Article 17 - Right to property
Article 52 - Scope and interpretation
Key facts of the case:
The case concerns the seizure with the purpose of confiscation of a car that belonged to a leasing company (A A/S) due to a criminal offence (reckless driving) committed by a driver (T) when he drove the car 103 km/h in a zone of maximum 50 km/h. The car had been leased to a company (B A/S) and put to the disposal of an employee (C) in that company. C was married to T and had lend the car to T on the night in question.
Thus, the car seized with the purpose of confiscation due to a criminal offence committed by T belonged to a third party (A A/S).
Key legal question raised by the Court:
Pursuant to section 133 a (2) (2) of the Danish Road Traffic Act (færdselsloven) vehicles must be confiscated in cases of certain criminal offences, including in cases of reckless driving, even if the vehicle is owned by a third party. However, this is not the case if the confiscation is disproportionately intrusive towards the owner, particularly considering the owner’s means of knowing that the vehicle would be used for such activities and possibility of taking all reasonable steps to ensure one’s economic position when handing over the vehicle.
Subsequent, the key legal issue was whether Articles 17 (1) and 52 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in general prohibit a national scheme in which seizure for the purpose of confiscation from a third party acting in good faith as a result of a criminal offence is possible.
Outcome of the case:
The Supreme Court did not find that Articles 17 (1) and 52 (1) in general prohibits any confiscation from a third party acting in good faith as a result of a criminal offence. Instead the Supreme Court assumed that an overall assessment of the Danish national confiscation scheme in the light of the principle of proportionality must be made. In this context, the Supreme Court found that the Danish scheme was not generally in breach of the mentioned Charter articles.
The Supreme Court found that the seizure with the purpose of confiscation was legal in the specific case, and that the final assessment of the legality of the confiscation must be made in the later criminal proceedings against the driver (T). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also did not find that the car could be returned even if security was provided by the leasing company.
Assessment according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The question is thus whether Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union together with Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property, entails that confiscation will not be possible. It follows from the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 June 2022 (UfR 2022.3840) that confiscation (and seizure for the purpose of confiscation) in the present case falls within the scope of EU law, cf. Article 51 (1) of the Charter and that i.a. Article 17 (1) consequently applies.
According to the first sentence in Article 17 (1) everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. According to the second sentence in Article 17 (1) no one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. According to third sentence in Article 17 (1) the use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.
According to Article 52 (1) of the Charter any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
The question is first whether seizure for the purpose of confiscation is precluded in the present case for the mere reason, that confiscation from a third party acting in good faith as a result of a criminal offence is in general contrary to Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) of the Charter.
In support of this A has referred to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 14 January 2021 in case C-393/19, OM, concerning an instance in which an employer had a tractor unit confiscated, which an employed driver had used for smuggling. In it the Court states i.a. that “[g]iven that the confiscation of property, that is to say, the definitive deprivation of the right of ownership in respect of that property, substantially affects the rights of persons, it must be noted that as regards a third party acting in good faith, who did not know and could not have known that his or her property was used to commit an offence, such confiscation constitutes, in the light of the objective pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of his or her right to property” (paragraph 55). The Court also states that “a national rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not comply with the right to property enshrined in Article 17 (1) of the Charter, in so far as it provides that the property of a third party acting in good faith used to commit an aggravated smuggling offence may be the subject of a confiscation measure” (paragraph 56). In conclusion, the Court states that Article 17 (1) of the Charter is “precluding national legislation that permits the confiscation of an instrumentality used to commit an aggravated smuggling offence, where that property belongs to a third party acting in good faith” (paragraph 58).
Even though the paragraphs in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union are partly formulated in general terms, it must be assumed that they must be understood in the light of the specific case, which concerned smuggling of antique coins. Specifically, the case concerned a provision in the Bulgarian Criminal Code in which “the means of transport or container used to transport the smuggled goods shall be seized for the benefit of the State, including where it does not belong to the perpetrator of the criminal offence, unless its value does not correspond to the severity of the offence.” Apart from instances where the value of the means of transport or the container does not correspond to the severity of the offence, it does not appear that under the Bulgarian law an exception to the rule concerning confiscation could be made, including that it had to be assessed whether the concerned third party acted in good faith, and whether confiscation would otherwise be particularly burdensome. In that connection, it does not appear that it should be emphasised whether the third party had a claim for damages towards the perpetrator, so that losses from the confiscation was covered.
Thus, the Supreme Court finds that the judgment does not provide a basis for assuming that any arrangement of confiscation against a third party acting in good faith as a result of a criminal offence is contrary to Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) of the Charter. It must be assumed – in line with case law under the European Convention on Human Rights, cf. below – that an overall assessment of the arrangement in question must be made particularly in light of a principle of proportionality.
Concerning the arrangement according to section 133 a (2) (2) of the Road Traffic Act, the Supreme Court notes that its purpose is to counteract and prevent particularly serious violations of the law that expose other people to life-threatening risks, and which, as stated in the prepatory works, is almost impossible for those concerned to protect themselves against. According to the section, confiscation must be avoided in cases where it would be disproportionately intrusive towards the owner of the vehicle, and this assessment must include, among other things, the vigilance shown by the owner and whether the owner can recover his loss by claiming compensation against the driver of the vehicle. The Road Traffic Act contains rules to ensure the owner's position in proceedings concerning the confiscation, including the public appointment of a lawyer and the possibility of claiming compensation from the driver.
