Article 7 - Respect for private and family life
Article 20 - Equality before the law
Key facts of the case:
The Bologna Court of Appeal asked the Italian Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutional legitimacy of the national legislation governing the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)– Law No. 69/2005 – and implementing the EU Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, in the part where it makes it generally possible to refuse to execute an EAW issued when the requested person is an Italian national or a national of another Member State of the European Union who lawfully and effectively resides or stays in Italy, provided that the court of appeal orders that that penalty or security measure be executed in Italy in accordance with its domestic law. The Court of Appeal asked especially whether the failure to extend this ground for refusal to the situation of a third-country national who nevertheless has a lawful and effective residence or abode on the Italian territory. According to the Court of Appeal, this unequal treatment would represent a violation of Art. 4(6) of the Framework Decision and of Art. 7 of the Charter, Art. 8 of the ECHR, Art. 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as of Articles 2, 3, 11, 27.3 and 117.1 of the Italian Constitution.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
According to the Court of Appeal, the challenged disposition causes an unequal treatment between Italian and EU citizens, on the one hand, and third-country citizens legally residing in Italy who are subject to an EAW when Italy is the executing Country. This issue was already dealt with by the CJEU –Case C-700/21 – when the Italian Constitutional Court (with the decision No. 217/2021) had asked whether the challenged internal disposition could be considered compatible with Art. 4(6) of the Framework Decision. The CJEU replied that it was incompatible with European Union law when the rules of a Member State which treats differently its own nationals, those of other Member States and those of third States, denying absolutely and automatically to the latter the benefit of the ground for non-execution of the arrest warrant laid down in Article 4(6) and thus precluding the competent judicial authority from assessing on a case-by-case basis whether the requested person, a national of a non-member State, is staying or residing in the territory of its own State and whether - if so - their links with that State are so significant that the objective of their social rehabilitation may be better achieved if the sentence is executed in that State.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court held that the CJEU’s decision of June 2023 confirmed that the contested law was incompatible with EU law - as well as with the Italian Constitution -as it violated Art. 4(6) of the Framework Decision and Art. 20 of the Charter, that is the principle of equality before the law, as well as the rehabilitation purpose of sentences, enshrined in Art. 27 of the Italian Constitution. For this reason, the Court annulled the challenged legislative disposition.
1.2 … As a result of that limitation, the contested provision would be outside the letter and the underlying rationale of Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision, thereby infringing Articles 11 and 117(1) of the Constitution. According to the referring party, in fact, it is within the discretion of the Member States to decide whether to implement the grounds for optional non-execution of the arrest warrant. However, should they decide to transpose them into their domestic law, they would be required to abide by the content of the Framework Decision, which does not distinguish between persons who are nationals of the executing State or persons residing or staying there. Moreover, by requiring the surrender also of persons permanently resident in Italy for the purposes of the execution of a custodial sentence abroad, the provision censured would run counter to the re-educative purpose of the sentence, enshrined in Article 27(3) of the Constitution, as well as with the right to family life of the person concerned, protected by art. 2 Const. and art. 117, first paragraph, Const. in relation to art. 8 ECHR and art. 17, paragraph 1, ICCPR, as well as by art. 11 and again 117, first paragraph, Const. in relation to art. 7 of the Charter. …
4.1 ... The Court of Justice of the European Union recalled that the margin of appreciation available to the Member States when transposing Article 4(6) is, however, not unlimited (paragraph 38), as they are bound, in accordance with Article 1(3), to respect the fundamental rights and principles set out in Article 6 TEU (paragraph 39), including the principle of equality before the law, guaranteed by Article 20 of the EU Charter (para. 40), which applies to all situations governed by Union law, including unequal treatment between nationals of Member States and those of third countries (para. 41), and "requires that comparable situations shall not be treated differently and that different situations shall not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified" (para. 42). …
1. ... What is criticised is especially the failure to extend that ground for refusal to the situation of a national of a non-member State of the European Union who nevertheless lawfully and effectively lives or resides in Italy. According to the referring court, such a failure to extend that ground of refusal is contrary to Articles 11 and 117(1) of the Italian Constitution, in relation to Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, Article 7 of the Charter, Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, as well as to Articles 2, 3 and 27(3) of the Italian Constitution. …
4.5 ...Among these fundamental rights - the Court of Justice of the European Union went on to say - must be included respect for the principle of equality before the law, guaranteed by Article 20 of the Charter, which applies equally to persons who are citizens and non-citizens of a State of the Union. That principle requires - not unlike, moreover, Article 3 Const. - "that comparable situations are not treated differently and that different situations are not treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified" (paragraph 42 of the judgment). …
4.6 ...The absolute and automatic exclusion of a national of a non-Member State from the benefit of refusal to surrender for the execution of a penalty or a security measure subject to an undertaking to execute that penalty or measure in Italy - a benefit enjoyed, on the other hand, by both Italian nationals and, under certain conditions, nationals of other Member States - has been held by the Court of Justice to be incompatible with the principle of equality before the law enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter and, therefore, with Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, read in the light of Article 1(3) of the same Framework Decision, which reaffirms the obligation to respect "fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union".
