyet a Kúria felülvizsgálati határozatában megállapíthatónak tartott. 

    (...)

    [60] A Kúria az Mfv.X.10.251/2019/12. számú végzésében az Európai Unió Bíróságának C-585/18., C-624/18. és C-625/18. számú egyesített ügyekben kifejtett – az EUSZ. 2. és 19. cikkei, valamint az Alapjogi Charta 47. cikke rendelkezéseiben meghatározott – jogelvek figyelembevételével a Bjt. 145 – 146. §-a általános jogorvoslati lehetőséget biztosító rendelkezéseit úgy értelmezte, hogy a perbeli esetben – a tételes jogi rendelkezésektől függetlenül – a felperest megilleti a bíróság előtti jogérvényesítés lehetősége az általa sérelmezett OBHE határozatokkal szemben. Ez az értelmezés felel meg az Alaptörvény XXVIII. cikk (1) bekezdésében foglalt bírósághoz fordulás, valamint a (7) bekezdésében elismert jogorvoslathoz való jog követelményének.

    (...)

    [69] Az anyagi jogszabályi rendelkezés hiánya azt eredményezi, hogy a II. rendű alperessel szemben a felperes igénye nem volt érvényesíthető. Ugyanakkor az a körülmény, hogy a felperesnek a II. rendű alperessel szemben nem állt fenn kereshetőségi joga, nem jelenti az EUSZ-ben és az Alapjogi Chartában lefektetett hatékony bírói jogvédelem elvének sérelmét, mert a felperes a pályázat eredménytelenné nyilvánításával összefüggésben jogorvoslattal élhetett a munkáltató III. rendű alperessel szemben.