The Supreme Court finds that the confiscation arrangement in the Road Traffic Act differs so significantly from the Bulgarian arrangement, which was the basis of the Court of Justice of the European Union's judgment in the OM case, that the judgment does not provide grounds to assume that the arrangement in the Road Traffic Act is in breach of Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) of the Charter. Furthermore, the Supreme Court finds that there is no other basis for assuming that the arrangement is in breach of the aforementioned articles. Especially with regard to the issue of discrimination between leasing companies and financial companies, which i.a. has security or ownership reservation in a confiscated car, it should be noted that this is a consequence of the general principle in section 76 (3) of the Criminal Act which applies to all confiscation, and not a special rule for confiscation according to section 133 a (2) (2) of the Road Traffic Act.
However, in the individual cases of confiscation pursuant to section 133 a (2) (2) of the Road Traffic Act, it must be ensured that the owner's rights according to Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) of the Charter are respected. This entails that confiscation cannot take place if, according to an individual assessment, it would be in breach of these articles.
The question of whether, in the present case, it is contrary to Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) to confiscate A's car, must be decided in the criminal proceedings against T on the basis of the information available at this time. On grounds of the present facts, where, as stated above, no circumstances have been disclosed that provide grounds for assuming that A will suffer financial loss in the event of confiscation, the Supreme Court finds that there is reason to assume that confiscation will not be contrary to the articles.
Summary and conclusion
On these grounds, the Supreme Court finds that there is reason to assume that the car in question in the criminal proceedings against T for violation of the Road Traffic Act should be confiscated which entails that confiscation will not be in breach of Article 17 (1) and Article 52 (1) of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights or Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Supreme Court therefore rules that the conditions for seizure have been met and consequently upholds the High Court’s ruling.
Bedømmelse efter EU’s Charter om grundlæggende rettigheder
Spørgsmålet er herefter, om artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1, i EU’s Charter om grundlæggende rettigheder, sammenholdt med rammeafgørelse 2005/212/ RIA af 24. februar 2005 om konfiskation af udbytte, redskaber og formuegoder fra strafbart forhold, indebærer, at konfiskation ikke vil kunne ske. Det følger af Højesterets kendelse af 28. juni 2022 (UfR 2022.3840), at konfiskation (og beslaglæggelse med henblik på konfiskation) i den foreliggende sag henhører under EU-rettens anvendelsesområde, jf. charterets artikel 51, stk. 1, og at bl.a. artikel 17, stk. 1, derfor finder anvendelse.
Efter artikel 17, stk. 1, 1. pkt., har enhver ret til at besidde lovligt erhvervet ejendom, at anvende den, at træffe dispositioner med den og at lade den gå i arv. Efter 2. pkt. må ingen berøves sin ejendom, medmindre det skønnes nødvendigt i samfundets interesse, og det sker i de tilfælde og på de betingelser, der er fastsat ved lov, og mod rimelig og rettidig erstatning for tabet. Efter 3. pkt. kan anvendelsen af ejendommen reguleres ved lov, i det omfang det er nødvendigt af hensyn til almenvellet.
Efter charterets artikel 52, stk. 1, skal enhver begrænsning i udøvelsen af de rettigheder og friheder, der anerkendes ved charteret, være fastlagt i lovgivningen og respektere disse rettigheders og friheders væsentligste indhold. Under iagttagelse af proportionalitetsprincippet kan der kun indføres begrænsninger, såfremt de er nødvendige og faktisk svarer til mål af almen interesse, der er anerkendt af Unionen, eller et behov for beskyttelse af andres rettigheder og friheder.
Spørgsmålet er i første række, om beslaglæggelse med henblik på konfiskation i den foreliggende sag er udelukket, allerede fordi konfiskation over for en tredjemand i god tro på grund af strafbart forhold generelt er i strid med charterets artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1.
Til støtte for dette har A henvist til EU-Domstolens dom af 14. januar 2021 i sag C-393/19, OM, vedrørende et tilfælde, hvor en arbejdsgiver fik konfiskeret en sættevognstrækker, som en ansat chauffør havde anvendt til smugleri. Her anfører Domstolen bl.a., at ”[h]enset til den væsentlige påvirkning af personers rettigheder, som konfiskation af et formuegode medfører, nemlig den endelige fratagelse af ejendomsretten til dette, bemærkes imidlertid, at hvad angår en tredjemand i god tro, som ikke vidste og ikke kunne vide, at hans formuegode blev anvendt til at begå en lovovertrædelse, indebærer en sådan konfiskation, når henses til det forfulgte formål, et uforholdsmæssigt og uantageligt indgreb over for det centrale indhold af denne persons ejendomsret” (præmis 55). Domstolen anfører også, at ”en national lovgivning som den i hovedsagen omhandlede ikke overholder ejendomsretten, der er sikret ved chartrets artikel 17, stk. 1, for så vidt som den fastsætter, at formuegoder, der tilhører en tredjemand i god tro, og som anvendes til at begå alvorligt smugleri, kan gøres til genstand for konfiskation” (præmis 56). Som konklusion anfører Domstolen, at charterets artikel 17, stk. 1, er ”til hinder for en national lovgivning, der gør det muligt at konfiskere et redskab, der er blevet anvendt til at begå alvorligt smugleri, når dette tilhører en tredjemand i god tro” (præmis 58).