“1.2 […] In conseguenza di tale limitazione, la disposizione censurata si porrebbe al di fuori della lettera e della ratio ispiratrice dell’art. 4, punto 6, dell’indicata decisione quadro, così violando gli artt. 11 e 117, primo comma, Cost. Secondo il rimettente, infatti, rientra nella discrezionalità degli Stati membri decidere se attuare o meno i motivi di non esecuzione facoltativa del mandato d’arresto. Qualora però decidano di trasporli nei rispettivi ordinamenti interni, essi sarebbero tenuti ad attenersi al contenuto della decisione quadro, che non distingue tra persone cittadine dello Stato di esecuzione, o persone ivi residenti o dimoranti. Inoltre, imponendo la consegna anche di persone stabilmente radicate in Italia ai fini dell’esecuzione di una pena detentiva all’estero, la disposizione censurata si porrebbe in contrasto con la finalità rieducativa della pena, sancita dall’art. 27, terzo comma, Cost., nonché con il diritto alla vita familiare dell’interessato, tutelato dall’art. 2 Cost. e dall’art. 117, primo comma, Cost. in relazione agli artt. 8 CEDU e 17, paragrafo 1, PIDCP, nonché dagli artt. 11 e ancora 117, primo comma, Cost., in relazione all’art. 7 CDFUE.”
“4.1 […] La Corte di Giustizia ha rammentato che il margine di discrezionalità di cui gli Stati membri dispongono in sede di trasposizione dell’art. 4, punto 6, non è tuttavia illimitato (paragrafo 38), essendo essi tenuti, conformemente all’art. 1, paragrafo 3, al rispetto dei diritti e dei principi fondamentali di cui all’art. 6 TUE (paragrafo 39), tra cui il principio di uguaglianza davanti alla legge, garantito dall’art. 20 CDFUE (paragrafo 40), che si applica a tutte le situazioni disciplinate dal diritto dell’Unione, incluse le disparità di trattamento tra i cittadini degli Stati membri e quelli dei paesi terzi (paragrafo 41), ed «esige che situazioni comparabili non siano trattate in modo diverso e che situazioni diverse non siano trattate allo stesso modo, a meno che un siffatto trattamento non sia obiettivamente giustificato» (paragrafo 42).”
“1. […] A essere censurata è, in particolare, la mancata estensione di tale motivo di rifiuto alla situazione del cittadino di uno Stato non membro dell’Unione europea, che tuttavia abbia legittimamente ed effettivamente dimora o residenza nel territorio italiano. Secondo il giudice rimettente, tale mancata estensione contrasterebbe con gli artt. 11 e 117, primo comma, Cost., in relazione all’art. 4, punto 6, della decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI, all’art. 7 CDFUE, all’art. 8 CEDU e all’art. 17, paragrafo 1, PIDCP, nonché con gli artt. 2, 3, e 27, terzo comma, Cost.”
“4.5 […]Fra tali diritti fondamentali – ha proseguito la Corte di giustizia – va annoverato il rispetto del principio di uguaglianza di fronte alla legge, garantito dall’art. 20 CDFUE, che si applica allo stesso modo alle persone cittadine e non cittadine di uno Stato dell’Unione. Tale principio esige – non diversamente, del resto, dall’art. 3 Cost. – «che situazioni comparabili non siano trattate in modo diverso e che situazioni diverse non siano trattate allo stesso modo, a meno che un siffatto trattamento non sia obiettivamente giustificato» (paragrafo 42 della sentenza).”
“4.6 […]L’esclusione assoluta e automatica del cittadino di uno Stato terzo dal beneficio del rifiuto della consegna per l’esecuzione di una pena o di una misura di sicurezza subordinata all’impegno a eseguire detta pena o misura in Italia – beneficio di cui godono, invece, tanto il cittadino italiano, quanto, a determinate condizioni, il cittadino di altro Stato membro – è stato ritenuto dalla Corte di giustizia incompatibile con il principio di uguaglianza di fronte alla legge sancito dall’art. 20 CDFUE e, dunque, con lo stesso art. 4, punto 6, della decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI, letto alla luce dell’art. 1, paragrafo 3, della medesima decisione quadro, che riafferma l’obbligo di rispettare «i diritti fondamentali e i fondamentali principi giuridici sanciti dall’articolo 6 del trattato sull’Unione europea» nell’esecuzione della stessa.”
