Article 21 - Non-discrimination
Article 15 - Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work
Key facts of tke case:
The case concerns an appeal lodged before the Council of State against decision No 1651/2016 of the Athens Administrative Court of Appeals, adjudicating in the first instance. The contested decision rejected the appellant’s petition for the annulment of an act issued by the Director of Secondary Education -Athens Administrative District A, which found that her employment relationship was terminated automatically due to the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Article 155 (2) of the Code of Civil Servants, i.e. her reaching the age of 60 years, having completed thirty-five years of actual service (not including unpaid leave etc.) counting towards retirement, in accordance with the applicable law on the pensions of public employees. Article 155 (2) provides that “1. A public employee shall be automatically dismissed from service upon reaching the age of 65 years. 2. Exceptionally a public employee shall be automatically dismissed from service at the age of 60 years, having completed thirty-five (35) years of actual service counting towards retirement."
Key legal question:
The key legal question brought forward for the Court’s consideration was whether the provision of Article 155 (2) of the Code of Civil Servants, in so far as it mandates the automatic dismissal of public employees - including primary and secondary education teachers - upon them reaching the age of 60, having completed thirty-five (35) years of actual service - is contrary to the provisions of Directive 2000/78/ EC, Law 3304/2005 (ratifying Protocol 14 ECHR) and Law 4443/2016 (transposing Directive 2000/78/ EC), as well as Articles 2 par. 1 (dignity), 4 par. 1 (equality), 5 par. 1 (freedom to develop one’s personality and to participate in the social, economic and political life) and 17 (right to property) and 22 (right to employment) of the Greek Constitution, articles 15 and 21 of the CFREU, and article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR.
Outcome of the case:
The appeal was dismissed as unfounded. The court found that the relevant national law provision did not run contrary to the provisions of the CFREU, Directive 2000/78/ EC, the Greek Constitution or the ECHR . Moreover, the court dismissed the appellant’s argument that the contested provision of the Code of Civil Servants infringes the principles of impartiality and transparency, primarily due to the fact that these principles are unrelated and not applicable to the issue regulated in that provision.
According to established case law, the purpose of article 155 of the Code of Civil Servants is: (a) to create a balance between younger and senior civil servants, allowing for the transfer of experience from senior staff to the younger employees, as well as of the new knowledge acquired recently by the younger employees to the senior staff, in the interest of the effective functioning of public services and (b) facilitating access to positions in the public sector for younger persons, which, in conjunction with similar provisions in other sectors, can contribute to the increase of young people's employment. Especially as regards teachers, this balance between younger and older employees also serves towards providing better education to students, who will benefit both from the experience and depth of knowledge of senior teachers and the knowledge younger teachers have acquired more recently, as well as their different approaches to various issues. The exceptional provision for the retirement of public employees at the age of 60 on the condition that they have completed thirty-five years of actual service counting towards retirement, serves all the more towards accomplishing the abovementioned goals while allowing teachers to have a long career and receive a full pension. In addition, in accordance with Article 6 (1) of the Directive, differences in treatment directly related to age, such as those established in article 155 (2) of the Code of Civil Servants between public employees who have reached the age of 60, having completed 35 years of actual service, on the one hand, and employees who have either not reached the age of 60 or have been retired at the age of 65 on the other, are permitted if introduced to serve a legitimate aim and the means used to achieve it are suitable and necessary. Necessity is established, among others, based on the balance between the damage inflicted on the individual and the benefits to the public. The court found that the abovementioned aims pass this proportionality assessment and that this established interpretation it adopted does not run contrary to articles 15 and 21 CFREU.
The court ruled that the termination of the employment relationship was lawful and the appeal was dismissed.
Finally, national authorities enjoy a broad margin of appreciation both in defining the specific aim and in selecting the measures to achieve it (see CJEU (ECJ) Hornfeldt, para. 32) and, consequently the relevant legislation may be amended to achieve different aims without this leading to the conclusion that the previous framework was contrary to the Directive (see CJEU (ECJ) Palacios de la Villa, para. 70, Fuchs και Kohler, para. 95 - 97). Thus, the fact that Article 59 (1) and (2) of Law 4369/2016 (A 33) [which subsequently amended article 155 of the Code of Civil Servants, after the contested decision was reached] provides that public employees are automatically dismissed from service upon reaching the age of 67 years without further distinction does not in any way lead to a contestation of the previous framework’s compliance with the Directive, disputed here. Therefore, the provision of Article 155 (2) of the Code of Civil Servants, as in force at the time the administrative act of dismissal was issued, is not contrary to Directive 2000/78/EC and laws 3304/2005 and 4443/2016. This interpretation and application of the Directive is clearly not in contravention of articles 21 and 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which enshrine, among others, the prohibition of discrimination based on age and the right to employment, respectively. Thus, these rights are not infringed by the contested provision (see the relevant CJEU judgement of 13.11.2014 C-416/13, VitalPerez, para. 24-25).
