Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Article 8 - Protection of personal data
Article 19 - Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition
Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Key facts of the case:
A Burundi national tried to reach Slovenia crossing the Croatian territory and was illegally returned to Bosnia on multiple occasions by the Croatian police before finally arriving to Slovenia. His application for asylum was dismissed on the ground that Croatia, the state responsible for reviewing his application, has accepted its responsibility under Article 20 (5) of the Dublin Regulation. He initiated an administrative dispute challenging the said decision of the Ministry of the Interior. He argued his return would worsen his health condition (he suffered psychically and has been seeing a psychiatrist) and alleged he could suffer a violation of Article 4 of the Charter if he is to be returned to Croatia. As a result, he argued that Slovenia should not return him to Croatia on the basis of Article 3 (2) of the Dublin Regulation and that he should be able to seek asylum in Slovenia.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
- When during the Dublin return procedure, the obligation of the national authorities to verify the risk of inhumane or degrading treatment and to seek individual assurances from the competent authorities of the country of return applies and what information must the asylum seeker present in the procedure to trigger such an obligation?
- Whether the Ministry of the Interior can appeal to the judgment of the Administrative Court, which quashes the decision of the Ministry and remands the case to it for fresh adjudication?
Outcome of the case:
The Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Ministry of the Interior and remanded the case to it for fresh adjudication. There were two reasons for illegality of the decision of the Ministry:
1) The Ministry failed to comply with the obligation to verify and assess special needs of the applicant concerning his health condition;
2) The Ministry wrongly interpreted the EU law, CJEU jurisprudence and standards stemming from the case law of the ECtHR, and operated under a wrong assumption that the State may deny a Dublin return under Article 3(2) of the Dublin regulation only if there are systemic deficiencies in the country of return and not in other cases, when there is a risk of violation of Article 4 of the Charter, not necessarily resulting from systemic deficiencies.
As to the first reason for illegality of the decision, the Administrative Court relied on the standard of “particularly serious state of health” from C. K. and others v Slovenia, C-578/16 PPU, para. 66. It first verified to what extent the Ministry was informed about the health condition of the applicant. It found that Ministry did not have enough information in the initial phase. The applicant did tell the authorities that he fled Burundi since the police intimidated him, that he was afraid of a violent government and that he was maltreated by the Croatian police. However, this was not enough to trigger the obligations from C. K. and others. However, the Ministry was later presented with the applicant’s medical record, showing that he started regularly seeing a psychiatrist, who found the applicant was afraid of the police, prescribed antidepressants and sleeping pills. He also underwent a radiological check-up since he felt pain in the stomach and throat. According to the Court, such information is not necessarily decisive from the perspective of “particularly serious state of health” but is sufficient to trigger Article 13 of the International Protection Act (the IPA) - the obligation concerning early identification of (vulnerable) persons with special needs (the Court found that the applicant could fall under the definition of such person in Article 2, point 22 of the IPA). However, considering the applicants’ health status, the requirements from the C.K. and others v Slovenia, paras. 73-76, and the fact that some reports showed that Croatia is experiencing difficulties in reception of people with special needs, the Court ruled that the Ministry should have assessed whether the applicant had special needs and if such special needs were confirmed, should have obtained individual assurances from the Croatian authorities concerning his reception. The Court concluded that the Ministry did not comply with such obligations, which are triggered when the applicant has an “arguable claim” about a potential Article 4 of the Charter violation if returned. In ascertaining whether such arguable claim exists, the competent authority must rely on objective, reliable, accurate and sufficiently updated information and must obtain such information proprio mutu, if necessary. As to the second ground, the Court found that the Ministry disregarded not only the CJEU jurisprudence and case law of the ECtHR, but also the jurisprudence of the Administrative Court, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional court, as it has treated systemic deficiencies as a sine qua non condition for preventing a Dublin return under Article 3 (2) (see para. 65 of the judgment of the Administrative Court). The Administrative Court ruled that such approach is contrary to the absolute nature of Article 4 of the Charter (prohibition of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment). The Court subsequently turned to the question, whether the Ministry of the Interior can appeal against the judgment of that court, which quashes the decision of the Ministry and remands the case to it for fresh adjudication. The Court developed an entirely new legal position. Relying on the jurisprudence of the CJEU and Article 47 of the Charter, the Court found that the established national jurisprudence, according to which the Ministry could appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court, is contrary to EU law, since it counters the principles of equivalence and efficiency by allowing the Ministry to appeal only in cases concerning asylum, but not in other comparable administrative disputes. In this part of the reasoning, the Court first declared that the CJEU case of E.N., S.S., J.Y. from 30 March 2023 created a new legal situation in Slovenia. It invoked paragraphs 27-30, where the CJEU ruled that the EU law (Article 27 of the Dublin regulation in relation to Articles 18 and 47 of the Charter) requires only one and not two judicial instances. The Court then relied on Diouf, C-69/10, para. 69, where the CJEU explicitly referred to the “individual” as a holder of the right to appeal, and argued that this could be sufficient to find that the Ministry cannot appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court, especially as the text of Article 27 of the Dublin regulation explicitly grants the right to appeal to the asylum seeker or alien and not to the competent national authority and since human rights are granted to individuals and private legal persons, and not the state authorities. Nevertheless, the Court extended its reasoning, again relying on CJEU’s decision in E.N., S.S., J.Y, where the CJEU invoked the principle of procedural autonomy of member states and ruled that it allows them to have two instances of judicial review under two cumulative conditions: “those rules are not, in situations covered by EU law, less favourable than in similar situations under domestic law (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness)”. The Court held that in contrast to the Dutch regulation at stake in E.N. S.S., J.Y., which was “applicable to all administrative law appeal proceedings” (see para. 32), the Slovenian legislation, namely Article 70 (4) of the IPA granted the appeal to the administrative authorities exclusively in proceedings concerning asylum, whereas there were no similar provisions in other fields of administrative law. Article 70 (4) of the IPA merely provides that “an appeal to the Supreme Court is allowed against the judgments of the Administrative Court”. The national jurisprudence interpreted this provision as granting the right to appeal not only to the individuals, but also to the Ministry. The Court found that such interpretation is at odds with the Article 27 of the Dublin regulation in relation to Article 47 of the Charter. Relying on Simmenthal, C-106/77, para. 23, RS, C-430/21, paras. 51-53 and Torubarov, C-556/17, paras. 73-74, the Court ruled that it had to ignore Article 70 (4) as interpreted by the Slovenian courts.
46 The Court finds that the applicant's account of what had happened to him in the past during his stay in the Porin institution in Croatia did not rise to the standard of inhuman treatment laid down in Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The "dismissive attitude" which, according to the applicant, "bordered on racism", which he perceived in his relationship with the officials at Porin, through their non-verbal behaviour and the fact that he was pushed around before he ate his meal, that he did not feel safe but humiliated, that he was called an "African terrorist", and when he wanted to go for a walk, he was told to just go to BiH, and that he was not provided with "primary" medical care - all of the above are not the kind of bi-national circumstances that would be comparable to the standard and criteria of inhuman treatment set out in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: ECtHR) in the case of M. S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.
47 In fact, the Administrative Court has repeatedly pointed out, in the context of the implementation of the CEAS (see, for example, the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case I U 1686/2020, 7 December 2020, para. 276), that the general definition of inhuman treatment also includes the fact that inhuman treatment must reach a minimum level of severity in order to fall within the scope of the right laid down in Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The assessment of this level is relative and depends on the circumstances of the case, in particular the duration of such treatment, its physical and psychological effects, as well as the sex, age, state of health of the victim (Khlaifia and others v. Italy, no. 16483/12, 15 December 2016, para. 159; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, no. 30696/09, para. 219). In order for the authority (or the court) to be able to assess whether such a minimum level of inhuman treatment has been reached, it must also take into account other factors, in particular: the intention or motive for such treatment, although the absence of an intention to humiliate the victim does not mean that the treatment was not inhuman or degrading; (Khlaifia and others v. Italy, no. 16483/12, 15 December 2016, para. 160) the context in which such treatment occurred, which includes an assessment of the general atmosphere, any heightened tensions, the emotional reactions in relation to which such treatment occurred; the third factor is the vulnerability of the victim, which is given even if the person is deprived of his or her liberty, although deprivation of liberty inevitably leads to a certain sense of humiliation and suffering, which is a consequence of the very nature of the measure of deprivation of liberty, and therefore does not in itself rise to the level of Article 3. (Ibid, para. 160).
