Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Key facts of the case:
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte costituzionale.
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – European arrest warrant – Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA – Article 1(3) – Article 23(4) – Surrender procedures between Member States – Grounds for non-execution – Article 4(3) TEU – Duty of sincere cooperation – Postponement of the execution of the European arrest warrant – Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment – Serious, chronic and potentially irreversible illness – Risk of serious harm to health affecting the person concerned by the European arrest warrant.
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
Articles 1(3) and 23(4) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
must be interpreted as meaning that:
– where there are substantial grounds to believe that the surrender of a requested person in execution of a European arrest warrant manifestly risks endangering his or her health, the executing judicial authority may, exceptionally, postpone that surrender temporarily;
– where the executing judicial authority called upon to decide on the surrender of a requested person who is seriously ill in execution of a European arrest warrant concludes that there are substantial and established grounds for believing that that surrender would expose that person to a real risk of a significant reduction in his or her life expectancy or of a rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration in his or her state of health, it must postpone that surrender and ask the issuing judicial authority to provide all information relating to the conditions under which it intends to prosecute or detain that person and to the possibility of adapting those conditions to his or her state of health in order to prevent such a risk from materialising;
– if, in the light of the information provided by the issuing judicial authority and all the other information available to the executing judicial authority, it appears that that risk cannot be ruled out within a reasonable period of time, the executing judicial authority must refuse to execute the European arrest warrant. On the other hand, if that risk can be ruled out within such a period of time, a new surrender date must be agreed with the issuing judicial authority.
1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24) (‘Framework Decision 2002/584’), read in the light of Articles 3, 4 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
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3) Recitals 6 and 12 of Framework Decision 2002/584 are worded as follows:
‘(6) The European arrest warrant provided for in this Framework Decision is the first concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the principle of mutual recognition which the European Council referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation.
…
(12) This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 [TEU] and reflected in the [Charter], in particular Chapter VI thereof. …’
17) That is the case, according to the case-law of the Court, where the execution of a European arrest warrant exposes the requested person to the risk of suffering inhuman or degrading conditions of detention in the issuing Member State as a result of systemic or generalised deficiencies or deficiencies which may affect certain groups of people, or certain places of detention, or to the risk of being subject to proceedings which do not respect the guarantees laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies in so far as concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary.
20) In those circumstances, the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 1(3) of [Framework Decision 2002/584], examined in the light of Articles 3, 4 and 35 of the [Charter], be interpreted as meaning that, where it considers that the surrender of a person suffering from a serious chronic and potentially irreversible disease may expose that person to the risk of suffering serious harm to his or her health, the executing judicial authority must request that the issuing judicial authority provide information [allowing] the existence of such a risk to be ruled out, and must refuse to surrender the person in question if it does not obtain assurances to that effect within a reasonable period of time?’
28) By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in the light of Articles 3, 4 and 35 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority called upon to decide on the surrender, in execution of a European arrest warrant, of a person suffering from a serious chronic and potentially irreversible illness concludes that that surrender could expose that person to the risk of suffering serious harm to his or her health, it must request from the issuing judicial authority the information enabling such a risk to be ruled out and is required to refuse to execute that surrender if it does not obtain, within a reasonable period of time, the assurances required to rule out that risk.
38) That said, that discretion must be exercised in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter, which prohibits, inter alia, inhuman and degrading treatment, since such a prohibition is absolute in that it is closely linked to respect for human dignity, the subject of Article 1 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 85, and of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 57).
39) In that regard, it cannot be ruled out that the surrender of a person who is seriously ill may cause that person to be exposed to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, either as a result of or, in certain circumstances, regardless of the level of quality of the care available in the issuing Member State (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 February 2017, C. K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 73).
42) It follows that, in a situation where the executing judicial authority has, in the light of the objective material before it, substantial and established grounds for believing that the surrender of the requested person, who is seriously ill, would expose him or her to a real risk of a significant reduction in his or her life expectancy or of a rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration in his or her state of health, that authority is required, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter, to exercise the power provided for in Article 23(4) of Framework Decision 2002/584 by deciding to postpone the surrender.
47) It follows that, in the situation referred to in paragraph 42 of the present judgment, where the executing judicial authority decides, by way of exception, to postpone temporarily the surrender of the requested person on the basis of Article 23(4) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in conjunction with Article 4 of the Charter, it must ask the issuing judicial authority to provide it with all the information necessary to ensure that the manner in which the criminal proceedings on which the European arrest warrant is based will be conducted or the conditions of any detention of that person make it possible to rule out the risk referred to in that paragraph (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 95).
53) In such a case, the executing judicial authority cannot, in accordance with Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, interpreted in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, give effect to the European arrest warrant (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 104, and, by analogy, of 1 June 2016, Bob-Dogi, C‑241/15, EU:C:2016:385, paragraph 66).
54) In those circumstances, it does not appear necessary to interpret Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584 in the light of Articles 3 and 35 of the Charter.
55) In the light of all the grounds set out above, the answer to the question referred is that Article 1(3) and Article 23(4) of Framework Decision 2002/584, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that:
