CJEU Case C-746/18 / Judgment

Criminal proceedings against H. K.
Policy area
Justice, freedom and security
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Grand Chamber)
Type
Decision
Decision date
02/03/2021
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2021:152
  • CJEU Case C-746/18 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus.

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector – Directive 2002/58/EC – Providers of electronic communications services – Confidentiality of the communications – Limitations – Article 15(1) – Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Legislation providing for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data by providers of electronic communications services – Access of national authorities to retained data for the purpose of investigations – Combating of crime in general – Authorisation given by the public prosecutor’s office – Use of data in criminal proceedings as evidence – Admissibility.

     

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits public authorities to have access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses and to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning his or her private life, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, without such access being confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime or prevent serious threats to public security, and that is so regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity or nature of the data available in respect of such a period.
    2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that confers upon the public prosecutor’s office, whose task is to direct the criminal pre-trial procedure and to bring, where appropriate, the public prosecution in subsequent proceedings, the power to authorise access of a public authority to traffic and location data for the purposes of a criminal investigation.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ 2002 L 201, p. 37), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 (OJ 2009 L 337, p. 11) (‘Directive 2002/58’), read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

    ...

    19) H. K. lodged an appeal on a point of law against the latter judgment before the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia), contesting, inter alia, the admissibility of the reports drawn up on the basis of the data obtained from the provider of electronic communications services. In her submission, it follows from the judgment of 21 December 2016, Tele2 Sverige and Watson and Others (C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, Tele2, EU:C:2016:970), that the provisions of Paragraph 1111 of the Law on electronic communications which lay down the obligation on service providers to retain communications data, as well as the use of such data for the purpose of her conviction, are contrary to Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter.

    20) According to the referring court, the question arises whether the reports drawn up on the basis of data referred to in Paragraph 1111(2) of the Law on electronic communications may be regarded as constituting admissible evidence. That court observes that the admissibility of the reports at issue in the main proceedings as evidence depends on the question of the extent to which the gathering of the data on the basis of which those reports were drawn up was in conformity with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter.

    21) The referring court considers that, in order to answer that question, it needs to be determined whether Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the access of State authorities to data making it possible to identify the source and destination of a telephone communication from a suspect’s landline or mobile telephone, to determine the date, time, duration and type of that communication, to identify the communications equipment used and to establish the location of the mobile communication equipment used amounts to interference with the fundamental rights at issue which is so serious that such access should be restricted to combating serious crime, regardless of the period in respect of which the State authorities have sought access to the retained data.

    ...

    26) It was in those circumstances that the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

    1. 'Is Article 15(1) of Directive [2002/58], in conjunction with Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the [Charter], to be interpreted as meaning that in criminal proceedings the access of State authorities to data making it possible to establish the source and destination, the date, the time, the duration and the type of the communication, the terminal used and the location of the mobile terminal used, in relation to a telephone or mobile telephone communication of a suspect, constitutes so serious an interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in those articles of the Charter that that access in the area of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences must be restricted to the fighting of serious crime, regardless of the period to which the retained data to which the State authorities have access relate?
    2. Is Article 15(1) of Directive [2002/58], on the basis of the principle of proportionality expressed in the judgment of [2 October 2018, Ministerio Fiscal (C‑207/16, EU:C:2018:788)], paragraphs 55 to 57, to be interpreted as meaning that, if the amount of data mentioned in the first question, to which the State authorities have access, is not large (both in terms of the type of data and in terms of its temporal extent), the associated interference with fundamental rights is justified by the objective of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences generally, and that the greater the amount of data to which the State authorities have access, the more serious the criminal offences which are intended to be fought by the interference must be?
    3. Does the requirement mentioned in the judgment of [21 December 2016, Tele2 (C‑203/15 and C‑698/15, EU:C:2016:970)], second point of the operative part, that the data access of the competent State authorities must be subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority mean that Article 15(1) of Directive [2002/58] must be interpreted as meaning that the public prosecutor’s office which directs the pre-trial procedure, with it being obliged by law to act independently and only being bound by the law, and ascertains the circumstances both incriminating and exonerating the accused in the pre-trial procedure, but later represents the public prosecution in the judicial proceedings, may be regarded as an independent administrative authority?'

     

    27) By its first and second questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits public authorities to have access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses and to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning his or her private life, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, without such access being confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime, regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity and the nature of the data available in respect of such a period.

    ...

    30) In this connection, the Court has also held that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, precludes legislative measures which, for such purposes, provide, as a preventive measure, for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18, EU:C:2020:791, paragraph 168).

    ...

    33) So far as concerns the objective of preventing, investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences, which is pursued by the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in accordance with the principle of proportionality only action to combat serious crime and measures to prevent serious threats to public security are capable of justifying serious interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, such as the interference entailed by the retention of traffic and location data, whether the retention be general and indiscriminate or targeted. Accordingly, only non-serious interference with those fundamental rights may be justified by the objective, pursued by the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, of preventing, investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences in general (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2020, La Quadrature du Net and Others, C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18EU:C:2020:791, paragraphs 140 and 146).

    ...

    39) However, the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter that is entailed by a public authority’s access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses, is in any event serious regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity or nature of the data available in respect of such a period, when, as in the main proceedings, that set of data is liable to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private life of the person or persons concerned.

    ...

    45) In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first and second questions is that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits public authorities to have access to a set of traffic or location data, that are liable to provide information regarding the communications made by a user of a means of electronic communication or regarding the location of the terminal equipment which he or she uses and to allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning his or her private life, for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, without such access being confined to procedures and proceedings to combat serious crime or prevent serious threats to public security, and that is so regardless of the length of the period in respect of which access to those data is sought and the quantity or nature of the data available in respect of such a period.

    46) By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that confers upon the public prosecutor’s office, whose task is to direct the criminal pre-trial procedure and to bring, where appropriate, the public prosecution in subsequent proceedings, the power to authorise access of a public authority to traffic and location data for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

    ...

    59) Accordingly, the answer to the third question referred for a preliminary ruling is that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation that confers upon the public prosecutor’s office, whose task is to direct the criminal pre-trial procedure and to bring, where appropriate, the public prosecution in subsequent proceedings, the power to authorise access of a public authority to traffic and location data for the purposes of a criminal investigation.