48 More specifically, the ECtHR defined inhuman treatment in the context of the living conditions of asylum seekers in the context of a dysfunctional asylum system in Greece as those circumstances in which asylum seekers were completely abandoned to life on the street for months on end, without basic means of subsistence, without access to sanitation, without the possibility to satisfy their most basic needs (food, hygiene, accommodation), in a state of extreme destitution and in constant fear for their personal safety, and combined with the fact that there was no prospect that this situation could improve. (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, no. 30696/09, paras. 254, 263.) The CJEU implicitly accepted and adopted this approach or standards of inhuman treatment in the application of the Dublin Regulation in its judgment in N.S. and M.E. (C-411/10 and C-493/10, 21 December 2011).
49 The applicant has therefore not justified or demonstrated in his application that the court at the main hearing should have investigated any other facts which would have shown that he had already been the victim of inhuman treatment within the meaning of the standards set out in the case-law of the ECtHR concerning Article 3 ECHR or the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 4 of the Charter, at the time of his crossing and stay in Croatia, before he arrived in Slovenia, since at that time the applicant had not yet demonstrated any particular psycho-physical or psycho-social vulnerability. Therefore, the standards of protection of the prohibition of inhuman treatment in the event of transfer of an applicant who, in the course of the proceedings in Slovenia, has developed or manifested certain specific psycho-physical problems in the sense of a "particularly serious medical condition" (See: C-578/16 PPU, 16 February 2017, para. 66), which could be substantially aggravated by transfer, are relevant (in the first step of the risk assessment) for the case at hand for the purpose of the assessment of the lawfulness of the contested measure.
50 However, this circumstance must also be considered (in the second step of the risk assessment) in relation to certain deficiencies in the management of asylum procedures and reception of applicants in Croatia in terms of effective access to the asylum procedure, which should have been known to the defendant in the light of the generally known information on the situation in Croatia over time, and which the defendant has taken into account in some way in its evidentiary assessment. However, in both cases, where the situation is one of an alleged particularly serious health condition of the applicant and where there may be more general or systemic deficiencies in the effective access to the asylum procedure and reception of applicants for international protection, the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States referred to in Article 2 TEU and Article 4 (3) TEU must be taken into account. (Union law is based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all other Member States a set of common values on which the Union is founded and recognises that other Member States share them, as more specifically set out in Article 2 TEU. This premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States with regard to the recognition of these values and therefore respect for the Union law implementing these values (Jawo, C-163/17, para. 80). According to this provision [Article 4(3) TEU], the EU and the Member States, on the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation, shall respect each other and shall assist each other in the fulfilment of the tasks deriving from the Treaties (see: X Y, C-562/21 PPU, C-563/21 PPU, 22 Feburary 2022, para. 48))
60 In this context, it should be borne in mind that, according to the position of the CJEU in the CIMADE judgment, the general scheme and purpose of the rules laid down in EU secondary law on the reception of asylum seekers and respect for fundamental rights, in particular the requirements of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, according to which human dignity must be respected and protected, preclude an asylum seeker from being excluded from the protection of the minimum standards laid down in this Directive, "even if only for a limited period of time." Therefore, the assessment of the special needs of the asylum seeker and the verification of the need to provide individual guarantees of adequate treatment upon reception must be made before the surrender instrument is issued, and it is not sufficient that the national authority is obliged, under Article 32 of the Dublin Regulation, to exchange or transmit medical information on the physical and mental health of the person before the transfer is carried out, to the competent authorities of the responsible EU Member State. According to the CJEU's interpretation in Ghezelbash, a narrow interpretation of the scope of the remedy provided for in Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is not permissible,29 as the EU legislator has "significantly increased" the procedural guarantees available to asylum seekers in Dublin Regulation 604/2013 compared to the former Dublin Regulation 343/2003; 30 the text of Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation does not contain 'any limitation on the claims' that can be relied on by an asylum seeker in the context of a legal remedy,31 so that 'the applicant shall have a guaranteed right to an effective remedy against any transfer decision taken at the end of the procedure. "32 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2.9.2003, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 118/2014,33 merely serves to implement Dublin Regulation 604/2013 and has no specific provisions on the right to an effective remedy of an applicant for international protection.
64 In the 2019 Jawo case, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU upheld the interpretation of the Chamber in the case of C.K. and Others v. Slovenia, by concluding: “Although the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation envisages only the situation underlying the judgment of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others (C 411/10 and C 493/10, EU:C:2011:865), namely that in which the real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, stems from systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and the reception conditions of applicants for international protection in the Member State which, pursuant to that regulation, is designated as responsible for examining the application, it is nevertheless apparent from paragraphs 83 and 84 of the present judgment and from the general and absolute nature of the prohibition laid down in Article 4 of the Charter that the transfer of an applicant to that Member State is ruled out in any situation in which there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant runs such a risk during his transfer or thereafter.” (Jawo, para. 87).
69 The principle of mutual trust, or the presumption of respect for human rights in another EU Member State, means that EU law is based on the basic premise that each Member State shares with all other Member States a set of common values on which the EU is founded and recognises that other Member States share them, as set out in more detail in Article 2 TEU. This premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between Member States as regards the recognition of these values and therefore respect for EU law implementing these values, and as regards the ability of their national legal systems to ensure “that their national legal systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, particularly Articles 1 and 4 thereof, which enshrine one of the fundamental values of the Union and its Member States.” (Jawo, para. 80) The presumption therefore refers to the treatment of asylum seekers in each Member State being in line with "the requirements of the Charter, the Geneva Convention and the ECHR." (N.S. and M.E., para. 80).
70 However, there is no "irrebuttable presumption" that the Member State responsible for examining an asylum seeker's application will respect fundamental rights, as this would be incompatible with the Member States' obligation to interpret and apply the Dublin Regulation in accordance with fundamental rights. (N.S. and M.E., paras 99, 100-105). The CJEU in Jawo states that the obligation not to return, if this could lead to a violation of the right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment, may arise "at the time of surrender, during the asylum procedure, or afterwards" (Mutatis mutandis: Jawo, C-163/17, 19 March 2019, para. 88).
71 Slovenia cannot "require Croatia, another EU Member State, to provide a higher national level of protection of fundamental rights than that guaranteed by EU law" and therefore Slovenia "may not even verify - except in exceptional cases - whether the other Member State has in fact respected the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Union in a particular case" (Mutatis mutandis: Opinion of the Court 2/13, 18.12.2014, para. 192; see also Jawo, C-163/17, paras. 80-84.) Where secondary law does not lay down specific rules in this respect, then a Member State (Slovenia) may apply its own standards, provided that these standards are at least equivalent to the level of protection guaranteed by the EU Charter and that the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby affected. (See mutatis mutandis: Melloni, C-399/11, para. 60; Lenaerts, Koen, 2017, La vie après l'avis: exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust, Common Market Law Review, 54, pp. 807-808, p. 815.)
72 The CJEU took the view in N.S. and M.E. that the "slightest breach of the directives" is not sufficient to prevent the surrender of an applicant to another Member State, i.e. that any breach of an EU directive does not require that the surrender should not take place. (N.S. and M.E., C-411/10 and C-493/10, paras. 84-85) In this respect, the CJEU in N.S. and M.E. does speak generally about the rebuttability of the presumption of respect for "fundamental rights" in another Member State. (Ibid. paras. 71, 77, 81, 99) However, in defining this presumption, it restricts itself to the right under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Rights; (Ibid. (See, for example, Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, paras 77, 78; Jawo, C-163/17, paras 78, 80; XXXX, C-483/20, para 27.) In more recent case law, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU also uses the term /.../ "in particular Articles 1 and 4 thereof," in relation to the protection of a possible range of rights in relation to the respect of the principle of mutual trust, while other versions of this judgment use the terms "including", (XXXX, C-483/20, para. (ibid., para. 27), which corresponds to "including", "notamment" (in French), which corresponds to "especially", "segnatamente" (in Italian) and "osobito" (in Croatian), which correspond to "in particular" and "principally" respectively (ibid., para. 27).
73 In the context of the second sub-paragraph of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, the CJEU does not limit itself to the right laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but, as already mentioned, the right to the protection of human dignity (Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). Another fundamental right which is not protected in absolute terms may also be relevant. (See, for example, Case C-745/21, 16 February 2023, paras. 49-54.)
74 Most often, the basic criterion (of demarcation) when the national authorities have to approach such a specific treatment or examination of the principle of mutual trust is the circumstance or legal standard that the applicant has an arguable claim with respect to Article 3 ECHR or Article 4 or Article 19 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This means, according to ECtHR case law, that a violation of Article 3 ECHR is not too unlikely in the event of return (See for example Soering v. the United Kingdom, paras. 85, 117) and in this respect the alien seeks to prevent removal. (See, for example, L.M. and others v. Russia, para. 100; M.A. and others v. Lithuania, para. 83; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, 21 November 2019, para. 136) The CJEU joined this standard from the ECtHR's case law in the clearest way in its judgment in B, where in relation to the standard of automatic suspensive effect of the remedy, the CJEU set a standard that the applicant's allegations were not manifestly unfounded as to the risk of inhuman treatment. (C-233/19, B, para. 66; see also LM, C-403/19, paras. 35, 43.)
75 This legal standard ("arguable claim") is to be established by the competent authority, inter alia, through an assessment of whether the Member State authority "is in possession of elements" demonstrating a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the other Member State, in the light of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as recognised in the EU acquis and, in particular, in Article 4 of the EU Charter. In such a case, when deciding whether to transfer the person to the authorities of the other Member State, the competent authority must assess the existence of that risk. (Mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, para. 88) The competent authority must rely on objective, reliable, accurate and duly updated information on the situation in the other Member State, which demonstrates actual systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning certain groups of persons or certain other relevant circumstances. This information may come in particular from international judicial decisions such as those of the ECtHR, from judicial decisions of the ordering Member State and from decisions, reports and other documents of the Council of Europe or United Nations bodies (Mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, para. 89; see also: Jawo, C-163/17, para. 90).
76 According to international case-law, in such cases, the authority or court, even without regard to the procedural activity of the applicant (F.G. v. Sweden, para. 156; J.K. and others v Sweden, paras 87, 83, 90, 140; M.M., C-277/11, paras 65-66), must also verify the information of its own motion, and it matters whether the authority should have been aware of this information about the situation in the relevant country. In this way, it must be understood and interpreted that, in order to ensure compliance with Article 4 of the EU Charter, the authority which 'has' objective, reliable, accurate and duly updated information confirming the existence of such deficiencies must verify whether, in the circumstances of the case, there are serious and reasonable grounds for believing that, following surrender to another Member State, the person concerned will be subject to a real risk of being returned to a third country, either in the Member State concerned or on the basis of a return to a third country (i.e., in the case of a person who has been returned to a third country). (indirect refoulement) inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of this Article. To this end, the authority must request the other Member State to send it, as a matter of urgency, any additional information it requires concerning the situation in which the person concerned will be treated in that Member State. (Mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, paras 93-95.) In the event of the existence of such information on the situation and the treatment of aliens in Croatia, it should, according to the standards set out mutatis mutandis in the judgment C. K. and Others v. Slovenia, the Ministry, having regard to the principle of mutual trust, should have provided adequate assurance (confirmation) prior to removal, or should have taken necessary and appropriate precautionary measures to deter "any concern" about a possible violation of the right under Article 4 of the Charter (Ibid. paras. 71, 76-78, 83; in paragraph 90 of the same judgment, the CJEU uses the term or standard of "serious concern") or to "exclude any real risk" of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of the applicant's removal. (Ibid. para. 84) However, in the event of a risk of a serious violation of another fundamental human right, the defendant must, in the administrative act, consider the application of the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin Regulation.
77 Certainly, if an authority of an EU Member State finds that at the time of the removal and surrender of an alien to another EU Member State, on the basis of reliable information, it is not possible to "rule out any real risk" of inhuman treatment, this does not mean that the EU Member State must definitively cancel the removal and surrender of the alien, but that the competent administrative authority must first assume certain obligations and obtain specific assurances in communication with the competent authorities of the other EU Member State that in the specific case of the reception of the alien, there will be no violation of the right to be free from inhuman treatment. (See mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Caldararu, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, para. 98; C.K. and Others v. Slovenia, C-578/16 PPU, paras. 85-90.)
78 Since the applicant already had a claim in respect of a right under Article 4 of the EU Charter which was not manifestly unfounded at the time of the defendant's decision, the Ministry was under an obligation to apply the principle of mutual trust in the manner described above and to apply a strict method of assessing the facts in the light of a possible violation of fundamental human rights, which it failed to do.
81 On the ground of misapplication of substantive law (Article 13(1) of the IPA, Article 42(4) of the IPA, Article 3(2)(2) of the Dublin Regulation), the Court upheld the action, annulled the contested act and remitted the case back to the defendant for a retrial (Article 64(4) and, consequently, point 4 and 2 of Article 64 of the Administrative Dispute Act-1). The Ministry is required to issue a new administrative act and is bound by the court's legal positions on substantive law and the conduct of the proceedings (Article 64(4) ADA-1). The Court ruled without a hearing, the applicant not having proposed that he should be heard, but only that a psychiatric expert should be engaged, which the Court rejected for the reasons already stated. There was no need for a public hearing, since the court relied on the provision of the first indent of the second paragraph of Article 59 of the ADA-1, the direct effect of the right to effective judicial protection under Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, which is a right of the applicant or of the person referred to in Article 18(1)(c) or (d) of the Dublin Regulation, and not a right of the competent authority (in conjunction with the CJEU's interpretation of the provision of Article 46(3) of the Procedural Directive 2013/32/EU), as it was possible for the court to make its assessment on the basis of the information in the file (Moussa Sacko, C-348/16, para. 44; Alheto, C-585/16, paras 116, 126; Torubarov, C-556/17, paras 54-56.)
83 With the publication of the CJEU judgment in E.N., S.S., J.Y. (C-556/21) of 30 March 2023, a new legal situation has arisen in Slovenia regarding the possibility for the Ministry to lodge a legal remedy against the first instance judgment of the Administrative Court, by which the administrative act of the defendant, issued on the basis of the Dublin Regulation, according to which the application for international protection is rejected on the grounds that the applicant will be handed over to another EU Member State as a competent Members state, is annulled, and the case is remitted back to the Ministry for a new decision. 84 In the case of E.N., S.S., J.Y., the CJEU makes clear for the first time that the provision of Article 27(3) of the Dublin Regulation "is not intended to regulate interim measures which may be adopted in the context of an appeal at second instance brought by the competent authorities."(C-556/21, 30.3.2023, para. 27(2), C-556/21, 30 March 2023, para. 27) In the CJEU's view, Article 27(4) of the Dublin Regulation provides that "the interruption or suspension of the transfer time limit may, in certain cases, be initiated by the competent authorities, that provision, as recalled in paragraph 22 of the present judgment, complements Article 27(3) of that regulation which is intended to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision."(Ibid. para. 28). The CJEU then goes on to say that if the surrender decision is annulled at first instance, then, in the context of a second-instance appeal brought by the competent administrative authorities, the surrender decision "no longer exists". (Ibid. para. 29) Since the Dublin Regulation does not contain any rule concerning the possibility of lodging an appeal against a first-instance judicial decision deciding on an appeal against a surrender decision or expressly regulating the system of possible appeal, it must be held that the protection guaranteed by Article 27(1) of that Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 18 and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is limited to the existence of a judicial remedy and does not require the designation of several judicial instances" (Ibid. para. 30).
85 From this part of the reasoning, or on the basis of the CJEU's interpretation up to this point, taking into account the much older Diouf case (According to the CJEU's judgment in Diouf, the principle of effective judicial protection guarantees "the individual" the right of access to a court, not to a multi-stage judicial remedy (C-69/10, 28 July 2011, para. 69), it would be possible to draw the conclusion that the competent authorities of the EU Member States for deciding on international protection do not have a right of appeal against judicial decisions of first instance courts. The provision of Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation expressly confers a right of appeal only on the applicant or other alien and not on the competent authority, which is also consistent with the wording and concept of the protection of human rights in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which belong to individuals and private legal persons and not to public authorities. However, the CJEU did not stop its interpretation at this point, but added the following:
86 “In the light of the foregoing, in the absence of EU legislation governing the matter, it is therefore, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, for the national legal order of each Member State to decide whether to introduce a second level of jurisdiction against a judgment ruling on an appeal against a transfer decision and, where appropriate, to lay down the detailed procedural rules of that second level of jurisdiction, including the granting of any interim measures, provided, however, that those rules are not, in situations covered by EU law, less favourable than in similar situations under domestic law (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 September 2018, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Suspensory effect of the appeal), C 180/17, EU:C:2018:775, paras. 34 and 35, and of 15 April 2021, État belge (Circumstances subsequent to a transfer decision), C 194/19, EU:C:2021:270, paras. 42).”
88 In E.N., S.S., J.Y., the CJEU found, in relation to the principle of equivalence, that the national rules on two-instance proceedings in the Dutch legal order at issue apply "all administrative law appeal proceedings" and that, therefore, such rules may provide that the court hearing such an appeal may, on application by the competent authorities, grant interim measures. (C-556/21, 30 March 2023, para. 32. In this context, it is relevant for the understanding of who is entitled to a remedy under Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation or under national law that an interim measure having the effect of suspending the time-limit for surrender pending the decision on the second-instance legal remedy can only be adopted if the execution of the surrender decision has been suspended, in accordance with the latter two provisions, pending the decision on the first-instance remedy (ibid., para. 34)). 89 In Slovenia, however, the legal situation with regard to compliance with the condition or principle of equivalence is different, and therefore the application of the principle of equivalence leads to the conclusion that, in a case such as the one at hand, the Ministry should not have been able to appeal against the decision of the court from the first operative part of the judgment, thereby postponing the finality of the judgment.
90 On the basis of the principle of equivalence relating to the procedural autonomy of Member States, which has been established in EU law for a long time before the E.N., S.S., J.Y. case, a each Member State can lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions "safeguarding the rights of individuals in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, on condition, however, that those rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence)". The CJEU adds that, taking into account the checks to be carried out by the national court, it must be found that /.../ " it is not apparent that similar situations are governed by national procedural arrangements that are more favourable than those laid down for the implementation of the EU directive concerned." (LH, C-564/18, 19 March 2020, paras 63-64; PG, C-406/18, 19 March 2020, paras 26-27; JP, C-651/19, 9 September 2020, para 36.)
91 The legislator of the Republic of Slovenia has prescribed the following only for international protection cases (in Article 70(4) of the IPA-1): "Judgments issued by an administrative court may be appealed to the Supreme Court." Case law in the Republic of Slovenia has interpreted this provision to mean that the authority competent to decide on an application for international protection also has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia.
92 This possibility for the administrative authority (the Ministry) to have access to a court of second instance is not, however, provided for in other areas of law, where otherwise only national law on administrative dispute applies. The general rule in other areas of administrative law is that, in the situation where the administrative act is annulled by the court of first instance and the case is remitted back to the Ministry for a retrial, the defendant has no right of appeal. An appeal is allowed only if the court itself has found a different factual situation from that found by the Ministry and has amended the contested administrative act on that basis, or if the court has made a decision pursuant to Article 66 of that ADA-1 (Article 73(1) of ADA-1). Applicants for international protection are therefore in a worse or unequal position with regard to their right to an effective remedy in a situation where they succeed in proceedings before a court of first instance, so that the court upholds the application, quashes the contested act and refers the case back to the Ministry for a fresh decision, than claimants in other administrative disputes where the implementation of EU law is not at issue.
93 However, as regards the principle of equivalence, the case-law of the CJEU shows that only a general comparison with other administrative disputes is not sufficient, but the CJEU in the JP case says that "it is therefore appropriate, on the one hand, to identify the comparable procedures or actions and, on the other hand, to determine whether the actions based on national law are handled in a more favourable manner than comparable actions concerning the safeguarding of the rights which individuals derive from EU law [...] With regard to the comparability of actions, it is for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics [...] So far as concerns the similar handling of the actions, it must be borne in mind that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural rule governing actions based on EU law is less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions must be analysed by the national court taking into account the role played by the rules concerned in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any special features of those rules before the various national bodies.” (JP, C-651/19, 9 September 2020, paras. 37-39.)
94 In the Slovenian legal order, a comparison with the decision on international protection could be made with the decision on various aliens' permits, with the decision on the return of aliens illegally staying in Slovenia to the country of origin, although this is also mostly an implementation of EU law, with the decision on extradition of foreign nationals, which is mostly not an implementation of EU law, but there is no provision in any of the types of case comparable to international protection that is comparable to Article 70, paragraph 4, of the IPA-1, which has been interpreted by national courts to date as meaning that the state authority (the Ministry) also has the right to appeal against judgments issued by the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia. In view of the principle of equivalence in relation to the principle of procedural autonomy of the EU Member States, in conjunction with the provisions of Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the judgments of the CJEU discussed in this section, the Administrative Court concluded that the provision of Article 70(4) of the IPA-1 could not be interpreted as referring to the Ministry.
95 The Administrative Court reached this conclusion by applying the principles of application of EU law, according to which, if statutory provisions cannot be given an interpretation consistent with EU law, the Administrative Court may not stay the proceedings and request a review of the law in the light of the provisions of Article 3a of the Constitution, as this would not be an effective and consistent application of EU law, (Simmenthal, 106/77, 9 March 1978, para. 24; RS, C-430/21, 22 February 2022, paras. 51-53. ) but must either interpret national law in accordance with the law of the Union and the settled case-law of the CJEU, and be careful not to rely on an interpretation of the text of secondary legislation which would be contrary to the fundamental rights protected by the acquis or to other general principles of Union law, (N. S. and M.E., C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 77; see also Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, no. Up 2012/08-18, 5 March 2009, para. 9), or the Administrative Court must act as the CJEU decided in the Torubarov case, concerning asylum. According to the position of the CJEU in Torubarov, any provision of national law or any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which has the effect of reducing the effectiveness of Union law by denying the court competent to apply that law the possibility of taking all necessary steps, when that law is applied, to avoid the application of national legal provisions which may impede the full effect of Union rules having direct effect (Article 27 of the Dublin Regulation read in conjunction with Article 47 of the EU Charter) is incompatible with the requirements of the very nature of Union law. This means, for example, that an administrative authority or a national court must, where necessary, act in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU by not applying the national regulation or case-law at issue (Torubarov, C-556/17, 29 July 2019, paras. 73-74. This also applies to the administrative authority (FMS, C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, para. 183; Minister for Justice and Equality, C-378/17, 4.12.2018, para. 38; see also Randstad Italia SpA, C-497/20, paras. 54, 79.) In the present case, for the purposes of deciding on the application for interim measures and for the purposes of legal precept in relation to the judgment referred to in the first operative part of the operative part of the judgment, the Court had to apply this second variant.
46 Sodišče ugotavlja, da iz tožnikovega opisa o tem, kaj se je v preteklosti zgodilo tožniku tekom njegovega bivanja v zavodu Porin na Hrvaškem ni dosegalo standarda nečloveškega ravnanja iz 4. člena Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah. „Odklonilen odnos“, ki je po njegovem mnenju „mejil na rasizem“, kar naj bi tožnik dojemal v odnosu z uradnimi organi v Porinu preko njihovega neverbalnega vedenja in preko tega, da so ga priganjali, preden je pojedel obrok, da se ni počutil varnega, ampak ponižanega, da je bil zmerjan z žaljivko „afriški terorist“, in ko je želel na sprehod, naj bi mu rekli, da naj kar gre v BiH ter da mu ni bil nudena „primarna“ zdravstvena oskrba - vse našteto niso takšne bivanjske okoliščine, ki bi bile primerljive s standardom in merili nečloveškega ravnanja iz sodbe Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice (v nadaljevanju: ESČP) v zadevi M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.
47 Upravno sodišče je namreč v zvezi z izvajanjem Skupnega evropskega azilnega sistem že večkrat izpostavilo, (Glej na primer sodbo Uprvnega sodišča v zadevi I U 1686/2020, 7. 12. 2020, odst. 276) da v okvir splošne opredelitve nečloveškega ravnanja spada tudi to, da mora nečloveško ravnanje dosegati minimalno stopnjo resnosti, da preide v okvir pravice iz 3. člena EKČP oziroma člena 19(2) Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah. Ocena te stopnje je relativna in je odvisna od okoliščin primera, zlasti od trajanja takšnega ravnanja, njegovih fizičnih in psihičnih učinkov, pa tudi od spola, starosti, zdravstvenega stanja žrtve. (Khlaifia and others v. Italy, App. no. 16483/12, 15. 12. 2016, odst. 159; M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, App. no. 30696/09, odst. 219) Da bi organ (ali sodišče) lahko ocenila, da je bila takšna minimalna stopnja nečloveškega ravnanja dosežena, mora(ta) upoštevati tudi druge dejavnike, predvsem: namen oziroma motiv za takšno ravnanje, čeprav odsotnost namena poniževanja žrtve ne pomeni, da ne gre za nečloveško ali ponižujoče ravnanje; (Khlaifia and others v. Italy, App. no. 16483/12, 15. 12. 2016, odst. 160) kontekst, v katerem je prišlo do takšnega ravnanja, kar vključuje oceno splošne atmosfere, morebitne povečane napetosti, čustvene reakcije, v zvezi s katerimi je prišlo do takšnega ravnanja; tretji dejavnik je ranljivost žrtve, kar je podano tudi, če je osebi odvzeta prostost, čeprav odvzem svobode neizogibno vodi do določenega občutka ponižanosti in trpljenja, kar je posledica že same narave ukrepa odvzema prostosti, zato to samo po sebi ne dosega ravni iz 3. člena EKČP. (Ibid. odst. 160.)
