Article 41 - Right to good administration
Article 42 - Right of access to documents
Key facts of the case:
The case concerned two extraordinary measures adopted by the Ministry of Health during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff requested access to the documentation (background materials) that formed the basis on which the emergency measures were taken. He argued that the procedures for adopting the extraordinary measures were administrative procedures within the meaning of the Code of Administrative Procedure, and that he was a party to these proceedings. As such, pursuant to the Code of Administrative Procedure and Article 42 of the Charter, he had the right to access the file of the procedure. The Ministry of Health rejected his request, arguing that the emergency measures were measures of a general nature (Art. 171 of the Code of Administrative Procedure) and the procedures for their adoption were not administrative procedures in their nature. Thus the plaintiff could not be a party to the procedures within the meaning of the Code of Administrative Procedure, and the provisions of this law were not applicable in this case. The plaintiff filed an administrative action against the decision, but the lower court dismissed the action. The court stated, among others things, that Article 42 of the Charter was applicable only in the case of the application of EU law. The plaintiff filed a cassational complaint. He argued that the conclusions of the lower authorities were contrary to Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.
Key legal questions raised by the Court:
Are state authorities bound by Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, or do these Articles apply only to the insitutions of the European Union?
Outcome of the case:
The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Ministry of Health and the lower court, stating that even if principles arising from the Charter were applicable to the case, this would not mean that the Ministry of Health was obliged to give access to the file of the case.
The Supreme Administrative Court stated that Articles 41 and 42 are applicable only to the institutions of the European Union, and it backed this conclusion also by qutiong a decision of the CJEU (joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12). It further stated that given the nature of the procedures (they were not administrative procedures within the meaning of the Code of Administrative Procedure), the Ministry of Health was not obliged to give access to the files, and the plaintiff was not a party to these procedures. The Supreme Administrative Court stated that the provisions of the Charter would not impose such an obligation even if they were applicable to the case.
The Municipal Court also considered the argument based on Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be meaningless, as it applies to European Union institutions and not to Member States, and it is therefore irrelevant to the case under consideration, notwithstanding the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is applicable only in the case of the application of EU law (Article 51 (1)).
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According to the plaintiff, the Municipal Court also disregarded the fact that the defendant's conduct was in breach of Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive 2011/24 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011, on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Directive on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare’).
Article 41 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that everyone has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union. According to paragraph 2, letter (b), this right includes, in particular, the right of everyone to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy. The interpretation of this provision has already been addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which, in joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, concluded that 'it is clear from the wording of Article 41 of the Charter that it is addressed not to the Member States but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see, to that effect, the judgment in Cicala, C 482/10, EU:C:2011:868, paragraph 28)'. It cannot therefore agree with the plaintiff that it is relevant in this case whether or not the defendant has applied European Union law when issuing emergency measures. Even if the plaintiff applied it and the principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could be applied to the case, a principle requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiff access to the file cannot be deduced from EU law.
Za nesmyslnou městský soud považoval i argumentaci ustanovením čl. 42 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie, neboť se vztahuje na orgány Evropské unie, nikoli členských států a pro posuzovanou věc je proto irelevantní, nehledě na to, že Listina základních práv Evropské unie je aplikovatelná pouze v případě uplatňování unijního práva (čl. 51 odst. 1).
Městský soud rovněž podle stěžovatele pominul skutečnost, že jednání žalovaného je v rozporu s čl. 168 Smlouvy o fungování Evropské unie, s čl. 41 Listiny základních práv Evropské Unie a směrnicí Evropského parlamentu a Rady 2011/24/EU ze dne 9. března 2011, o uplatňování práv pacientů v přeshraniční zdravotní péči (dále jen „směrnice o uplatňování práv pacientů v přeshraniční zdravotní péči“).
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Ustanovení čl. 41 odst. 1 Listiny základních práv Evropské Unie stanoví, že každý má právo na to, aby jeho záležitosti byly orgány, institucemi a jinými subjekty Unie řešeny nestranně, spravedlivě a v přiměřené lhůtě. Podle odst. 2 písm. b) pak toto právo zahrnuje především právo každého na přístup ke spisu, který se jej týká, při respektování oprávněných zájmů důvěrnosti a profesního a obchodního tajemství. Výkladem tohoto ustanovení se již zabýval Soudní dvůr Evropské unie, který v rozsudku ze dne 17. 7. 2014 ve spojených věcech C-141/12 a C-372/12 dospěl k závěru, že „ze znění článku 41 Listiny tedy jasně vyplývá, že toto ustanovení je určeno nikoliv členským státům, nýbrž výlučně orgánům, institucím a jiným subjektům Unie (v tomto smyslu viz rozsudek Cicala, C-482/10, EU:C:2011:868, bod 28)“. Nelze tedy dát stěžovateli zapravdu v tom, že by v projednávané věci bylo významné, zda žalovaný při vydávání mimořádných opatření aplikoval právo Evropské unie, či nikoliv. I kdyby jej totiž aplikoval a na věc by bylo možné vztáhnout zásady zakotvené v Listině základních práv Evropské unie, není možné z evropského práva dovodit princip, který by vyžadoval povinnost žalovaného umožnit v dané věci stěžovateli nahlédnout do spisu.