Selv om præmisserne i EU-Domstolens dom til dels er generelt formuleret, må det antages, at de skal forstås i lyset af den konkrete sag, der vedrørte smugleri af antikke mønter. Sagen angik nærmere en bestemmelse i den bulgarske straffelov, hvorefter ”transportmidlet eller den beholder, der er anvendt til transport af de smuglede varer, konfiskeres til fordel for staten, også når det/den ikke tilhører gerningsmanden, medmindre dets/dens værdi ikke svarer til den strafbare handlings grovhed.” Bortset fra tilfælde, hvor værdien af transportmidlet eller beholderen ikke svarer til den strafbare handlings grovhed, fremgår det ikke, at der efter den bulgarske lov kunne gøres undtagelse fra reglen om konfiskation, herunder at det skulle vurderes, om den pågældende tredjemand var i god tro, og om konfiskation i øvrigt ville være særligt byrdefuld. Det fremgår i den forbindelse ikke, at der skulle lægges vægt på, om tredjemand havde et erstatningskrav over for gerningsmanden, således at tab ved konfiskationen herved blev dækket.
Højesteret finder herefter, at dommen ikke giver grundlag for at antage, at enhver ordning om konfiskation over for en tredjemand i god tro som følge af strafbart forhold er i strid med EUCharterets artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1. Det må således – på linje med praksis efter Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention, jf. herom nedenfor – antages, at der skal anlægges en samlet vurdering af den pågældende ordning navnlig i lyset af et proportionalitetsprincip.
Om ordningen efter færdselslovens § 133 a, stk. 2, 2. pkt., bemærker Højesteret, at den har til formål at modvirke og forebygge særligt alvorlige overtrædelser af loven, der udsætter andre mennesker for livsfare, og som det som anført i forarbejderne er tæt på umuligt for de pågældende at værne sig imod. Efter bestemmelsen skal konfiskation undlades i tilfælde, hvor den vil være uforholdsmæssigt indgribende over for køretøjets ejer, og det skal her bl.a. indgå, hvilken agtpågivenhed ejeren har udvist, og om ejeren kan få dækket sit tab ved erstatningskrav mod føreren af køretøjet. Færdselsloven indeholder regler, der skal sikre ejerens stilling i konfiskationssagen, herunder om offentlig beskikkelse af advokat og mulighed for at gøre erstatningskrav gældende over for føreren.
Højesteret finder, at færdselslovens konfiskationsordning adskiller sig så væsentligt fra den bulgarske ordning, som lå til grund for EU-Domstolens dom i OM-sagen, at dommen ikke giver grundlag for at antage, at færdselslovens ordning er i strid med EU-Charterets artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1. Højesteret finder endvidere, at der heller ikke i øvrigt er grundlag for at antage, at ordningen er i strid med de nævnte bestemmelser. Særligt med hensyn til spørgsmålet om forskelsbehandling mellem leasingselskaber og finansielle virksomheder, der f.eks. har sikkerhed eller ejendomsforbehold i en konfiskeret bil, bemærkes, at der er tale om en konsekvens af det almindelige princip i straffelovens § 76, stk. 3, som gælder for al konfiskation, og ikke om en særlig regel for konfiskation efter færdselslovens § 133 a, stk. 2, 2. pkt.
Det skal imidlertid i de enkelte sager om konfiskation efter færdselslovens § 133 a, stk. 2, 2. pkt., sikres, at ejerens rettigheder efter EU-Charterets artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1, respekteres. Det indebærer, at der ikke kan ske konfiskation, hvis det efter en konkret vurdering vil være i strid med disse bestemmelser.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt det i den foreliggende sag er i strid med artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1, at konfiskere A’ bil, skal afgøres under straffesagen mod T på grundlag af de oplysninger, som på dette tidspunkt foreligger. På det foreliggende grundlag, hvor der som anført ovenfor ikke er oplyst omstændigheder, der giver grundlag for at antage, at A i tilfælde af konfiskation vil lide økonomisk tab, finder Højesteret, at der er grund til at antage, at konfiskation ikke vil være i strid med bestemmelsen.
Sammenfatning og konklusion
Efter det anførte finder Højesteret, at der er grund til at antage, at den omhandlede personbil under straffesagen mod T for overtrædelse af færdselsloven bør konfiskeres, herunder at konfiskation ikke vil være i strid med artikel 17, stk. 1, og artikel 52, stk. 1, i EU’s Charter om grundlæggende rettigheder eller artikel 1 i den første tillægsprotokol til Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention.
Højesteret tiltræder derfor, at betingelserne for beslaglæggelse er opfyldt, og stadfæster herefter landsrettens kendelse.