48 Bolj konkretno je opredelitev nečloveškega ravnanja, ko je šlo za vprašanje bivanjskih pogojev prosilcev za azil v okoliščinah nedelujočega azilnega sistema v Grčiji, ESČP opredelilo kot tiste okoliščine, ko so prosilci bili več mesecev povsem prepuščeni življenju na cesti, brez osnovnih sredstev za bivanje, brez dostopa do sanitarij, brez možnosti, da zadovoljijo najbolj osnovne potrebe (hrana, higiena, namestitev), v stanju skrajnega siromaštva in v stalnem strahu za osebno varnost in v kombinaciji s tem, da ni bilo nobenih izgledov, da bi se ta položaj lahko izboljšal. (M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, App. no. 30696/09, odst. 254, 263.) Sodišče EU je ta pristop oziroma standarde nečloveškega ravnanja v primeru uporabe Dublinske uredbe implicitno sprejelo in prevzelo v sodbi v zadevi N.S. in M.E. (C-411/10 in C-493/10, 21.12.2011)
49 Tožnik torej v tožbi ni opravičil oziroma izkazal, da bi sodišče na glavni obravnavi moralo razčiščevati neka morebitna druga dejstva, ki bi kazala na to, da je bil v času njegovega prečkanja in bivanja na Hrvaškem, preden je prišel v Slovenijo, že žrtev nečloveškega ravnanja v smislu standardov iz sodne prakse ESČP iz 3. člen EKČP oziroma sodne prakse Sodišča EU iz 4. člen Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, saj takrat tožnik neke posebne psiho-fizične ali psiho-socialne ranljivosti še ni izkazoval. Zato so (v prvem koraku ocene tveganja) za obravnavani primer presoje zakonitosti izpodbijanega akta primarno oziroma najprej (ne pa izključno) relevantni standardi varstva prepovedi nečloveškega ravnanja v primeru predaje prosilca, pri kateremu so se tekom postopka v Sloveniji razvile oziroma pojavila določene specifične psiho-fizične težave v smislu „posebej resnega zdravstvenega stanja“, (Glej: C-578/16 PPU, 16. 2. 2017, odst. 66) ki bi jih predaja lahko bistveno poslabšala.
50 Vendar pa je to okoliščino treba (v drugem koraku ocene tveganja) obravnavati tudi v povezavi z določenimi pomanjkljivostmi v vodenju azilnih postopkov in sprejema prosilcev na Hrvaškem v smislu učinkovitega dostopa do azilnega postopka, ki pa bi toženi stranki morale biti znane glede na splošno znane informacije o stanju na Hrvaškem v daljšem časovnem razdobju, in ki jih je tožena stranka na nek način tudi upoštevala v dokazni oceni. V obeh primerih, ko gre za situacijo zatrjevanega posebej resnega zdravstvenega stanja prosilca in ko so morda prisotne bolj splošne oziroma sistemske pomanjkljivosti glede učinkovitega dostopa do azilnega postopka in sprejema prosilcev za mednarodno zaščito, pa je treba upoštevati načelo medsebojnega zaupanja med državami članicami EU iz 2. člena Pogodbe o EU (PEU) oziroma iz določila člena 4(3) PEU. ( Pravo Unije temelji na osnovni premisi, da vsaka država članica z vsemi ostalimi državami članicami deli vrsto skupnih vrednot, na katerih temelji Unija, in priznava, da jih druge države članice delijo z njo, kot je natančneje določeno v členu 2 PEU. Ta premisa pomeni in utemeljuje obstoj vzajemnega zaupanja med državami članicami v zvezi s priznavanjem teh vrednot in torej spoštovanjem prava Unije, s katerim se te vrednote izvajajo (Jawo, C-163/17, odst. 80). Po tem določilu [člen 4(3) PEU] se EU in države članice na podlagi načela lojalnega sodelovanja medsebojno spoštujejo in si pomagajo pri izpolnjevanju nalog, ki izhajajo iz Pogodb (glej: X Y, C-562/21 PPU in C-563/21 PPU, 22. 2. 2022, odst. 48)).
60 Ob tem je treba upoštevati, da po stališču Sodišča EU v sodbi v zadevi CIMADE splošna sistematika in namen pravil iz sekundarnega prava EU o sprejemu prosilcev za azil ter spoštovanje temeljnih pravic, zlasti zahtev iz člena 1 Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, v skladu s katerim je treba človeško dostojanstvo spoštovati in varovati, nasprotujejo temu, da bi bil prosilec za azil izključen, „čeprav le za začasno obdobje iz zaščite minimalnih standardov, ki jih določa ta direktiva.“28 Zato mora biti ocena o posebnih potrebah prosilca ter preverjanje potrebe za pridobitev individualnega zagotovila za ustrezno obravnavo ob sprejemu narejena pred izdajo akta o predaji, in ni zadosti, da mora tožena stranka po določbi 32. člena Dublinske uredbe izmenjati oziroma posredovati zdravstvene podatke o telesnem in duševnem zdravju osebe pred izvedbo predaje pristojnim organom iz odgovorne države članice EU. Po interpretaciji Sodišča EU v zadevi Ghezelbash ozka razlaga obsega pravnega sredstva iz člena 27(1) Dublinske uredbe ni dopustna,29 saj je zakonodajalec EU z Dublinsko uredbo 604/2013 v primerjavi s prej veljavno Dublinsko uredbo 343/2003 „občutno povečal“ postopkovna jamstva, ki so na voljo prosilcem za azil;30 v besedilu člena 27(1) Dublinske uredbe ni „nobene omejitve glede trditev“, na katere se lahko sklicuje prosilec za azil v okviru pravnega sredstva,31 tako da ima „prosilec zagotovljeno pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva zoper morebitno odločitev o predaji, sprejeto ob koncu postopka.“32 Poleg tega je treba ob tem upoštevati, da Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1560/2003 z dne 2. 9. 2003, spremenjena z Izvedbeno uredbo Komisije (EU) 118/2014,33 zgolj služi za uporabo oziroma izvedbo Dublinske uredbe 604/2013 in nima posebnih določb glede pravice do učinkovitega sodnega varstva prosilca za mednarodno zaščito.
64 Veliki senat Sodišča je v zadevi Jawo leta 2019 potrdil interpretacijo malega senata v zadevi C.K. in drugi proti Sloveniji, s tem, ko je izpeljal naslednje: „Čeprav se člen 3(2), drugi pododstavek, Uredbe Dublin III nanaša zgolj na položaj, kot je ta iz sodbe z dne 21. decembra 2011, N. S. in drugi (C 411/10 in C 493/10, EU:C:2011:865), torej na položaj, v katerem je dejanska nevarnost nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja v smislu člena 4 Listine posledica sistemske pomanjkljivosti v azilnem postopku in pogojev za sprejem prosilcev za mednarodno zaščito v državi članici, ki je na podlagi te direktive odgovorna za obravnavanje prošnje, iz točk 83 in 84 te sodbe ter iz splošne in absolutne prepovedi, ki je določena v tem členu 4, izhaja, da se predaja prosilca v to državo članico ne izvede v vseh okoliščinah, v katerih obstajajo utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bo prosilec med predajo ali po njej izpostavljen taki nevarnosti.“(Jawo, odst. 87)
69 Načelo medsebojnega zaupanja oziroma domneva o spoštovanju človekovih pravic v drugi državi članici EU pomeni, da pravo EU temelji na osnovni premisi, da vsaka država članica z vsemi ostalimi državami članicami deli vrsto skupnih vrednot, na katerih temelji EU, in priznava, da jih druge države članice delijo z njo, kot je natančneje določeno v členu 2 PEU. Ta premisa pomeni in utemeljuje obstoj vzajemnega zaupanja med državami članicami v zvezi s priznavanjem teh vrednot in torej spoštovanjem prava EU, s katerim se te vrednote izvajajo ter v zvezi s tem, da so njihovi nacionalni pravni sistemi zmožni zagotoviti „enakovredno in učinkovito varstvo temeljnih pravic, priznanih z Listino, zlasti s členoma 1 in 4, ki določata eno temeljnih vrednot Unije in njenih držav članic.“ (Jawo, odst. 80) Domneva se torej nanaša na to, da je obravnavanje prosilcev za azil v vsaki državi članici v skladu z „zahtevami Listine, Ženevske konvencije in EKČP.“ (N.S. in M. E., odst.. 80)
70 Vendar ne gre za »neizpodbojno domnevo«, da bo država članica, ki je pristojna za obravnavanje prošnje prosilca za azil, spoštovala temeljne pravice, kajti to ne bi bilo združljivo z obveznostjo držav članic, da Dublinsko uredbo razlagajo in uporabljajo v skladu s temeljnimi pravicami. (N.S. in M.E., odst. 99, 100-105). Sodišče EU v zadevi Jawo pravi, da obveznost prepovedi vrnitve, če bi to lahko pripeljalo do kršitve pravice do prepovedi nečloveškega ravnanja, lahko nastane „ob predaji, med azilnim postopkom, ali po njem“ (Mutatis mutandis: Jawo, C-163/17, 19. 3. 2019, odst. 88).