Since, in her [contested] petition for annulment the appellant argued that the declaratory administrative act on the termination of her employment was unlawful as the provision of article 155 (2) of the Code of Civil Servants is contrary to: (a) Directive 2000/78/EC and article 21 of the CFREU, as it introduces unlawful discrimination based on age; (b) articles 22 of the Greek Constitution and 15 of the CFREU, establishing the right to employment; (c) the constitutional principles of meritocracy, impartiality and transparency; (d) article 17 of the Greek Constitution and article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR, establishing the right to property; (e) articles 4 para. 1, 2 para. 1 and 5 para. 1 of the Greek Constitution, establishing the principle of equality, the protection of human dignity and the right to the free development of one’s personality. These grounds were dismissed by the contested decision. The Appellate Court’s judgement is sound, as demonstrated in thoughts 5 to 7. In particular, regarding the arguments on the aforementioned provision’s conflict with the principles of impartiality and transparency, these are unfounded primarily due to the fact that these principles are unrelated to the issue regulated in the provision. Hence, all grounds argued in the present appeal are rejected as unfounded, as is the appeal in its entirety.
Τέλος, οι εθνικές αρχές έχουν ευρύ περιθώριο εκτίμησης τόσο ως προς τον καθορισμό τού προς επίτευξη συγκεκριμένου σκοπού, όσο και ως προς την επιλογή των μέτρων, με τα οποία μπορεί αυτός να υλοποιηθεί (βλ. ΔΕΕ (ΔΕΚ) απόφαση Hornfeldt, ε.α., σκ. 32), και, ως εκ τούτου, η οικεία νομοθεσία μπορεί να τροποποιείται προκειμένου να επιτευχθούν διαφορετικοί σκοποί, χωρίς αυτό να σημαίνει ότι οι προηγούμενες ρυθμίσεις ήταν αντίθετες στην οδηγία (βλ. ΔΕΕ (ΔΕΚ) αποφάσεις Palacios de la Villa, ε.α., σκ. 70, Fuchs και Kohler, ε.α., σκ. 95 - 97). Συνεπώς, το γεγονός ότι με το άρθρο 59 παρ. 1 και 2 του ν. 4369/2016 (Α 33) προβλέφθηκε ότι οι υπάλληλοι απολύονται αυτοδικαίως από την υπηρεσία με τη συμπλήρωση του 67ου έτους της ηλικίας τους, χωρίς περαιτέρω διακρίσεις, ουδόλως μπορεί να θέσει εν αμφιβόλω τη συμφωνία προς την οδηγία των προγενέστερων και εν προκειμένω επίμαχων ρυθμίσεων. Επομένως, η διάταξη του άρθρου 155 παρ. 2 του ΥΚ, ως ίσχυε κατά τον κρίσιμο χρόνο δημοσίευσης της προσβαλλόμενης πράξης, δεν αντίκειται στην οδηγία 2000/78/ΕΚ και στους ν. 3304/2005 και 4443/2016. Η ερμηνεία και εφαρμογή αυτή της οδηγίας προφανώς δεν έρχεται σε αντίθεση προς τα άρθρα 21 και 15 του Χάρτη Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, με τα οποία κατοχυρώνονται, μεταξύ άλλων, η απαγόρευση των διακρίσεων λόγω ηλικίας και το δικαίωμα στην εργασία, αντίστοιχα. Συνεπώς, δεν τίθεται ζήτημα παραβίασης των δικαιωμάτων αυτών από την επίμαχη διάταξη (βλ. σχετ. απόφαση ΔΕΕ της 13.11.2014, C-416/13, VitalPerez, σκ. 24-25).
Επειδή, με την αίτηση ακυρώσεως προβλήθηκε ότι η διαπιστωτική πράξη περί λύσης της υπαλληλικής σχέσης της εκκαλούσας είναι μη νόμιμη, διότι η διάταξη του άρθρου 155 παρ. 2 του ΥΚ αντίκειται: α) στην οδηγία 2000/78/ΕΚ και στο άρθρο 21 του Χάρτη Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, διότι εισάγει αδικαιολόγητη διάκριση λόγω ηλικίας, β) στα άρθρα 22 του Συντάγματος και 15 του Χάρτη, που κατοχυρώνουν το δικαίωμα στην εργασία, γ) στις συνταγματικές αρχές της αξιοκρατίας, της αμεροληψίας και της διαφάνειας, δ) στο άρθρο 17 του Συντάγματος και το άρθρο 1 του πρώτου πρόσθετου πρωτοκόλλου της ΕΣΔΑ, που κατοχυρώνουν το δικαίωμα στην περιουσία και ε) στα άρθρα 4 παρ. 1, 2 παρ. 1 και 5 παρ. 1 του Συντάγματος, που κατοχυρώνουν τις αρχές της ισότητας, της προστασίας της αξιοπρέπειας του ανθρώπου και το δικαίωμα ελεύθερης ανάπτυξης της προσωπικότητας. Οι λόγοι αυτοί απορρίφθηκαν, ως αβάσιμοι, με την εκκαλούμενη απόφαση. Η κρίση αυτή του διοικητικού εφετείου είναι ορθή, σύμφωνα με όσα εκτίθενται στις σκέψεις 5 έως και 7. Ειδικώς οι λόγοι με τους οποίους προβάλλεται αντίθεση της ανωτέρω διάταξης στις αρχές της αμεροληψίας και της διαφάνειας είναι αβάσιμοι, προεχόντως διότι οι αρχές αυτές δεν έχουν σχέση με το ζήτημα που ρυθμίζεται με την εν λόγω διάταξη. Συνεπώς, όλα τα περί του αντιθέτου προβαλλόμενα με την κρινόμενη έφεση είναι απορριπτέα ως αβάσιμα, όπως και η έφεση στο σύνολό της.
