CJEU Case C-743/24 / Judgment
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CJEU Case C-743/24 / Judgment
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part – Surrender of a person to the United Kingdom for criminal prosecution – Risk of breach of a fundamental right – Second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law – Changes, to the detriment of the sentenced person, to the licence regime
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
The second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the application, to a person who may be sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment, of a regime under which that person must serve at least two thirds of a fixed custodial period before being eligible for release on licence, such release is conditional upon a specialised authority finding that the continued imprisonment of that person is no longer necessary for the protection of society and that person is necessarily eligible for release on licence one year before the end of the sentence imposed, does not constitute the imposition of a heavier penalty, when, under the rules applicable on the date of the alleged commission of the offences at issue, he or she should automatically have been eligible for release on licence after having served half of that sentence. -
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
22. By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the application, to a person who may be sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment, of a regime under which that person must serve at least two thirds of a fixed custodial period before being eligible for release on licence, such release is conditional upon a specialised authority finding that the continued imprisonment of that person is no longer necessary for the protection of society and that person is necessarily eligible for release on licence one year before the end of the sentence imposed, constitutes the imposition of a heavier penalty, when, under the rules applicable on the date of the alleged commission of the offences at issue, he or she should automatically have been eligible for release on licence after having served half of that sentence.
23. The second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter provides that no heavier penalty is to be imposed than that which was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
24. It follows from the case-law of the Court that Article 49 of the Charter contains, at the very least, the same guarantees as those provided for in Article 7 ECHR which must be taken into account by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter as a minimum threshold of protection (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).
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29. Accordingly, a measure relating to the execution of a sentence will be incompatible with the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter only if it retroactively alters the actual scope of the penalty provided for on the date on which the offence at issue was allegedly committed, thus entailing the imposition of a heavier penalty than the one initially provided for. Although that is not, in any event, the case where that measure merely delays the eligibility threshold for release on licence, the position may be different, in particular if that measure essentially repeals the possibility of release on licence or if it forms part of a series of measures which have the effect of increasing the intrinsic seriousness of the sentence initially provided for (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 97).
30. It follows from the foregoing that the fact that national legislation provides, in the case of offences committed before its entry into force, for the extension of the part of a prison sentence which must necessarily be served in custody before release on licence may be ordered cannot, taken in isolation, entail an infringement of the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.
31. However, the question referred concerns changes to a licence regime which go beyond merely extending the eligibility threshold for such release. Those changes have the specific feature of calling into question a rule under which release on licence had to occur automatically when half of the sentence had been served. They thus replace that rule with a system in which release on licence, as a first step, is subject to an assessment of the dangerousness of the sentenced person by a specialised authority, after a predetermined part of the sentence imposed has been served, and then, as a second step, must occur automatically one year before the end of that sentence.
32. It is true that such a change leads, in itself, to a hardening of the detention situation. Thus, that change creates uncertainty as to when the release on licence of a sentenced person will occur and may mean, in certain cases, that such release will occur only in the final year of the sentence imposed, whereas, under the rules applicable on the date of the alleged commission of the offences at issue, that person had the certainty that he or she would automatically benefit from that regime on a date before that final year.
33. That being said, it is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraphs 27 and 29 above that the fact that changes to the licence regime lead to a hardening of the detention situation does not necessarily have to be regarded as entailing the imposition of a heavier penalty, within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.
34. That finding stems from the separation between the concept of ‘penalty’, understood as being the sentence handed down or capable of being handed down, on the one hand, and that of measures relating to the ‘execution’ or ‘enforcement’ of the penalty, on the other. It applies not only to the extension of the eligibility threshold for release on licence, but also to changes to other conditions to which the grant of a release on licence is subject or to the procedural rules governing such a grant.
35. Thus, in so far as those changes do not, in essence, repeal the possibility of such release and do not lead to an increase in the intrinsic seriousness of the penalty provided for on the date of the alleged commission of the offences at issue, their application to offences committed before their entry into force does not infringe the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.
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46. In those circumstances, neither the fact that changes to the licence regime such as those at issue in the main proceedings concern only certain categories of sentenced persons nor the reasons underlying those changes mean that they are incompatible with the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter. That fact and those reasons have no implications in terms of the effects of those changes on the objective situation of those persons, with the result that they cannot, as such, lead to the conclusion that those changes entail the application of a heavier penalty to those persons.47. In the light of all those factors, the answer to the question referred is that the second sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the application, to a person who may be sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment, of a regime under which that person must serve at least two thirds of a fixed custodial period before being eligible for release on licence, such release is conditional upon a specialised authority finding that the continued imprisonment of that person is no longer necessary for the protection of society and that person is necessarily eligible for release on licence one year before the end of the sentence imposed, does not constitute the imposition of a heavier penalty, when, under the rules applicable on the date of the alleged commission of the offences at issue, he or she should automatically have been eligible for release on licence after having served half of that sentence.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)