71 Slovenija ne more od Hrvaške, ki je druga država članica EU, „zahtevati višje nacionalne ravni varstva temeljnih pravic, kot je tista, ki se zagotavlja s pravom Unije,“ in zato Slovenija ne sme „niti preveriti – razen v izjemnih primerih – ali je druga država članica v konkretnem primeru dejansko spoštovala temeljne pravice, ki jih zagotavlja Unija“. (Mutatis mutandis: Mnenje Sodišča 2/13, 18. 12. 2014, odst. 192; glej tudi: Jawo, C-163/17, odst. 80-84.) Kadar sekundarno pravo posebnih pravil glede tega ne ureja, potem država članica (Slovenija) lahko uporabi svoje standarde pod pogojem, da so ti standardi vsaj enaki ravni varstva, ki jo zagotavlja Listina EU in da s tem primarnost, enotnost in učinkovitost prava EU niso prizadete. (Glej mutatis mutandis: Melloni, C-399/11, odst. 60; Lenaerts, Koen, 2017, La vie après l'avis: exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust, Common Market Law Review, 54, str. 807-808, str. 815.)
72 Sodišče EU je v zadevi N.S. in M.E. zavzelo stališče, da že »najmanjša kršitev direktiv« ne zadostuje, da se prepreči predaja prosilca v drugo državo članico, to pomeni, da vsaka kršitev direktive EU ne zahteva, da se predaja ne opravi. (N.S. in M.E., C-411/10 in C-493/10, odst. 84-85) Sodišče EU v zvezi s tem v zadevi N.S. in M.E. sicer na splošno govori o izpodbojnosti domneve o spoštovanju »temeljnih pravic« v drugi državi članici. (Ibid. odst. 71, 77, 81, 99) Vendar se pri opredeljevanju te domneve omejuje na pravico iz 4. člena Listine EU pravicah; (Ibid. odst. 86, 88, 94, 106, 112.) v določenih drugih zadevah pa v tej zvezi omenja tudi pravico do varstva človekovega dostojanstva iz 1. člena Listine EU. (Glej na primer: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 in C-659/15 PPU, odst. 77, 78; Jawo, C-163/17, odst. 78, 80; XXXX, C-483/20, odst. 27.) Tudi v novejši sodni praksi Veliki Senat Sodišča EU v zvezi z varstvom možnega kroga pravic v povezavi s spoštovanjem načela medsebojnega zaupanja uporablja izraz /../„zlasti z njenima členoma 1 in 4,“ /.../ med tem ko so v drugih različicah te sodbe uporabljeni pojmi: „including“ (v angleščini), (XXXX, C-483/20, odst. 27) kar ustreza izrazu „vključno“, „notamment“ (v francoščini), kar ustreza pojmu „posebej“, „segnatamente“ (v italijanščini) in „osobito“ (v hrvaščini), ki ustrezata pojmu „zlasti“ oziroma „predvsem“. (Ibid. odst. 27.)
73 Sodišče EU se v kontekstu drugega pod-odstavka člena 3(2) Dublinske uredbe namreč ne omejuje zgolj na pravico iz 4. člena Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, ampak je, kot že rečeno, lahko relevantna tudi pravica do varstva človekovega dostojanstva (1. člen Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah), ali kakšna druga temeljna pravica, ki ni absolutno zavarovana. (Glej na primer: L.G., C-745/21, 16.2.2023, paras. 49-54.)
74 Najbolj pogosto je temeljni kriterij (razmejitve), ko mora tožena stranka pristopiti k takšni specifični obravnavi oziroma preverjanju načela medsebojnega zaupanja, okoliščina oziroma pravni standard, da prosilec nima očitno neutemeljenega zahtevka (arguable claim) glede 3. člena EKČP oziroma 4. člena ali 19(2) člena Listine EU. To po praksi ESČP pomeni, da kršitev 3. člena EKČP v primeru vrnitve ni premalo verjetna (Glej na primer Soering v. the United Kingdom, odst. 85, 117) in s tem v zvezi tujec želi preprečiti odstranitev. (Glej na primer: L.M. and others v. Russia, odst. 100; M.A. and others v. Lithuania, odst. 83; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, 21. 11. 2019, odst. 136) Sodišče EU se je temu standardu iz sodne prakse ESČP na najbolj jasen način pridružilo v sodbi v zadevi B, kjer je Sodišče EU v zvezi s standardom avtomatičnega suspenzivnega učinka pravnega sredstva postavilo standard, da tožnikove trditve niso očitno neutemeljene glede tveganja za nečloveško ravnanje. (C-233/19, B, odst. 66; glej tudi: LM, C-403/19, odst. 35, 43.)
75 Ta pravni standard („arguable claim“) mora pristojni organ med drugim ugotavljati preko presoje, ali organ države članice „razpolaga z elementi,“ ki pričajo o dejanski nevarnosti nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja v drugi državi članici glede na standard varstva temeljnih pravic, kot so priznane v pravnem redu Unije in zlasti v členu 4 Listine EU. V takem primeru mora pri odločanju o predaji osebe organom druge države članice presoditi obstoj te nevarnosti. (Mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 in C-659/15 PPU, odst. 88) Pristojni organ se mora opreti na objektivne, zanesljive, natančne in ustrezno posodobljene podatke o razmerah v drugi državi članici, ki dokazujejo dejanske sistemske ali splošne pomanjkljivosti, ki zadevajo določene skupine oseb bodisi nekatere druge relevantne okoliščine. Ti podatki lahko izhajajo zlasti iz mednarodnih sodnih odločb, kot so sodbe ESČP, iz sodnih odločb odreditvene države članice ter iz odločb, poročil in drugih dokumentov organov Sveta Evrope ali Združenih narodov- (Mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 in C-659/15 PPU, odst. 89; glej tudi: Jawo, C-163/17, odst. 90).
76 Po mednarodni sodni praksi v tovrstnih primerih mora(ta) organ ali sodišče, tudi ne oziraje se na procesno aktivnost prosilca, (F.G. V Sweden, odst. 156; J.K. and others v. Sweden, odst. 87, 83, 90, 140; M.M., C-277/11, odst. 65-66) informacije preveriti tudi po uradni dolžnosti in važno je, ali bi organu te informacije o stanju v relevantni državi morale biti poznane. Na ta način je namreč treba razumeti in razlagati, da mora organ, ki „razpolaga“ z objektivnimi, zanesljivimi, natančnimi in ustrezno posodobljenimi podatki, ki potrjujejo obstoj takih pomanjkljivosti, da se zagotovi spoštovanje člena 4 Listine EU, preveriti, ali v okoliščinah obravnavanega primera obstajajo resni in utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bo ta oseba po predaji drugi državi članici podvržena dejanski nevarnosti, da bo v tej državi članici ali na podlagi vračanja v tretjo državo (t.i. posredno vračanje) nečloveško ali ponižujoče obravnavana v smislu tega člena. Organ mora v ta namen od druge države članice zahtevati, naj mu nujno pošlje potrebne dodatne informacije glede razmer, v katerih bo zadevna oseba obravnavana v tej državi članici. (Mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Cãldãraru, C-404/15 in C-659/15 PPU, odst. 93-95.) V primeru obstoja takšnih informacij o stanju in ravnanju s tujci na Hrvaškem, (bi) mora(la) po standardih mutatis mutandis iz sodbe v zadevi C.K. in ostali proti Sloveniji tožena stranka, upoštevajoč načelo vzajemnega zaupanja, pred odstranitvijo poskrbeti za ustrezno zagotovilo (potrditev) oziroma bi morala poskrbeti za preventivne nujne in primerne ukrepe, da bi odvrnila „vsakršen pomislek“ o možnem kršenju pravice iz 4. člena Listine EU (Ibid. odst. 71, 76-78, 83; v odstavku 90 iste sodbe Sodišče EU uporablja izraz oziroma standard „resnega pomisleka“) oziroma da se “izključi vsakršna dejanska nevarnost“ nečloveškega ravnanja ali ponižujočega ravnanja v primeru odstranitve tožnika. (Ibid. odst. 84.) V primeru tveganja za hudo kršitev kakšne druge temeljne človekove pravice pa mora tožena stranka v upravnem aktu pretehtati uporabo diskrecijske klavzule iz člena 17(1) Dublinske uredbe.
77 Seveda pa, če organ države članice EU ugotovi, da v času odstranitve in predaje tujca drugi državi članici EU na podlagi zanesljivih informacij ni mogoče „izključiti vsakršne dejanske nevarnosti“ nečloveškega ravnanja, to še ne pomeni, da mora država članica EU odstranitev in predajo tujca dokončno odpovedati, ampak mora pristojni upravni organ najprej prevzeti določene obveznosti in v komunikaciji s pristojnimi organi druge države članice EU pridobiti posebna zagotovila, da v konkretnem primeru sprejema tujca do kršitve pravice do prepoved nečloveškega ravnanja ne bo prišlo. (Glej mutatis mutandis: Aranyosi, Caldararu, C-404/15 in C-659/15 PPU, odst. 98; C.K. in ostali proti Sloveniji, C-578/16 PPU, odst. 85-90.)
78 Ker je imel tožnik že v času odločanja tožene stranke zahtevek glede pravice iz 4. člena Listine EU, ki ni bil očitno neutemeljen, je imela tožena stranka obveznost, da uporabi načelo medsebojnega zaupanja na zgoraj opisan način in da po strogi metodi presodi dejstva z vidike morebitne kršitve temeljnih človekovih pravic, česar pa ni storila.
81 Zaradi napačne uporabe materialnega prava (prvi odstavek 13. člena ZMZ-1, četrti odstavek 42. člena ZMZ-1, drugi pod-odstavek člena 3(2) Dublinske uredbe je sodišče tožbi ugodilo, izpodbijani akt odpravilo in zadevo vrnilo toženi stranki v ponoven postopek (4. točka in posledično 2. točka prvega odstavka 64. člena ZUS-1). Tožena stranka mora izdati nov upravni akt, pri tem pa je vezana na pravna stališča sodišče glede materialnega prava in vodenja postopka (četrti odstavek 64. člena ZUS-1). Sodišče je odločilo brez glavne obravnave ob tem, da tožeča stranka nit ni predlagal zaslišanja tožnika, ampak zgolj angažiranje izvedenca psihiatrične stroke, kar je sodišče zavrnilo iz že navedenega razloga. Glavna obravnava pa ni bila potrebna, ker se je sodišče oprlo na določbo prve alineje drugega odstavka 59. člena ZUS-1, na neposredni učinek pravice do učinkovitega sodnega varstva iz določbe člena 27 Dublinske uredbe v zvezi z 47. členom Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, ki je pravica prosilca oziroma osebe iz člena 18(1)(c) ali (d) Dublinske uredbe in ne pravica pristojnega organa (v povezavi z razlago Sodišča EU določbe člena 46(3) Procesne direktive 2013/32/EU), saj je lahko presojo opravilo zgolj na podlagi podatkov iz spisa. (Moussa Sacko, C-348/16, odst. 44; Alheto, C-585/16, odst. 116, 126; Torubarov, C-556/17, odst. 54-56.)
83 Z objavo sodbe Sodišča EU v zadevi E.N., S.S., J.Y. (C-556/21) z dne 30. 3. 2023 je v Sloveniji nastala nova pravna situacija glede možnosti vložitve pravnega sredstva tožene stranke zoper prvostopenjsko sodbo Upravnega sodišča, s katero je upravni akt tožene stranke, izdan na podlagi Dublinske uredbe, po katerem se prošnja za mednarodno zaščito zavrže, ker bo tožnik predan drugi državi članici EU kot odgovorni državi članici, odpravljen in je zadeva vrnjena v ponovno odločanje toženi stranki.
84 V zadevi E.N., S.S., J.Y. Sodišče EU namreč prvič jasno izpelje, da namen določbe člen 27(3) Dublinske uredbe „ni urejati začasne ukrepe, ki bi se lahko morebiti sprejeli v okviru drugostopenjskega pravnega sredstva, ki so ga vložili pristojni organi.“( C-556/21, 30. 3. 2023, odst. 27) Po stališču Sodišča EU iz člena 27(4) Dublinske uredbe izhaja, da „lahko za pretrganje ali zadržanje roka za predajo v nekaterih primerih pobudo podajo pristojni organi,“ in ta določba, kot je opozorjeno v točki 22 te sodbe, pomeni „dopolnitev člena 27(3) te uredbe, katerega namen je odložiti izvršitev odločitve o predaji.“( Ibid. odst. 28) Sodišče EU nato nadaljuje, če je odločba o predaji na prvi stopnji sojenja razglašena za nično, potem v okviru drugostopenjskega sredstva, ki so ga vložili pristojni upravni organi, odločitev o predaji, „ne obstaja več. (Ibid. odst. 29) Ker Dublinska uredba ne vsebuje nobenega pravila v zvezi z možnostjo vložitve pritožbe zoper prvostopenjsko sodno odločbo, s katero je odločeno o pravnem sredstvu zoper odločbo o predaji, ali ki bi izrecno urejalo sistem morebitne pritožbe, je treba ugotoviti, da je varstvo, zagotovljeno s členom 27(1) navedene uredbe v povezavi s členom 18 in členom 47 Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, omejeno na obstoj sodnega pravnega sredstva in ne zahteva določitve več sodnih instanc“- (Ibid. odst. 30.)
85 Iz tega dela obrazložitve oziroma na podlagi razlage Sodišča EU do tega mesta, ob upoštevanju precej starejše zadeve Diouf (Po sodbi Sodišča EU v zadevi Diouf načelo učinkovitega sodnega varstva zagotavlja „posamezniku“ pravico do dostopa do sodišča, in ne do večstopenjskega sodnega varstva (C-69/10, 28. 7. 2011, odst. 69) bi bilo možno narediti sklep, da pristojni organi držav članic EU za odločanje o mednarodni zaščiti nimajo pravice do pritožbe zoper sodne odločbe sodišč prve stopnje. Določilo člena prvega odstavka 27. člena Dublinske uredbe namreč izrecno daje pravico do pravnega sredstva samo prosilcu oziroma drugemu tujcu in je ne daje pristojnemu organu, kar je sicer skladno tudi z besedilom in konceptom varstva človekovih pravic iz 47. člena Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, ki pripadajo posameznikom in zasebnim pravnim osebam in ne državnim organom. Vendar pa Sodišče EU ni ustavilo interpretacije na omenjeni točki, ampak je dodalo naslednje:
86 „Glede na prej navedeno in ker na tem področju ni predpisov Unije, je treba torej na podlagi načela procesne avtonomije v notranjem pravnem redu vsake države članice sprejeti odločitev o tem, da se morebiti določi drugostopenjska sodna instanca zoper sodbo, s katero je odločeno o pravnem sredstvu, ki se nanaša na odločbo o predaji, in po potrebi določiti postopkovna pravila za to drugostopenjsko sodno instanco, vključno z morebitno izdajo začasnih ukrepov, vendar pod pogojem, da ta pravila v položajih, ki so zajeta s pravom Unije, niso manj ugodna od pravil v podobnih položajih, za katere velja nacionalno pravo (načelo enakovrednosti), in da ta pravila v praksi ne onemogočajo ali čezmerno ne otežujejo uveljavljanja pravic, ki jih priznava pravo Unije (načelo učinkovitosti) (glej v tem smislu sodbi z dne 26. septembra 2018, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Odložilni učinek pritožbe), C 180/17, EU:C:2018:775, točki 34 in 35, in z dne 15. aprila 2021, État belge (Elementi, nastali po odločbi o predaji), C 194/19, EU:C:2021:270, točka 42).“
88 V zadevi E.N., S.S., J.Y. je Sodišče EU v zvezi z načelom enakovrednosti ugotovilo, da se predmetna nacionalna ureditev glede dvostopenjskega sodnega postopka v nizozemskem pravnem redu uporablja „za vse postopke s pravnimi sredstvi v upravnem pravu“ in da zato lahko taka ureditev določa, da sodišče, ki odloča o takem drugostopenjskem pravnem sredstvu, na predlog pristojnih organov izda začasne ukrepe. (C-556/21, 30. 3. 2023, odst. 32. Ob tem je za razumevanje, komu gre pravica do pravnega sredstva iz 27. člena Dublinske uredbe ali po nacionalnem pravu, pomembno, da začasni ukrep, katerega učinek je zadržanje roka za predajo do odločitve o drugostopenjskem pravnem sredstvu, mogoče sprejeti le, če je bila izvršitev odločitve o predaji v skladu z zadnje navedenima določbama odložena do odločitve o prvostopenjskem pravnem sredstvu (ibid.odst. 34).)
89 V Sloveniji pa je pravna situacija glede upoštevanja pogoja oziroma načela enakovrednosti drugačna in zato uporaba načela enakovrednosti pripelje do sklepa, da tožena stranka v primeru, kot je obravnavani, ne bi smela imeti možnosti vložiti pravnega sredstva zoper odločitev sodišča v prvi točki izreka te sodbe, in s tem odložiti pravnomočnost sodne odločbe.
90 Na podlagi načela enakovrednosti v zvezi s procesno avtonomijo držav članic, ki pa je v pravu EU uveljavljeno že precej dolgo pred zadevo E.N., S.S., J.Y., država članica lahko določi postopkovna pravila v zvezi s pravnimi sredstvi pred sodišči, s katerimi se zagotavlja „varstvo pravic upravičencev, vendar pod pogojem, da ta pravila niso manj ugodna od tistih, ki urejajo podobne položaje, za katere velja nacionalno pravo (načelo enakovrednosti).“ Sodišče EU dodaja, da je treba ob upoštevanju preverjanj, ki jih mora opraviti nacionalno sodišče, ugotoviti, da /.../ „ni razvidno, da bi za podobne položaje veljala nacionalna postopkovna pravila, ki so ugodnejša od tistih, ki so bila določena za izvajanje direktive EU." (LH, C-564/18, 19. 3. 2020, odst. 63-64; PG, C-406/18, 19. 3. 2020, odst. 26-27; JP, C-651/19, 9. 9. 2020, odst. 36.)
91 Zakonodajalec Republike Slovenije je namreč samo za zadeve mednarodne zaščite (v četrtem odstavku 70. člena ZMZ-1) predpisal naslednje: „Zoper sodbe, ki jih izda upravno sodišče, je dovoljena pritožba na vrhovno sodišče.“ Sodna praksa v Republiki Sloveniji je to določbo razlagala, da ima tudi organ, ki je pristojen za odločanje o prošnji za mednarodno zaščito, pravico do pritožbe na Vrhovno sodišče RS.
92 Ta možnost dostopa upravnega organa oziroma tožene stranke do sodišča druge stopnje pa ni predpisana za druga pravna področja, kjer se sicer uporablja samo nacionalno pravo o upravnem sporu. Na splošno je za druga področja upravnega prava urejeno tako, da v situaciji, ko sodišče prve stopnje upravni akt odpravi in vrne zadevo toženi stranki v ponovni postopek, tožena stranka nima pravice do pritožbe. Pritožba je dovoljena samo v primeru, če je sodišče samo ugotovilo drugačno dejansko stanje, kot ga je ugotovila tožena stranka, ter je na tej podlagi spremenilo izpodbijani upravni akt ali če je sodišče odločilo na podlagi 66. člena tega zakona (prvi odstavek 73. člena ZUS-1). Prosilci za mednarodno zaščito so torej v slabšem oziroma neenakovrednem položaju glede njihove pravice do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva v situaciji, ko s tožbo uspejo v postopku pred sodiščem prve stopnje, tako da sodišče tožbi ugodi, izpodbijani akt odpravi in vrne zadevo ministrstvu v ponovno odločanje, kakor tožniki v drugih upravnih sporih, kjer ne gre za izvajanje prava EU.
93 Vendar v zvezi z načelom enakovrednosti iz sodne prakse Sodišča EU izhaja, da ni dovolj kakršna koli oziroma zgolj splošna primerjava z drugimi upravnimi spori, ampak sodišče EU v zadevi JP pravi, da je „treba na eni strani identificirati primerljive postopke ali pravna sredstva in na drugi strani ugotoviti, ali se pravna sredstva, ki temeljijo na nacionalnem pravu, obravnavajo ugodneje od pravnih sredstev, ki se nanašajo na varstvo pravic, ki jih imajo posamezniki na podlagi prava Unije /.../. V zvezi s primerljivostjo pravnih sredstev mora nacionalno sodišče, ki neposredno pozna postopkovna pravila, ki se uporabijo, preveriti, ali sta si zadevni pravni sredstvi podobni po predmetu, podlagi in bistvenih elementih /.../. V zvezi s primerljivo obravnavo pravnih sredstev je treba opozoriti, da mora nacionalno sodišče vsak primer, v katerem se zastavi vprašanje, ali je neka nacionalna procesna določba v zvezi s pravnimi sredstvi, ki temeljijo na pravu Unije, manj ugodna od določb v zvezi s primerljivimi pravnimi sredstvi po nacionalnem pravu, preizkusiti ob upoštevanju položaja zadevnih pravil v celotnem postopku, poteka tega postopka in posebnosti teh pravil pred različnimi nacionalnimi sodišči.“ (JP, C-651/19, 9. 9. 2020, odst. 37-39.)
94 V slovenskem pravnem redu bi bilo mogoče primerjavo z odločanjem o mednarodni zaščiti narediti s področjem odločanja o različnih dovoljenjih tujcev, z odločanjem o vrnitvi tujcev, ki nezakonito bivajo v Sloveniji v izvorno državo, čeprav gre tudi tu največkrat za izvajanje prava EU, z odločanjem o izročitvah tujih državljanov, kjer pa večinoma ne gre za izvajanje prava EU, vendar v nobeni vrsti zadeve, ki bi bila primerljiva z mednarodno zaščito, ni določbe, ki bi bila primerljiva z določbo 4. odstavka 70. člena ZMZ-1, in ki jo je dosedanja sodna praksa razlagala tako, da ima pravico zoper sodbe, ki jih izda Upravno sodišče RS, tudi državni organ oziroma tožena stranka. Zaradi načela enakovrednosti v zvezi z načelom procesne avtonomije držav članic EU v povezavi z določbo 27. člena Dublinske uredbe in 47. člena Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah ter v tem razdelku obravnavanih sodb Sodišča EU, je Upravno sodišče prišlo do zaključka, da določbe določila četrtega odstavka 70. člena ZMZ-1 ni mogoče razlagati tako, da se to določilo nanaša na toženo stranko.
95 Do tega zaključka je Upravno sodišče prišlo z uporabo načel uporabe prava EU, po katerih, če zakonskim določbam ni mogoče dati pravu EU skladne razlage, Upravno sodišče ne sme prekiniti postopka in vložiti zahteve za presojo zakona z vidika določila člena 3.a Ustave, ker to ne bi bila učinkovita in lojalna uporaba prava EU,(Simmenthal, 106/77, 9. 3. 1978, odst. 24; RS, C-430/21, 22. 2. 2022, odst. 51-53.) ampak mora bodisi razlagati nacionalno pravo v skladu s pravom Unije in z ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodišča EU in paziti, da se ne opre na tako razlago besedila sekundarne zakonodaje, ki bi bila v nasprotju s temeljnimi pravicami, ki jih varuje pravni red Unije, ali z drugimi splošnimi načeli prava Unije, (N. S. in M. E. (C-411/10 in C-493/10), tč. 77; glej tudi odločbo Ustavnega sodišča RS, št. Up 2012/08-18, 5. 3. 2009, odst. 9) ali pa mora Upravno sodišče ravnati, kot je odločilo Sodišče EU na v azilni zadevi Torubarov. Po stališču Sodišča EU v zadevi Torubarov je vsaka določba nacionalnega pravnega reda ali vsaka zakonodajna, upravna ali sodna praksa, katere učinek bi bil zmanjšanje učinkovitosti prava Unije s tem, da bi se sodišču, pristojnemu za uporabo tega prava, odrekla možnost, da ob tej uporabi stori vse potrebno, da se ne uporabijo nacionalne zakonske določbe, ki morda ovirajo polni učinek predpisov Unije, ki imajo neposredni učinek (27. člen Dublinske uredbe v zvezi z 47. členom Listine EU) nezdružljiva z zahtevami same narave prava Unije. To na primer pomeni, da mora upravni organ ali nacionalno sodišče v skladu z načelom lojalnega sodelovanja iz člena 4(3) Pogodbe EU po potrebi ravnati tako, da sporne nacionalne ureditve ali sodne prakse ne uporabi. (Torubarov, C-556/17, 29. 7. 2019, odst. 73-74. To velja tudi za upravni organ (FMS, C-924/19 PPU in C-925/19 PPU, odst. 183; Minister For Justice and Equality, C-378/17, 4. 12. 2018, odst. 38; glej tudi: Randstad Italia SpA, C-497/20, odst. 54, 79.) V konkretni zadevi je sodišče za potrebe odločanja o zahtevi za izdajo začasne odredbe in za potrebe pravnega pouka v zvezi s sodbo iz prve točke izreka moralo uporabiti to drugo varianto.
